Kriegsmarine and the aircraft carrier?

[stona]

Thanks for the info. It's not something I know a lot about specifically, just in relation to other things. I'm only surprised because the Admiralty looked at the effects of aerial attacks on shipping in the early stages of the war and published, in 1941, the imaginatively titles 'Tactical Summary of Bombing Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping from September 1939 to November 1941'.
High level bombing (from above 9,000ft) was considered ineffective. The Germans abandoned the tactic in May 1940 so they probably agreed.
Low level bombing from around 1,000ft was considered moderately effective against destroyer/escort classes and trawler/auxiliary classes, but not against anything heavier.
Very low level attacks, called 'flat bombing' by the British were usually considered to be machine gun runs, making the use of bombs impractical and exposing the aircraft to anti aircraft fire in exchange for little advantage.
Dive bombing was considered by far the most effective form of bombing attack on ships and the statistics support this. However, what was a relatively easy attack made on smaller vessels unable to elevate their guns above 40 degrees was not so when attacking larger vessels. The Ju 87 would have to dive slowly through an intense barrage. The British reckoned that the Ju 87 dived slower than its US or Japanese counterparts. Another consideration, particularly in Northern waters, was the weather. The Ju 87 ideally needed clear visibility and a cloud ceiling above 10,000ft.
The Germans didn't really have much of a torpedo bomber in 1939/41.
The Navy did not consider its larger vessels to be at serious risk from air attack, though smaller vessels were. Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet thought so. He dismissed the idea of small warships operating a flotilla defence in the English Channel in the face of German air superiority but others disagreed.

There was a debate pre-war in Britain about what sort of ordnance was best dropped on war ships. Much of the work was carried out by Henry Tizard (who must have been a busy man) and the correspondence between him and Dowding about the failure of RAF bombs to destroy German warships bombed at anchor on 4th September 1939 survives. Dowding had been involved in the earlier 'Job74 Trials'. Basically the RAF was using the wrong type of bomb with the wrong fusing (delay).

The Admiralty report above confirms that the Germans were doing the same thing. German bombs varied from 50Kg to 600Kg (the latter only 2% of those dropped). 70% of bombs dropped were up to 'about 100Kg'. 73% were fused for delay indicating that the Germans did understand the importance of timed fuses.
The figures are based on unexploded ordnance and 'bombs reported'. How accurately those being bombed assessed and counted the ordnance falling on them is open for debate but the figures convinced the Admiralty that the Germans were mostly dropping bombs too small to seriously inconvenience their larger vessels.

I suspect that the move to produce more carriers was based on other strategic and tactical considerations rather than an appreciation of the vulnerability of large vessels to aerial attack. At least in late 1941 the Admiralty didn't consider its larger vessels to be vulnerable at all.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

I have to disagree, and at home have material to support a completely contrary view. the Admiralty was first exposed to sustained air attack during the operations off Norway, and the threat of german airpower, combined with the near complete lack of fighter defences forced the british to rely on inadequate AA cruisers as their primary defences. After Norway the conclusions drawn were that there had been insufficient carriers to make a difference, and those that were available were tactically mishandled. The RN did not at that stage operate CAP to any effective degree, and this more than anything had constrained all fleet operations, and forced the British to abandon a number of critical defensive positions, because re-supply could not be adequately put into effect.

After Norway there were small, but very significant changes that made a considerable difference. Fulmars were being introduced as rapidly as possible (and despite the justified criticism of it limited performance, it was, to the Navy, what the Spitfire was to the RAF), Night capable strike squadrons were being trained as intensively and quickly as possible (with devastating and war changing results to come), to allow the fast carriers to hit and run where needed. From a sea control point of view, efforts were being made to change operating procedures. before Norway standard response after a threat was detected, was to strike down all aircraft, including the fighters, fill the avgas lines with inert gas, and deploy the NBCD crews in readiness . certain AA ships were usually deployed within the TD of the carrier to maximize the carriers defence 9these ships needed to have worked closely with the carrier in order to do that....you need nerves of steel and ship handling responses to match to pull this off in combat conditions) and the centre of the TF was no longer the capital ships, they operated in the defensive ring, as part of the screen. The British from a very early stage recognixed that it was the carrier that was the centrepiece of the modern TF and no longer the BB.

