buffnut453
Captain
Actually just re-read that Wikipedia article and its full of errors - too many to go into in detail.
Influence of the Akutan Zero in Allied tactics
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buffnut453
Captain
"the F2A-3 and the british buffalo are heaviest and go down the performances and they are not equal to F4F-3 of USN"
Actually, Marion Carl would disagree with you - he thought Buffalos would have done no worse than the Wildcats did at Guadalcanal, and he flew both types operationally. Wildcats only started receiving armour plating and self-sealing tanks in mid-1942 which degraded the performance of that aircraft in much the same way that it hurt the Brewster's performance.
Actually, Marion Carl would disagree with you - he thought Buffalos would have done no worse than the Wildcats did at Guadalcanal, and he flew both types operationally. Wildcats only started receiving armour plating and self-sealing tanks in mid-1942 which degraded the performance of that aircraft in much the same way that it hurt the Brewster's performance.
buffnut453
Captain
Different locations, different tactics, different pilot proficiencies, different warning set-ups - too many variables to draw any meaning from statistics.
For example, everyone quotes the Marianas Turkey Shoot as evidence of superiority of USN aircraft and pilots. However, "And I Was There" by Adm Layton notes that the Japanese had an airborne "mission commander" directing the IJNAF forces and that USN intel was intercepting his transmissions. That tactical intel enabled USN fighters to be directed to the optimal height and location to disrupt the Japanese formations.
For example, everyone quotes the Marianas Turkey Shoot as evidence of superiority of USN aircraft and pilots. However, "And I Was There" by Adm Layton notes that the Japanese had an airborne "mission commander" directing the IJNAF forces and that USN intel was intercepting his transmissions. That tactical intel enabled USN fighters to be directed to the optimal height and location to disrupt the Japanese formations.
From JoeB, on another thread, for Burma 1942, IJA assets:
That does NOT prove that Oscar was not present prior Feb 1942 in Malaya, however.
buffnut453
Captain
in early Dec 41, the IJAAF fighter ORBAT for operations over Malaya comprised:
64th and 59th Sentai (59 Ki-43 and 6 Ki-27) at Duong Dong and Kukan Airfields
1st Sentai (42 Ki-27s) at Kampong Trach Airfield
11th Sentai (38 Ki-27s) to Kukan Airfield
77th Sentai (27 Ki-27s) to Duong Dong Airfield
The Ki-27s were used to defend the invasion convoys and, later, to provide local air defence over newly-captured airfields in Thailand and Northern Malaya. The Ki-43s were used almost exclusively to secure air superiority over Northern Malaya. Thus although the Ki-27 was more numerous, it actually took little part in direct combat with the RAF's Buffalos.
64th and 59th Sentai (59 Ki-43 and 6 Ki-27) at Duong Dong and Kukan Airfields
1st Sentai (42 Ki-27s) at Kampong Trach Airfield
11th Sentai (38 Ki-27s) to Kukan Airfield
77th Sentai (27 Ki-27s) to Duong Dong Airfield
The Ki-27s were used to defend the invasion convoys and, later, to provide local air defence over newly-captured airfields in Thailand and Northern Malaya. The Ki-43s were used almost exclusively to secure air superiority over Northern Malaya. Thus although the Ki-27 was more numerous, it actually took little part in direct combat with the RAF's Buffalos.
Here's the USN flight test from Oct 1942:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/a6m2-oct2342.pdf
and a comparison with other USAAC/USN fighters:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/a6m2-oct2342.pdf
and a comparison with other USAAC/USN fighters:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf
buffnut453
Captain
I'd be interested to know where Joe B obtained the stats for the Ki-27s because the only Japanese sources are very sketchy and don't tie up at all. The postwar report into IJAAF losses during the Malayan Campaign shows far more aircraft shot down than are accounted for in any surviving unit records. Note that 6 of the Buffalo losses to K-27s were in Burma, not Malaya which is the area I was discussing. That said, I have to accept that my original statement that the Ki-27s weren't heavily involved wasn't 100% correct. They were increasingly thrown into the air campaign over Singapore in Jan 42 but, prior to that, had been primarily focussed on defending airfields.
