Interesting read about fighter bombers in ETO

[vinnye]

La Baleine was the first ORS investigation of its type, and certainly
reflects the shortcomings of air-to-ground weapons against tanks.
Despite the craters none of the tanks or self-propelled guns had been
knocked out by bombs, and the number destroyed by rockets is
unimpressive. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of evidence
discovered by the ORS at la Baleine to suggest that air attack was
responsible, even if indirectly, for the disruption and abandonment of
the column, and that the German crews preferred to abandon or destroy
their armour rather than invite further air attack by attempting to
salvage combat-worthy tanks.

II. Mortain

Similar evidence of German tanks being abandoned under air attack is
seen in the example of the only large-scale German armoured offensive
mounted in Normandy. Early on the morning of 7 August 1944, the strike
force of XLVII Panzer Corps, the 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 2nd Panzer
divisions, attacked positions held by the US 30th and 9th Infantry
divisions near Mortain with the ultimate objective of reaching the
Cotentin coast at Avranches and cutting off American armoured
spearheads from their supplies. Although tank strength was depleted
after weeks of heavy fighting the Germans mustered 70 Panthers, 75 Mk
IVs, and 32 self-propelled guns for the attack. By noon on 7 August
they were within nine miles of Avranches after penetrating the front
of 30th Division to a depth of about three miles. Having arrived in
Mortain only the day before, 30th Division had nothing but its 57 mm
towed anti-tank guns and 3 inch gun tank-destroyers with which to
engage the German tanks at close range. Despite its determined
defence, the credit for bringing the German attack to a decisive halt
on the afternoon of 7 August is generally regarded as belonging to
Allied fighter-bombers, particularly the RAF Typhoons, which were
called to intervene.

The response of the Allied tactical air forces to the German attack
was swift. The Typhoons of No.83 Group RAF were made available, and
plans co-ordinated directly between the headquarters of No.83 Group
and IX Tactical Air Command. Rocket Typhoons were to engage the German
tanks, while American fighter-bombers were to attack transport moving
to and from the battle area. The Ninth Air Force was also to provide a
fighter screen to intercept German aircraft, a vital task as the
Luftwaffe had planned to make an all-out effort to support the attack
with some 300 planes. The German command had relied upon fog,
prevalent on previous days and which had been forecast for 7 August,
to protect their armoured spearheads from air observation and attack,
but at about 11 am that day the fog over the battle area began to
clear.

At about midday the first Typhoons took off for the American sector
from their advanced landing grounds, and went into action just before
1 p.m. against a concentration of some 60 tanks and 200 vehicles
observed along a hedge-lined road near Mortain. The tanks, some
heavily camouflaged, were grouped closely together as if unprepared
for the rapid lifting of the fog. After overflying at low level to
confirm them as German, the Typhoons commenced dive attacks upon the
front and rear of the column, which was immediately brought to a halt.
The pilots observed that their attacks caused great confusion, and saw
German tank crews bailing out and running for cover regardless of
whether or not their tanks were left blocking the road. Also at this
time the first American fighter-bombers arrived in the area, with
P-47s, including the squadron equipped with rockets, attacking German
transport.

 

[vinnye]

The weather remained clear and between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. flights of
five or six Typhoons were taking off roughly every 20 minutes to
attack, returning to refuel and rearm before setting off again for
Mortain. As the afternoon wore on the pilots found the task of
locating the German tanks increasingly difficult due to their
dispersion and to clouds of dust and smoke in the battle area, but the
forward movement of the German attack had been halted. By the end of
the day No.83 Group had flown 294 sorties and IX Tactical Air Command
200 sorties in the Mortain area. Three Typhoons and pilots had been
lost. Though the level of flak had initially been light, it had
increased during the day with box-like patterns being put up over the
tanks, and many of the Typhoons were found to have suffered damage
from this and small-arms fire.

German accounts clearly attribute the failure of their attack on 7
August to the fighter-bombers. The commander of 2nd Panzer Division,
von Luttwitz, later recalled that his tanks had made a swift advance
of about ten miles when suddenly the fighter-bombers appeared,

They came in hundreds, firing their rockets at the
concentrated tanks and vehicles. We could do nothing
against them and we could make no further progress.

Hans Speidel, then the Chief of Staff of the German Army Group B,
later wrote of Mortain that

it was possible for the Allied air forces alone to wreck
this Panzer operation with the help of a well co-ordinated
ground-to-air communication system.

