Instead of the ME 262...why not THIS...

[bigZ]

Even with the uber jets. Where is all the fuel and pilots going to come from for this renewed onslaught. Germany is still going to go through the grinder. This is not the BOB on an island with a decent Navy. Germany will be on the defensive leaving initative to the allies.

A fighter force is an integral part to any armed force but in itself is not a war winning one(but granted without one you MIGHT lose a war).

 

[Civettone]

GrauGeist, I wad reading up on the HeS 30 engine (on wiki) and it seems that the HeS 30 was to be quite an impressive engine. It would have had a similar output than the BMW 003 and Jumo 004 but weighing only half! For some obscure reason Heinkel-Hirth was ordered to stop work on it and start with the design of a next-generation engine, which resulted in the HeS 011.
Yet the HeS 030 development seemed to have gone quite well while the BMW 003 had to be redesigned completely as of early 1943.

But to me the range of the He 280 seems to be an insurmountable obstacle !!

In fact, I don't see much use for a Me 262 as interceptor if the He 280 was accepted. I think it would not have been that difficult to give it a stronger armament. Other than that it could do what the Me 262 could, at least when it comes to air defence.

Even if the Germans had these 'uber' jets earlier it is still a weapon of defence and will not in itself change the outcome of the war.

To isolate one branch of the airforce as the weapon that will overturn the situation and bring total victory is folly. I don't think even Goring imagined that.

Even with the uber jets. Where is all the fuel and pilots going to come from for this renewed onslaught. Germany is still going to go through the grinder. This is not the BOB on an island with a decent Navy. Germany will be on the defensive leaving initative to the allies.

A fighter force is an integral part to any armed force but in itself is not a war winning one(but granted without one you MIGHT lose a war).

BigZ, that may be true but I don't see what this adds to the discussion. We are all aware of the lack of fuel and pilots. And we are all aware that the AF itself can not win the war.

This thread is about the Luftwaffe acquiring better fighter aircraft than the ones they historically had. Do you have anything to add on that? 8)

Kris

 

[GrauGeist]

The limited range was indeed a handicap, but again, had the RLM allowed better funding for research and development at that early stage, there's no telling just how far the Germans could have gotten with thier engine's performance.

Having the three Mg151/20 in the nose was a pretty deadly setup, and weighed 94 pounds each (Mk108 = 130 lb., Mk103 = 320 lb.) making it a pretty heavy hitter for the weight. If it were left up to me, I would leave the three 151/20 as they were...but *maybe* replace the center cannon with a Mk108 30 m/m...but that's a huge maybe, because the He280 was designed as a fighter, not a bomber killer. Besides, you could have Minengeschoss rounds for the Mg151/20 if needed.

I think the Me262 was just as valuable, and it's development and deployment was nessecary. This would be the case of "not keeping all of your eggs in one basket", meaning that having two proven performing jets in production would be very similiar to having the Bf109 and Fw190 in production at the same time, each had thier own strengths and complimented each other.

Perhaps by having the He280 on the battle front at an early stage with the Me262 coming online shortly afterwards (we're assuming that the RLM had backed the jet engine manufacturers in this speculation), then by the time 1944 came around, the Me262's intended successor, the Me262 HG series may have actually made it to at least test-flight stage, if not beyond.

It's really hard to work out any one scenario out of the countless possabilites, because there were so many blundered decisions by the German leadership that exploring them all would take us a whole lifetime...

 

[psteel]

Even with the uber jets. Where is all the fuel and pilots going to come from for this renewed onslaught. Germany is still going to go through the grinder. This is not the BOB on an island with a decent Navy. Germany will be on the defensive leaving initative to the allies.

A fighter force is an integral part to any armed force but in itself is not a war winning one(but granted without one you MIGHT lose a war).

The lack of fuel and trained pilots was a direct result of the allied strategic bombing campaign of early 1944. If that can be prevented by interceptors from 1943 on, then their could be enough of both pilots and fuel. The German catastrophy of the second half of 1944 was a direct result of three events coming together. The Normandy invasions putting a second front in play and the Soviet summer offensive of 1944, combinded with the fuel crunch of mid 1944 that occured as a result of the bombing campaign of the spring of 1944.

All these events were intercontected but were prefaced by the allies shooting the Luftwaffe out of the skys before 1944. By this time in the war the allies [USA in particular] had average pilots getting 600-800 flying hours per year compared to the Luftwaffe dropping from 250 hours per year of the early years, to 180 flying hours by 1943.

