Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941

[parsifal]

But this leaves out a very major chapter of IJA history, its great successes against western Allied troops in the opening campaigns of the Pacific War through May 1942, when Japan captured territory over an enormous expanse in a short time. The IJA was aided in those campaigns by Japanese superiority in air and at sea, but also consistently defeated Allied armies with inferior (Japanese) numbers. Of course these Allied armies were far from the best the Allies fielded in WWII. The British Armies in Malaya and Burma were generally second-string collections of forces which could be spared by an already highly stretched British Empire; the 'US' force in the Philippines was mainly a still poorly trained Philippine National Army with US support and leadership; the Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) was already cut off from the German occupied Netherlands even before the Pacific War. However, the fact remains the IJA showed up very well against those Allied forces, and often defeated them with manuever. But even when frontal assault was used as a tactic, those Allied armies could not always stand up to it. Japanese infantry attacks were very fierce; they didn't only work against the Chinese.

IMO, it's partly leftover Allied propaganda from the WWII era which leads us to ignore or explain away the early IJA successes in relatively 'stand up fights' with numerically superior (though less well supplied) Allied armies, then overemphasizes IJA defeats in later Pac War battles where their position was entirely hopeless. It's true that some Japanese field commanders (as in the early attempts to retake G'canal) underestimated enemy strength and quality, but their own numbers and firepower were usually insufficient to overcome any competent enemy of such relative strength. Again, I think biased wartime accounts, and later first hand oriented accounts focused on honoring American servicemen, tend to blow out of proportion the importance of inferior IJA infantry tactics at G'canal. No army with the IJA's lack of numbers, weapons and supply at G'canal could have overcome any reasonably competent army possessing the positions, numbers, supply and weapons of the US Marine (later also US Army) defending force. The key to such campaigns was the air/sea struggle to reinforce and resupply the islands, which the Japanese lost at G'canal, and coudn't even contest in some later island campaigns.

Given the IJA performance v the Allies in Malaya, Burma, Philippines and DEI in 1941-42, they probably would have had overall qualitative superiority against the Soviets in the infantry-friendly terrain of Eastern Manchuria/Maritime Province as well. Red Army quality in '41 was very spotty, and the Soviets like the western Allies left relatively lower quality forces in the Far East.

Joe

Hi Joe

In fact i would extend this assessment to further than the first year of the war. On the ground, the US never got the better of the japanese man for man in jungle fighting. After the fighting around sanananda and Gona, the US only occasionaly engaged in deep penetration campaigns against the IJA in that terrain. The US contented itself with using massive amounts of firepower to take out key stongholds, generally airfields and port installations, and then leaving the remainder of the garrison to "wither on the vine". Thats code for not having the skills or the willingness to take casualties fighting battles against an enemy prepared to fight to the death in the trackless jungle.

In assessing IJA capabilities in the jungle, one has to be mindful of the acute disadavantages that they were forced to fight under for much of the war. I am not making exceuses fior the japanese when i say that...their leaders willingly embarked on a major campaign knowing the disadvantages they would be fighting under. Lacking proper heavy artillery support, virtually no airlift capability with little or no direct ground support from the air, uisually starving and often not even enough supplies to put boots on the soldiers (try walking in the jungle without boots sometime....its not pleasant), relatively lightly does not produce a balanced indication of IJA fighting capabilities. The US camapaigns across the pacific, including those that captured key bases in New Guinea, were not jungle campaigns and were not a balanced assessment of IJA fighting capabilities.

If you want to gauge actual combat effectivenes of the IJA, you have to search hard for what might be termed a level playing field. Perhaps the nearest might be the IJA counterattacks into the Arakan in Burna, or their defensive campaigns near Wau or later in the Finnisterre ranges against the australians. Yamashitas defensive campaign in the PI in 1944-5 might also be worth having a look at. none of these camapaigns are anything like a fair fight but they are at least more equal in terms of the firepower that could be brought to bear supporting the ground troops.

Saying the Japanese were not effective fighters is ultimately offensive to the allied soldiers who fought them. If they were so weak, why did the US take so long to defeat them. Its the same failure as when people try to argue the Russians were not effective in fighting the germans. Ultimately, it reflects worse on the germans themselves who were defeated by these so-called "inferior troops".

 

[parsifal]

A major problem for the Soviets was the vulnerable Transiberian. If the Japanese managed to cut it, they would be doomed.

Not really, though it was useful to retain control of the rail line. all of the manpower, the factory space, most of the raw materials needed to build and maintain the Soviet Far eastern Armies could (and were) raised in the far east. We are talking about an area of land several times biger than western Europe, and a local population and miliotary infrastrructure able to raise and maintain a military force of over 1.5 million men. Whilst Siberia was the "wild west" of the USSR 1900-01940, major efforts had been made by ther Soviets 1920-40 to decentraliase and colonise this region. The two empires may share a common frontier, but their respective areas of high development were separated by hundreds of miles of trackless tundra, forest, mountain ranges, swamplands and deserts.....

