improving the 109??

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They did build 20,000+ Spitfires and Seafires.
 
GrauGeist said:
The problem with Germany, is they never took the mass-production model seriously.
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Dave, I thought Hitler was a big fan of Mr Ford and his production techniques?

"Hitler said he regarded Ford as his "inspiration," explaining his reason for keeping Ford's life-size portrait next to his desk.[63] Steven Watts wrote that Hitler "revered" Ford, proclaiming that "I shall do my best to put his theories into practice in Germany," and modeling the Volkswagen, the people's car, on the Model T.[64]"
 
Hitler may have admired Henry for his policies and sentiments, but he hardly followed Henry's production line techniques or advice.

If you look at the production output of the Bf109, you'll see it was almost a cottage industry adventure until 1944, which was far to late to be of any consequence to the war effort. The overall production totals for all types was ridiculous and could barely keep pace with either Britain or the Soviet Union. The U.S. on the otherhand, was out producing nearly everyone else combined.

Top put it into perspective, here's some wartime totals by year:
Germany:
1939 - 8,295
1940 - 10,826
1941 - 12,401
1942 - 15,409
1943 - 24,807
1944 - 40,593
1945 - 7,540

Soviet Union:
1939 - 10,382
1940 - 10,565
1941 - 15,735
1942 - 25,436
1943 - 34,900
1944 - 40,300
1945 - 20,900

United States:
1939 - 2,141
1940 - 6,086
1941 - 19,433
1942 - 47,836
1943 - 85,898
1944 - 96,318
1945 - 46,001
 
Interesting discussion, the 109V21 is an interesting bird too.
I have a question, well 4 actually.

The 109 is reputed to be increasingly difficult to fly approaching 400mph, surely this would need to be addressed too and was it seriously attempted with the later G/K models?

Also earlier were mentioned fabric-covered ailerons, is this true? If so did the 109 go through the Spitfire experience of improving with metal ailerons (& did Luftwaffe Squadron personnel go round nicking them from production facilities as their Spitfire contemporaries are known to have done)?
 

A) The Me-109 was not difficult to fly at 400mph (642 mph) , the stick became stiff,but that was the same in many others, the Me-109F4 to G12 could safely dive up to 750 kph. The Me-109 was not very good at sharp turns because his relatively small wing, but is that is other topic.

B) The production models from "E" series had metal covered ailerons.
 
Gixxerman said:
Interesting discussion, the 109V21 is an interesting bird too.
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There were two of them, actually.

Bf109V21 (WkNmr 1770) was fitted with a P&W Twin Wasp and tested 1938/1939


Bf109X (WkNmr 5608) was fitted with a BMW 801 and tested 1940/1942


On occasion, you will see photos of Bf109V21 referred to as the Bf109X, but you can tell the difference immediately, because the Bf109X used the cowling from an Fw190.
 
Milosh said:
Only at lower altitudes and was IAS.
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In a dive, no variant of the Me-109 could reach 750 kph in horizontal flight, at any altitude. 750 max speed is the figure indicated in the pilots handbook, but several accounts of ww2 pilots claim that they dive up to 900 kph to scape after being "bounced" from behind, But I coudnlt tell if the airframe of the Me-109 really could withstand 800 or 900 kph stress.
 
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GrauGeist said:
Top put it into perspective, here's some wartime totals by year:
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But would those low totals for Germany be a direct result of the intensive allied bombing? The larger figure for 44' I assume is because Speer took production underground - and with worker absenteeism at 25%. So taking the bomber offensive out of the equation - would there have been a portrait of Ford in every factory with massive production?
 

I haven't seen that sort of fitting with a bend in it. That's just my experience, and I have none with the 109, but it did stand out to me. Maybe that is the way that they were manufactured. In my experience, that is how that sort of fitting starts to fail.

For what its worth, I came across this photo of a FW-190 with the main gear door removed (not the inner doors which cover very little):
 
If we look back at the Allied bombing offensive, it didn't really gain momentum until 1943.

