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Indeed. Presumably the IJ Army had a plan to keep the military and economy fueled and fed. Otherwise there's no point in seizing Russia's eastern barren wastelands.Fuel comes from the USA, the Dutch East Indies, and from Russia. None of this goes to Japan.
First geography.Indeed. Presumably the IJ Army had a plan to keep the military and economy fueled and fed. Otherwise there's no point in seizing Russia's eastern barren wastelands.
Hokushin-ron was largely supported by the Imperial Japanese Army. General Kenkichi Ueda was a strong believer in the Hokushin-ron policy since he believed that Japan's main enemy was communism and that Japan's destiny lay in conquest of the natural resources of the sparely-populated Northern Asian mainland. Northward expansion (Hokushin-ron) would gain the natural resources of Siberia by attacking the Soviet Union via Manchuria.
Sakhalin Island has the most important oil reserves in the Russian Far East. In 1936, the Ohka oil wells extracted about 470,000 tonnes; one-third were obtained for Japanese concessionaires. In the Emba River area about 466,000 tonnes were extracted from about 20 pits of a total of 300 yaciments in 1937.
Japan decides to steel the lot.
Same goes for the go south policy. The Japanese seized the DEI oil fields as they intended, but they had no plan on how to refine and get the oil to where it was needed, proving unable to do either even before the USN submarines began sinking all the oil tankers. But we're going to get bogged down in the feasibility discussion.The go north policy would give Japan a severe timetable to achieve a win or a two front war.
We have been over this before. Japan did have a plan. They did implement it (despite the loss of some of the oil field personnel on the Taiyo Maru in May 1942 which casused some delay). And most of the DEI refineries were brought back on line. And it was late 1943 before Allied policy was changed to focus on Japanese tanker traffic. In 1942 they actually managed to increase the size of their tanker fleet.Same goes for the go south policy. The Japanese seized the DEI oil fields as they intended, but they had no plan on how to refine and get the oil to where it was needed, proving unable to do either even before the USN submarines began sinking all the oil tankers. But we're going to get bogged down in the feasibility discussion.
If IJA is going to help Hitler, they don't have to fight but deploy 700K troops along the Manchuria-Soviet border until Hitler wins like IJA attempted in July, 1941. Eastern Soviet territory will be given to Japan after that. If IJN wants to help, they can block the Maritime Province of Siberia.I think we've covered off the reasons why the northern attack wouldn't, couldn't or shouldn't have occurred. Let's now consider the impact on the IJ Air Force and naval air service had Japan gone ahead with the IJA's strike north move regardless.
If only Japan knew they had oil within their own territory, plus that in Korea.Since this is an ATL, and i like trying to imagine reasonable scenarios to get to such ATLs, i would suggest finding the manchurian oil in the 1930s, either Daqing or Liaohe, as a way to get to this strike north scenario. This way Japan has at least as much oil as OTL except from within it's territory, there's no immediate need to get the DEI oil and go to war with US/UK even if there is an embargo, hence striking north is much more plausible.
I agree... With Manchurian oil, and oil PURCHASED from DEI on a long-term basis (before things heated up), Japan would not have had to attack US/UK... But it still leaves it fighting a messy war in China with their militaristic, racist, imperialistic government still in power... Maybe the Pacific War "had" to happen for that ugly boil to be lanced... Hard to see a kinder, gentler Japan resulting from anything less than total defeat...Since this is an ATL, and i like trying to imagine reasonable scenarios to get to such ATLs, i would suggest finding the manchurian oil in the 1930s, either Daqing or Liaohe, as a way to get to this strike north scenario. This way Japan has at least as much oil as OTL except from within it's territory, there's no immediate need to get the DEI oil and go to war with US/UK even if there is an embargo, hence striking north is much more plausible.
things had been going down hill since 1931 if not before. July 1937 really heated things up.I agree... With Manchurian oil, and oil PURCHASED from DEI on a long-term basis (before things heated up), Japan would not have had to attack US/UK... But it still leaves it fighting a messy war in China with their militaristic, racist, imperialistic government still in power... Maybe the Pacific War "had" to happen for that ugly boil to be lanced... Hard to see a kinder, gentler Japan resulting from anything less than total defeat...