And getting to the rail line from Japanese Manchuria is quite impossible except in one sector of the front, and this route ....the Mutanchiang gap is more heavily fortified than the Maginot line. The light Infantry that makes up most of the IJA was going nowhere through that path. One other pathway might exist on the far side of the Black Mountains though the NW of Manchuria (to attempt to breack the line as it passes south of Baikal) but here too the IJA would be pitting its light infantry against far greater numbers , and far more heavily equipped soviet forces, that would have behind them the industrilal support and manpower reserves of the eastern Urals complex. This land is incidentally heavily forested and swampy, served by a single light rail link back to Hailar....the nearest rail head and airfield, some 240 miles from the front. Soviet settlements, principally Chita were far more substantial and extensive, and much closer to the front. There is lilttle prospect of success in this TO.

 

[tyrodtom]

I've think i've made clear that I though the Japanese soldier was a tough to beat oponent, but his mid level, and higher command structure was not up to the task.
Probably the most abused and neglected soldier of his era was the Japanese fighting man.

I've no doubt the troops sent to invade the Pacific and Siberian area's of the USSR would be handicapped by the same supply and support the JA seemed to suffer through everywhere else they fought.

 

[Jenisch]

Parfisal, while I certainly will considerate what you say, this leaves the question of what the IJA thought about this. They didn't make such considerations for the geopgraphy of the country they considerated their main expansion goal? I remember that Edward J. Drea mentioned in an interview that the IJA didn't fought well in the Pacific, because it was not prepared for it. While the material inferiority against Russia was mentioned, it was just the opposite in terms of readiness.

 

[parsifal]

Parfisal, while I certainly will considerate what you say, this leaves the question of what the IJA thought about this. They didn't make such considerations for the geopgraphy of the country they considerated their main expansion goal? I remember that Edward J. Drea mentioned in an interview that the IJA didn't fought well in the Pacific, because it was not prepared for it. While the material inferiority against Russia was mentioned, it was just the opposite in terms of readiness.

Didnt fight welll....are you kidding??? it fought with a great deal of distinction both offensively and defensively. What defeated it on the atolls had nothing to do with the fighting qualities of the IJA, its officers, or its equipment. It was a question of who controlled the oceans around them, and the skies above them. The US gained control of these areas always before applying massive force multipliers to assist their ground assaults. When these force multipliers were removed, the US did far less well against the japanese.

In the Jungle camapaigns proper, the Japanese proved themselves an effective and intractable opponent, even when outnumbered and outgunned. It didnt matter whether they were on the attack or the defence. They planned, for example, to take Port Moresby, an area with a reinforced Brigade of AIF troops with about the same sized force....an RCT. They fought in Kokoda with a similar RCT, against at least two Allied Divs, and were only defeated with difficulty. They fought at guadacanal in the worst possible conditions, against an enemy well dug and in strength.....the Japanese were never able to corordinate their attacks properly and were never given anything like adequate fire support or supply. They planned to assault Midway with just a single regiment, and , despite the reviosionist claims in Shattered sword and other articles after thje fact, the opinioons of the troops defending was that had they gotten to shore would have pulverized the Allied defenders.

Sure its easy to say they did do well in the attack, and to a degree I would agree with that, but that does not take into account the mitigating situations they often found themselves in.

My advice, forget the nancy smancy revisionist accounts written from the comfort of an air conditioned desk and an iced tea on the side like shattered sword. Talk to the vets that had to fight these little B*ggers. They could fight and fight very well. They often won their fights, though nothing of strategic importance

 

[Nikademus]

agree with Pars. and JoeB. The IJA was far more than just an org that "Banzai" charged, nor was it made up only of officers who believed in fighting to the death above all else. Even at Nomanhan there were a number of seasoned officers who were disdainful of wasteful operations that did not further their objectives. In terms of tactics, the IJA specialized in a number of them that were directly attributable to their early war successes. Emphasis on night attacks, coupled with the Piston tactics displayed at Nomanhan gave them some impressive local successes despite being outnumbered and stuck out on unfavorable terrain. Their fluency in hooking (flanking) manuevers gave the British coniption fits in Burma and Malaya (and were present during the drive in the PI's are another example. This ability was only countered through a combination of embracing the enemy's tactics (Slim) coupled with a massive influx of air supply. Defensively, the IJA were ingenious in constructing interlocking and mutually supporting positions and proved capable of holding off or even defeating a force far stronger in material firepower and superior in air support. There was a reason why Island Hopping was devised.

There were flaws and weaknesses of course, but those have been well vented. I agree too that to continually treat the IJA as an inferior opponent only serves to take away from the bravery and professionalism of those that defeated them.