But after Norway, it slowly began to be realised that aircraft offred great defensive potential but needed to be airborne in order to provide that benefit. From at least June, possibly earlier, the british began to deploy their fighters in standing CAP and when a threat was detected, launched fighters to boost the defences, rather than strike the airborne ones down. Fighters no longer flew directly over the carrier, wherer the fleet officers had rightly believed they would get in the way of the AA screen, they operated (usually)some miles outside the screen, harrying the attacking formations and breaking up the attackers. Losses to the fighters were low, but frankly, that was irrelevant. the primary mission of a fleet defence is not to rack up impressive scores, its to ensurtre the defence of the fleet by a tight, integrated defence, and in this regard, the British werre unsurpoassed, even by the Americans. Small wonder that Cunningham said what he did. It was because the British realised that a tight defence alowed carrier TFs to operate deep inside enemy controlled territory, with a reasobnable chance of success.

The British indeed planned for additional fleet carriers, and in June 1940 there were 5 fleet and 3 Light fleet carriers in various stages of construction. By comparison, the 4 (or was it 5) battelships, that were on the stocks had already been cancelled. The pressures of war meant that 5 of the 8 carriers were delayed, 1 to 1942, 2 to 1943 and a further 2, the biggest, until 1944. main problem was a shortage of steel and skilled workers to complete the ships, not a false sense of security. In any event, the wemergency escort carrier program beginning with Audacity and the unsatisfactory CAM ships gave the British some time to make do and fill other gaps in their defences, principally their ASw escort gaps.

but it is quite wrong to suppose that the British were unaware of the threat from the air, or the limitations of their carrier fleet. Atleast from Norway on, they were acutely aware of the limitations of their existing fleet. And they would have much preferred to have done something about it straight away, but limited resources constrained things everywhere, not least in the reinforcement of the carriers.

 

[RCAFson]

FAA radar controlled GCI during the Norway Campaign:

Page 366

This is a must read.

 

[fastmongrel]

Thanks RCAFson thats a great find

 

[tomo pauk]

+1 on that. All together the contribution here is commendable.

 

[stona]

I have to disagree, and at home have material to support a completely contrary view. the Admiralty was first exposed to sustained air attack during the operations off Norway, and the threat of german airpower, combined with the near complete lack of fighter defences forced the british to rely on inadequate AA cruisers as their primary defences.

I don't know, this is not my field at all. I'm just paraphrasing the conclusions of the Admiralty's own report.
Some naval officers were certainly running scared of the Luftwaffe. Admiral Charles Forbes told Churchill (who didn't believe him) that he would not bring the heavy ships of the Home Fleet south of the Wash should a German invasion fleet set sail. Churchill later told Forbes (according to Forbes) that he never believed an invasion was possible anyway.

RN losses off Norway to air attack didn't amount to much. The only major vessel lost was sunk by gunfire.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

RN losses off Norway to air attack didn't amount to much. The only major vessel lost was sunk by gunfire.

Maybe if the losses are restricted to RN, this might be correct, but i seriously doubt it. i only have figures for allied losses, which includes the norwegians and the french.

According to my sources the allies suffered the following losses

107 naval ships sunk or captured
c. 70 merchant ships and transports sunk (combined Norwegian/Allied total)

On the naval side of the Norwegian casualties, the Royal Norwegian Navy, fielding 121 mostly outdated ships at the outset of the German invasion, was virtually wiped out during the campaign. Only 15 warships, including a captured German fishing trawler, with some 600 men had managed to evacuate to the United Kingdom by the end of the fighting. The remaining Norwegian naval vessels were sunk in action, scuttled by their own crews, or captured by the Germans. Among the warships sunk in action during the campaign were two coastal defence ships and two destroyers

The British lost one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers and a submarine but with their much larger fleet could absorb the losses to a much greater degree than Germany.

The French Navy lost the destroyer Bison and a submarine during the campaign, and a cruiser severely damaged. The exiled Polish Navy lost the destroyer Grom and the submarine Orzeł

As indicated above, about 70 merchant ships were lost...