Anyway, let's get back on track...bottom line is that Koga's Zero didn't have as much impact on tactics or future fighter design as had previously been ascribed to it. All in agreement say, "Aye!".
Anyway, let's get back on track...bottom line is that Koga's Zero didn't have as much impact on tactics or future fighter design as had previously been ascribed to it. All in agreement say, "Aye!".
Messy1
Master Sergeant
Aye! Aye!
Bloody Shambles is one of the primary (and best) sources for actual loss estimates for all sides. Its been the best of the one's i've looked at so far. I won't clutter the thread with my own kill ratio estimates for Malaya/Burma/SRA etc etc.
Thach Weave was only used once by F4F's prior to Sept 42......at Midway. It worked to perfection but should be noted that it was a completely defensive maneuver, and didn't allow the F4F's to do their job (aka....escort the bombers). Thach and his surviving pilots also benefited from a fatigued and disorganized CAP that had in all probability exhausted most if not all of it's cannon ammo.
A variety of factors went into the better ratio for the Wildcat. First....the USN pilots benefited from reports filtering back from USAAF and other forces re: Japanese planes and tactics. Secondly, USN training (as a group) was arguably the best vs. the larger orgs that had proceeded it (mainly due to post training CAG work with squadron leaders such as Thach), Third....up to Sept 42, USN Wildcats fought singular pitched one day battles vs. sustained ops......something that makes obtaining a lopsided kill ratio harder. In the first encounter, the Zero came out a clean 2:1 over the USN F4F's, but then fell behind at Midway, mainly due to Thach's defensive engagement. (outside of that...the Zeros did credably vs. fighters.....and did far more important work vs. bombers) One can go on.
If i were to drill deeper into USN success vs. the A6M.....alot had to do with teamwork. Many a Zero was "brushed" off a partner F4F. Thach himself disfavored one on one engagements and at Midway chose a cloud vs. taking one on by himself.
As others have already said, the Koga Zero mainly served to reinforce what was already generally known. More so...it allowed refinement of training tactics for 1943 newbies coming into the war zone. A far more important development was Thach getting his much wanted improvements in gunnery training incorporated into standard USN training. Essentially taking what the CAG's had done in pre-war and making it part of the mass production pilot training sylibus.
Thach Weave was only used once by F4F's prior to Sept 42......at Midway. It worked to perfection but should be noted that it was a completely defensive maneuver, and didn't allow the F4F's to do their job (aka....escort the bombers). Thach and his surviving pilots also benefited from a fatigued and disorganized CAP that had in all probability exhausted most if not all of it's cannon ammo.
A variety of factors went into the better ratio for the Wildcat. First....the USN pilots benefited from reports filtering back from USAAF and other forces re: Japanese planes and tactics. Secondly, USN training (as a group) was arguably the best vs. the larger orgs that had proceeded it (mainly due to post training CAG work with squadron leaders such as Thach), Third....up to Sept 42, USN Wildcats fought singular pitched one day battles vs. sustained ops......something that makes obtaining a lopsided kill ratio harder. In the first encounter, the Zero came out a clean 2:1 over the USN F4F's, but then fell behind at Midway, mainly due to Thach's defensive engagement. (outside of that...the Zeros did credably vs. fighters.....and did far more important work vs. bombers) One can go on.
If i were to drill deeper into USN success vs. the A6M.....alot had to do with teamwork. Many a Zero was "brushed" off a partner F4F. Thach himself disfavored one on one engagements and at Midway chose a cloud vs. taking one on by himself.