 

[Jenisch]

Parsifal, you think that in 1941 an IJA success would be unlikely, or even without China it would? You gave the IJA reasoning ability, which many people don't do. But, if they were capable of reasoning, they would be even more capable of reasoning about their pior expansionist target - the Soviet Union. Shinpachi is correct when the mentioned the Japanese wanted to conclude the war in China before engage the Soviets. In 1941, they pressed for engage them despite the ongoing war in China, and for a simple reason: the Germans were in the game, taking most of the Soviet capability.

Coox mentioned in his book that the Japanese had the hability to conquer Siberia in the desesperated situation of 1941. The problem was the southerns didn't won the argument because the risks this would represent, particularly an oil embargo from the now Soviet allied Western Powers. Not to mention their increased support to China. The Japanese were not fearful from the Soviets like some authors claim. They represented a very real threat for them in medium and long term. There was their treat in the source rich Manchuria, as well as the the support of Mao in the China they wanted so much to control to their economical benefit. The vulnerability of the Japanese Home Islands to attack, particularly form the air, is a problem even today, and therefore they needed a large defensive perimeter. The Soviet resources and living space were also of interest. The Japanese also wanted to be a superpower, and therefore the Soviets and the Western colonists needed to be expelled for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to succeed.

 

[parsifal]

I dont believe it possible for the Japanese to make much headway in Siberia for a number of reasons. Even in the darkest days of 1941, the Soviets never allowed their frontline military strength to drop below certain levels. prior to the German attack, Soviet force levels were around 1.4 million men in the far east, and around 2-3000 a/c. thats far more than was needed for a defensive mission. Japan had been a major focus of Soviet military design for more than 20 years.....it was a long held objective of the soviets to take back what they had lost at the turn of the century. So, far from it being a possibility of Japan to attack Russia, it was actually problematic as to when or how the Soviets would invade Manchuria.

The german invasion changed all that. Siberia became a resource for munitions, equipment and manpower. Force levels to December dropped to about 900000 but in the winter of 41-2 the Soviets restored manpower levels to 1.2 million men (though the quality of that manpower was questionable). That would have been enough in terms of manpower, and equipment wise the Red Army remained more or less full strength (according to the book "Claws of the Bear), but the limiting factor/problem remained twofold....a lack of logistics sufficient to support offensive operations, and a lack of transport needed to support large armies at long distances. Neither of these problems could be solved until the germans were defeated. In addition, the Russians wanted their best and most experienced personnel to lead the attack in 1945. The transfer of manpower from west to east in 1945 was just manpower, incidentally. The army that transferred to siberia collected new equipment basically as it detrained.

So, throughout the war, the Soviets maiontained force levels that was either postured for an attack on the japanese, or, able to counter any attack mounted by the japanese. The Japanese were on the defensive in manchuria, fearful for most of the war of Soviet attack, not planning an attack themselves. there were some hotheads in the Kwantung Army that thought otherwise, but they were overruled.

If the russians pulled up because of a shortage of munitions and logisitc transport to support an attack, the japanese would have been immeasurably worse off in this area. In the period 1940-42, their industrial base could support offensive operations for a fraction of their army....if the southern area operations is anything to go by, they could support maybe 10-12 divisions on offeensive operations, they simply lacked the supply....the food, the uniforms, the guns to support larger offensives on the scale seen in Europe. They had large numbers of troops, but only a fraction of these could move, or attack at any given time. look at what happened in China.....basically nothing happened for 4 years until, driven by desperation, and only at the cost of robbing all other commands in China, was a rather fitful effort made by about 6 Divs in Southern China in 1944-5. That represented about as much as the japanese could muster offensively by that stage. That is not enough to trouble the soviets in any way, despite the excellent fighting qualities of the IJA. Logistics is a completely different matter to fighting ability. The japanese made first class soldiers, and third class supply officers.

 

[JoeB]

If the russians pulled up because of a shortage of munitions and logisitc transport to support an attack, the japanese would have been immeasurably worse off in this area. In the period 1940-42, their industrial base could support offensive operations for a fraction of their army....if the southern area operations is anything to go by, they could support maybe 10-12 divisions on offeensive operations, they simply lacked the supply....the food, the uniforms, the guns to support larger offensives on the scale seen in Europe. They had large numbers of troops, but only a fraction of these could move, or attack at any given time.

The IJA General Staff plan to invade the Soviet FE in 1941 featured 22 IJA divisions. Various back and forth included plans for operations from 16-24 divisions. The focus was, again, on the Maritime Province, not campaigns across vast distances to the west. See Coox.

Again we should specially note that successful IJA operations against western armies always had the Japanese outnumbered. This point is naturally de-emphasized in western accounts, though hardly a secret. It's probably worth the risk to overly repeat it, to counteract the tendency to forget it.

