Impact of much stronger Taranto raid, Nov 1940?

[Admiral Beez]

On the night of 11–12 November 1940 a single carrier, HMS Illustrious launched twenty-one Fairey Swordfish in two waves against the Italian base at Taranto. Of these, one broke down enroute, leaving twenty Swordfish to proceed to attack the Italian navy ships and base. The result of the raid was three battleships damaged (one permanently out of service), plus one heavy cruiser and two destroyers damaged.

HMS Eagle was supposed to take part, but had engine issues and transferred five Swordfish to Illustrious. Let's change up history a little. For starters, HMS Eagle is fully operational. Second, let's move HMS Ark Royal to join the force. Third, each carrier has its full complement of strike aircraft. That should give at least fifty Swordish, plus at least a dozen Skuas to the force. Would this larger force have much more of an impact?

 

[nuuumannn]

Another interesting theory, Admiral. Possibly; had even more Italian vessels been sunk the impact would have been devastating for the Regia Marina. As it was, the Taranto raid was an unresounding success and knocked out three Italian battleships, effectively half its useable fleet, and although two of those ships were returned to action before the Italian surrender, the Italians were never in a position to wrest sea control from the Royal Navy, especially following Matapan and despite the Italian reprisal raid against Alex using midget submarines.

The real problem the British faced in the Med was from air attack and submarines, which the raid against Taranto was inconsequential.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Another interesting theory, Admiral. Possibly; had even more Italian vessels been sunk the impact would have been devastating for the Regia Marina.

There were definitely more ships to attack.

Any chance that a strong enough force impacts the political situation in Italy? By this same time in Nov 1940 the Italian invasion of Egypt was turning into a failure. Can a worse autumn 1940 put Mussolini at risk?

 

[SaparotRob]

Were land installations hit at Taranto? A stronger raid, taking out that dry dock and a tank farm(?) might have even wider implications. The IJN studied Taranto and might have launched a third strike at Pearl Harbor if the Taranto strike had been more devastating.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Were land installations hit at Taranto? A stronger raid, taking out that dry dock and a tank farm(?) might have even wider implications. The IJN studied Taranto and might have launched a third strike at Pearl Harbor if the Taranto strike had been more devastating.

It was a night raid, without pathfinder illumination. Robert Taylor shows us best.

With so few aircraft, this was a full on torpedo attack, no land targets. But with more aircraft and some pathfinder flares, hitting the fuel farms should be doable. Can a Skua divebomb at night?

 

[Glider]

The main impact on the Italian Fleet was how it affected the Morale of the senior officers. In that sense the impact of heavier losses wouldn't have been any different, as the Italian Fleet was effectively harbour bound for the rest of the war. Yes they did sometimes sail, but at almost the first sign of air attack or even moderate naval defence, retreated back to base despite often having a significant advantage.

A more intriguing 'what if' might be what if the attack hadn't worked and the morale of the Italian Fleet been higher.

 

[Admiral Beez]

A more intriguing 'what if' might be what if the attack hadn't worked and the morale of the Italian Fleet been higher.

The Italian Navy was still active into the Malta campaign, Battle of Matapan, etc. But yes, I see your point. I think we need to define a failed Taranto attack. Are ships not damaged, are the twenty Swordfish for the most part sunk, or did the RN call off the attack due to other issues?

 

[Glider]

The Italian Navy was still active into the Malta campaign, Battle of Matapan, etc. But yes, I see your point. I think we need to define a failed Taranto attack. Are ships not damaged, are the twenty Swordfish for the most part sunk, or did the RN call off the attack due to other issues?

For the Italians the best result would have been the attack taking place with limited or no success and reasonably serious losses to the Swordfish. That would be a win to the Axis side, plus the knowledge that aircraft had been lost reducing the threat.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Was there anyone senior in the interwar RN that advocated for a combined carrier strike force, akin to Japan's Kido Butai. Instead of RN carriers operating as single units and in ASW work; prewar strategy and preparations are to use the RN carriers to attack the enemy bases in multiship CBGs.

History shows us that the RAF was ineffective in attacking the German fleet in its bases. Per Wikipedia....