As others have already said, the Koga Zero mainly served to reinforce what was already generally known. More so...it allowed refinement of training tactics for 1943 newbies coming into the war zone. A far more important development was Thach getting his much wanted improvements in gunnery training incorporated into standard USN training. Essentially taking what the CAG's had done in pre-war and making it part of the mass production pilot training sylibus.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Through November, 1942, USN Wildcats were able to hold their own with IJN Zekes, barely. Without going back and looking it up in Lundstrom the actual numbers were roughly 30-30. The USN fighter pilots and the IJN fighter pilots in 1942, used roughly the same tactics which did not involve dogfighting. Today they would be called energy tactics. Primarily high side rear aspect low deflection runs for the Zekes and the same type runs but more high deflection by the Wildcats. It is a myth that the Zero pilots, at least the well trained ones, wanted to dog fight.
varsity078740
Airman
- 47
- Aug 30, 2006
Read Philippine and Hawaiian based pilot accounts of combat with Zeros. They hadn't a clue about the Zero's capabilities did indeed try to dogfight with it, albiet not for long ,with disastrous results. By the time the fighting moved to New Guinea
in May of '42, word had come down from the Philippine and Java veterans about the Zero's performance.
Duane
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
the first american units had no clue about jap planes and tried to dogfight with them and suffered according to tex hill in one of his interviews.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Zeros destroyed 4 aircraft in the air during the Pearl Harbor Attack while losing 9 or 10, mainly to ground fire. P-36s brought down 2 Zeros while losing one (ground fire) and P-40s brought down at least 3 Zeros. 2 P-40s were brought down at Bellows Air Field while attempting to take off. These aircraft were on a training mission and it is not known if they were armed or not.
I don't know your references about "Hawaiian based pilot accounts of combat with Zeros" as there seems to be very little written about the aerial combat over Pearl Harbor with regards to tactics and engaging the enemy. It seems that most if not all of the Zero victories achieved by AAF fighters over Pearl were accomplished at high rates of speed with little or no "dog fighting" occurring (If someone finds a documented reference stating otherwise, please post). The fighting over Pearl was very chaotic and I know of no pilot report from the Pearl Harbor attack mentioning the maneuverability of the Zero.
"Dogfighting" with the Zero WAS possible providing you didn't slow down to speeds where the Zero could exploit its abilities (Under 200 mph). At higher speeds the controls of the Zero became concrete
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parsifal
Colonel
Zeroes probably did more to challenge the myth of western superiority and put in the minds of colonial populations that they could challenge their white masters more than any single piece of technology.
In that regard, the legacy of the Zro is at least as great as any aircraft....right up there with the Spitfire, Sturmovik and P-51
In that regard, the legacy of the Zro is at least as great as any aircraft....right up there with the Spitfire, Sturmovik and P-51
But Tex Hill himself didn't encounter a Zero until long after his AVG days (possibly in some combats with 23rd FG in 1943-4). The point being, though Hill of course fought bravely against Japanese Army Type 97 and Type 1 fighters w/ the AVG, that the Allies had a pretty fuzzy impression and knowledge of their Japanese fighter opponents until well into the war. There was certainly no detailed and accurate feed back about Japanese fighters from Philippines or DEI that provided any useful detail to units of another service, for example the Navy/MC by the summer of 1942. To a limited degree, USAAF fighter units in the summer/fall of 1942 had the personal experience of particular pilots who'd already flown against the Japanese in PI or DEI (like Buzz Wagner of PI fame, though most of his combats there were also against Type 97's rather than Zeroes, flew P-39's in New Guinea; and some particular pilots in the P-40 equipped 49th FG had several months of experience, on and off, v Zeroes by late '42).
It took longer for the most part for that first hand knowledge though to percolate through to training and manuals and so forth; that was mainly in 1943. And by that time, the first hand experiences were complemented by the test data pitting the Akutan Zero v various Allied types. And the Akutan Zero results tended to corroborate most of the general impressions of the Zero; although OTOH the results were somewhat controversial in finding that a/c slower than was the impression of many Allied pilots who had met it. And indeed it seems the Akutan results were at least a bit on the low side v the actual maximum capabilities of never wrecked and well maintained Model 21 Zeroes.
On tactics, as was mentioned, the Zero came of age in the JNAF in China in 1940-41 fighting strictly slower and sometimes lower wing loading fighters. JNAF fighter doctrine changed at that time to 'energy tactics' by sections in coordination. Though in various cases they would revert in combat to the older individual dog fighting method, Zeroes were often recorded in Guadalcanal campaign attempting hit and run tactics v F4F's, which were only equal in speed, at best, to Zeroes.