I think examples of IJA campaigns after 1942 tend to be misleading in analyzing IJA capability in 1941, in a number of ways. One tangent can be to focus on the ability of Japanese forces to soak up a lot of Allied resources and time in hopeless defenses to the last man, whether on smaller islands or larger ones with jungle hinterlands. In a mission to delay an opponent in a hopeless defensive struggle, the Japanese were unsurpassed, nobody came close. But, it's not too relevant to considering an offensive campaign in eastern Manchuria. And, even late Pac War IJA offensives in places like China and India were hobbled by more extreme resource constraints than in a notional war v USSR where Japan didn't attack the US. Still, it's again worth nothing that the Japanese were heavily outnumbered in their late war offensives but still gained some ground against the British, and loads against the Chinese. IJA offensives in China were seldom outnumbered less than 2:1, and often a lot more than that; again numbers must be considered, not only the fact that Chinese forces didn't qualitatively measure up to those of the west or Soviets, on average at least.

Again IMO the best qualitative comparison to a notional Japanese attack in the Soviet Far East would be the 1941-42 IJA campaigns against western armies in Philippines, Malaya, Burma and DEI. They usually had considerably smaller numbers, but faced the second string of already overstretched opponents, and were simply and demostrably superior man for man and unit for unit of combat power on paper. The IJA forces had not only individual bravery but pretty skillful leadership at higher levels, and a good grasp of maneuver (which is also how they often defeated much larger Chinese forces). The Soviet forces in FE might have done much better than western forces did in those real campaigns v the IJA despite the USSR's already overstretched military situation, but it's also plausible IMO that Japanese performance would have paralleled that in the early Pac War campaigns, and generated surprising success for them, and humiliating defeat for more numerous defenders (though Soviet forces might have been only slightly numerically superior, depending on assumptions).

Joe

 

[parsifal]

I think the scale of the front would defeat them. With 16-24 divisions, they would be facing a force of at least 50-70 Russian Divisions. But as you say, there is a qualitative edge with the IJA, though I doubt it is as marked as the IJA in the PI or Malaya demonstrated.

Plus its a question of the size of the front. In the PI and Malaya, the forces committed did not exceed two Japanese Armies....thats the equivalent of two Western Corps. There was the 16th Army, committed somewhat later in the NEI, the South seas Detachment (roughly a divisional sized force), the units committed to Burma, and some odds and ends elswhere....all up about 10 divisions. at the end of that 4 month campaign, the japanese were at the end of their tetgher supply wise, moreover the none of these campaigns involved large numbers of transports or long overland supply lines. where that happened, the Japanese rapidly ran out of puff, such as in China (incidentally, in China, the usual odds were far worse for the japanese....usually around 6-8:1 against them....they could not move in China, however because of supply difficulties.


I have no problem arguing the quality of the japanese army. Either offensively or defensively. however, arguing that the IJA was a well supplied army capable of deep penetration overland advances is simply not true. Try looking at their assessments for invading Australia, for example, and see what the main stumbling blocks were seen as. They could never do that (undertake large scale continental style military operations) . neither did their industrial base have near the capacity to sustain a long haul land campaign of high intensity such as occurred on the European eastern front 41-5. germany was hard pressed even to maintain such a battle. Japan demonstrated in spades what happens to an army insufficiently supplied in her operations in China.....spectacular advances, followed by years of stalemate and an inability to move. In a war in Siberia including the maritime provinces the same result would occur, only the Soviets, unlike the Chinese have a far greater ability to recover and counterattack.

Moreover, there is no way to attack the Maritime provinces except through one relatively narrow gap, and this section of front was the most heaviliy fortified piece of ground in the world at that time....more heavily fortified than the franco-German frontier, for example. The seaward defences of both Vladivostock (and to a lesser extent the other main port at Sovietskaya Gavan) were heavily defended, including defences against seaward attack.....the Russians and then the Soviets had been working on these defences since 1905. It is not overstating the case to say these were impregnabale fortesses, and unassaultable from the sea.

The battle the Japanese would have found themselves locked in in a soviet scenario was precisely the sort of battle they were not equipped to fight very well......they would need loads more heavy artillery, loads more (and better tanks) and most impoprtantly loads more wheeled transport. They would have needed a huge engineering capability and ammunition supply, above what they actually possessed. perhaps these weaknesses could have been addressed, but i doubt it. far from seeing the possibilities of a Japanese attack on the USSR, with or without a german attack in the west, we should be looking at how long they could hold out from a Soviet attack in 1942 or 1943 in Manchuria. If the Soviets had been able to solve their transport problems early (perhaps by even more lend lease trucks), the Soviets would have been able to steamn roll the Japanese in manchuria fairly rapisly in my opinion.