September 3 The RAF launches its first raid of the war over Germany territory. Eighteen Handley Page Hampdens and nine Vickers Wellingtons are sent to attack the German warshipsmoored at the Wilhelmshaven naval base. However poor visibility prevents the bombers from finding any targets before nightfall so they return.[6]

September 4: The RAF launches another bombing operation against German shipping. Fourteen Wellingtons from 9 and 149 Squadrons attack Brunsbuttel and 15 Bristol Blenheims from 107 and 110 Squadrons raid Wilhelmshaven bay. Five Blenheims and three Vickers Wellingtons are shot down through a combination of Messerschmitt Bf 109s and flak. They become the first British aircraft casualties on the Western Front.[7]

What if the RN and FAA has trained for this very event with a mass carrier strike on Wilhelmshaven day one of the European war? Then it's repeated against the French and then Italians at Taranto. That should free up some flattops for the Pacific in 1941.

 

[Kevin J]

Was there anyone senior in the interwar RN that advocated for a combined carrier strike force, akin to Japan's Kido Butai. Instead of RN carriers operating as single units and in ASW work; prewar strategy and preparations are to use the RN carriers to attack the enemy bases in multiship CBGs.

History shows us that the RAF was ineffective in attacking the German fleet in its bases. Per Wikipedia....What if the RN and FAA has trained for this very event with a mass carrier strike on Wilhelmshaven day one of the European war? Then it's repeated against the French and then Italians at Taranto. That should free up some flattops for the Pacific in 1941.

I'm not sure how you reckon this would free up flattops. It's more likely to result in their loss. It's only 308nm from hull to wilhelmshaven so a raid launched from ashore would be better.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Here's the British Pac Fleet in 1945, with five carriers aircraft carriers (HMS Indomitable, Indefatigable, Illustrious, Victorious and Formidable) plus the maintenance carrier HMS Unicorn.

Imagine this level of fleet organization in 1938-39, with HMS Ark Royal, Furious, Courageous and Glorious acting in unison, each with a complete CAG, with HMS Hood, Repulse and Renown as heavy escort.

Above is HMS Furious, Glorious and HMS Hood. Below is HMS Ark Royal, Furious and the battlecruiser Renown.

Of course the investment in aircraft procurement and aircrew pipeline/training would need to be underway by the mid-1930s. Then in Nov 1940 if not before, the British Kidō Butai strikes Taranto.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm wondering had the Taranto raid failed, would the IJN still have attacked Pearl Harbor? Perhaps Admiral Yamamoto might have attacked the Philippines instead. That might not have enraged the U.S. enough to declare war and instead negotiate.
I don't think either Britain or the U.S. would have had a "Kido Butai" until Japan showed the west just how it's done. Even after the Pearl Harbor attack not all were convinced that the battleship was no longer preeminent. That would be especially true had the Taranto raid failed. But I catch your drift.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I'm wondering had the Taranto raid failed, would the IJN still have attacked Pearl Harbor? Perhaps Admiral Yamamoto might have attacked the Philippines instead.

That was an IJA affair, and they hated the IJN beyond their necessity for transport. The Kido Butai was equipped and optimized for anti-ship ops, the Philippines isn't really its game. The preemptive strike is a foundation of the Japanese military plan, so I think the IJN's target has to be Pearl Harbour.

 

[MycroftHolmes]

Prior to WWII the plan was for a three-carrier strike on Taranto, but war-losses made this impracticable.

 

[The Basket]

As advised before, the threat was far more than the battleships.

Sending more aircraft doesn't always guarantee more damage but certainly created greater opportunities. Land targets were hit as oil depots were hit.

Italy had other ports so destroying Taranto is not the same as destroying Pearl Harbour.

Destroying a fleet in port is hardly new and Nelson did that at Battle of Copenhagen and going back further to the Raid on the Medway. Also U-47 entering Scapa and sinking Royal Oak.

The Japanese had history attacking the Port Arthur base of the Russian Pacific Fleet in 1904. So attacking Pearl Harbour was certainly on the cards and the attack in Taranto would have been icing on the cake.

Attacking ships in port is not a sure thing as the attacks on Brest against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the later Tirpitz attacks prove that.

One issue is that Vittorio Veneto was undamaged and so more air attacks could mean damage to this modern battleship.

