Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941

[michaelmaltby]

".... there's no conclusive evidence showing they really did this. This thesis is held by Western and Russian historians per deduction. I do not doubt the Japanese did take this course, but also thinking in obtain resources for a possible showdown with the Soviets later."


First: the question you posed is NOT on Coox's agenda in the book, "Nomonhan".

Second: there is definitive intelligence on what the Japanese were thinking: Richard Sorge (Stalin's German spy in Japan).

[from Wikipedia]

"... Sorge transmitted information toward the end of September 1941 that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union in the East.

"This information made possible the transfer of Soviet divisions from the Far East, although the presence of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria necessitated the Soviet Union's keeping a large number of troops on the eastern borders..."

MM

 

[Jenisch]

".... there's no conclusive evidence showing they really did this. This thesis is held by Western and Russian historians per deduction. I do not doubt the Japanese did take this course, but also thinking in obtain resources for a possible showdown with the Soviets later."


First: the question you posed is NOT on Coox's agenda in the book, "Nomonhan".

Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 - Alvin D. Coox - Google Livros

Page 1052.

Second: there is definitive intelligence on what the Japanese were thinking: Richard Sorge (Stalin's German spy in Japan).

Sorge provided what he found to be likely info for 1941 and 1942 (in case the Germans captured Stalingrad).

Here's two sources that contradicts Coox thesis:

The oil supply problem resulting from the embargo was so severe (a supply of 800 million liters per year vs. 5,400 required), that a quick resolution by military or diplomatic means was essential. The Army calculated that on the basis of oil supply alone, resources were insufficient to simultaneously pursue conflicts in the south and the north. So plans for a war with the Soviet Union were shelved.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/south.htm

The World At War: Banzai! Japan 2/5 ::

Information provided at 8:36

True, the occupation of Southern Indochina was a consequence of the South Group policy, which perhaps was because Nomonhan. But even if was, this was not the only reason. Hitler's pact with Stalin and non warning of the Barbarossa were apparenly just as decisive.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Here's two sources that contradicts Coox thesis..."

Your losing me, Jenisch ... what thesis do you claim Coox is advocating - certainly neither western or Soviet IMHO,

MM

 

[Jenisch]

"... Here's two sources that contradicts Coox thesis..."

Your losing me, Jenisch ... what thesis do you claim Coox is advocating - certainly neither western or Soviet IMHO,

MM

The Japanese didn't attack the Soviet Union by "fear". There's no conclusive evidence of this.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... The Japanese didn't attack the Soviet Union by "fear". There's no conclusive evidence of this."

Don't follow, Jenisch .... no one is claiming this .... however, the outcome of the 1904-05 Russo-Japan conflict made Japan complacent about Russian resolve .... the Communists weren't the Czarists however. Japan should have recognized "fear" of the Soviets ... but they didn't. [Having been beaten, Japan's next pick was the USA ... another misestimation].

MM

 

[parsifal]

Only just saw this thread, am late, so my apologies.

One needs to step back from this scenario and taker a long hard look at all the constraints and opportunities available to both sides. In no particular order here are a few observations I habe made over the years.

The Japanese Manchurian garrison was heavily outnumbered from 1937 right through to 1945, with one period in exception. The Soviet Far Eastern forces from 1939 numbered about 1.6 million men, dropping to about 900000 during June = December 1941. By extraordinary efforts by the local commanders, local manpower drafts were able to restor manpower levels to around 1.3million men in the Far East, though quality of the fillers was not nearly as good as the Siberian vets that had been pulled out of the Far Eastern Forces.

Japanese Manchurian garrisons were heavily outnumbered during most of that period....reached a peak of 1.1 million in 1945. Japan was on the Strategic Defensive from 1939-45, and were alsway worried about Soviet intentions. Soviets prepred for both defence and attack.

Despite their weaknesses in men and materiel, the hotheads in the Kwangtung Army had designs on Soviet Far Eastern provinces in 1939, and plans were under prepration for large scale attacks into Siberia. Sorge was feeding detailed information on Japanese plans and actions from 1937. The strike north group was in the first instance overrulled by the advocates of the Greater East Asia group of nutters (ie conquer China) and then the strike south group. Japan simly did not have the manpower or the military resources to fight the Chinese, AND the Soviets at the same time. As time progressed they didnt have the resources to fighht the Soviets alone.

If the Japanese had wanted to attack the Soviets the Styrike North Group needed a victory, that why Khalkin Gol is so important. For the Japanese to take on the Russians, they would have to not be involved in China in the first place. They would have to attack no later than Summer 1940, because any later their army is going to blown out of the water. No attack on China gives them access to oil etc, and a total of 40 divs to attack. The Japanese Army has not the logistic support to attack anywhere except on direction through the eastern provinces toward Vladivostock. They need Vladivostock as a point of suppy, but the port is one of the most heavily defended and fortified regions in the world....more heavily defended than the Maginot line. Seaborn assault is out of the question, the Japanese have only one option, through the flat lands of Mutanchiang....and this was also a heavily defended passage.

In all, Japan did not attack the USSR for good reason .....they could win such a fight.....and they knew it

 

[Jenisch]

They would have to attack no later than Summer 1940, because any later their army is going to blown out of the water.

You want to mean that even if the IJA was not in China in 1941, it didn't have a chance by lack of resources?

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... You want to mean that even if the IJA was not in China in 1941, it didn't have a chance by lack of resources?"

Yep! [in hindsight]

MM

 

[Jenisch]

".... You want to mean that even if the IJA was not in China in 1941, it didn't have a chance by lack of resources?"

Yep! [in hindsight]

MM

If the IJA was not in China, then I don't see much a way to the government put brakes in the Army after the Barbarossa. Stalin would take measures to counter this, but the problem would be how much Hitler would be benefited or not.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Help .....

