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Carriers have to point into the wind when taking off aircraft and from what I read that would mean travelling towards the sisters.
Not ideal. Although the fact the ship was travelling so slow pretty much means that there were no plans to launch aircraft.
With our without a torpedo?
The swordfish would still have to land and take off. Again limitations on Swordfish abilities.
With no witnesses, he might not need one. Considering that only forty people out the total 1,529 aboard Glorious, Acasta and Ardent survived the sinking, and most of those were taken POW or died in Norway, D'Oyly Hughes' survival and return to Britain may be seen as a miracle, akin to Admiral Holland being found alongside Hood's wreckage. The fact that Glorious was on half boilers and had no lookouts or CAP may remain an unknown until after the war.Ok D'Oyly Hughes survives and is court martialled. What defence does he have?
But every so often one gets through to do great damage, like Kimmel at Pearl Harbour.
Also, I wouldn't be too hard on Kimmel, he got handed a raw deal and knew it, if you look into what he was doing and trying to get done (before December 7), he comes off a lot better than history has painted him.
Was General Short Admiral Kimmel's commanding officer? Could Adm Kimmel have ordered his ships off of routine without Gen Short's approval? IIRC, Short wasn't, and Kimmel could. And I might be alone here in saying that it would have been better had he done that.... overall defense of US military forces on Hawaii was actually vested upon Gen. Short... and he had ordered that "normal peacetime routine was to be followed, so as not to alarm the populace". This is why the Navy's ships were in-port and mostly unmanned that Sunday morning... weekdays were for exercises at sea, the weekend was for R&R, including attending Sunday services, visiting friends and businesses in town, etc. In addition, Gen. Short had declared that sabotage was the biggest threat to US military forces in Hawaii, and that protection against that was the prime concern - which is why the Army's aircraft were all lined up in neat rows instead of scattered and in the pre-built protective revetments, their guns had no ammo, and all of the ammo - including that intended for the AA guns - was locked up in the ammo lockers/bunkers.
Maybe D'Oyly-Hughes was too?Kimmel was a scapegoat, pure & simple.
Maybe D'Oyly-Hughes was too?
I would have found his testimony interesting. Why running on half boilers? Why not CAP aloft? Why no TSRs readied?
You make some good points (as always) buuuut...Was General Short Admiral Kimmel's commanding officer? Could Adm Kimmel have ordered his ships off of routine without Gen Short's approval? IIRC, Short wasn't, and Kimmel could. And I might be alone here in saying that it would have been better had he done that.
I think that both officers took the "war warning" message with the assumption that war would perhaps break out, but not in their areas of responsibility; hence Shorts ordering USAAC aircraft lined up against sabotage rather than maintaining search and rapid-response deployments, and Kimmel not adjusting the weekend routine.
I'm not saying they were themselves solely to blame. But I do think each may have had a touch of complacency about PH itself being attacked. In short (pardon the unintended pun), they assumed that PH would not be a target, and clearly did not issue orders under that framing of the danger. Rather than plan for enemy capabilities, both flag officers seemed to plan for perceived intentions, and then got caught by the short hairs.
Of course, this opinion is informed by hindsight. But it's hard for me to see how ships lined up in harbor and planes lined up on an apron are ready for war, which was the order given. Forces weren't dispersed and ammo wasn't readied because they did not think they would themselves be attacked, I believe.
Perhaps DC should have made explicit their expectations about what being "ready for war" actually meant.
As for Kimmel, well, as memory serves the fleet's BB's had just completed some exercises and were reasonably ready to sail but as we discussed on the BC board years ago, when do they sortie? You can't have them at sea constantly as they were pretty good fuel hogs. Even if Kimmel had them rotating in and out as fast as possible you still don't know when the hammer will drop, it's expensive in fuel and wear and tear on the ships to keep them at sea for no real reason other than a "threat" of war. The cost of fuel alone would be prohibitive.
Also where to the BB's go? Having your entire fleet stand out to sea without a destination means their just steaming around burning fuel and oil. The worst case scenario we came up with was that the fleet was indeed at sea but still within range of the carrier strike force. Now we have seven or eight slow battle wagons with marginal maneuverability out in deep water. Granted they would have freedom of movement and would put up a pretty stiff AA defense but any ships that took catastrophic damage are lost, no raising them from the mud of Pearl Harbor and with significantly more lives lost.
These are just some of the issues Kimmel had to face in the fall of 1941 with real ships and more importantly, real lives on the line. There is some justification for his actions just a few days later when HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales are caught at sea by superior air forces.
I give Kimmel a lot of credit for doing what he could and for standing up like a man even though he must have known he was going to have to bite the bullet and go down in history as the admiral who let his fleet get "surprised at Pearl Harbor".
Agree or disagree with my rhetoric but give the man his due on this part, there were no carriers in Pearl on December 7, yes they were making plane deliveries but he made sure they were in and out (mostly out) of PH as fast as possible.
Apologies Beez, I'm not trying to hijack your thread, I will cease and desist now.
Kimmel, and Phillips with Force Z had the same issue as D'Oyly-Hughes, an omission or insufficient use of reconnaissance patrol aircraft. Had Kimmel maintained long range recon (along with picket ships) to discover the IJN approaching, or had Phillips used his eight Shagbats to search for reported IJA transports from a safe distance (instead of within 300 nmi of FIC), or had D'Oyly-Hughes used his nine Gladiators to look for any enemy surface warships.... Well in all three cases, information is power.As for Kimmel, well, as memory serves the fleet's BB's had just completed some exercises and were reasonably ready to sail but as we discussed on the BC board years ago, when do they sortie? Also where to the BB's go? Having your entire fleet stand out to sea without a destination means their just steaming around burning fuel and oil.