How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?
First, I will post a part of the foreword of J. Edward Drea's book, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939:
Today the U.S. Army stresses the concept of fighting outnumbered and winning. To achieve that difficult feat of arms will require thorough preparation and intensive, realistic training before the first battle of the next war. This account of how the Imperial Japanese Army prepared for its "'first battle"' should help us profit from the Japanese experience against a formidable Soviet enemy. While it points out errors, it also identifies several Japanese strengths which almost prevailed against the greatest concentration of armor and mechanized forces then known.
Now, a synopsis from the book:
Before World War II, the Irnperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe. the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June through August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2 /28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces.
In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K- Zhukov When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine dictated that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units. including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines.
The 2/28th Infantry's War Diary provides a vivid day-by-day account of its combat operations. This in turn allows the examination of how the Japanese applied their tactical doctrine on the battlefield_ The datednose tried to use an aggressive tactical doctrine to compensate for materiel and equipment deficiencies in their army. Such an approach was successful as long as the Japanese could conduct bold offensive operations. When they were forced to adopt a defensive posture. however. discrepancies between tactical doctrine and battlefield reality became apparent_ These problems. applicable to any army, highlight fundamental difficulties of force structure, preconceptions of potential enemy capabilities. and the role of doctrine in a combat environment. An examination of small unit tactics is particularly useful to illustrate, the dynamics of doctrine as expressed on the battlefield.
Another point:
While the overwhelming Soviet qualitative and quantitative materiel superiority ultimately defeated the Japanese at Nomonhan. the defeat cannot be ascribed to materiel deficiencies alone, A tactical doctrine designed for infantrymen that stressed offensive action to achieve a quick victory was pitted against a doctrine which emphasized combined arms and protracted warfare. The Japanese decision to fight a war of attrition against the superior Soviet Red Army was, in retrospect, a mistake.
Air power (which I will enter in detail later):
The IJA remained an infantryheavy force, It always lacked sufficient armor because armor was unaffordable (actually, the Japanese changed their mind about this later). Japanese strategic thought opted for the aircraft.
Source:
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp
My conclusions:
* As already mentioned in the text, the IJA showed great inflexibility in this battle, pressing it forward even after realized it didn't enjoyed advantages it belived to have, such as in artillery.
* The IJA disregarded Intelligence, and was caught by a massive enemy pincer offensive. This offensive consisted of three tank brigades and two mechanized brigades (with infantry support). The entire Sovit force consisted of three rifle divisions, two tank divisions and two more tank brigades. About 500 BT-5 and B-7 tanks, two motorized infantry divisons, and over 550 fighters and bombers. The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.
By contrast, at the point of attack the Kwantung Army had only Lieutenant General Michitarō Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions.
Source:
Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Zhukov's offensive was a surprise and massive. If the Japanese had attack him in the same way with a similar force, it's possible that he would be defeated as well. This can be boosted by Drea's mention of the IJA offensive actions in the first quote his book I bolded: "which almost prevailed..."
* While the Red Air Force eventually overcomed the Japanese Army Air force with quantity, better tactics and aircraft, the Japanese didn't explored their air power advantage, specially in the first two months when it existed. As Drea points out, the IJA realied heavily in aircraft. One of the reasons it lacked modern equipment. When when this advantage was lost, in sum with the others, the situation could not have been worse. The non employment of the air force in the enemy's rear was also a preponderant factor for Zhukov's offensive be succesfull, because not only his supplies could arrive without aerial interference, but any interference of Japanese aircraft to spot any discrepancys from what he was doing existed at all.
Therefore, I don't see the quality of the IJA as being a critical problem for an invasion of the USSR in 1941. The Japanese (the Kwantung Army more precisely), lost in Nomonhan by it's own mistakes. After the Nomonhan fight, the Army started several modernization programs, with the artillery school receiving a lot of attention. The IJA got rid of it's stereotypes of the Soviets, and was much better prepared to fight them in a new conflict. Specially if this conflict had ocurred in 1941, with the USSR hard pressed by the Germans, and the decisive theater of operations being the hilly and treeless Eastern Manchuria terrain, much more suitable to IJA tactics even before Nomonhan. They would also count with the IJN to dominate the coast and provide logistics and air support, as well as conduct amphibious landings in strategical locations.
I belive the Nomonhan Incident could have changed history, in the sense the IJA lost prestige and the IJN took over. I already read this in some sources, and also that the Emperor was furious with the Army because Nomonhan, and more so because it iniciated an undeclared war without authorization than from the defeat itself. Because in the military field, the Japanese seems to have lost only by their incompetence in try continue a conflict when it was clear they need to pull out to make some adjustments.