SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The like is for the no free lunch. The one thing I could follow.
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The Kinsei may not have had the low speed/low throttle fuel consumption that the 1 speed Sakae had.Designing the A6M around the Kinsei from the get go?
A bigger drop tank - 400-450 vs. 300 L - can lessen the 'range anxiety' by a good deal, since, after all, Kinsei was not that much more powerful until the 60 series.
Somewhere in 1942 would be good for the change over. Either stick the Kensei in instead of the Sakae 21 or build both for while until a full transition can be made.IOW - Japanese can have, in service in early 1942, a Zero+ with 1100 HP at 2000 ft, vs. the Zero with 940 HP at ~13500 (Mod 21; an usual occurrence back then) or with 970 HP at ~19500 ft (Model 32; to enter service in Spring of 1942).
Well, 8 1/3 shells a second with 123-130gram shells or 12 shells a second with 79gram shellsType 99 was firing a much heavier shell than the Ho-5 (130g vs. 83g - even lighter than Shvak; the Type 99-2 was also firing at much higher MV than the 'legacy' 99-1)
Trick with the Ho-5 was that it was a bit too late - some 3 years after the 'short' Type 99, and 1 year after the 'long' Type 99. In the other words, by the time Ho-5 was in service, the 'short 99' was superseded by the 'long 99' a long time ago.Well, 8 1/3 shells a second with 123-130gram shells or 12 shells a second with 79gram shells
The velocity is much better with the Ho-5 than with the short Oerlikon but just about equal with the long Oerlikon. With guns in the wing and crossing over I don't think there was much to choose in range between the Ho-5 and the type 99 II.
The Ho-5 is going to be easier to hit with than the Type 99 I and the ammo is going to be lighter.
The 12.7mm machine guns and the 20mm Ho-5 cannon are going be a better ballistics match than the type 99 I with most any other gun.
J2M3 Radian with the long barrel high velocity cannon inboard and the short barrel low velocity cannon outboard.
you have got about 33 rounds per sec and since the out board guns have about 80% of the velocity of the inboard guns unless the range is close (or the target is big) the shells are not going to wind up in the place in the sky.
The Japanese cannot afford numerous heavy guns like the M2 Browning and their heavy ammo.
Agreed all the way.They also cannot afford to build thousands of Ki-43s with all the material and effort to just get a pair of machine guns into the air.
Not sure that any of that is viable.Well, I think this goes back to finding a way for better strategic cooperation between the axis. For Japan, the last thing I would want to do is wage war against the US. A different path to alleviate the impact of the embargo and possibly victory would be to support Germany by declaring war against Russia (pinning Russian troops in the east) and only invading British or French colonies in the Pacific for raw materials. By not attacking the US, you undermine American emotion for war and probably keep the US neutral. The UK and France don't have the resources to fight the Japanese and Russia is forced to choose whether to commit more resources to the German front. In return Japan needs to get greater technical/material support from Germany. Also, Germany doesn't declare war against the U.S. further tipping the war in its favor.
And Rubber.Not much oil deposits found in Siberia in 1941 ... and it was oil that drove Japan to war. They weren't about to take NEI without securing the flank against the Philippines, by their own notions of military ops.
The Japanese got many resources from Manchuria, except for the one they really needed -- oil.
That's why Burma became more important to them as the war went on.Not much oil deposits found in Siberia in 1941 ... and it was oil that drove Japan to war. They weren't about to take NEI without securing the flank against the Philippines, by their own notions of military ops.
The Japanese got many resources from Manchuria, except for the one they really needed -- oil.
Hong Kong was pretty much isolated from the rest of China from 1938 after the Japanese occupied Canton and the surrounding area. Canton had been the major port of entry for materials to support the Chinese fight against the Japanese.Beside securing oil, in order to continue the war in China, Japan had to close three supply routes to Chiang Kai-shek in northern FIC, HK and Burma as soon as possible.
Agreed as to summer/fall of 1941. The embargo was the tipping point in Japan's decision to attack the United States and move to capture critical resources in the Pacific Rim. My point is that the decision to attack the U.S. ensured that Japan would lose the war. However, the majority of resources that Japan sought were not in U.S. territories and could have been secured without the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. On the other hand, declaring war on the Soviet Union helps Axis partner Germany and strengthens Axis allegiances. The Soviet Union had been keeping significant military resources in the east and the reassignment of these forces to the German front was a critical factor in the winter 1941 counteroffensive. Japan doesn't need to invade the Soviet Union, but it does need to close the Pacific Ports through which lend-lease supplies are beginning to move.Not sure that any of that is viable.
"A different path to alleviate the impact of the embargo and possibly victory would be to support Germany by declaring war against Russia (pinning Russian troops in the east)"
That would take place in June 1941 at the earliest and American lead embargo was increasing at that time. Scrap iron, copper and passage through the Panama canal were already restricted.
I'm not so sure on this point. American public opinion is still heavily on the side of neutrality, or at the very least of remaining a non-combatant. Without a Pearl Harbor it will be much more difficult to build momentum to join the war. My guess is that the U.S. could remain neutral for two more years and depending on the impact of a Japanese embargo on Russian ports the war could look vastly different than what happened in actuality." only invading British or French colonies in the Pacific for raw materials."
The US was not going to stand by and let Japan invade British, French or Dutch colonies for raw materials. At least not for long. The oil embargo was in response to Japanese moves in French Indo-china. The war may not have started in Dec of 1941 but going into 1942 things get even hotter.
