Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941

[Jenisch]

I don't disagree with Wiki's definition of a Banzai attack, but you seem to have no idea what you call a " frontal attack" is, as carried out by the U.S. Army, Marines etc. is.

Mate, I really don't understand much. But I like to risk talk some things.

I understand you mentioned the Banzai charge as a defect of the IJA. While it frequentely lead to high casualities, it was not a predominant Japanese tactic. Specially when they had air support and more flexibility to use their other tactics, like it would be in a hypotetical Japanese invasion of Russia. That's my point.

 

[Shinpachi]

Nice talk guys but my father did not want to get back to the IJA


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UR5XPd3YW9E

 

[tyrodtom]

The JA learned a lot of lessons fighting in China, that weren't so successful when used against better armed and trained opponents.

But their change of fighting tactics late in the war at Iwo Jima and Okinawa shows they were still capable of learning from earlier mistakes.

The Army going into Russia in 40-42 wouldn't be using the better thought out tactics of the 44-45 Japanese Army.

 

[Jenisch]

The JA learned a lot of lessons fighting in China, that weren't so successful when used against better armed and trained opponents.

But their change of fighting tactics late in the war at Iwo Jima and Okinawa shows they were still capable of learning from earlier mistakes.

The Army going into Russia in 40-42 wouldn't be using the better thought out tactics of the 44-45 Japanese Army.

But it would be in it's " natural environment". Like JoeB mentioned, the IJA had all it's tactics to fight against Russia in Eastern Manchuria. This is the reason why it achived it's objective in Changkufeng (only to be expelled later due to lack of support), despite massive enemy numerical superiority and total lack of air support.

And I think it's not fair put all the weight in the Army. The Japanese Air Services and the IJN certainly would make a lot of noise as well. The Polikarpovs and their inexperience pilots were mauled by the Luftwaffe, and there's no reason to belive they would not be from the Japanese. After this, the Soviet troops and supply lines would be mauled as well.

 

[JoeB]

The JA learned a lot of lessons fighting in China, that weren't so successful when used against better armed and trained opponents.

But this leaves out a very major chapter of IJA history, its great successes against western Allied troops in the opening campaigns of the Pacific War through May 1942, when Japan captured territory over an enormous expanse in a short time. The IJA was aided in those campaigns by Japanese superiority in air and at sea, but also consistently defeated Allied armies with inferior (Japanese) numbers. Of course these Allied armies were far from the best the Allies fielded in WWII. The British Armies in Malaya and Burma were generally second-string collections of forces which could be spared by an already highly stretched British Empire; the 'US' force in the Philippines was mainly a still poorly trained Philippine National Army with US support and leadership; the Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) was already cut off from the German occupied Netherlands even before the Pacific War. However, the fact remains the IJA showed up very well against those Allied forces, and often defeated them with manuever. But even when frontal assault was used as a tactic, those Allied armies could not always stand up to it. Japanese infantry attacks were very fierce; they didn't only work against the Chinese.

IMO, it's partly leftover Allied propaganda from the WWII era which leads us to ignore or explain away the early IJA successes in relatively 'stand up fights' with numerically superior (though less well supplied) Allied armies, then overemphasizes IJA defeats in later Pac War battles where their position was entirely hopeless. It's true that some Japanese field commanders (as in the early attempts to retake G'canal) underestimated enemy strength and quality, but their own numbers and firepower were usually insufficient to overcome any competent enemy of such relative strength. Again, I think biased wartime accounts, and later first hand oriented accounts focused on honoring American servicemen, tend to blow out of proportion the importance of inferior IJA infantry tactics at G'canal. No army with the IJA's lack of numbers, weapons and supply at G'canal could have overcome any reasonably competent army possessing the positions, numbers, supply and weapons of the US Marine (later also US Army) defending force. The key to such campaigns was the air/sea struggle to reinforce and resupply the islands, which the Japanese lost at G'canal, and coudn't even contest in some later island campaigns.

Given the IJA performance v the Allies in Malaya, Burma, Philippines and DEI in 1941-42, they probably would have had overall qualitative superiority against the Soviets in the infantry-friendly terrain of Eastern Manchuria/Maritime Province as well. Red Army quality in '41 was very spotty, and the Soviets like the western Allies left relatively lower quality forces in the Far East.

Joe

 

[Jenisch]

A major problem for the Soviets was the vulnerable Transiberian. If the Japanese managed to cut it, they would be doomed.

 

[Jenisch]

While an interesting subject, I don't think there's much sense in discuss this. Perhaps only in case the Sino-Japanese war didn't started in '37. The Western Allies would never let Japan link up with Hitler. The Japanese didn't started such war just because the oil question.

 

[tyrodtom]

When one side attacks first without even the formality of a declaration of war , they tend to do well.

The allies should not have been as unprepared as they were. I'm not so sure it was the superority of the JA, or the gross incompetence on the part of the allies, or maybe a little of both.

But we seemed to have learned faster from our failures than the Japanese. Maybe with the JA's go for broke policy whenever things didn't go well ( Banzai) didn't leave any survivors to learn from.