In a scenario of the Japanese attacking the USSR, one has to accept a quid pro quo. I assume no attack on the west, and a wholsesale withdrawal from China. if that occurs, there is a significant increase in allied capability in the west, and a significant corresponding reduction of effort by the germans to copunter that. Instead of 80% of the heer being available for operations on the east front, it might drop to 50%, as the remainder would be needed to counter the aincreased allied presence in the west. maybe not as divisions on the ground, but perhaps as increased flak or airforce.......

 

[Jenisch]

Parsifal, what you mentioned let clear why the Japanese only wanted to attack in 1941, if the Soviets drastically reduced their manpower. And if the area was so heavily defended, then my impression is that Nomonhan did little difference, as the Japanese probably knew this. I think an attack against the Soviets therefore, could only come after the "Chinese Incident" was conclude.

 

[Nikademus]

Frank McLynn recently promoted that theory in his new book on the Burma campaign. In it he postulated that the Japanese High Command's smartest move (in hindsight of course) would have been to aceed to FDR's demands that Japan remove itself from China thus taking away a major political divide between the US and Japan in the process. Such a move would have allowed them to focus on the on the Southern strategy with the possibility of forcing the US into a declaration of war based on defending Western Colonial interests (obviously the PI's would need to not be attacked prior to any such action by the US)

However as the author saw it....the Japanese generals were inflexible and tried to do it all and keep it all. Stay in China....contemplate war with the Russians....contemplate (and eventually implement) war with the US/Britian. North/South options combined. Politically speaking such a withdraw from China would have been difficult, given the percieved loss of Face of the military. The Northern movement tended to be the most fanatical (the Imperial Way) and insisted on continuing in China. Had Japan withdrawn from China proper but stayed in Manchuria, this might still have caused continued friction with the US but less so than with the full on invasion of China proper. In relation to this scenario, the withdraw back from China would have given the Northerners more assets to play with for the preposed invasion of Russia. IIRC, Caputo noted that the Japanese did attempt a final compromise with the US that went along those lines.....withdraw back to the status quo of the early-mid 30's but this was sumarily rejected by the Roosevelt administration.

 

[Jenisch]

Nikademus, since the US and Britain were supporting Russia, how do you think their reaction would be if Japan had pulled out of China just to attack the Soviets?

 

[Nikademus]

I believe that any scenario which doesn't involve a direct attack on the US would be a difficult situation for the Roosevelt administration. While it is true that the US military was building itself up for a possible war, this is often mistaken for public support of a war. The reality was that the US and many within the government were still largely isolationist and anti-war. Did the US declare war on Germany during the BoB? That was an interesting point that McClynn made in his book.....which really made one think because it was so obvious. If the US public didn't rush to Britian's defense when the island itself was under attack? Why would one expect the US to go to war in defense of their colonies.......especially given the virolent anti-colonial sentiment within the JCS.

As such.....I think a Japanese attack on Russia (already at war with Germany) would not have induced a war declaration from the US. Similar would be a Japanese attack on Britian alone in the SRA.

 

[parsifal]

Hi nik


I would appreciate your thoughts on the posts I have made in the following thread

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...kari-japanese-attack-pearl-harbour-31077.html

To me it was not just a case of the FDR administration bracing for war. they knew it was coming, and maybe even wanted war, judging by the diplometic exchanges leading up to PH. I reject the notion that the administration knew in advance of PH, but they sure seem to have known war was coming, and actually wanted it to "sort out the Far East"....

 

[Jenisch]

Hi nik


I would appreciate your thoughts on the posts I have made in the following thread

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...kari-japanese-attack-pearl-harbour-31077.html

To me it was not just a case of the FDR administration bracing for war. they knew it was coming, and maybe even wanted war, judging by the diplometic exchanges leading up to PH. I reject the notion that the administration knew in advance of PH, but they sure seem to have known war was coming, and actually wanted it to "sort out the Far East"....

http://www.warbirdforum.com/south.htm:

1. The war between Japan and the US, Britain, British Commonwealth countries, and the Netherlands was a consequence of Japans "advance to the south".

2. As with most wars, the origins of this one (as well as many errors in its prosecution) are permeated with miscalculations about how determined the adversary is.

3. Japanese national policy in this period was dominated by the military. If the Army and the Navy agreed on the approach to a particular issue (which seldom happened), the government was almost certain to go along.

4. Middle rank officers in both branches were much more aggressive in their plans and more determined to go to war than their superiors. Eventually this belligerent attitude percolated upward.

