FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
There was a time when Kelly Johnson was denied use of a wind tunnel so the issue wasn't initially captured, I'll have to look up specifics.
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There was a time when Kelly Johnson was denied use of a wind tunnel so the issue wasn't initially captured, I'll have to look up specifics.Did the wind tunnel research on the P-38 introduce the term "compressibility" into the aviation lexicon? The Typhoon is said to have had compressibility issues with its thick wings and chin radiator, but previously the Tornado (same plane with a Vulture engine) was said to have dive and stability issues with the radiator further back even though it is obviously the same compressibility problem.
From Wiki with references -Did the wind tunnel research on the P-38 introduce the term "compressibility" into the aviation lexicon? The Typhoon is said to have had compressibility issues with its thick wings and chin radiator, but previously the Tornado (same plane with a Vulture engine) was said to have dive and stability issues with the radiator further back even though it is obviously the same compressibility problem.
Schweik,I'll defer to your greater experience on that - what I remember from flying light planes years ago was that it got much colder when you reached 10,000 ft.
However, -5F is pretty damn cold without a heater. I've experienced those kinds of temperatures. Ground temperature in the Pacific is also often in the 80s. For example as I type this the current temperature in Port Moresby is 78. Per your calculation that would mean -24C at 25,000 ft and that is -11F, which is chilly brotha.
Did the wind tunnel research on the P-38 introduce the term "compressibility" into the aviation lexicon? The Typhoon is said to have had compressibility issues with its thick wings and chin radiator, but previously the Tornado (same plane with a Vulture engine) was said to have dive and stability issues with the radiator further back even though it is obviously the same compressibility problem.
Which brings up the issue of when was the tipping point in the PTO. It's say probably a fairly wide period (~ 6 months) was still fiercely contested, but if I had to put the middle of the tipping point in that Theater I'd place it near the end of 1942. At that time you still had a lot of P-38G and then H with the various issues.The aircraft was just entering service at the start of the war and was initially designed as an interceptor. It's mission changed and during that time issues were worked out. Some of these "fixes" had to first be approved by the government so there was a delay there, but by the time the P-38J was introduced (August 1943) many of these issues were worked out. These issues and their time line to fix would compare to other fighters. If you research mission capable rates these so called issues in the SWP they didn't factor much.
I don't know there is any, though I'll look into it. I just doubt it would be an issue in say, Tunisia or Algeria but not in New Guinea.The generator issue was solved with the H and definitely with the J model, I believe and the only issue with the generator is you had only one, a configuration initially accepted by the AAF. Again, show evidence that PTO pilots complained continually about the heater issue which would actually exist in any twin engine aircraft that used engine heat exchangers in lieu of a dedicated heater unit.
I'm not blaming it all on Lockheed, I'm just pointing out there were issues and it took a while to resolve them all. Aside from problems with the actual machine there was also the training issue which seemed to get better in 1943. In the interview I linked one of those guys mentioned that each new group that came in was assigned a veteran to show them the ropes so that has to be helpful. But when they went in (earlier) they had very little time on type.I can somewhat agree but at the same time if you researched those who gave a negative critique of the P-38 in Europe, they did not like flying a twin engine fighter. It was more complicated and harder to train new pilots on. There were many improvements offered by Lockheed and it took awhile for approval or these recommendations were rejected.
Schweik,
As Shortround mentioned, the colder it gets the harder it is to keep warm. In planes that cruise for long periods at altitude a phenomenon called soaking occurs. Cold soaking in this case, heat soaking in the case of the Reno warbirds trying to win a race. The plane feels okay when you get to altitude , but several hours later it's colder than hell (I've experienced this numerous times in the Eagle). Also remember that the planes were unpressurised and drafty, so you fought cold with minimal heat that could be vacuumed overboard.
The Europe template called for extended high altitude cruise in sometimes extremely cold temperatures. It is my understanding the SWP did not use the same profile. 10k with oxygen mask off until nearing the threat area then push it up and take it up. Post fight cruise descent until 10k, then lower as you neared the field. The plane had the same problems regardless of where it was, they just weren't obvious (cockpit temp wise) in the SWP.
Cheers,
Biff
The P-38s first missions in force were actually flown in late 1942 so how can that be? If you want a start of the "tipping point" research the mission flown on December 31, 1942Which brings up the issue of when was the tipping point in the PTO. It's say probably a fairly wide period (~ 6 months) was still fiercely contested, but if I had to put the middle of the tipping point in that Theater I'd place it near the end of 1942. At that time you still had a lot of P-38G and then H with the various issues.