From what ive read by 1944 with, the loss of fuel , the luftwaffe flying hours fell to ~ 50 per plane per year. So even by 1943 the Luftwaffe is in crises. They needed to build allot more trainer and divert the bulk of their experten to training more pilots well enough AND give them more flying hours. Combined they could well double the numbers of flying hours per pilot per year. But this still puts them behind the allies in training hours and thus pilot quality. To level the playing field they still need some other advantage? Perhaps this is early arrival of the Me-262.

 

[Erich]

the 262 was very satisfactory if only produced in numbers exceeding piston engine s/e's in the staffeln. if you could read the US pilots first combats with the 262 you could see if the LW had had the full arsenal how upsetting this would of been for the US air forces during 1944

 

[Civettone]

The lack of fuel and trained pilots was a direct result of the allied strategic bombing campaign of early 1944. If that can be prevented by interceptors from 1943 on, then their could be enough of both pilots and fuel.

(...)

By this time in the war the allies [USA in particular] had average pilots getting 600-800 flying hours per year compared to the Luftwaffe dropping from 250 hours per year of the early years, to 180 flying hours by 1943.

From what ive read by 1944 with, the loss of fuel , the luftwaffe flying hours fell to ~ 50 per plane per year. So even by 1943 the Luftwaffe is in crises. They needed to build allot more trainer and divert the bulk of their experten to training more pilots well enough AND give them more flying hours. Combined they could well double the numbers of flying hours per pilot per year.

I think the second part of your post already shows that first part is inaccurate. The lack of trained pilots had NOTHING to do with oil shortages. The shortages set in after April 1944. By then the training of new pilots was already down to unacceptable levels.

So why was this you may ask?
Bad management. Nazi leaders were absolutely clueless about the importance of proper training. When the US entered the war, the first thing they did was to start building trainers and training facilities. Only when they knew how many pilots they could train did they look at how many aircraft they would build. Hitler himself was the one who decided how many fighters, bombers and tanks had to be delivered. He often changed his plans and would order production of one of them to be doubled immediately! And under Milch and Speer from the end of 1943 onwards the production of fighter aircraft started to rise exponentially. And yet training facilities was kept the way they were. No increase in training aircraft. No, instead they even brought back many trainer pilots to operational units. Also fighter aircraft for operational training were removed and put back at the front. Nazi leaders saw training schools as a fast way to recuperate pilots and aircraft when needed. In most of the cases they were not returned to the schools afterwards.

Of course after April 1944 the training hours went even more down but by then the game was already over anyway. It takes at least a year to train a recruit into a decent new pilot.
It becomes even more crazy after that. Nazi leaders including Goering himself believed that training was not important but courage and a will to fight were all what was needed. And that is how they 'solved' the training problem. It is these kind of people who lost the war, not the soldiers on the field or in the air...

Kris

 

[Shortround6]

The Americans were planning on getting into the war a long time before they actually did. I beleive there was a goverment sponsered training program for civilian pilots that started in either 1940 or very early 1941.
Large numbers of Piper, Taylorcraft and Aeronca planes were involved inthis program with a few other small manufacturers trying to design planes to meet the requirements of the program.

 

[Civettone]

That's true. A good thing they did that.
Also the British had a similar program, in cooperation with Canada but that came a bit late.


Kris

 

[psteel]

I think the second part of your post already shows that first part is inaccurate. The lack of trained pilots had NOTHING to do with oil shortages. The shortages set in after April 1944. By then the training of new pilots was already down to unacceptable levels.


Of course after April 1944 the training hours went even more down but by then the game was already over anyway. It takes at least a year to train a recruit into a decent new pilot.
It becomes even more crazy after that. Nazi leaders including Goering himself believed that training was not important but courage and a will to fight were all what was needed. And that is how they 'solved' the training problem. It is these kind of people who lost the war, not the soldiers on the field or in the air...

Kris

Kris we are in agreement . I was only taking the original posters point and worked backwards. The basic point is any change in 1944 is too late, change has to happen earlier. I've read that prewar German training programme counted on a fleet of over ~3000 trainer planes and teachers and was said to be able to train 15-20,000 pilots per year based on ~ 250 hours /year basic flying and specialist courses beyond that. This seems to have served them well until the BoB, where it looks like each sides attrition rate left only 1/4 of their veterans left. IE most of the pilots fighting were raw with minimal training.