 

[Juha]

...Given the IJA performance v the Allies in Malaya, Burma, Philippines and DEI in 1941-42, they probably would have had overall qualitative superiority against the Soviets in the infantry-friendly terrain of Eastern Manchuria/Maritime Province as well. Red Army quality in '41 was very spotty, and the Soviets like the western Allies left relatively lower quality forces in the Far East.

Joe

I'm not sure on that, Siberian units deployed in early 42 against Finns were good quality troops with good forest fighting tactics, definitely better in forest than German regular infantry in 1941. If IJA would have attacked Eastern Siberia, it would have been Soviet troops which had been fighting in their home turf not IJA.

Juha

 

[Jenisch]

I'm not sure on that, Siberian units deployed in early 42 against Finns were good quality troops with good forest fighting tactics, definitely better in forest than German regular infantry in 1941. If IJA would have attacked Eastern Siberia, it would have been Soviet troops which had been fighting in their home turf not IJA.

Juha

On advantage to the Japanese side was a concentrated attack in Eastern Manchuria. The Soviet troops were dispersed over a large area. The critical objective was the Transiberian, very close to them:

*Consideration only to the the red line.

If they cut the Transiberian, the Soviets could resist, but the outcome would be already decided.

About the Siberian troops, well, in the winter I do not doubt of their superiority. Otherwise, they would be competitive to the Japanese. But again, isolated army comparisons are not correct. Air and naval (the Japanese planned amphibius landings in several places) superiority can change the things decisvely. The Soviets were also in a not very good position to replace lost men and equipment. I do do not doubt of them, but also do not doubt of the Japanese.

 

[Shinpachi]

As you may know, Jenisch, 73000 Japanese troops once stayed there during the Siberian Intervention(1918-1922) even after other allies came home.
IJA's conclusion was that the future war with the Soviet Union would be their last choice because they had not been interested in Siberia as a territory with severe climate and the ground of hard harvest. Target should not be the north.

 

[Juha]

On advantage to the Japanese side was a concentrated attack in Eastern Manchuria. The Soviet troops were dispersed over a large area. The critical objective was the Transiberian, very close to them:

*Consideration only to the the red line.

If they cut the Transiberian, the Soviets could resist, but the outcome would be already decided.

It's not enough to cut it it also must be kept cut. Much also depended where it would be cut. Soviets were aware of the vulnerability of Trans-Siberian railway, so they probably had stockpiled much in Eastern Siberia. But as LW found out, or USAF and USN during Korea, the problem was how to keep the railways cut, not how to cut them. And in heavily forested areas the effects of airpower is fairly severely limited, of course centres of population and bridges etc are still fairly easy to find.

Juha

 

[Jenisch]

As you may know, Jenisch, 73000 Japanese troops once stayed there during the Siberian Intervention(1918-1922) even after other allies came home.
IJA's conclusion was that the future war with the Soviet Union would be their last choice because they had not been interested in Siberia as a territory with severe climate and the ground of hard harvest. Target should not be the north.

I know. I'm just arguing about the military aspects.

 

[Jenisch]

It's not enough to cut it it also must be kept cut. Much also depended where it would be cut. Soviets were aware of the vulnerability of Trans-Siberian railway, so they probably had stockpiled much in Eastern Siberia. But as LW found out, or USAF and USN during Korea, the problem was how to keep the railways cut, not how to cut them. And in heavily forested areas the effects of airpower is fairly severely limited, of course centres of population and bridges etc are still fairly easy to find.

Juha

Yeah Juha. But as I told before, I wouldn't underestimate the Japanese infrantry capability. The training of the Japanese soldier was probably the harshest in the world, and the winter in Manchuria was very severe. They trained for war with the Soviets for decades as well.

 

[Shinpachi]

Motivation is also an important factor to win.

IJA soldiers may have looked a fighting machine but they were not machines.
They fought for their nation and that was all.
Please consider.

 

[tyrodtom]

I have nothing but respect for the individual Japanese fighting man, soldier, sailor, or airman.

But I feel nothing but utter contempt for their command structure that would lead them into, and then leave them in impossible situations, where, because of their culture, there was no escape, except death.

 

[Shinpachi]

Thanks tyrodtom for your thoughts over your older opponent.

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, 20,000 IJA soldiers were killed in vain before their commander noticed he had better bring the bigger cannons from the homeland even if taking time. But soldiers could fight because they had strong motivation.

If it had been in 1941, I wonder the result because they had no reason to fight.

 

[Jenisch]

The IJA didn't showed motivation to the death in the Pacific? The Russians that motivated the IJA, not the Americans. Therefore, I don't know why they would not show motivation. "Spiritual power" was also the main topic for the IJA training.

 

[tyrodtom]

It's a poor commander that depends on his soldier's " spiritual powers" to make up for his bad tactical planning.

 

[Jenisch]

It's a poor commander that depends on his soldier's " spiritual powers" to make up for his bad tactical planning.

Ah, that depends. Hitler didn't belived the Germans were racially superior, specially against the Slavics? The Red Army didn't have the Political Commissar until 1942? The Japanese also had their "defect". But like the others, this didn't prevented them from achive successes.