They did to a point - as stated, the 5th AF with P-39s and P-40s were less than 1 to 1 against the Japanese until the P-38 arrived on scene. Because of their lack of range they were basically fighting on the defensive, your own posts validate this!!! I've shown evidence that proves a lot of the Japanese fighter force was neutralized. Compare the P-40 claims to the P-38 as well as those pilots who shot down 5 or more aircraft from that period until the PI was secured.And by that point, the older types had already in large part broken, or at least severely blunted the air superiority of the Japanese in New Guinea and the Solomons. The Navy and then Marines had developed their Thach Weave tactic (and others) with the Wildcat, the Army and ANZAC units had figured out effective escape maneuvers with the P-40 and how to use BnZ tactics, increased their horsepower and largely resolved their issues with ammunition. In both places they had improved their coast watcher network and had developed effective pilot rescue systems (something the Japanese severely lacked). If you read pilot interviews from 49th FG or 76 Sqn RAAF there is a major shift in tone from spring to fall 1942, by the latter period they are much more confident.
AgreeI'm not blaming it all on Lockheed, I'm just pointing out there were issues and it took a while to resolve them all. Aside from problems with the actual machine there was also the training issue which seemed to get better in 1943. In the interview I linked one of those guys mentioned that each new group that came in was assigned a veteran to show them the ropes so that has to be helpful. But when they went in (earlier) they had very little time on type.
The earlier P-38s I can agree to a point, the P-38J was a different storyRegardless, the P-38 units were doing pretty well and giving worse than they got by early 1943, which was not the case in the MTO. German and Italian fighters could escape a P-38 more or less at will in a vertical dive, and depending on the specific opponent and the altitude, P-38s did not necessarily have a speed advantage. In the PTO they did, and even the fastest Japanese planes really couldn't outrun them. Some could out-climb, but the P-38s high speed climb abilities allowed them to extend away in relative safety without needing to dive precipitously. They couldn't do that against a Bf 109G or a Macchi C.205 though.
They also flew P-40 missions to Lae, going back to mid 1942The P-38s first missions in force were actually flown in late 1942 so how can that be? If you want a start of the "tipping point" research the mission flown on December 31, 1942
On December 31, 1942 took off from 14 Mile Drome (Schwimmer) near Port Moresby piloted by 2nd Lt. Kenneth Sparks as one of twelve P-38s led by Thomas J. Lynch on a mission to escort A-20 Havocs, B-25 Mitchells and B-26 Marauders on a bombing mission against Lae Airfield near Lae. Over the target, the P-38s engaged eight Zeros (actually Ki-43 Oscars from the 11th Sentai). During the combat, Sparks fired at a Zero (actually a Ki-43 Oscar) and witnessed it crash. During the combat, Ki-43 Oscar pilot Hasegawa collided with this P-38, damaging the right aileron and wingtip. Returning, to 14 Mile Drome Sparks made a direct landing approach and nearly collided with P-38F piloted by 1st. Carl G. Planck who was also damaged and landing in the opposite direction. To avoid a head on collision, Planck swerved off the runway. jammed on his breaks and narrowly missing the control tower. The P-38s claimed a total of ten enemy "Zeros" shot down. In fact, only Ki-43 piloted by Shishimoto was shot down and bailed out and his fighter crashed into the sea.
Pacific Wrecks - P-38F-5-LO Lightning Serial Number 42-12652 Nose 33
Assigned to the 5th Air Force (5th AF) and served in New Guinea until written off in early 1944 and buried at Finschafen Airfield. During late 1999, dug up and exported to Australia then to the United States and restored.pacificwrecks.com
Although there were overclaims on this mission, the importance was the ability of the P-38 to provide long range escort for the noted bombers.
They did to a point - as stated, the 5th AF with P-39s and P-40s were less than 1 to 1 against the Japanese until the P-38 arrived on scene. I've shown evidence that proves a lot of the Japanese fighter force was neutralized. Compare the P-40 claims to the P-38 as well as those pilots who shot down 5 or more aircraft.