Sort of reminds me of the movie "The Sand Pebbles" although the Japanese were not in it yet.things had been going down hill since 1931 if not before. July 1937 really heated things up.
Sinking the USS Panay on Dec 12th 1937 didn't help things.
By the mid-1930s, the US had around 2,400 ground troops in China, with 528 Marines on station in Beijing, 785 Army troopers posted to Tientsin, and 1,100 Marines stationed at Shanghai. 4 In addition, units of the US Asiatic Fleet regularly visited Chinese ports, with Admiral Yarnell's flagship the Augusta (a heavy cruiser) anchored conspicuously at Shanghai's Battleship Row throughout the summer and fall of 1937. Lastly, the riverine gunboats of the US Yangtze Patrol provided a reassuring presence deep into the interior of China for the scattered American missionary outposts, schools, trading enclaves and businesses strung out along South China's major trade corridor, the Yangtze River.
Now we can argue about if the US was pissed that the Japanese were poaching America's "unofficial" colony or not but there is little doubt that the Japanese were much more brutal in their treatment of the Chinese. The League of Nations had shown that they were powerless to do anything about just about any countries aggression to any other nation.
As a side note some of the Marines at Guadalcanal were "old China Hands" as were some men in the Army 15th Infantry Regiment although the 15th was withdrawn after the Panay incident and was later used in Morocco and Europe. Audie Murphy severed with the 15th.
Sort of reminds me of the movie "The Sand Pebbles" although the Japanese were not in it yet.
USS Augusta (CA-31) was often present at historic events. Her China service would have been some of the most exciting foreign service in the interwar USN. Followed by FDR hosting Churchill aboard CA-31 for the Atlantic Conference in Newfoundland in April 1941. As an aside, Newfoundland was not yet part of Canada, and was a British colony until 1949. Then embarking General Patton for Operation Torch in Nov 1942, followed by hosting King George VI for lunch with Admiral Kirk. In Jan 1945, CA-31 again embarked President Roosevelt for the trip back to the US following the Yalta Conference. And then in July 1945, CA-31 again conveyed VIPs, in President Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes, and Fleet Admiral Leahy to the Potsdam Conference, where enroute General Eisenhower joined ship. Lastly, in Aug 1945, Truman hosted a repeat of KGVIs visit to the ship. If there was ever a USN presidential flagship it's CA-31.the US Asiatic Fleet regularly visited Chinese ports, with Admiral Yarnell's flagship the Augusta (a heavy cruiser) anchored conspicuously at Shanghai's Battleship Row throughout the summer and fall of 1937.
If Japan stops moving south further into China (and maybe even draws back a bit) in order to supply men, etc for the push into the USSR, the US may well loosen the embargo - especially if the IJN is also diverted from the southern areas to service the move northwest and mostly stays around the East China Sea/Yellow Sea/Sea of Japan/Okhotsk Sea.First geography.
But it is not just getting oil. It is about getting enough oil to meet Japan's needs both military and civilian.
Very roughly there are about 6.42 barrels of oil per ton of oil. So 470,000 + 466,000 = 936,000 tons = appox 6.0 million barrels per year.
The Japanese produced 3 studies of their oil position between June and Dec 1941 for the first 3 years of the war. These took account of both their own domestic production (which they anticipated expanding but would still only have reached about 4.5 million barrels by 1944) and consumption by the IJA/IJN/civilians. The estimated consumption figures to Sept each year are as follows:-
1941/42: 33 - 38 million barrels
1942/43: 31 - 35 million barrels
1943/44: 30 - 35 million barrels
IJN consumption formed about 50% of that consumption. 1941/42 was higher as they were assuming the "decisive battle" with the USN would occur. And even then some of the later estimates did not include all consumption. Even with the reserves they had in 1941 the conclusion was that with the ongoing US/British/Dutch embargo they would be out of oil in about two years.
So any oil from those two Russian sources hardly makes a dent in the Japanese oil problem. Even if you park up the entire Japanese navy, you don't solve the oil problem, merely prolong the agony unless something drastic happens politically, like a Soviet collapse giving access to oil in the Caucasus, but Germany also wants that.