Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941

[Nikademus]

A couple of questions .

Where is the fuel coming from for this adventure? Seeing as how in the real world, Japan needed allied forces crippled in Asia so they could take over oilfields in Burma and Indonesia. How is Japan going to fuel their war machine ? Also where are they getting their steel, or iron ore ?

Same place they got their resources when the "Move South" plan was initiated....their Reserves.

Also since a large portion of the Japanese army was involved in China during the real WW2, this new adventure against Russia will require a drawdown of forces from China. So Japan is fighing in Russia while a undefeated China does nothing ? I don't think so.

Not necessarily. Japan managed to build the Kwangtung Army to peak strength in Manchuria in 42 when a preposed invasion of Russia was actively contemplated (but eventually shelved). Ideally, they SHOULD scale back or withdrawl completely as they envisioned, but its admittedly unlikely. Chiang wasn't going to do squat either way. His biggest goals were preserving his power base and making his "allies" do all the real fighting. He also had a historical tendancy to be more concerned over what Mao was doing along with certain problem Warlords as well as members of his own corrupt regime. China (aka the KMT) would be unlikely to do anything other than reoccupy anything the IJA gives up to consolidate positions in order to reinforce Manchuria.

 

[RCAFson]

The Red Army in Siberia was also very strong prior to it being largely withdrawn to defeat the Germans at Moscow. It is possible that the Soviets might have defeated the Japanese Army to the point where a withdrawal of Soviet forces could still take place in time to save Moscow.

 

[tomo pauk]

(while I do acknowledge that OP asks specifically about air power)

If IJA goes with it's forces vs. Soviets, but ground forces remain in China, what does that gain for Japan? No boots, no territory - that would be much akin to BoB, with IJA flying over Amur, doing their damage, receiving some losses, with nothing to show for it. In the mean time, Chinese can harass Japanese ground troops at will. Unlikely at any rate.

Now, Japanese army abandons China to mount a invasion on Siberia, and they succeed (for the sake of discussion). What are the gains for Japan? Just another territory that need to be held, without any resources Japan may use. And while doing so, their oil reserves are cut thin. Why bother?

 

[davebender]

So was the Red Army in western Russia, at least on paper.

Red Army leadership was crippled by Stalin's purges. If you are going to fight the Soviet Union then 1938 to 1942 is the best possible time. Hit them while they are still in a state of Stalin induced leadership chaos.

 

[davebender]

That would never happen. China was Japan's highest priority from the 1890s right up to 1945.

 

[Nikademus]

That would never happen. China was Japan's highest priority from the 1890s right up to 1945.

Most likely yes. But not due to priority....rather pride. Frank McClynn recently pointed out that had the Army dominated government played it's cards smarter, they'd have aquiecsed to FDR's insistance on a "Free China" and focused on the SRA (South option). Conversely, such a maneuver would have allowed the North option more flexability. The author pointed out that economically speaking, China offered far less for Japan's needs than the SRA..or Manchuria for that matter....and the Russian threat, if eliminated (hypothetically speaking) would secure Manchuria and allow the Japanese to focus on Southern threats.

This is backed up by Edward Drea's analysis of the Imperial Japanese Army, which sought to disentangle itself from China by 43....assuming the concessions they wanted were granted. The Army leaders were not stupid (Stubborn....but not stupid) They realized China was their "Vietnam" and couldn't commit major ground troops there indefinately. The large troop presence, as pointed out in this thread, also put a cramp on the IJA's ability to respond to other situations and threats. Permanent occupation of China was never part of their plan.

 

[tyrodtom]

The move south was to replace those reserves they used in that move, the move north has no payback in oil, it just uses it.

I admit the Nationalist weren't much of a threat, but it Japan weakened it's army in China then Mao might see it as a opportunity.

 

[davebender]

KMT China tied down the bulk of the Japanese Army for about 15 years, simultaneously defeating Mao's communist forces. That meets my definition of a serious threat.