Divebombing at night is not safe as no ground markers and the smaller bombs of Skuas could still make a mess of cruisers and destroyers if deployed as level bombers. Did the Skua have the range as the Swordfish needed to have long range tanks and leave a crewman behind?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Was there anyone senior in the interwar RN that advocated for a combined carrier strike force, akin to Japan's Kido Butai. Instead of RN carriers operating as single units and in ASW work; prewar strategy and preparations are to use the RN carriers to attack the enemy bases in multiship CBGs.

History shows us that the RAF was ineffective in attacking the German fleet in its bases. Per Wikipedia....What if the RN and FAA has trained for this very event with a mass carrier strike on Wilhelmshaven day one of the European war? Then it's repeated against the French and then Italians at Taranto. That should free up some flattops for the Pacific in 1941.

The RN was operating Courageous, Glorious and Furious as an integrated group prior to WWII.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The RN was operating Courageous, Glorious and Furious as an integrated group prior to WWII.

True, and one of my favourite pics, with all three at Malta. This trio could have been planning coordinated CBG strikes against fleet bases, like Taranto. If each had its full CAG of forty-eight aircraft, that would put over sixty Swordfish plus about twenty Skuas over the Italian base that November. If a larger attack can be made in one wave, a surprise daylight option may be better than the two small waves' night attack.

Prior to WWII the plan was for a three-carrier strike on Taranto, but war-losses made this impracticable.

It is a shame that HMS Glorious was so recently lost, but in Nov 1940 where was HMS Ark Royal? This ship with its large CAG was tailor made for the Taranto strike, but apparently Ark Royal was on convoy duty elsewhere in the Mediterranean? And where was HMS Furious, apparently still off Norway?

This takes me back to my earlier thread.... Better luck for the RN carrier force 1939-1941

 

[The Basket]

I wouldn't want to fly a Swordfish anywhere near a fighter in daylight.

Kamikaze would have higher survival rates.

Just coz them Italian you still have to respect them fighting spirit.

If the carrier is in torpedo strike range then you can play the UNO reverse card. Fancy having 3 carriers in daylight off the coast of Italy.

That would be a bombers delight.

And submarine delight. And torpedo boat delight.

Youse guys need to be in the IJN cos you looking for the decisive battle.

Alfred Mahan called, he wants his theory back.

 

[nuuumannn]

What if the RN and FAA has trained for this very event with a mass carrier strike on Wilhelmshaven day one of the European war?

They did, in 1918! Argus was initially designated a torpedo aircraft carrier equipped with Sopwith Cuckoos for such a raid, along with fitting merchant ship hulls with flat top decks to enable torpedoplanes to take off.

Attacking ships in port is not a sure thing as the attacks on Brest against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the later Tirpitz attacks prove that.

Yes and no and it depends on how many other ports are available with the kind of facilities needed to service such a ship. The Tirpitz was bound to stay in fjiords in Norway because of the constant damage being done to her simply because there were no ports nearby that could take her. Damage done after the X-craft raid was severe enough that she could not sail again and needed a dry dock. As for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, leaving them where they were meant they were subject to constant attack; the only option was to make a break for German ports, resulting in the Channel Dash, which was a gamble that succeeded, but might well not have, which would have been a political and material disaster for the Kriegsmarine. Let's not forget that after being struck by a mine following the Channel Dash, the Gneisenau remained in dry dock for the rest of the war.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'd define failure at Taranto as little or no damage to the BBs. The aim of the mission was to redress the imbalance in heavy ships in the Med. Not doing that = failure, no matter how many or few aircraft are destroyed.

Of course adding more a/c to the strike would benefit, if for no other reason that (assuming the proportion of hits remain the same) the damaged/sunk BBs take more torpedoes, lengthening repairs -- or even rendering them nugatory.

I don't think night-time dive-bombing was possible in that time-frame. Even with flares, visibility is going to be crap, because your target will still not be silhouetted. Avionics were crap, too.

I don't think either Britain or the U.S. would have had a "Kido Butai" until Japan showed the west just how it's done.

I think one or the other nation would've rediscovered the principle of mass in the attack, and grouped carriers accordingly, but the Japanese started the development of that doctrine, and their successes certainly spurred the UK and especially the US to rethink its carrier doctrine, perhaps speeding up the changes by a few years.