Up to the mid-1930s the Japanese policy was that of the Army: Northern advance, southern defense. This was a long-standing strategy dating back to incursions in Korea in the 19th century. In the mid-1930s the Navy advanced a competing "southern advance, northern defense" policy for two reasons: it wanted to justify obtaining a larger share of the defense budget and it recognized the importance of the strategic materials, particularly oil, in that region. It called for a peaceful expansion, however. In 1936 this policy was put on an equal footing with the Army policy, but this equilibrium was upset in 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out and shifted the balance of power back to the Army. With the outbreak of the European war, Japanese policy (supported by both the Army and the Navy) was one of non-involvement because of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 and their rough handling by the Soviets in the Nomonhan incident of the same year. The middle rank officers, however, campaigned for using this distraction of European powers as an opportunity for expansion.

In the first half of 1940 two things happened that had a profound effect: the Army concluded that it could not win militarily in China using its current approach, and Germany's successes in Europe convinced the Japanese that Britain would soon be defeated and they needed to take action soon or "miss the bus." Consequently, the Army switched to a southern strategy that became national policy in July 1940 with some modifications made by the Navy. It called for settling the China conflict first and then moving into Indochina, although it left open the option of moving south even before things were settled in China on the grounds that this would block supplies to the Nationalist forces. It was based on the unrealistic hopes that a diplomatic settlement was possible in China (serious negotiations called the Kiri Project were underway with Chiang Kai-shek in the summer of 1940), and that war with Britain was possible without intervention by the US. The Navy objected to the latter assumption.

In September 1940, Japanese troops began marching into northern Indochina as part of the southern advance and the tripartite pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy was signed. In response, the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek collapsed and the US and Britain imposed the first round of economic sanctions. Senior Japanese naval officers were convinced that even if Germany defeated Britain, a southern advance would ultimately lead to war with the US. By March 1941 the hard line being taken by the US regarding Japanese expansion caused the Army to come around to the Navy view, and plans were being drawn up that assumed that a war with the US was almost unavoidable.

Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 greatly reduced the threat in the north, thereby giving Japan more flexibility in the south. In July Japanese troops marched into southern Indochina, and in retaliation the US and Britain froze Japanese assets and imposed a complete embargo. The oil supply problem resulting from the embargo was so severe (a supply of 800 million liters per year vs. 5,400 required), that a quick resolution by military or diplomatic means was essential. The Army calculated that on the basis of oil supply alone, resources were insufficient to simultaneously pursue conflicts in the south and the north. So plans for a war with the Soviet Union were shelved. The foreign ministry was assiduously pursuing a negotiated settlement with the US right up to October 1941, and was willing to make significant concession in China. Roosevelt, however, believed that the best way to avoid or defer the war was to take a hard line. Consequently, the initiative failed (to the relief of the Army) and in mid-October the Konoe cabinet resigned and General Tojo became Prime Minister while retaining his position as Army Minister. Subsequent events are known to all.

I found the position Japan found itself in to be wonderfully summed up by the circular scenario developed by the operations section of the Japanese naval general staff in August 1940. To prepare for hostilities with Britain and the US, Japan would need to occupy Indochina for the raw materials. But this would cause the US to impose an embargo, which would in turn force Japan to seize the Dutch East Indies for oil. The latter would cause the US to go to war. Not exactly the order of events, but close enough. Unfortunately for Japan but predictable by those with more economic and political realism, the events would proceed far too quickly for it to make use of the resources and adequately prepare for war [my observation].

Another interesting observation the authors made was that although the Navy knew it was not prepared to take on the US and could possibly have prevented or delayed the war, it did not attempt to do so. The reason given is that for years the Navy had been demanding an increasing share of the defense budget to prepare for this war, and it would have lost face and influence to the Army if it admitted at this point that it was not up to the task.

 

[Nikademus]

Hi nik


I would appreciate your thoughts on the posts I have made in the following thread

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...kari-japanese-attack-pearl-harbour-31077.html

To me it was not just a case of the FDR administration bracing for war. they knew it was coming, and maybe even wanted war, judging by the diplometic exchanges leading up to PH. I reject the notion that the administration knew in advance of PH, but they sure seem to have known war was coming, and actually wanted it to "sort out the Far East"....

Costello's book does make a strong case for suggesting that FDR not only was, as you said, bracing for war but actively sought to make it a reality. While it is easy to condemn him thus as a "warmonger" (and some have), I viewed this at the time as him looking at "The Big Picture" in which he clearly saw that the US could not survive or thrive in a world dominated by military dictatorships. Certainly his view on Nazi Germany was clear as the "undeclared war" in the Atlantic showed amidst growing German frustration at the degrees made by the FDR administration and the actions of its navy. Also fascinating in his book was how the development of Japanese industry, including those useful for military purposes were funded by US companies despite government attempts to steer those interests toward Chinese markets…..but capitalism isn't about brinkmanship or good deeds…..you go where the money is…and in the early 20's Japan was a better investment.