In general Germans found that if they could maintain 1/4 of their veterans in a unit, they could retrain the force upto acceptable levels given enough time [1/2 year?], but that implied rotation of forces and the on going war of attrition in Russia scuttled this long term plan.

So yes building more trainers instead of bombers could have helped emmensely in this task, but they would also need to divert their experten into more training roles. We should also mention the notion that the Hitler and the Nazi regime was convinced the war would be over in a matter of a year or so, and thus made no preperations for such a long war.

 

[Civettone]

Totally !
And also Hitler who was starting to interfere personally with the Luftwaffe or the entire Heer. Also the RLM under Goering was stuck in pre-war thinking. Best example of that is that production hardly increased. They were told that the war was going to be short and Goerings personal reputation was at stake: he could never ask Hitler for more aircraft do to the job he promised Hitler he could do.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

I have gotten quite intrigued by the He 280 ...

There have been some discussions about it before on this forum.

From Cool Kitty:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/p-80-v-me-262-a-7274-15.html

But the 003 had shorter spool-up time and less throttle-up and flameout problems and at WEP overrev it had slightly more thrust than the 004B, though the 004D or E would be at least as good overall the 004B was not. (accept in terms of maintanence as the 004D still lasted under 100 hrs and the 003E was known to last well over 100 hrs, iaround 500 hrs in som cases if memory serves) Though the 004 was much easier to produce and didn't need to be harmonized as delcyros mentioned with the 003, plus there were plans to produce an afterburning 004E while the closed thing the 003 had near production was the rocket boosted 003.

(...)

The HeS-30 was also the only Heinkel-Hirth design that could have been worth producing, compared to the HeS-8 and HeS-011. (though this may not have been if Ohain had designed an axial design to follow on of the HeS-3 and 6, and indeed he favored these designs bu this time but the RLM wasnted to keep a centrifugal design going in case the axlial ones ran into problems. In the end the engine never produced the projected 700 kp and development had fallen behind the 004 and even their own HeS-30 by 1942)

and Delcyros in the same thread:

The Jumo-004B is not a bad engine per se but as Koolkitty pointed out, it was the second worst possibility (I believe the radial HeS08 would have been even worser but that´s another matter) to choose from the german perspective. The BMW-003 is indeed better in almost every respect and the 003 along with the -004e would have received afterburner in later 1945 (that was the first german scientists did on those engines in russia). The BMW-003D with improved fuel consumption and 1100 Kp thrust on the benchtest is an excellent engine for Ar-234 and He-162 even if it did not managed to get into mass production due to factories beeing overrun in march 1945 in Silesia.
The -004 was upgradable and thus would be improved as well but more importantly, it was produced in huge numbers! The good point on the development of the Jumo-004 is that in the cause of it´s development pioneering techniques had to be developed. It´s a point of "we do not learn from success". While the Jumo-004 was not initially successful it paved the way from a technology point of view and would have made successing axial designs much easier. I believe BMW enjoied some of the related experiences, esspeccially in it´s large axial jet engine, the BMW-018 (which can be grossly correlated with the RR Nene, altough not as efficiant and much heavier).
However, I fundamentally agree that nothing beats the HeS030.
The HeS011 is difficult to have a position towards. It is somehow comparable in development to the Dervent V (both engines went airborne the same month!) and would have resulted in very comparable thrust ratings later that year. But as complicated as it´s vibration issues proved to be, I see lot´s of problems to overcome beforehand.

and most interesting of all ... planned improvements for the He 280!

In a corresponding writing towards Dir. Francke, Dr. Motzfeld and Mr. Eichner dating from dec. 12th, 1942, Heinkel suggests the following points to improve the He-280 for serial production:

-VERBESSERUNGEN HE 280-
IMPROVEMENTS HE 280

1. Sechs Kanonen,
1.) six cannons,

2. Wesentlich mehr Brennstoff und deshalb dickeren Rumpf,
2.) considerably more fuel buncerage and therefore a larger fuselage diamter,

3. Modernes Flächenprofil,
3.) modern airfoil,

4. Zentral-Leitwerk,
4.) central tailplane (normal tail)

5. Rumpf um 50 - 80 cm verlängern,
5.) fuselage to be elongated by 50-80 cm,

6. Möglichkeit der Unterbringung von Bomben unter dem Rumpf prüfen,
6.) checking the possibility to take two bombs under fuselage,

7. Zwecks Berücksichtigung einfacher Fertigung und bequemer Montage soll Gestängeführung und Leitwerk zu beiden seiten aussen sein, zweckmässige Baugruppen-Unterteilung usw.,
7.) (...)