So interestingly enough, as the bombing increased, so did the German's production. Of course, the figure for 1945 reflects both the collapse of Germany and the war ending by May. It might also be worth looking into how many types were being manufactured in 1940 compared to 1944, too.

Had Germany put a high priority on production in 1938/1939 as they did in 1944, it may have painted a slightly different picture in the airwar.
 
I think it is important to remember that starting with the ABC Plan of 1930 which was developed into a much larger plan in 1932, the Germans created an aircraft industry almost from scratch.
In January 1933 just 3,988 people were employed in the aircraft and aero engine industry in Germany. This figure was already 53,865 by January 1935. Floor space in m2 for the industry increased from just 30,000 to over 200,000 in the same period.
There was always incredibly inept and confused planning which resulted in a huge gap between what the RLM planned and what actually got built. People often refer to the unrealistic late war production plans, but those of the mid thirties were just as unattainable.
For example in December 1933 Milch ordered 1,000 Do 11 and Do 13 bombers . Milch's 1934-35 budget ran to over 1,000,000,000 RM! The Rhineland programme of July 1934 called for 4,000 aircraft to be produced by October 1934.
In 1934 the German aircraft industry produced 1,968 aircraft, nowhere near the programmed number but still 5.35 times more than in 1933.

Whilst it is true that the German government did not plan for a long war, Nazi ideology almost precluded that, it did intend to build many more aircraft than it actually did, and it certainly planned for mass production. The development of the Regensburg plant would be a good example of this.

At the outbreak of the war the Luftwaffe was formidable in size compared to its potential European adversaries. It lacked sustainability, reserves of aircraft were inadequate and the aircraft industries capacity was only, roughly, a quarter of what it would later become in Milch's direction. The Reich also had no significant stockpiles of the raw materials required to sustain the industry. When in October 1940 new plans were developed they were hampered by a lack of raw materials.

All of this is not so much evidence of a lack of the desire to mass produce aircraft as it is of the often overlooked fact that the war came at least two years too early for Nazi Germany.

Cheers

Steve
 
Graeme said:
But would those low totals for Germany be a direct result of the intensive allied bombing? The larger figure for 44' I assume is because Speer took production underground
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Numbers of aircraft produced are not the best measure. Airframe weight and aero engine numbers are better. In 1944-45 the Germans almost stopped producing anything but single engine fighters and to a lesser extent twin engine fighters. The industry was dispersed but this must have slowed down the rate of production. Aircraft coming of the production lines at Regensburg for example would be more efficiently built than those in the dispersed industry, however well it was managed (and it was very well managed). Those production lines utilised all the best practices of mass production and used methods that would be recognised in any car plant today.
The 8th AF estimated that it had significantly impeded aircraft production with its campaign. Throughout 1944 it reckoned that only between 60% and 70% of planned production was realised. A report on the effects of the bombing ststes:

"The rise in aircraft production since March 1944, in spite of a large increase in weight of Allied bombing attacks, reflects a successful reorganisation of the German aircraft industry. When attacks were initiated in 1943 , the German aircraft industry was organised into a relatively few highly integrated complexes and component plants using mass production methods. The 1943 precision attacks, involving a total of only 2,420 tons, resulted in very considerable damage and large production losses. These attacks proved the vulnerability of the existing industrial plan and compelled a wholesale reorganisation of the German aircraft industry."

Some of this may be a little over optimistic, but the salient points remain.

Cheers

Steve
 

No possibility of diving more than ~500mph TAS. 800/900 kph reading is result of faulty pitot tube readings in .6-65M compressibility range
 
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Many airspeed indicators became wildly inaccurate at speeds above their normal range (normal dive speed range) and reports of extreme speeds touched on in combat situations should be looked at in that light. Pilot is not lying, he is relating what the airspeed indicator read. But the airspeed indicator could be off by tens of mph/kph if not a hundred in some cases.
 
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