McLynn's book takes things one step further however and criticizes what the author saw as FDR's personal (meaning FDR….not the US government) obsession with China and his "vision" of making China, and Chiang's KMT the premier Asian power in the region. As realized by FDR, this dominant China would then be a benevolent and lucrative economic partner to the US. Win Win for us. The British were confused and exacerbated by FDR's obsession with Chiang whom they saw more realistically as a fascist sham and hopelessly corrupt leader who promised all and delivered nothing. Yet the US looked down its nose at Britain for having "colonies" Economic imperialism comes in many forms. Even within the US government there was frustration (per McClynn) at FDR's love affair with Chiang. Growing indications compiled in the State Department all pointed to his (Chiang) simply sucking the teat dry on US provided Lend Lease in return for vaporware. Marshall in particular, a champion of Stillwell was driven to virtual despair by FDR's benevolence towards Chiang until finally mid-war at least. The amount of money and material we sent to Chiang was embarrassing. After reading McClynn's book it was no wonder to me that Mao quickly triumphed and the US public was left to wonder how we "lost China" to the Communists.

Naturally the Japanese saw things differently in Asia. THEY wanted to be the premier Asian power and did have some legitimate grievances with the US, starting with its hypocrisy. (US debuts Monroe Doctrine in North America that declares the entire American hemisphere under its Sphere of influence and will react…..militarily if necessary to any outside intrusion (mainly aimed at European powers at the time))…This whether the Central or South American nations wanted it or not. Yet here was the US interfering in Asian matters. The Japanese saw US Asian policy thus as highly hypercritical given this……how can a country that declares it's local neighborhood off limits to all foreign influences justify poking it's nose into someone else's neighborhood?

More recently, the Japanese seethed at the rampant racism displayed in California in the 1920's and which continued to plague relations up to WWII. This racism (white over yellow) was a major factor in Western foreign policy and also in military preparation and led to a severe underestimation of Japanese potential and capabilities. This anger and perceived inferiority complex helped fuel the Japanese' own brand of racism as their string of military victories piled up from the first Sino-Japanese conflicts through the Russo-Japanese war (in which the Japanese felt extremely slighted during the peace settlements despite having won the conflict) and through being on the winning side of WWI. Japanese militants began a campaign of showing the West….particularly the US as a mutt like race of lazy self centered individuals and thus would lead to a severe underestimation of US capabilities and resolve. (save for a few non firebrands like Yamamoto). Hate begets hate…..angst begets angst. Misunderstanding and conflicting agendas lead to schism. Japan modeled itself along Western lines yet as they saw it, they were being denied the same spoils as the "corrupt" West already held the keys too. Haves vs. the Have Nots.

This is not to say that the West was solely responsible for Japanese militarism, but it was part of the process. As McClynn stated, Japanese militarists didn't simply "appear" out of the woodwork in 1931 anymore than Hitler's Nazi party. There were reasons, underlying factors and influences, including the foreign policies of other nations. The rise of the Japanese right in 1930's Japan was also influenced by internal problems within Japan exacerbated by the Great Depression. Edward Drea's book on the rise of the Imperial Japanese Army gives very good info on this as well as Japanese views on China.

The Japanese decision for war was as you already related, driven by the embargo on resources vital to that nation but also by the successes of its Axis partner Germany as well. The militarists saw late 41 as a now is the best time period that if not grasped, would be lost. Many knew that war with the US could be ruinous but humans have a great capacity for fatalism and as Drea and other resources have stated, it was felt by many of the hard liners that it was better to die by the sword than live in chains, which is honestly how many Japanese saw the West in regards to its Asian policy.

As a friend of mine said to me long ago, 'It wasn't what they (The Japanese) did that was so wrong….it was "how" they did it" What he meant was, the reasons for Japan….and Germany's war are as old as humanity itself. The Have Nots want what the Haves 'have'. No western nation wasn't guilty of the same thing in one form or another (including economic imperialism) at one time or another during its lifespan. The Japanese military and its government however forever shamed itself in its brutal treatment of subject peoples and prisoners of war…..which of itself was a direct result of Japan's attempt to fanaticize its population and indoctrinate it into an Orwellian type nightmare. Putting aside these actions and focusing on the why though is key to a better understanding of why nations do what they do and reminds that there are two sides to every story and different views. The Japanese saw things very different than the US did.

I think…therefore I babble. All this is to help clarify that while yes….I believe FDR was pushing for war…and while in more recent times I see that he wasn't nearly the perfect leader I thought he was when i was younger (he was one of my heroes)…especially in regards to his foreign policies (Stalin is another big miss) But I think that Big Picture wise….he was right in the end. You can call him a warmonger and his motives were not totally pure but along with Churchill's stance against Hitler, it was the right move at the right time. He made some tremendous errors too it seems. But overall I think humanity came out better than the alternative. WWII remains probably the closest thing to"good" war humanity has ever fought. Japanese and German actions during that war justified the total war that was brought down on them. Churchill's quote comes to mind on Democracy being the worst form of government….except for all the others. Reading Ostkrieg right now……humanity at it's most honest and brutal in the pursuit of land and resources. Chilling read. However in my old age I am increasingly focused on the hows and whys so it's a necessary read.