Agree
The earlier P-38s I can agree to a point, the P-38J was a different story
From what I read that was one problem, another was that the original position on the Tornado increased the maximum cross sectional area and of course the maximum frontal area so it had to be moved either forwards or backwards. The intake/ exhaust and radiator set up on the P-51 was big, but cleverly didnt increase the maximum cross section because most is behind the wings and the radiators are mainly in the fuselage, it didnt hugely increase maximum frontal area either because of the taper in the fuselage.Are you talking about the ventral radiator that was initially fitted to the Tornado?
My understanding is that the radiator didn't work in that location because of boundary layer buildup on the lower surface of the fuselage and wing roots. I don't think that is related to compressibility, but I could be wrong.
Herman Glauert published his paper "The Effect of Compressibility on the Lift of an Aerofoil" in 1928.Did the wind tunnel research on the P-38 introduce the term "compressibility" into the aviation lexicon? The Typhoon is said to have had compressibility issues with its thick wings and chin radiator, but previously the Tornado (same plane with a Vulture engine) was said to have dive and stability issues with the radiator further back even though it is obviously the same compressibility problem.
They did, but this time they had medium bombers in mass and they were able to be escorted by a fighter that wasn't range limitedThey also flew P-40 missions to Lae, going back to mid 1942
And compare them with the 80th and 475th FG as wellThat is what I did earlier, comparing 8th to 9th FS of 49th FG. 9th was on P-38s from late 1942, 8th was still flying P-40s into 1944. The 9th had 15 Aces, the 8th had 14. Same number of double Aces (3 each).
You're not going to win a war swapping fighter to fighter with an enemy while flying a range limited aircraft. Again, the P-38 entered the scene and for AAF operations thengs changed quickly.The overall rate of victories to losses may have been close to 1-1 with P-39 units and possibly some of the P-40 units, but that was not the case with the 49th FG. There were more than 30 US aces flying P-40s in the PTO (mostly with 49th and 18th FG), compared to 1 flying P-39s. So I don't think it's really comparable.
Sorry but in the SWP especially talking about JAAF pilots, not true. I'll agree with "Allied numerical superiority, training and logistics ramped up." Your time line and area of operation is wrong if you're trying to compare the F6F to the P-38 - the F6F first saw combat in September 1943. The IJN lost many good pilots at Midway and over Guadalcanal but attrition really started to take it's bite by mid-1943. Because of where it was operating (aircraft carriers) and the campaigns it was deployed in, it was able to engage a target rich environment. Lastly when it did engage, it was well after that time the Japanese started losing the best of its pilots.P-38s scored a lot more claims granted (1700 in the PTO vs 660 for P-40s) but I think that also has to do with when they were operational, as P-40s were kind of left behind in the war due to range. Also without a doubt, later model P-38s were superior to P-40s in combat.
I generally believe that the Allied pilots scored a lot more victories after (and on the downslope of) the 'tipping point' as the Japanese pilot quality declined and Allied numerical superiority, training and logistics ramped up. Look at the number of claims by the F6F (5600!) which is more than P-40 or P-38 claims combined.
Do you have those stats available?They did, but this time they had medium bombers in mass and they were able to be escorted by a fighter that wasn't range limited
And compare them with the 80th and 475th FG as well
49th FG turns out to have had about a 1-1 ratio during their desperate defense of Darwin starting in March through Sept of 42, but by the fall of that year I think they were doing considerably better than that. I believe this is also true for the US 44th Sqn (active from Dec 42) and 76 Sqn RAAF. 14 and 15 RNZAF weren't deployed until Spring 1943 but they were definitely doing better than 1-1.You're not going to win a war swapping fighter to fighter with an enemy while flying a range limited aircraft. Again, the P-38 entered the scene and for AAF operations thengs changed quickly.
That is subjective - as is, admittedly, my perception that the P-38 pilots in the PTO were not complaining so much (or we don't read about their complaints if they had them) because they were doing a lot better operationally.Sorry but in the SWP especially talking about JAAF pilots, not true. I'll agree with "Allied numerical superiority, training and logistics ramped up." Your time line and area of operation is wrong if you're trying to compare the F6F to the P-38 - the F6F first saw combat in September 1943. Because of where it was operating (aircraft carriers) and the campaigns it was deployed in, it was able to engage a target rich environment. Lastly when it did engage, it was well after that time the Japanese started losing the best of its pilots.
I have a list of the entire 5th AF P-38 aces with those units combinedDo you have those stats available?