 

[tyrodtom]

Well if they are a threat, then that can't be good for Japan's plan for the move north.

And i'm not even going to comment on your other statement.

 

[Nikademus]

Japanese military policies were not directed solely by the quest for economic autarky. There were also questions of national defense and the protection of their existing empire 'as is'. Traditionally the Japanese Army saw Russia as the gravest threat to their national security while obviously....the Imperial Navy saw the United States as it's most likely and dangerous threat. In terms of economics, Manchuria represented to many Japanese as their equivilent to the American Frontier in the West. It had vast resources and lebensram for future settlers and the Japanese Army was paranoid about Russian encroachment (of which there was alot.......border clashes being so prominent and regular...one which turned into Nomanhan in 39)

Eventually the Imperial GHQ split on the North vs South strategy. Nomanhan obviously had an influence here as prior to that the Army held the Russians in contempt. It could also be argued (and was by "northerners") that that incident only proved that Russia was the greatest threat to Japanese security.

Point being, moving north wasn't about securing Oil (other than the oil in Manchuria that is), it was about securing Japan's flank. For US citizens....imagine Canada as a great armed dictatorship with a big standing army. But there are also naval threats to deal with. Which gets priority? which is the most likely to boil over? Hypothetically speaking, a weakened/eliminated USSR (with German help of course) would have been of great benefit to Japan militarily speaking.....had all the cards gone the way it was theorized.

re: Mao....assuming Japan got what it wanted from Chiang and pulled back or out......it would be Chiang's problem. Mao was pretty smart. Without a Japanese invader to focus on, he might have been willing to cut a deal with Japan. All speculative of course.

 

[RCAFson]

So was the Red Army in western Russia, at least on paper.

Red Army leadership was crippled by Stalin's purges. If you are going to fight the Soviet Union then 1938 to 1942 is the best possible time. Hit them while they are still in a state of Stalin induced leadership chaos.

How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?

 

[Juha]

Hello
One important aspect in Japanese eagerness to subdue China was that they needed it as a market for their industry, that became especially important after the WWI and during and after the Great Depression, when at first Chinese and later European amd US markets were closed to Japanese products which caused unemployment and social restlessness in Japan. That got Japanese leading circles to think that they needed a secure large market area for their products, to which role they thought China would fit perfectly.

Juha

 

[Juha]

How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?

Very good and important question.

Juha

 

[Nikademus]

Very good and important question.

Juha

And one hard to explain in one or two paragraphs. Coxx's book afterall was over 700 pages! In a nutshell.....The USSR won because Stalin and Zhukov committed themselves to this battle whereas the Kwangtung Army HQ never realized what was developing and treated the situation as more of a typical border incident vs. the major brew haha that the USSR percieved it to be. Stalin wanted to make a statement......and Zhukov, so authorized committed his forces more decisively and brought in the logistics to support his goals. It hardly went all rosy for him and his forces but in the end their side 'achieved' it's objectives. The Japanese committed primarily a new and green division (The 23rd) which also was a smaller new triangular style division which in turn committed it's forces piecemeal, including at the end a couple regimental groups from another Div. Logistics and firepower wise, committment was peacemeal.

Despite this the battle resulted in comprable casualties. But the "victory" was not about losses.....it was about objectives. Thats why even the IJA admitted that it had "lost" the battle. They didn't achieve their objectives while the Russians and their Mongolian allies sat on the contested terrain. Confusion over just what was going on around Nomanhan extended all the way back to GHQ in Tokyo which butted heads with the Kwangtung Army staff officers.

One should also keep in mind that while Nomanhan was the biggest and most well known "border clash" between Japan and Russia, there were others, and Russia didn't win all of em and all were fairly bloody for both sides. So both sides ended up having a grudging respect for the others......save for the most hotheaded Kwangtun Midgrade Staff Officers who continued to rattle their sabres.

