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I have studied all the German fighter losses from December 1943 to May 1944 and non-combat losses were always lower than combat losses. And it was never as low as 7%, but at least double of that! So I don't know where you get your information from ???Non-combat losses accounted for about three times the number of losses as combat related losses. During the war, the Luftwaffe suffered an average monthly loss rate of just under 7% per month due to non-combat related accidents. Introducing new technologies early will increase the unreliability of the machines, and place additional stresses on conversion training schools. It is almost inevitable that loss ratesw to attrition will go up if there is a wholesale conversion to jet technologies. Moreover the supply of pilots and other aircrew will dry up as the idiosyncrasies of this new design slow down the rate of output for new aircrew. The Luftwaffe will fight its final battles with even more numbers stacked against it. And ther is no substantive evidence that I know of that the new Jet equipped uinits of the Luftwaffe historically fielded were significantly better in their kill rates than were conventionally armed units. An Me 262 would get airborne, and maybe shoot down a bomber, as could an Me 109. It might have a better chance of shooting down a fighter , but these were not the determinants to Germany's defeat in the final months of the war.
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There was no solution for Germany after the US entered the war. Even before then there was only a small chance at outright victory. So the question for me is not if they adopted a different policy whether they could win, but if they adopted a differnt policy, whether they could do better than they did. And i happen to think that the Germans were wasteful in their R&D resources because they expended resources on projects that had no chance in improving their immediately available technologies (like the 109 and the 190) they might have had a better chanc
The other thing that killed them was oil. Or lack of it. Their early war strategy should have been aimed at augmenting their meagre supplies of the stuff. Then perhaps they may have been able to expand their training establishments, and churn out pilots in the required numbers.
The simple, single engined jet fighter might replace the 109 and 190, while using fuel that could be easier obtained. The Wolksjaeger, but one year before for exmple. I agree that hey $crewed it big time by not tanking care if their stocks enough, not only the fuel stocks.
The plane would not save Germany though, since Germans blew their chances in previous years.
The other thing they needed to do was integrate the European industrial base rather than just rip it off blind for short sited theoretical gain only. Nazi economic policy during the war was incredibly short sighted. By setting the exchange rate at artificailly low levels they ensured that all goods made outside of germany were worthless, and so firms in these occupied countries shut down or reduced to the absolute minimum of activity for the duration. The germans also systematically plundered many factories of essential items like machine toools and the like, which destroyed the viability of theose factories, with the added irony that the tools expropriated were generally never used anyway
Well put.
Certainly your ideas on simplification are on the right track. In the wider context this points to a rationalization of production across the board....for example an abandonment of Tiger Tanks to build something more in keeping with German industrial capabilities....like the SGIII perhaps
IMO the Tiger could've replaced 2-3 Pz-IV tanks in WW2 era, but, in the air, it took two 262 to replace, say, 3 Bf-109. So, yes for Tiger/Panther, but Germany needed a jet plane that could afford.
That is pretty much my viewThe kill rates for Me 262 operating squadrons were higher than that of their piston counterparts. and that is taking into account the weapon was new, introduced under worst possible circumstances, with short-lived engines and prime target for any fighter sweep at the time. While I agree that it was no war winning super weapon, one Me 262 was certainly worth a couple of piston engined fighters in terms of effectiveness against bombers...
Your figures are arbitrary.Regarding the kill rates issue, remember that the Me 262 units were generally crewed by elite pilots hand picked for the job. This would probably have a skewed effect on the kill ratesw of those units. Further, are you taking into account the serviceability rates of the new technology....the Me 262 had a production run of about 1500 yet in service there were never many more than 100 available at any given moment, and of these, only about 25 or so were able to get airborne at any given time. So if the Me 262 units are shooting down say 1.5 Allied planes per sortie, compared to say 1.0 per conventional aircraft but the conventional aircraft has a serviceability rate of 50% compared to 25%, the conventionally equipped unit in fact has a higher kil rate than the jet equipped unit for the overall force structure.
They went out to conquer the Middle East and the Caucasus.Their early war strategy should have been aimed at augmenting their meagre supplies of the stuff. Then perhaps they may have been able to expand their training establishments, and churn out pilots in the required numbers.
Exactly. Note that the BMW 003 turned out to be much more reliable due to throttle limiting. [/QUOTE]I was under the impression that the bulk of the reliablity issue surrounding aircraft had to do with engine reliablity.