Depending on the timeframe they may have done better than 1:1 but not much better. I have no info on the RNZAF or the RAAF units flying the P-40.49th FG turns out to have had about a 1-1 ratio during their desperate defense of Darwin starting in March through Sept of 42, but by the fall of that year I think they were doing considerably better than that. I believe this is also true for the US 44th Sqn (active from Dec 42) and 76 Sqn RAAF. 14 and 15 RNZAF weren't deployed until Spring 1943 but they were definitely doing better than 1-1.
Well that's your opinion - I can tell you there were plenty of Lockheed tech reps in theater assisting with issues. Now IMO there may have not been many complaints (as you put it) because the pilots flying the P-38 basically liked their aircraft. It also comes back to the operational environment.That is subjective - as is, admittedly, my perception that the P-38 pilots in the PTO were not complaining so much (or we don't read about their complaints if they had them) because they were doing a lot better operationally.
I disagree - the tipping point started when we (and our allies) went on the offensive and that was in early 1943. The Japanese main supply hub was Rabual and once we started hitting Rebaul and severing the Japanese supply lines, things started changing. During this time the JAAF starting loosing some of their better pilots.I think our debate hinges on this factor of precisely when the tipping point actually was in the South Pacific. I'd say after the battles of Coral Sea (May 42), Milne Bay (Aug-Sept 42) the end of the first Japanese bombing offensive at Darwin (Sept 42) and the Second Battle of Guadalcanal (Nov 42) the Japanese offensives in both the New Guinea and Solomons were blunted, they no longer had air supremacy and at that point it was up to them to try to regain it. Guadalcanal and Port Moresby were firmly in Allied hands. Darwin was going to suffer another series of raids in 1943 but there was no longer a sense (however misguided) that the Japanese were about to invade Australia.
As stated, into 1943.To me this was the turning point, basically a six month period from August 42 to maybe March 43, with the middle being probably Nov or Dec 42.
Please shareIt would be really interesting to look at Japanese aircraft losses in this period, I hope to have some new (to me) books arriving in a few weeks which will help with that analysis.
Thanks, what I meant by "into the aviation lexicon" was moving out of academia and the design offices of companies into the world where pilots had it and its efects explained and what to do about it. According to wiki wind tunnel testing of the P-38 for these issues started late 1941 which was the same time as the Hawker Tempest with laminar flow wings was ordered.Herman Glauert published his paper "The Effect of Compressibility on the Lift of an Aerofoil" in 1928.
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspa.1928.0039
In it he has a footnote on page 117 that states:
This result is quoted without proof by Ackeret in the "Handbuch der Physik", vol. 7, p. 340 (1927), as given by Prandtl in his lectures at Gottingen in 1922.
You need the "South Pacific Air War" Series if you haven't already got them. Volume 4 states Japanese losses from 8 Dec 41 - 8 Sep 42 as being 235 aircraft. These are verified losses from Japanese records, not claims. Allied losses in the same time frame were 361 aircraft.It would be really interesting to look at Japanese aircraft losses in this period, I hope to have some new (to me) books arriving in a few weeks which will help with that analysis.
Read my post AGAIN (1415)Sounds like we are getting close to a tipping point to me, somewhere between September and December. Definitely going to get this book in spite of the high price tag.
P-38s began major operations staring in late 1942/ early 1943By early September the strategic picture in the theater had changed markedly within just six weeks. From their new Buna beachhead, the Japanese Army commenced a Papuan mountain campaign which threatened the Allied bastion of Port Moresby. Meanwhile the battle for Guadalcanal was raging, with the outcome of the wider Pacific War in the balance.
Against this background a strengthened US Fifth Air Force took the fight to the IJA with direct air support. While this was being conducted by P-39s, P-40Es, A-20As and B-25s, raids by B-17s against Rabaul aided US forces in the neighboring Solomons. RAAF Beaufighters, Beauforts, Bostons, and Hudsons also contributed substantially to these efforts.
At Rabaul, a wide variety of fresh IJN fighter and bomber units poured in the theater, although these became focused mainly on the Solomons. Such were the massive losses experienced, by November the IJN undertook a complete operational and administrative reorganization of its air power. Then, despite a strong reluctance to become involved, the IJA sent an advance reconnaissance detachment to Rabaul, the forerunner of major reinforcements that would arrive in December.