8. Im Prinzip sonst alles ähnlich.
8.) pricipally everything else likewise


gez. H E I N K E L
sig. Heinkel

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/advanced-designs-3287-11.html

Pluss the HeS-30 would probably produced even more thrust than the 004B (at least 2000 lbf static) and was smaller and lighter than the BMW 003. Though the compressor was somewhat more complex than the 004's and 003's (not mechanically, but aerodynamically, as the rotors did about half the compession, instead of the stator's doing almost all, so the design could produce the compression in 5-stages, what a normal one could in 10). Thus the engine produced somewhat more thrust than the 004 but with little more than half the weight, length and frontal area. HeS-30 (like the Jumo 004) used simpler flame-cans, opposed to the 003's more-advanced (and problematic) annular one, so it would have had less combustion problems in development than the 003. IIRC the 003 also had to be tuned to syncronise the compressor to avoid vibration.

The HeS-30 also would have needed far less material to build, so high-temp alloys could be used more extensivly per engine than could be done with the other engines. (realitively small turbine and hot-section) Development struggled at first and improved little when Hirth was aquired as Muller (unlike Ohain) was unhappy to accept help from outside the design team. IIRC work was finally going smoothly somtime after Muller left Heinkel and was progressing so rapidly that the engine was nearing production quality and was about to overtake the development of the 004 and 003 when it was cancelled in '42, as it was thought that the 004 and 003 were ready to enter production. But the 004 was only ready in the A (pre-production) configuration and the 003 was having many difficulties and was scarcely producing more than 1100 lbf. These engines subsequently went into long delays, over 1 year befor the 004B was ready for production, and about another year after that for the 003. IIRC fuel efficience of the HeS-30 (006) was similar to that of later 003 models (and probably the uprated HeS-8 ) and better than the early A models with 1.4 [lb/lbf hr]

(...)

The only Jet fighter that could have been ready early enough to make a real difference though would have been the He 280. (Possibly the 262 with HeS 006 engines) If it were to take a more conservative engine approach and use HeS-6 as a stop-gap for better engines, they could be mud-wing mounted in modified wings with about 1/3 of the engine above the wing allowing clearsnce for both the ground and for the exaust under the tail. If well-streamlined nacelles were used and 1300 lbf engines were fitted (assuming thrust hadn't been improved further) the plane should have had a thrust/weight of over .28 if weight was limited to 9250 lbs and a top-speed of ~480+ mph. (so ~2900 lbs
load) And an endurance of ~1 hr (at 2000 lbf net thrust assuming 1.4 lb/lb/hr sfc, though it may have been even less) so, assuming a 400 mph cruise, range should be around 400 miles (up to 600 with more fuel efficient engines, even more with HeS-8s and more further with HeS-30's due to higher performance, increased load capacities and reduced drag) It should have been possible to fit 2 Mk 108s with decent ammo capacity (100+ rounds each) Maybe even Mk-103s with more powerful engines. Or maby a mixed armament of 2x MG 151/20s and a single 108 or 103. Larger numbers of MG 151/20s (perhaps 5) should also have been possible if 2 more were mounted further back and higher up in the nose.
These should have been ready for production by early 1942 and would have been devestating aganst daylight bombers. And, despite somewhat inferior high-speed performance then the Me 262 (as the 280 wasn't meant for much more than 500 mph at altitude and .79 mach limit), it had excelent low to medium speed handeling (below 500 mph, best fit for 350-450 mph maneuvers, though lowere speeds should be good too). Such maneuverabillity would allow easier evasion (or engagement) of escort fighters and would be harder for bomber's gunner's to hit.

