Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Kinda' like what the USN had to learn the hard way in the Solomon's in 1942. To me with my 20/20 hindsight I find it incomprehensible that the captain of a warship in a combat area isn't at least running at some level of heightened readiness. There was no excuse for the disaster at Savo Island, same for the HMS Glorious. I find it rather inexcusable for her to be running with any boilers offline in a hostile (or potentially hostile) environment and no CAP. The CAP doesn't even need to attack immediately, just warn the Glorious so she can leg it out of there at full speed. The Germans always seemed ready to mess their pants at the thought of one of their ships taking damage so my money would be on the S&G turning tail at the first sign of any air attack.Usually the peacetime commanders and senior officers who rose through nepotism, networking and decades-old laurels get moved to desk jobs to be replaced by commanders and senior officers of merit and capability. Look at the USN, all of the famous and successful leaders replaced desk jockeys and career men once the fighting started. Before the war, Nimitz was the chief of the USN's Bureau of Navigation, but after Pearl Harbour FDR appointed Nimitz to CINCPACFLT. I'm sure that huge promotion annoyed the D'Oyly Hughes types of the USN.
But every so often one gets through to do great damage, like Kimmel at Pearl Harbour. Or Phillips with Force Z and his decisions to not tell the RAF where he was going, and to place his ships within easy striking range of land based bombers from FIC. I'd like to think that Cunningham, Sommerville or Fraser would have done something else - such as coordinating with the RAF to leave the IJN landing ships in the China Sea to the Hudsons and Blenheims, and keeping Force Z well out to sea to catch anything coming from the south, and using his eight(!) Shagbats to discover and flee from the approaching IJN second fleet (2xBC, 8xCA, 1xCL, 8xDD).
D'Oyly Hughes, with no appreciation of naval aviation had no business being in command of an aircraft carrier. Running on half boilers may be explained away by lack of fuel or perhaps mechanical issues. But he had nine Sea Gladiators and five working Swordfish, that's more than sufficient to run a CAP with the fighters and have the five TSRs armed and ready to go on the flight deck. The RAF Gladiators and Hurricanes were already struck below.
That's what the USN learned hard at Guadalcanal as the peacetime officers got rotated out (or killed) and guys that were fighters took over. Fellows that were in charge of the Vincennes, Quincy and Astoria at Savo defy logic for me. The Astoria's search radar actually spotted the IJN force at 29 miles but the captain refused to believe any action need be taken. The next sound you hear will be 8" rounds falling just short of Vincennes.
Compare that to guys like Captain Mike Moran of Boise and Gilbert C. Hoover of Helena about two months later. Hoover's ship spotted the Japanese cruisers at 30,000 yards, Admiral Scott in his pre-battle orders turned loose his cruiser captains beforehand. He told them to open fire without asking permission from him. Hoover did actually radio a position report and ask for permission to open fire but that was academic, 6" salvos were on the way to the tune of 200 rounds per minute from Helena alone.
Also, I wouldn't be too hard on Kimmel, he got handed a raw deal and knew it, if you look into what he was doing and trying to get done (before December 7), he comes off a lot better than history has painted him.