MM

 

[Jenisch]

Help .....

MM

Ok Michael, will admit my pro Japanese sentiment and stop. The Soviet question was not lucrative. It was better take the resources in the Pacific from the "decadent" democracies and perhaps fight the reds later. Period.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... It was better take the resources in the Pacific from the "decadent" democracies and perhaps fight the reds later. "

An Island's got to do what an Island's got to do, Jenisch ..... ... there is, of course, a PRICE to pay for all behavior ... .

MM

 

[tyrodtom]

The Japanese Army couldn't even defeat China, a fight they chose.
China, a country that had practically no modern manufacturing base, all their arms and most of their supplies came from other countries. It seems they could chase the Nationalist all over China, but never pin down enough of them to decisively defeat them. Chiang Kai-shek was much more concerned about putting down the Communists than expelling the Japanese. I wonder how much success Japan would have had in China, if Chiang hadn't been fighting two wars, with the Japanese being the secondary threat?

If Japan couldn't even defeat a backward China, how could they even have any chance against a fairly modern, industrialized power like Russia.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Well said.

MM

 

[Zeke_Freak]

Apparently some IJN pilots that were training specifically for the Pearl Harbor attack were under the impression that they would be attacking the Soviets instead. With their experience in China they were primed for action. Overall, I think a Japanese invasion of the USSR at that time would have been effective in splitting red army concerns, probably lending more aid to German forces than doing much for Japan. The biggest effect IMO, would have been not being able to attack the US naval forces in Dec 1941, postponing the US entry into WWII. Probably the best approach would have been for Japan to back off in China, appeasing the US, then striking the USSR in conjunction with German forces.

 

[Zeke_Freak]

The Japanese Army couldn't even defeat China, a fight they chose.
China, a country that had practically no modern manufacturing base, all their arms and most of their supplies came from other countries.

Uhm... I think your understimating the sheer manpower China could field, not to mention the US had Japan in a resource 'choke hold'. All things considered, China was a much tougher proposition than you are suggesting. Meanwhile the USSR was relatively weak and recovering from Stalin's purges, with next to no navy, and virtually cut off from foreign aid, and they would be fighting on two fronts.

 

[tyrodtom]

I'm aware China had plenty of manpower, far more than they could ever begin to equip, sometimes more than they could even feed, without external help.

 

[RCAFson]

Uhm... I think your understimating the sheer manpower China could field, not to mention the US had Japan in a resource 'choke hold'. All things considered, China was a much tougher proposition than you are suggesting. Meanwhile the USSR was relatively weak and recovering from Stalin's purges, with next to no navy, and virtually cut off from foreign aid, and they would be fighting on two fronts.

The Red Navy was in a poor strategic position since it was divided amongst several main bases, but it was hardly "next to no navy":

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, cadre ships of the USSR Navy numbered 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 59 flotilla leaders and destroyers, 218 submarines, 269 torpedo-boats, 22 guard-ships, 88 mine-sweepers, 77 submarine-chasers and several other ships and boats as well as auxiliary vessels. 219 ships including 3 battleships, 2 heavy and 7 light cruisers, 45 destroyers and 91 submarines were under construction. In terms of their tactical characteristics and operational effectiveness the Soviet surface ships were up to foreign analogues with which foreign fleets were equipped. They were notable for their high speed parameters, proper safety characteristics, sufficient survivability, operability and unsinkability. These cruisers and destroyers were armed with highly-reliable long-range 180-mm and 130-mm artillery complexes.

The Soviet Navy at the Outbreak and During the Great Patriotic War: Introduction

The USSR received western aid and trade through 3 main ports, of which Vladivostok was only one.

 

[Shortround6]

Compared to even France or Italy (the "3"s of the 5-5-5-3-3 big Navys) the Soviet navy was distinctly second rate and due to the " divided amongst several main bases" which boils down to the Baltic fleet, the Black sea fleet and the Far East fleet the chances of concentrating what they did have was remote.
The 3 existing battleships date from before WW I in design and initial construction. Trying to get even one of them to the Far East would be a long and difficult task.

Of the 7 Cruisers 2-3 were old WW I types with 13cm guns in casements and on the broadside, of the 15 guns only 8-9 could actually fire in one direction at best. There was one odd ball with four 18cm guns in single turrets, two one each end of the ship and only 4 modern Kirov class cruisers. 2 in the Baltic, 2 in the Black sea and a further 2 still under construction in the Far East. The Soviets had nothing bigger than a Destroyer/leader in the Far East in 1940/41 and not many of them.

 

[bobbysocks]

ok so the japs didnt have the resources to fight in china and the ussr...so they keep china but abandon their interest in the ussr... and in doing so, set their sites on weaker nations....the us, the uk and all the commonwealth nations?? did they think the uk and the us were just going to give them up because the supply lines were long or something? with the ussr...you already kicked that bull in the ass once you are going have to keep your eye on it....namely now pin a substancial number of troops and machinery there "just in case". so you are already basically fighting on 2 fronts!! i just dont see how they could think that if they didnt have the resouces for war with the ussr they could successfully do battle with the us, uk and CW....for very long and win or keep it.

as for fighting in china...that is the same as fighting in the ussr. the sheer size of the land you have to occupy and subdue is staggering and a defensive weapon in and of itself as tyrodtom illuded to. the defending army can retreat hundreds of miles making the attacker out run it supply. EVEN if the attacker could execute a precision strike and capture the govenment....it would take forever to quell all the insurgencies. conversely, for the south pacific...the mass one would have to defend would be a tool for the attacker. the islands are isolated and supply extremely vunerable. to take and hold these you would have to have huge resources....which japan didnt but the allies did...although not at the onset of the war.