The German troops received no air support on 7 Aug. Their aircraft
attempting to reach the battle area were intercepted by strong
American fighter patrols and none reached within 40 miles of Mortain.
Although fighting continued in the area for several days, with Mortain
being recaptured by American forces on 12 August, the Germans made no
further attempt to reach Avranches after 7 August. Typhoons took no
part in the battle after that date, with responsibility for air
support reverting to the IX Tactical Air Command. The claims made by
the Allied fighter-bomber pilots for the period 7 - 10 August are
impressive, and are shown below:

ALLIED FIGHTER-BOMBER CLAIMS, 7 - 10 AUGUST 1944

Probably
Armour Destroyed Destroyed Damaged Total
2nd TAF 8 35 21 140
9th AF 69 8 35 112

Motor Ttansport
2nd TAF 54 19 39 112
9th AF 94 1 21 116

 

[vinnye]

Yet these claims are misleading and cannot be substantiated. During
12 - 20 August the Mortain battle area was examined by two separate
British ORS teams; No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF. No German vehicles were
missed by the investigation as the areas was not extensive; moreover
the area was examined from an observation aircraft at low level with
no further vehicles discovered. The destruction attributed to various
weapons can be tabulated as shown in the following table, which is a
compilation of both the RAF and Army reports:

DESTRUCTION ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS WEAPONS,
MORTAIN AREA, AUGUST 1944

FORM OF DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALISATION
Cannon/ Aband.
TYPE Rockets MG Bomb intact Crew US Army Unknown Total

Panther 5 - 1 6 4 14 3 33
Mk IV 2 - 1 1 - 5 1 10
SP Guns - - - - - 1 2 3
Arm.Troop Carr. 7 4 - 1 - 3 8 23
Arm.Cars 1 - - 1 - 5 1 8
Arm Recov.Veh. - - - - - 1 - 1
88 mm Guns - - - - - 1 1 2
75 mm Guns - - - - - 1 - 1
50 mm Guns - - - 1 - - - 1
Cars 2 2 - - - 4 3 11
Lorries - 6 - 1 1 2 20 30
Ambulances - 2 - 2 - - 1 5
Motor Cycles - - - 1 1 1 2 4
_____________________________________________________________________
Totals 17 14 2 14 5 38 42 132

This shows that a total of only 46 German tanks and self-propelled
guns were actually found in the battle area, and of these only nine
were considered to have been destroyed by air weapons.

It was not possible to discriminate between victims of British and
American aircraft as the latter had also fired some 600 rockets. Many
of the 'unknown causes' were found some distance from any sign of air
attack - such as cannon and machine gun strikes on the ground and
rocket or bomb craters - and could not be considered as possible air
victims. An obvious question is whether the Germans had been able to
recover any of their tanks. The presence of a German tank recovery
vehicle would seem to confirm they had but, while it is likely that
some tanks were recovered, this can hardly be an adequate explanation
for the discrepancy between air claims and the destruction found.
Armoured and motor vehicles destroyed by air weapons were invariably
burnt out, and for recovery purposes damaged and abandoned vehicles
had priority over such. German prisoners, many of whoom were
questioned on this subject, consistently stated that burnt out tanks
were never salvaged. In effect, a tank hit by a rocket or bomb was not
worth recovering and the ORS should have found what was left of it.

 

[vinnye]

Another question is whether German accounts of the fighting can shed
more light on the number of tanks and vehicles destroyed by air
attack. The histories of the German divisions that fought at Mortain,
compiled post-war, stress how decisive the intervention of the
fighter-bombers had been, but are ambiguous with regard to the
question of losses. That of the 2nd Panzer Division states of the
Typhoons that they attacked with great accuracy and succeeded in
knocking out even the heaviest tanks, but the number of tanks actually
lost in this way is not given. The history of the 1st SS Panzer
Division (LAH) is similarly unclear as to the actual number of tanks
knocked out from the air, though it implies that the number was
considerable and quotes an account of the air attacks by a panzer
grenadier who recalled seeing many black oil clouds indicating the
position of destroyed tanks. Also quoted is a panzer grenadier officer
who, after describing how a fighter-bomber shot down by flak crashed
onto a tank and put it out of action, adds that most of the other
tanks and armoured personnel carriers also fell victim to the intense,
hour-long, low-level attacks. Yet such German accounts attributing
heavy tank and vehicle losses to air attack are misleading. They take
little cognizance of the losses inflicted by US ground forces which,
though almost certainly overestimated at the time in the confusion of
battle, were none the less considerable. American accounts of the
fighting indicate that, on 7 August, the forward troops of the US 30th
and 9th Divisions claimed the destruction of at least eighteen German
tanks, fourteen of them by the 30th Division's attached 823rd Tank
Destroyer Battalion alone. Moreover, the ORS confirmed that US troops
accounted for more heavy German armour than the fighter-bombers, the
destruction of twenty of the total of forty-six tanks and SP guns
found being attributed to US ground weapons.