 

[Juha]

IIRC SU won if not all then almost all of those border clashes. And on Khalkhin Gol, in fact Soviet kept it local, they didn't began the conflict and didn't attack clearly Manchurian areas, on the other hand Japanese began the conflict and also tried to invade areas in Mongolia proper. And Kwantung Army committed almost every means they had to spare, they committed them peacemeal, yes, but they sent there their tank regiment, that attack didn't went well and their HQ heavy artillery units. Plus of course one regiment fron 7th Div and sundry other units.

Juha

 

[davebender]

Japan wanted to control China by keeping it weak and divided into small states ruled by warlords. That simply isn't compatible with the KMT who wanted a unified China. For that matter it isn't compatible with Mao either. The difference is that Mao was a military weakling prior to 1945 and so posed no threat to Japanese control.

 

[Nikademus]

Japan wanted to control China by keeping it weak and divided into small states ruled by warlords. That simply isn't compatible with the KMT who wanted a unified China. For that matter it isn't compatible with Mao either. The difference is that Mao was a military weakling prior to 1945 and so posed no threat to Japanese control.

I'm not sure the Japanese 'Northerners' quite knew themselves what they wanted out of China proper. Certainly they wanted official recognition of Manchukuo by the Chinese and other nations. When midline staff officers triggered the invasion of China proper it was expected that Chiang would give in to their demands allowing them to withdrawl. Didn't happen. Chiang just withdrew into the interior and fed off US lend lease.

Obviously they wanted a China favorably disposed towards them....who didn't. Most foreign powers wanted China to be if not weak....then at least subsidiary. Roosevelt allegedly (per a recent author) wanted to prop up Chiang's regime as the premier Asian power in the region who would of course....be favorably disposed economically towards the US. Basic point....everyone wanted something. Britian wanted to maintain the status quo of it's own empire. Certainly Japan wanted to do the same. By 1943 they certainly wanted "out" militarily. Permanent occupation as I mentioned, was never in their plans...outside of Manchukuo that is.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?"

Better tanks, more planes, they didn't underestimate their enemy (Japan), better leadership, AND, there had been minor incursions in the areas before ... so the Soviets were prepared. They had the artillery range mapped for all the ground the Japanese took, and punished them. It was June and there only a few hours of darkness in which the Japanese could operate.

The Japanese command hoped that Communist Russia would stumble and be swamped .. it didn't happen. Stalin put Zhukov in charge and removed all political interference.

Russia was strong in 1939 and industrialized ....

(all sources, Alvin Coox, Nomonhan)

MM

 

[Jenisch]

How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?

First, I will post a part of the foreword of J. Edward Drea's book, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939:

Today the U.S. Army stresses the concept of fighting outnumbered and winning. To achieve that difficult feat of arms will require thorough preparation and intensive, realistic training before the first battle of the next war. This account of how the Imperial Japanese Army prepared for its "'first battle"' should help us profit from the Japanese experience against a formidable Soviet enemy. While it points out errors, it also identifies several Japanese strengths which almost prevailed against the greatest concentration of armor and mechanized forces then known.


Now, a synopsis from the book:

Before World War II, the Irnperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe. the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June through August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2 /28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces.

In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K- Zhukov When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine dictated that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units. including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines.

The 2/28th Infantry's War Diary provides a vivid day-by-day account of its combat operations. This in turn allows the examination of how the Japanese applied their tactical doctrine on the battlefield_ The datednose tried to use an aggressive tactical doctrine to compensate for materiel and equipment deficiencies in their army. Such an approach was successful as long as the Japanese could conduct bold offensive operations. When they were forced to adopt a defensive posture. however. discrepancies between tactical doctrine and battlefield reality became apparent_ These problems. applicable to any army, highlight fundamental difficulties of force structure, preconceptions of potential enemy capabilities. and the role of doctrine in a combat environment. An examination of small unit tactics is particularly useful to illustrate, the dynamics of doctrine as expressed on the battlefield.