Well over 80% of these losses were to airpower. The stukas were everywhere, and were devastating. it was here that the British realized their air defence solutions were inadequate.

 

[swampyankee]

I have no doubt that the KM could develop an effective carrier air arm, given time, but the UK was not (contrary to some opinions) run by raving morons: the government would have changed the defense programs. In addition, the German government, before 1938, had resource constraints (these were relaxed when the Germans were able to loot Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, the Netherlands....), which means that something else would have to be eliminated.

What would the KM have to give up to have carriers? What would the Luftwaffe lose to keep a carrier air group, which would need to be under the KM's operational control, if not ownership?

 

[Juha]

All allied main units lost during the Norwegian campaign, CV Glorious and the two Norwegian coastal defence ships, were sunk by KM surface ships. OK RN CL HMS Effingham was bigger than the Norwegian coastal defence ships, it ran aground and was sunk by a RN DD, and the old AA-cruiser HMS Curlew was not much lighter than the Norwegian coastal defence ships, it was the only one of the bigger ships sunk by the LW.

Juha

 

[Wavelength]

I find that the KM didn't need aircraft carriers at all. However, they did need a shore based airforce built for naval air operations under naval command-not Luftwaffe command.

 

[GrauGeist]

I find that the KM didn't need aircraft carriers at all. However, they did need a shore based airforce built for naval air operations under naval command-not Luftwaffe command.

Herein lies the problem: The Luftwaffe held absolute control over all air ops...from scouting aircraft aboard Kreigsmarine ships, to coastal defense and even AA units attached to Wehrmacht groups.

As far as carriers go, you can only send aircraft so far from land before you have a point of no return. The battle of the Atlantic for the Germans, was left to slow, long range aircraft like the Condor or the U-Boat fleet in general (with the occasional surface raider). Had the Germans built a carrier (or two) and supported it with an effective surface support group, then perhaps it may have done some damage to the Allied shipping and/or surface fleet - but this would be only for as long as the Luftwaffe was able to maintain adequete air cover.

We can look to the Japanese as an indicator of what happens to your carrier fleet when you lose air supremacy.

 

[parsifal]

I find that the KM didn't need aircraft carriers at all. However, they did need a shore based airforce built for naval air operations under naval command-not Luftwaffe command.

How does a well organised land based air (which i do agree was needed) help in situations like Bismark, or later at many oppotunities where the KM simply had to turn around (or not sortie at all) because a carrier was known to be in the area. I believed that Hitler issued a standing order forbidding his heavy ships from taking any risks if there were carriers about. thats one reason why in 1942, inter4est in obtaining a carrier was renewed.

The KM probably needed carriers even more than the RN

 

[Nobby57]

Not to derail this thread but just one correct point fastmongrel has made '...and the Japanese were given a headstart by the British post WWI when they were given designs,
planes and advisors wholesale by the RN.'

I'm sure many of you know this already...We had traitors in our midst most prominent of whom was William Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YK4dreccM_Y (But please try and see the entire programme for balance)

 

[nuuumannn]

But there a very good documentary (I highly recommend) on the whole affair which explains more clearly, now that many restrictions have been lifted, what happened.

Actually it's rather rubbish. It's poorly researched and written and the tone is highly suggestive and not accurate in its portrayal of attitudes of the time. While both Sempill and Rutland were guilty of supplying secrets to the Japanese, the implication in the documentary is that the two were on the same pegging as Cold War spies, but the situation between Britain and Japan was definitely not the same as between the USA and the Soviet Union post war. Japan was a British ally - granted, between the Treaty of Washington and the invasion of Singapore, Britain's relationship with its ally degraded considerably, this took place over time - even into the mid 1930s, the Japanese were receiving technical assistance from Britain.

Sempill and Rutland were not supplying British secrets to Japan with the intent of undermining the British, but to assist an ally, which they - and a great deal many people in Britain at the time regarded Japan as such. In the late 1920s, both Rolls Royce, Shorts and Blackburn made overt measures to supply equipment and knowhow to the Japanese to aid in the construction of long range flying boats - something Sempill was involved in as a result of the British Naval Mission of 1921 (not 1920 as the documentary states) - with the knowledge and acceptance of the British government. Included on the list of acceptable equipment was the Kestrel engine, although, as we know, these were also supplied to the Germans in the Thirties. Napier Lion engines were also supplied to the Japanese by the dozen to equip Japanese Army land and Navy carrier based aircraft, as well as civilian machines.