Joe
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Its been said too, that without the A6M and it's less glamerous attributes, that the entire SRA campaign would not have been possible. The plane was good but so were the pilots driving them. That coupled with the pre-war held prejudices helped lead to it's early successes that exceeded the more usual comparative exchanges. A6M was a brilliant design for a 1940 plane. I agree it's legacy is comprable to other 'great' aircraft. If the plane's upgradability was limited, leaving it obsolecent by mid 1943.....well the plane's designer stated himself that one should only expect at most 3 years out of any fighter airframe and after that point you'd better have the successor aircraft in the air. The Japanese air industry couldn't do that and build enough existing fighters, so they chose the lesser evil and kept building Zeros even after P-38's, F6F's and F4U's came out in numbers.
There's no one simple explanation for win/loss. The P40 drivers in the PI's didn't "all try to dogfight" Zeros anymore than Chennault's Flying Tigers all used "energy tactics". Combats tend to devolve into free for alls in large part. Often it comes down to luck, suprise, positioning.....etc etc. IIRC.....the greatest statistical killer of fighter planes remains ambush....aka...the one you never saw till the bullets and/or cannon started impacting your airframe. FT's benefited greatly from choosing their battles and having a crude but workable early warning system. Fighting in the PI's, they lost much of their early warning capability in the first week of the air war including the one working radar they had. USAAF fighters did well at Pearl Harbor but most if not all of their kills were scored by ambush against an enemy spread out and focused on ground targets. (including the fighters which had not seen any enemy in the air when the first wave came in, spread out and started hitting ground targets) USN got a heads up prior to Coral Sea and a sobering lesson as of Coral Sea. @ Guadalcanal the defenders benefited tremendously from Force Modifyers of which without their defense would have been impossible. Still, even with early warning, and the Japanese attack pattern virtually dictated by range and vectoring, the Zeros managed to score a small positive ratio (1.2:1) but failed in their mission. They were simply beyond effective operating range. Too much was asked of them with too little assets.
Endless variables. Endless interpretations, discounts and props are possible.
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parsifal
Colonel
Hi nik
With regard to the way fights tend to develop, i couldnt agree more with you, but its here that training comes into its own. In a high stress envioronment, where fear has to be a major factor....what do people do.....they can tend to follow their instinct, but they also can tend to follow what they have been trained to do. if it has been drummed into pilots "dont dogfight with a zero!!!", and you are bounced by a Zero, chances are your instincts and your training will align. What will you do.....dive away and use energy tactics. If they are the tactics that give you survival, the ones that dont follow the optimum tactics tend to die and dont get the chance to impart their advice. The ones that do survive and follow the energy tactics doctrine will pass on that wisdom to the following crops of pilots.
My opinion, with regard to the Japanese, is that because they tended not to rotate their pilots, everybody tended to die in the finish. There was no clear tactical school of thinking that could be passed onto the next generation of pilots, so unlike the Allies, Japanese pilots, as a group, did not learn, evolve and grow.
With regard to the way fights tend to develop, i couldnt agree more with you, but its here that training comes into its own. In a high stress envioronment, where fear has to be a major factor....what do people do.....they can tend to follow their instinct, but they also can tend to follow what they have been trained to do. if it has been drummed into pilots "dont dogfight with a zero!!!", and you are bounced by a Zero, chances are your instincts and your training will align. What will you do.....dive away and use energy tactics. If they are the tactics that give you survival, the ones that dont follow the optimum tactics tend to die and dont get the chance to impart their advice. The ones that do survive and follow the energy tactics doctrine will pass on that wisdom to the following crops of pilots.
My opinion, with regard to the Japanese, is that because they tended not to rotate their pilots, everybody tended to die in the finish. There was no clear tactical school of thinking that could be passed onto the next generation of pilots, so unlike the Allies, Japanese pilots, as a group, did not learn, evolve and grow.