It was easier to fly because it didn't have swept wings. This would reduce the landing and take off speed.And about the B&V P.211: I wonder what makes you think it was probably easier to fly than a He 162. Considering how bad all post war planes with thin boom arrangements did plus the fact B&V had no experience with jet planes. The He 162 was a year ahead in terms of preliminary design. It was a good decision they went with it.
Notice I said preliminary design. A lot of the features that eventually found its way into the He 162 (or not because they came too late) were in earlier projects of Heinkel like the top-mounted engine, the V-tail etc, cockpit arrangement, landing gear design...It was easier to fly because it didn't have swept wings. This would reduce the landing and take off speed.
What were the problems with late-war jet planes with boom arrangements? And which were these planes?
The He 162 was not further in its development. Heinkel said they had already been working on it before but this was the P 1073 which was nothing like the projected He 162. Judge for yourself:
Kris
The He280 had a slightly smaller and lighter airframe (He280 V-3: 9,470 lb max. - Me262 A-1: 15,720 lb max.) and was proven to be a good handling aircraft. Plus, it was ready tp produce in 1941 (while the ME262 V-1 prototype was still undergoing testing development), which means that *had* it gone into production at that point, it would have had much longer to develop along with the HeS, Jumo and BMW jet engines (which never got the attention or funding they needed).GrauGeist, what advantage did the He 280 have over the Me 262 ?
Are you sure this is a result of the sturdiness of the tail boom? The X-5 had problems due to the positioning of the tail surfaces and elevators IIRC. Moving the elevators to the top of the tail might have improved the situation somewhat. I still find it a bit of a long shot to simply discard the B&V P.211 because it had a tail boom like the X-5 without directly linking its problems with the boom.The Mig 9 and Saab have a much larger sturdier boom. The X-5 is much more comparable and even it is more conventional.
No that's not true. Most publications simply copy what was given as the official reason why the He 162 was chosen over the B&V P.211. Heinkel said it had been working on a similar project but not only had they been doing little work on it (not even a mock up) it was also not like the He 162 design at all. I have posted the P.1073 image and it is clear that there is nothing more than a superficial resemblance. You claim that the fuselage was similar but the fuselage of the P.1073 was much bigger in every dimension. The P.1073 had one of its wings on top, that's it. Even the Focke Wulf projects look more like the He 162 !The preliminary design phase can take months as was the case for e.g. the Me 262. The P.1073 shares many similarities with the He 162 epsecially considering the fuselage, so I'm pretty sure it gave some advantage or else most publications wouldn't mention it.
I think that is being very simplistic. No one claims the Me 262 was a superweapon. It was an advanced design and thus needed time to grow. It became fully operational at the end of 1944 and by mid 1945 it would have gotten more reliable engines making it the best fighter of the world if it wasn't already.Your figures are arbitrary.
Like nearly all the german uber weapons, poke around a little and you find major problems with them everywhere
They were going for the quick victory. Until the end of 1941 that worked out perfectly. Then the offensive against the Russians stalled and what was the first thing they did? Plan to capture the Caucasion and Arab oil fields.Germany never gave serious and timely consideration to the capture of foreign oilfields.
But I always read that the HeS 8 and 30 engines were not ready for production so how could the He 280 had been ready for production. And what about its very short range/fligth endurance ?Plus, it was ready tp produce in 1941 (while the ME262 V-1 prototype was still undergoing testing development), which means that *had* it gone into production at that point, it would have had much longer to develop along with the Hs, Jumo and BMW jet engines (which never got the attention or funding they needed).
The aircraft itself was pretty much a done deal by the V-3 airframe, all that was left to be worked out, were the engines. The V-3 was fitted with the HeS8, and did perform well with those engines, even though it had a short range of 230 miles, it's speed was 512 mph.But I always read that the HeS 8 and 30 engines were not ready for production so how could the He 280 had been ready for production. And what about its very short range/fligth endurance ?
Civettone I agree with most of what you state. I gather that the initial production of Me-262 was taking something like 24,000 manhours to build when a Me-109 was only about 4300 manhours. By comparison the Ju-88 was about 15,000 manhours to build by 1943 when it started out at 50,000 man hours. The longer a weapon is in production the cheaper it is to build and cost out.
Similarly after the first 1000 Me-262 had been produced the manhours would have dropped to ~ 10,000 man hours and when the production reached many thousand mark , it would have been down to about 3400 man hours, less than the Me-109!