The principal reason why such German accounts should be regarded with
caution, however, is that they provide no explanation as to what had
become of the tanks and vehicles destroyed by the fighter-bombers by
the time the ORS examined the battle area. Nor do they explain the not
inconsiderable number of tanks found abandoned or destroyed by their
own crews. To some extent, German attribution of tank losses to air
attack may stem from the confusion of battle, but it may also suggest
both a reluctance to acknowledge the morale effect of such attack, and
a desire to ascribe the halting of the armoured thrust, which was much
in the nature of a forlorn hope, to Allied air power rather than to
defeat at the hands of US ground forces.

 

[vinnye]

Despite the toll taken of the German armour by US ground weapons, the
commanders of the US units engaged on 7 August later confirmed that it
was the fighter-bombers that brought the German thrust to a halt. At
the time of the ground survey, a member of ORS 2nd TAF visited the
headquarters of the US 9th Division's 39th Infantry Regiment. He was
told by the Commander how the German attack had cut off part of his
regiment from its headquarters and how his anti-tank guns had been
insufficient to halt such a large number of tanks. He also told how he
had remained 'vulnerable and anxious' until Typhoons arrived to attack
the German spearhead. A visit was also made to the Commander of the
30th Division's 117th Infantry Regiment, which had been in the path of
the 2nd Panzer and 1st SS Panzer Divisions on 7 August. He recalled
that when the mist lifted at about 12.30,

Thunderbolt and Typhoon aircraft came in immediately and
attacked, Typhoons attacking for what seemed to him to be
about two hours. This, added to the resistance of the ground
forces, stopped the thrust.

Such appreciation of the close air support on 7 August is significant
in view of the tendency of Allied aircraft to attack friendly
positions inadvertently in what was a very fluid ground battle. The US
30th Division recorded that the Typhoons and P-47s often attacked its
positions, the 120th Regiment alone receiving ten such attacks during
the day.

Given the lack of tank destruction by air weapons, the undoubted
effectiveness of the sustained fighter-bomber assault on 7 August must
have been largely the result of completely disrupting the German
attack by compelling tanks to seek cover or their crews to abandon
them. The level of destruction attributed to air weapons by the ORS is
too insignificant to have been decisive, and even if the unknown
causes for destruction of both armour and motor transport were added
to the air attack totals the number would not be a quarter of those
claimed. Yet no fewer than ten of the 33 Panthers found, or 30 per
cent, had been abandoned or destroyed by their own crews. This was an
important discovery at that time, and a contemporary RAF tactical
study stressing the demoralising effect of the 3-inch rocket (RP)
projectile offered this explanation for the German abandonment of
tanks and vehicles at Mortain:

Interrogation of prisoners has shown without question
that German tank crews are extremely frightened of
attacks by RP...Crews are very aware that if an RP
does hit a tank, their chance of survival is small.
It is admitted that the chances of a direct hit are
slight; nevertheless, this would hardly be appreciated
by a crew whose first thought would be of the disastrous
results if a hit was obtained.

Prisoner of war data further confirmed the demoralising effect of air
attack upon tank crews. German tank crewmen questioned for the later
joint RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness indicated an
irrational compulsion among inexperienced men to leave the relative
safety of their tank and seek alternative cover during air attack:

The experienced crews stated that when attacked from the
air they remained in their tanks which had no more than
superficial damage (cannon strikes or near misses from
bombs). They had a great difficulty in preventing the in-
experienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked.

It is certainly plausible that tank crews under a heavy scale of air
attack would be induced to bale out, despite the interior of the tank
being possibly the safest place to be, and in this way the bombs and
rockets did not need to strike the tanks to be effective. When asked
for an opinion by the ORS on the number of abandoned tanks in the
Mortain battle area, an experienced NCO of a US anti-tank unit
replied,
There is nothing but air attack that would
make a crack Panzer crew do that.

 

[drgondog]

Be careful with the interpretation. All of the Mustangs of 8th and 9th AF were 95% dedicated to CAS ot tactical bombing escort and patrol in June... probaly 75% in July and 50% in August.

Lot of losses to flak in that time frame.

 

[Maxrobot1]

I always like d the P-47. For severl years I worked building aircraft instruments in a shop two blocks North or the Republic plant in Farmingdale, L.I., N.Y. Then they were making A-10s and on warm days the big doors were open and the green painted sub assemblies could be seen from the road. A mamber of my small target -shooting gun club was a P-47 pilot and told a few stories including about when he was sent to be a ground liason.
Interesting about the tankers bailing. Reading the armor forums they would have us believe that German tankers were hardy fearless types who ate Shermans for breakfast!