Atmittedly after early 1943, the Me-262 should be a better choice (assuming the 280 hasn't been improved) and HeS 006 should be available. Though with the 280 already in service and production, it may have been easier (training wise, and production wise) to fit the 280 with HeS 006 engines.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

And from a newsgroup, on the HeS 030 and 011

Heinkel Hirth despite not gaining a contract for its exceptional HeS
030 (also 109-006 and perhaps HeS 006) engine which used advanced
features such as a very efficient axial reaction as opposed to impulse
compressor and had variable inlet guide nozzle for the turbine and
which it is said had the lowest thrust to weight ratio, lowest frontal
area and best sfc of any engine till 1946 was forced to put its
resources into developing the RLM specified HeS 011 while BMW and
Junkers concentrated on first generation 'class 1' engines which was a
so called "class 2" engine with more thrust than the class 1 engines
(jumo 004, BMW003). In that regard there was a sort of attempt to
not duplicate effort in engines with the claim that Junkers was
further along in productionising their engine with realistic
quantities of refractory metals.

The engine they were forced to develop, the HeS 011, turned out to be
very important for the new generation of fighters that were to follow
the Me 262 so that the Luftwaffe had technical superiority over the
anticipated allied jet fighters but the imposition of a composite
'diagonal' or 'mixed flow' compressor (this is a centrifugal
compressor with its flow exit being axial into a stator) for the
first stage delayed the engine a . It was benching at 1150kg thrust
in early 1945 still short of the 1300kg spec for the HeS 011A and
hoped for 1500kg of the Hes 011B. Nevertheless the diagonal flow
compressor would have given the engine the best of both worlds in the
axial vs centrifugal compressor argument. Bad results showing
sooting caused by a turbine compressor mismatch. Fear of failure of
this engine seems to have encouraged the Jagerstab to provide some
kind of go ahead to BMW to produce the P.3306 which was a scaled up
BMW003. At the end of the war German metallurgists had developed new
alloys (eg at Haraeous Vacuum Scmeltze) that would have increased Jumo
004 engine life from 25 hours in the field to 150 hours in the field
or raised inlet temperatuers from 720C to about 800-860C but the true
situation of strategic materials was that variants of the P.3306 (and
I think HeS 011 as well) were to be given all steel (no chromium no
nickel) turbines that had only a 2 hour life, this was achieved by
lowering turbine inlet temperature to 650C through use of efficient
compressor design. In effect they were single at most two mission
disposable turbines.

Steel single-use turbine blades ... genius!
Kris

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the excerpts, Kris.

I don't see whats the fuss about engines having only 25 hours life. The plane could do 20 missions, 1 hour each, with one set of engines and then had the engines replaced. The plane would be more likely destroyed by enemy action before new set of engines would be mounted.

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of times the "life" of an engine was an 'average' life, not a guaranteed minimum life.

Say you are the one flying the plane in it's 20th hour, do you want engines that "average" 25 hours of life or engines that "average" 100hours

 

[tomo pauk]

In the peace time, or in military low-intensity tasks, 25 hours life of an engine borders with lunacy

Above Germany in 1944, 25 combat hours borders with eternity. At least for 90% if German pilots.

 

[Shortround6]

Fine, you be the pilot who's left engine turns out to be good for 45 hours while the right engine blows up it's turbine in hour #5.

25 hour average.

 

[tomo pauk]

45 hours???

...

I don't see whats the fuss about engines having only 25 hours life. The plane could do 20 missions, 1 hour each, with one set of engines and then had the engines replaced. The plane would be more likely destroyed by enemy action before new set of engines would be mounted.

Here, I've made it more easy for you to see.

 

[Shortround6]

Just what part of "A lot of times the "life" of an engine was an 'average' life, not a guaranteed minimum life."

aren't you getting?

you are assuming the 25hr was a guaranteed mininum life and every single Jummo 004 would make to 25 hrs with no problem.

If you can show me reference to this "minimum" life please do so.

Some modern piston engines are rated at 1400-2000hrs between overhauls depending on engine. Some have with inspections, gone hundreds of hours over this time. Others have cracked cylinders, broken pistons and even developed crankcase cracks while hundreds of hours short of making it to the "expected" life of the engine.

British Viper jet engines had two different "life" ratings in the 1950s. one rating a given level of thrust was was "manned use" and was If I remember right, 250 hrs. The other rating was for unmanned use, at a higher thrust rating but the life rating was 50hrs.
According to you all they had to do was run the engine at the higher thrust rating with manned aircraft and change the engine at 40 hrs and the men should have been safe.

 

[tomo pauk]

What's your problem?
Since SET of engines would be replaced after 20 hours by another SET of engines, the 21st mission would be flown with zero-hour engines on board.

Please quote my post(s) that I stated that 25 hrs was guaranteed lifetime of any engine.

 

[Milosh]

How many engines would be required to be able to changes engines every 25 hours?