Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
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Not saying it can' be true, just saying it's amazing that such a lightly armed aircraft with very modest performance can do so well, he F4U had such a performance advantage it should have been able to cruise in at near the Ki-43's top speed and engage and disengaged at it's choosing, likewise the Oscar could neither catch nor run away from the Corsair, it makes you wonder what tactics or situation the Corsairs were in that allowed the Oscars to get an advantage.
EDIT: Sorry I posted before I saw this had been addressedTo be clear, the Corsair stat was against A6M, probably A6M5 which is a bit faster than the Oscar II (and better armed)
We can also go by the numbers at times.
The countries were not equal in industrial capacity or human capacity. There was actually a huge disparity between the US (#1) and Italy (#6, not counting France) in steel production alone by a factor of about 40 to 1. The US had a huge advantage in the number of engineers and draftsmen. I am not saying they were smarter, just that the US had more of them to speed designs (of practically anything) along.
The concept of a global war was also not on anybody's mind in the 1930s. Just about all aircraft were designed with local conditions in mind.
The British did keep in mind the Empire but at times they were shortsighted. Empire/colonial duties were often different (or less intense) than European duties.
The Soviets had more experience with extreme weather than just about anybody else.
The Japanese, with their minds on expansion into China, Manchuria and south east Asia probably were the most interested in range of the major powers.
Things in 1930s were often limited by what was possible, not what could be thought of. And with aviation what was possible varied by the year if not every few months.
Once the Western war started, Sept 1939 as apposed to the war in Asia, it was found that a lot of the 1920s-1930s theories were not valid. It took time to rethink, retool and come up with new theories. And at times the nations that joined late (Dec 1941) didn't want to pay attention to other nations that had been fighting for over two years.
The concept that a small group of elite warriors (sailors, soldiers, airmen) could win a large scale war against large numbers was attractive for a number of reasons, Some pride or belief in national/racial superiority and sometimes because it meant they could go cheap on the weapons or numbers.
With aircraft there was a constant and not at times, steady progression, there were fit's and starts but the trend cold be seen. If you want to play on the world stage you have to keep up.
The Japanese were not keeping up. Part do to industrial base. Part due to misreading the time available. They were also gambling on a short war (cheap) and misread the situation (the Americans would not fight a long war)
ever in the ACIG 57 MiG-17 and 13 MiG-19/J6 for the Phantom in Vietnam*in the ACIG databast i just find 5 MiG-15 + 1 damaged for the F9F for 3 lost to MiG-15
The Japanese as far as steel goes had about 60% of the steel production of GB and about 1/3 or less that of Germany. However there was the British commonwealth, Canada out produced Italy most years. Japan effectively stopped production of large (cruisers or larger) warships except what was already laid down even the the sister of the Shinano was ordered broken up in place in March of 1942 when 30% complete.The Japanese also clearly didn't have the industrial capacity of the US, or even probably the UK or Germany. But they kept up fairly well in spite of it. At least for a while.
1943 was a sort of hole as far as the US Navy and carrier warfare goes. There were no carrier vs carrier battles in 1943. There were a bunch of carrier vs Islands/bases battles.It really seems that the Hellcat made the big difference in the Pacific. The Navy, rather Borg-like, struggled on mainly with their overloaded and underpowered F4F-4s for the second half of 1942 and all through 1943, and I don't think that was such a great match-up with their Japanese opposition, but then they got a big reward in the much, much more capable F6F, and in smaller numbers, the faster and faster F4U.
The thing is that sometimes the planes (or versions) used in Asia were not the same as the ones used in Europe, or they were introduced later in time.I also don't personally buy the idea that the German or British aircraft in this same period were necessarily superior to the Japanese types. I admit this is probably harder to prove. But we get some idea of the likely matchups just from the fact that many of the same aircraft did fight in both regions - Spitfires and P-38s fought from England. Hurricanes and P-40s and P-38s and Spitfires, and even Wildcats / Martlets and P-39s, A-36s and other planes fought in the Med as well as in the Pacific. A-20 bombers, B-25s, B-24s, Beauforts, Beaufighters and Wellingtons also fought in both the Med and Pacific.
well, if the goal was in close, high G maneuvering, having good visibility/situational awareness was probably very important.One thing worth noting about the Ki-43 (and the Ki-27 as well) is that they had pretty good visbility. That may have been a more important factor than is initially obvious.
I used Bloody Shambles V3 to look at Hurricane vs Ki43 combats some years back, and if all one does is make a tally of the kill/loss ratio between them, then it doesn't look that good for the Hurricane. When you look at the number of sorties flown vs the number of kills, you realize that the number of Hurricanes lost to KI-43s was so small (a very low sortie loss rate) and over such a long time frame that it wasn't really an issue for the Hurricanes, which were typically flying low altitude strike missions, and were constantly at a disadvantage in terms of situational awareness and altitude. I expect that the same was true for the B-24s.
well, if the goal was in close, high G maneuvering, having good visibility/situational awareness was probably very important.