Regarding the British Mission to Japan, this was preceded by an invitation by the Japanese Navy to supply instructors and aircraft, which the British willingly obliged. Prior to this, the Japanese Army set a precedent by inviting the French Armee de L'Air to supply expertise. The Mission personnel returned to Britain in 1923 as a result of the big earthquake that hit the country that year.

The Documentary: The first error is within the first minute with the statement that HMS Eagle was Argus' sister ship. It was not. Eagle was built on the hull of the incomplete Chilean battleship Almirate Cochrane and interms of commissioning dates was fourth in line of British carriers to enter service, beginning with Furious in 1917, then Argus in 1918, then Hermes in 1923, followed by Eagle in 1924. Another error is that Rutland was squadron leader aboard Eagle; he became sqn commander of Furious' 'F' Sqn after Sqn Cdr Dunning lost his life in deck landing trials in 1917. At the time Eagle entered service, Rutland was was a civilian and was about to go to Japan to take up employ with Mitsubishi.

One thing that is annoying about the whole episode of these two men is the implication that their actions deliberately led to the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, as many newspapers put it sensationally when their activities became public late last century; whilst their influence on Japanese navy doctrine was considerable, its a rather simplistic view and does not take into account that prior to the outbreak of WW2 the Japanese learned everything they needed to know about carrier aviation from the British as a whole, with the aid of the British government. This is, of course not taking the Taranto raid of 1940 into account, which is openly regarded as a big inspiration behind Yamamoto's plans.

The one aspect that this rather sorry documentary does not consider is that it wasn't just the introduction of carriers to the Japanese navy that proved so useful to them, but specifically the use of air launched torpedoes. Along with the British Mission was two different carrier based torpedoplanes, one of which appears in a still in the documentary, a Blackburn Swift, one of three sent and also six Sopwith Cuckoos, the very first carrier based torpedoplane. Instructors from the former RNAS went to Japan to train the Japanese on the use of these aircraft at Kasumigaura and in torpedo dropping over Tokyo Bay; a vital and constantly overlooked ingredient in the rise of Japanese naval air power, as significant as their acquisition of dive bomber knowledge from the Germans.

It's also often conveniently overlooked that many British individuals sought employment in Japan after WW1 with the offer of lucrative contracts; one of significance is former Sopwith draughtsman Herbert Smith, who was employed by Mistubishi the same year as the British Naval Mission arrived. Smith was resposible for the world's first purpose designed aircraft carrier based fighter, the Mitsubishi 1MF1, or the Type 10 Carrier Fighter and Japan's first carrier torpedo bomber, the 1MT1, or Type 10 Carrier Torpedo Aircraft. This aircraft bears considerable relation to the Cuckoo, which Smith was responsible for draughting, in that it is based on the same tactical ethos, a highly manoeuvrable unarmed single-seater, apart from the offensive element; once the torpedo is released it would rely on manoeuvrability to escape predators - the Japanese aircraft was a triplane. Both the Cuckoo and its immediate replacement in FAA service, the Blackburn Dart worked on this philosophy.

Smith was also responsible for the excellent Navy Type 13 Carrier Attack Aircraft, the B1M1 torpedo bomber of 1923 that, in common with the Fairey Swordfish, outlived its intended successor and proved a superb aircraft, the IJN standardising on it as its carrier based torpedoplane and bomber recon platform throughout the Twenties and Thirties, taking part in Japan's invasion of China. These were replaced in service by the Nakajima B5N in 1938, although they were being used only as recon platforms by then.

This is not to state that what Rutland and Sempill were doing was legal, but lets not get carried away by the hype. They felt they were aiding friends, regardless of the naughty implications of their actions, as like I stated earlier, the British government was still supplying the Japanese with technical knowhow for many years after MI5 began investigating both men.