Another point:

While the overwhelming Soviet qualitative and quantitative materiel superiority ultimately defeated the Japanese at Nomonhan. the defeat cannot be ascribed to materiel deficiencies alone, A tactical doctrine designed for infantrymen that stressed offensive action to achieve a quick victory was pitted against a doctrine which emphasized combined arms and protracted warfare. The Japanese decision to fight a war of attrition against the superior Soviet Red Army was, in retrospect, a mistake.

Air power (which I will enter in detail later):

The IJA remained an infantryheavy force, It always lacked sufficient armor because armor was unaffordable (actually, the Japanese changed their mind about this later). Japanese strategic thought opted for the aircraft.

Source: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp

My conclusions:

* As already mentioned in the text, the IJA showed great inflexibility in this battle, pressing it forward even after realized it didn't enjoyed advantages it belived to have, such as in artillery.

* The IJA disregarded Intelligence, and was caught by a massive enemy pincer offensive. This offensive consisted of three tank brigades and two mechanized brigades (with infantry support). The entire Sovit force consisted of three rifle divisions, two tank divisions and two more tank brigades. About 500 BT-5 and B-7 tanks, two motorized infantry divisons, and over 550 fighters and bombers. The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.

By contrast, at the point of attack the Kwantung Army had only Lieutenant General Michitarō Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions.

Source: Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Zhukov's offensive was a surprise and massive. If the Japanese had attack him in the same way with a similar force, it's possible that he would be defeated as well. This can be boosted by Drea's mention of the IJA offensive actions in the first quote his book I bolded: "which almost prevailed..."

* While the Red Air Force eventually overcomed the Japanese Army Air force with quantity, better tactics and aircraft, the Japanese didn't explored their air power advantage, specially in the first two months when it existed. As Drea points out, the IJA realied heavily in aircraft. One of the reasons it lacked modern equipment. When when this advantage was lost, in sum with the others, the situation could not have been worse. The non employment of the air force in the enemy's rear was also a preponderant factor for Zhukov's offensive be succesfull, because not only his supplies could arrive without aerial interference, but any interference of Japanese aircraft to spot any discrepancys from what he was doing existed at all.

Therefore, I don't see the quality of the IJA as being a critical problem for an invasion of the USSR in 1941. The Japanese (the Kwantung Army more precisely), lost in Nomonhan by it's own mistakes. After the Nomonhan fight, the Army started several modernization programs, with the artillery school receiving a lot of attention. The IJA got rid of it's stereotypes of the Soviets, and was much better prepared to fight them in a new conflict. Specially if this conflict had ocurred in 1941, with the USSR hard pressed by the Germans, and the decisive theater of operations being the hilly and treeless Eastern Manchuria terrain, much more suitable to IJA tactics even before Nomonhan. They would also count with the IJN to dominate the coast and provide logistics and air support, as well as conduct amphibious landings in strategical locations.

I belive the Nomonhan Incident could have changed history, in the sense the IJA lost prestige and the IJN took over. I already read this in some sources, and also that the Emperor was furious with the Army because Nomonhan, and more so because it iniciated an undeclared war without authorization than from the defeat itself. Because in the military field, the Japanese seems to have lost only by their incompetence in try continue a conflict when it was clear they need to pull out to make some adjustments.

 

[Jenisch]

I also would like to mention that the Japanese, despite their problems, really start to develop some excellent modern equipment by the time the Pacific war broke out.

Some tanks:

Type 4 Chi-To - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Type 3 Chi-Nu - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Type 4 Chi-To - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

They also adopted the Type 100 sub machine gun by 1942, had projects of APC's, projects to produce German weaponry and other things.

It's also worth to remember they started to develop "modern" aircraft (by the Western standards) before the war started. The Ki-84 fighter, the A7M fighter, the Ki-67 bomber. All started to be projected before the war.

The problem with Japan in my view was that with it's economy and military resources, it was not enough to wage war with the minimum of safety against China and the US and Britain. It was simple too much for them. The United States was the main problem of course. It was really a shame for them that they (and Hitler) underestimated the American potental.