The low drag (or not so low) hoods and canopies of the 109, Spitfire, P-36, D. 520 etc probably were a hindrance.
Yes, bombers would be better than fighters but if there's broken cloud or by going up sun the fighters can often gain an element of surprise especially on a small formation. Of course on the bomb run the bomber can't maneuver:Now I don't quite follow you. The crew of a heavy bomber would seem to have pretty good situational awareness due to several gunners looking in every direction, not to mention flying in formation, plus there were navigators and radio operators doing navigation. And in interceptions, the bombers almost always determined the combat height, and the US heavy bombers with their turbocharged engines had a higher optimum height than the Ki-43s.
I agree that B-24 losses were usually light and both sides had meager resources.
BTW just noticed than at least 27 Nov 1943 both 7th and 308th BGs participated an escorted attack on Rangoon. Both sent 28 bombers and lost 1 and 2 B-24s respectively.
On 26 November all flights were called off because of weather. With two days gone and nothing accomplished, the planned schedule was thrown aside, and on the 27th, AAF Liberators accompanied by Lightnings, and Mitchells escorted by Mustangs, struck at Insein. Despite determined interception by a large number of enemy fighters just prior to the bomb run, results of the attack were excellent. In a subsequent report General Davidson, in command of the Tenth Air Force since August, estimated that at least 70 per cent of the buildings and installations of the locomotive works were destroyed.51 In the aerial fight which developed from the interception, Japanese pilots pressed their attacks home time after time. After the mission returned, it was found that four P-51's, two P-38's, and three B-24's had been lost. One of the Mustangs shot down was piloted by Colonel Melton, commander of the 311th Group, who was seen to bail out and land in territory where natives were generally friendly. One of the B-24's landed in water off the coast and nine of the crew were rescued. Thirteen enemy fighters were claimed destroyed, seven probably destroyed, and four others damaged.52
An attack on Botataung docks was set for the following day, the 28th. Since the provision of escort for B-24's at approximately 18,000 feet and mediums operating at about 9,000 feet was too great an undertaking for the few fighters left, the mediums on that day attacked Sagaing instead of flying with the heavies to Rangoon. Over the targets the Liberators encountered far less resistance than on the preceding day and no American aircraft was lost. Four interceptors were shot down and five more claimed as probables. Heavy damage was done to the dock area and results of the mission were considered very good.53
The 29th and 30th of November were set aside for maintenance, but on 1 December the B-24's revisited Insein while the B-25's bombed Myitnge bridge. All available fighters, now only ten P-51's and fifteen P-38's, were assigned as escorts to Insein. Delayed in taking off from Kurmitola by heavy fog and unable because of poor communications to warn the bombers, the P-51's failed to finish refueling at Ramu in time to make the rendezvous. The mission went out with only the fifteen P-38's to protect it.54
Japanese fighter strength in the Rangoon area apparently had been at a low ebb on 28 November, but in the two intervening days they must have brought in heavy reinforcements from neighboring regions. When the bombers made their run from north to south in order to avoid heavy antiaircraft fire, the sixty-odd enemy fighters already aloft were able to make head-on attacks out of the sun. The first assault was as devastating as it was surprising. Enemy aircraft were in firing distance before they were sighted, concentrating on the formation leaders. The 7th Group, forming the first wave, bore the brunt of the attack. On the first pass the group leader, his left wingman, and a squadron leader were knocked out. Three planes pulled up to close the gaps in the formation and soon afterward one of the three was lost. Three others tried to cover the group leader, who was losing speed and altitude, and thus did not complete the bomb run. The P-38's could give little direct assistance, as they had their hands full with other fighters still above the bomber formation.55
When the planes of the 308th Group arrived and were ready to begin their bomb run, the attacks were repeated by a slightly smaller number of aircraft. Sometimes enemy fighters came in three abreast, all concentrating on a single plane. At other times they approached in a
string, each plane making a pass and pulling away to allow the next in line to come in. The lead plane of the 308th was shot down on the first pass, just before the bomb run, and the plane which took its place was badly hit during the run. Attacks persisted after bombs were away, enemy pilots singling out cripples; but the P-51's finally arrived in time to offer some protection on the return, losing one ship in their brief participation.56
Bombing results of the costly mission were largely unobserved because of the continuing fighter attacks during the bomb run, but the pattern was believed good. American losses, however, were appallingly high--six B-24's and one P-51 destroyed and five B-24's seriously damaged.57
The American phase of the operation came to a close on the afternoon of 4 December when AAF bombers ran successful mining missions to Rangoon and Moulmein without encountering resistance or suffering losses. The AAF missions on 25, 27, and 28 November and 1 December resulted in the loss of twelve B-24's, eight P-51's, and two P-38's, while many other craft of various types were temporarily unusable because of damage sustained.58