 

[Nobby57]

I accept your argument nuuumannn, but that's not a kop out on my part. Whenever I've been involved in the past on other sites I've often included stuff like this as a means of testing the mettle of a forum and indicating other perspectives to those who may not know. As I'm an alumnus of University of London, Hist (Hons) this method I've found is likely to get some great perspectives from others. And I've now perceived yours but in the debating manner to which I'm sure you are all familiar I take no offence whatsoever...so let the play, play on! (Sorry back to the GZ)

 

[nuuumannn]

Hello Nobby,

What I have written is not an argument, nor is it a criticism of you personally, nor of your credentials. It is an establishment of facts in place of poorly drawn conclusions. My intentions are clear; I think the documentary is not well produced and could be much better than it is. The producers' background knowledge of the subject is lacking and the establishing of an angle is biased and ill considered.

Yes, Sempill and Rutland are guilty of trading secrets, but their motivations for doing so have been roundly mis-represented in the popular press. Yes, Sempill was a difficult character, but such a trait is not necessarily going to lead him to treason. Rutland in particular has been treated rather harshly, all things considered. He was a true aviation hero; few can justifiably claim that title, but he was one who could. His acts in pioneering naval aviation were truly ground breaking, not to mention courageous. He was an extraordinarily gifted pilot with a quick mind; a 'Boy's Own' character and it is sad that his place in history has been overshadowed by his treatment at the hands of those who don't know any better.

One essential ingredient that is missing from analysis of why these people did what they did is emotional. The Far East in the Twenties and Thirties held a mysticism that few who visited from Europe could resist. Although under developed compared to Britain at the time, Japan was full of welcoming, curious people beholden to a culture so vastly different from any in Europe. It would not be too much of a stretch to state that Sempill and Rutland might have been enchanted - they found the Japanese to be smart, quick learners that exceeded the general perception that Europeans held of Asians at the time. Let's not forget that Rutland met and fell in love with a Japanese girl (who doesn't love Japanese girls? ). Perhaps the Japanese were using them and feeling the way they did about their hosts and surrounding meant they were happy to oblige?

This might seem to be a romatic view of events, but it is worth thinking about. There is no evidence that either man deliberately meant harm to his own country in his actions and vilifying them both so many years after the fact is unnecessary.

 

[Shortround6]

The British had built much of the Japanese battlefleet used in the Russo-Japanese war and the Kongo (lead ship of the Kongo class battle cruisers) was built in a British shipyard with around 200 Japanese personnel observing, learning between 1911 and 1913. The other other 3 ships were built in Japan with varying amounts of assistance (material) from Vickers.
The Japanese 15th destroyer flotilla (4 destroyers and a light cruiser) was based at Malta in 1917 and co-operated with the British fleet in the Med on convoy duties and anti-sub work. The British bought thousands of Japanese rifles for training during WW I. I find it hard to believe that British-Japanese relations could have deteriorated by 1923-25 to such an extent that helping then with carrier aviation would have considered "treason" at the time.

 

[Jabberwocky]

If you want to make Germany better off then why not build something they really need?

Graf Zeppelin Info
The German CVs cost about RM 92 million each. Four cost about RM 368 million.

Enough money to pay for a Nibelungenwerk size tank plant (RM 65 million. 320 medium tanks per month.) and the first 2,500 Panzer IVH. If factory construction begins 28 Dec 1936 (i.e. same date as Graf Zeppelin) those 2,500 Panzer IVH medium tanks should be in service during 1939.

Man you come out with some wierd stuff.

A Panzer IVH. In 1939??? Bizarre.

May as well have German tank division armed with Pz VIs.

German panzer divisions would have real tanks rather then Panzer I machinegun carriers. Poland would probably accept a Danzig plebiscite rather then face a well armed German Army and Europe would avoid WWII (at least during 1939).

Argument from assertion. What did you base this probability on?

 

[GrauGeist]

Man you come out with some wierd stuff.

A Panzer IVH. In 1939??? Bizarre.

Sometimes ya' just gotta back away quietly and hope they don't notice

 

[parsifal]

weve all done that at some point or other. Just Dave seems to revel in it....