Same as above. Without a major incident and without Germany declaring war it's unlikely that public sentiment would demand the U.S. enter the conflict as a belligerent. Without Japan initiating war with the U.S. it's unlikely Germany declares war prior to a greater likelihood of success against the Soviet Union. It's worth remembering that Germany appeared to be on the verge of defeating the Soviet Union in December 1941, which probably influenced the decision to declare war against the U.S. Without the U.S.S.R's influx of troops around Moscow in the winter 1941/1942 its conceivable that the German summer 1942 offensive would have had a different outcome." Also, Germany doesn't declare war against the U.S. further tipping the war in its favor."
US Germany was only a matter of time. The USN was already dropping depth charges on German U-boats and the Germans had not only torpedoed American Merchant ships but the USS Rueben James in Oct 1941. It was only a matter of time before one or more "incidents" pushed the US and Germany into war.
It was brought up earlier in this thread that Germany had withheld a number of technical advances such as turbocharging. At the very least greater transfer of technical knowledge could have aided the Japanese cause. In the spirit of this thread, without having to fight the U.S.N in the Pacific, the Japanese Navy would be on better footing to engage the British Fleet and possibly gain control of large portions of the Indian Ocean sea lanes. By NOT fighting the U.S. the Japanese merchant fleet doesn't suffer and is more able to maintain shipping of war resources. Control of the Indian Ocean would also provide the opportunity to close, or prevent, the Persian Corridor further cutting off the U.S.S.R. from much needed support." In return Japan needs to get greater technical/material support from Germany."
They weren't going to get much more. Once Japan formally supports Germany (declares war on Russia or engages in sizable combat)) the British are going to at the very least, try to stop all shipping from connecting the two, they were already blockading Germany. Japanese merchant ships anywhere in the Indian Ocean or Pacific would be fair game.
Trade by Submarine?
See above. Japan would be more able to move raw materials without the critical loss of merchant shipping.Technical support also means the ability to turn drawings into actual products. doesn't matter how good the drawings are if you don't have the ability ( raw materials & manufacturing capabilities) produce them.
Two points:Thank you for your reply, Shortround6,
Here is a better description of my thoughts now that I'm not trying to post through my phone.
Agreed as to summer/fall of 1941. The embargo was the tipping point in Japan's decision to attack the United States and move to capture critical resources in the Pacific Rim. My point is that the decision to attack the U.S. ensured that Japan would lose the war. However, the majority of resources that Japan sought were not in U.S. territories and could have been secured without the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. On the other hand, declaring war on the Soviet Union helps Axis partner Germany and strengthens Axis allegiances. The Soviet Union had been keeping significant military resources in the east and the reassignment of these forces to the German front was a critical factor in the winter 1941 counteroffensive. Japan doesn't need to invade the Soviet Union, but it does need to close the Pacific Ports through which lend-lease supplies are beginning to move.
I'm not so sure on this point. American public opinion is still heavily on the side of neutrality, or at the very least of remaining a non-combatant. Without a Pearl Harbor it will be much more difficult to build momentum to join the war. My guess is that the U.S. could remain neutral for two more years and depending on the impact of a Japanese embargo on Russian ports the war could look vastly different than what happened in actuality.
Same as above. Without a major incident and without Germany declaring war it's unlikely that public sentiment would demand the U.S. enter the conflict as a belligerent. Without Japan initiating war with the U.S. it's unlikely Germany declares war prior to a greater likelihood of success against the Soviet Union. It's worth remembering that Germany appeared to be on the verge of defeating the Soviet Union in December 1941, which probably influenced the decision to declare war against the U.S. Without the U.S.S.R's influx of troops around Moscow in the winter 1941/1942 its conceivable that the German summer 1942 offensive would have had a different outcome.
It was brought up earlier in this thread that Germany had withheld a number of technical advances such as turbocharging. At the very least greater transfer of technical knowledge could have aided the Japanese cause. In the spirit of this thread, without having to fight the U.S.N in the Pacific, the Japanese Navy would be on better footing to engage the British Fleet and possibly gain control of large portions of the Indian Ocean sea lanes. By NOT fighting the U.S. the Japanese merchant fleet doesn't suffer and is more able to maintain shipping of war resources. Control of the Indian Ocean would also provide the opportunity to close, or prevent, the Persian Corridor further cutting off the U.S.S.R. from much needed support.
See above. Japan would be more able to move raw materials without the critical loss of merchant shipping.
Those are my thoughts. Since it's a what if thread, I am admittedly optimistic in the outcomes of these actions. Ultimately, I still believe the Allies would emerge victorious.
Kk
While in principle I agree with your final statement that the US could outbuild Japan, the longer war was deferred then the longer that advantage would have taken to arrive given peacetime build rates. So at Dec 1941 the scheduled completions of the expanded fleet look like this:-The US Navy expansion plans had been announced in US news papers and from 1937 these increases had been substantial. The First of the modern BB had been authorized in FY 38 and by 1940 the first two Iowa's were authorized eight BB total and more to come. Other ships, carriers, cruisers, Destroyers and subs in proportion. On July 19 1940 after France fell, the 2 Ocean navy bill had been Approved.
In the Fall of 1941 the US would never be weaker as new ships were arriving all the time, The US was outbuilding the Japanese at a tremendous rate so the Japan to US force ratio would never be better for years to come. If the US stayed neutral for a year it would only be stronger compared to the Japanese. The ships the US would use to fight the Japanese with in 1943/44 had been authorized and paid for in 1939-40.
You are right about the speed up the program but they had speed up some of it in late 1941 as tensions increased.The whole build programme was rapidly speeded up immediately after PH to generate the fleet of 1943/44 and many more ships were ordered in 1942 under the Maximum War Programme, many of which also completed by 15 Aug 1945, sometimes ahead of the ships of the Two Ocean Navy.
Had the peacetime plan continued for longer with a delay in the start of the war, the navy might have had a different shape come 1944/45. Montanas might have been in build for example.