 

[JoeB]

I think the scale of the front would defeat them. With 16-24 divisions, they would be facing a force of at least 50-70 Russian Divisions. But as you say, there is a qualitative edge with the IJA, though I doubt it is as marked as the IJA in the PI or Malaya demonstrated.

(incidentally, in China, the usual odds were far worse for the japanese....usually around 6-8:1 against them....they could not move in China, however because of supply difficulties.


I have no problem arguing the quality of the japanese army. Either offensively or defensively. however, arguing that the IJA was a well supplied army capable of deep penetration overland advances is simply not true.

Moreover, there is no way to attack the Maritime provinces except through one relatively narrow gap, and this section of front was the most heaviliy fortified piece of ground in the world at that time....more heavily fortified than the franco-German frontier, for example. The seaward defences of both Vladivostock (and to a lesser extent the other main port at Sovietskaya Gavan) were heavily defended, including defences against seaward attack.....the Russians and then the Soviets had been working on these defences since 1905. It is not overstating the case to say these were impregnabale fortesses, and unassaultable from the sea.

According to Coox, the Soviet strength was more like 30 divisions in the criticial period, and their divisions were smaller. He notes however that the Soviet force weakened in part after ther Sorge spy ring in Germany gave the Soviets intel that the Japanese were leaning toward attacking the Americans, British and Dutch instead.

As far as Japanese and Chinese numbers, I based that on the Nationalist Chinese official history of the war, which wasn't likely to understate their own numbers. When Chinese numerical superiority reached levels like 4:1, those were the campaigns (a number of the post 1937 campaigns) where the Japanese were unable to hold their gains.

But the Japanese did cover very large distances in China, way more than the distance from eastern Manchurian border to the Pacific, so distance does not rule out their success.

The Japanese reduced considerable fortifications at Corregidor; and recall that the Russo-Japanese war was not in the extremely distant past in 1941. The IJA was used to the idea that fighting the Russians in the Far East would involve episodes of siege warfare. I agree Vladivostok wouldn't have been attacked from the sea, again this was taken for granted.

I still don't see a reason why a Japanese offensive against the Soviets in 1941 had to fail, as far as the specific operational goal of seizing (the populated areas of) the Maritime Province. It might have, but OTOH if the Japanese showed anything like the man for man superiority over the Soviets as they did over the Anglo-American-Fil-Dutch armies in the early Pac War campaigns, it's quite plausible it would have succeeded.

But as I said before there's much more question about the overall strategic success of such a war. And I agree it somewhat parallels the strategic issue in China. The Japanese seized important parts of China proper (ie not considered to include Manchuria in those days) in 1937-8 but that didn't cause a collapse in Chinese resistance. And China was just too big to conquer entirely, and the whole involvement eventually led to fatal strategic consequences in creating a war with the US that might not have happened otherwise. This might well have been paralled in a successful seizure of the Maritime Province, followed by a non-collapse of Soviet resistance in a two-front war, Far Eastern stalemate, then eventual devastating Soviet counter offensive years later when they still managed to completely defeat the Germans. OTOH attacking the US had huge downside as well, which was entirely realized as it turned out. And it's *possible* that the Soviets would have suffered psycological/political/moral collapse under two-front attack in 1941. But if not, then just taking the Soviet FE didn't accomplish much in the big picture, even if the offensive were successful.

Joe

 

[Civettone]

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet territory until reinforcements arrive.
This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?

Kris

 

[Jenisch]

I think people underestimate the IJA. Together with the directive Civettone mentioned, the Soviets had many men in Asia to counter the Japanese. If the Japanese were so "weak and with outdated gear" they would not have this attention from the Soviets. Also, as Shinpachi told in this or other topic, the Japanese commander said that he could have defeated the Soviets in Nomonhan if IGHQ had supported him. I noticed this when I read about the conflict for the first time. People say that Nomonhan was a "terrible defeat" to the Japanese which "teach them a lesson that they could not face the Red Army". I don't see that. I see a massive Soviet offensive against a Japanese Army which was actually surprised, outnumbered and poorly equipped. Even so, the casualities were similar for both sides. Not that the IJA did not have it's faults, but the thing wasn't so one-sidded as popularly belived. Also, the main reason for the Japanese *temporary* abandon the idea of fight the Russians was the German pact with Stalin that was signed (intentionally by Stalin) together with the Soviet offensive in Nomonhan to provoke a rupture in the German-Japanese relations. The Japanese government fell and also the advocates of the "North Strike Group".