Lancaster as an escorted, daylight bomber ala B-17/24?

[buffnut453]

The B-17 was not impervious to attacking enemy aircraft, but it's defenses were such, that the Germans put alot of effort into applying armor to their Fw190A-8/R8 to protect the pilot.

Do you have a source for that? I'd be interested to see the cause and effect between losses due specifically to the B-17 (or all USAAF bombers?) and the addition of armour plate.

 

[GrauGeist]

Do you have a source for that? I'd be interested to see the cause and effect between losses due specifically to the B-17 (or all USAAF bombers?) and the addition of armour plate.

I do not have my books or computers available (still) so I can't point you in the right direction.
I thought I'd jump on google to see if there's a good source for the Sturmbock to recommend and I kid you not, every single result is a modelling supply link loaded with kits of the Fw190A-8.
So it appears that Google is in high-gear for Christmas by "grooming" my results...

 

[nuuumannn]

So in 1942 RAF bomber command found out it could avoid being shot down by RAF spitfires in pursuit. To bad they didn't explain their tactics to the 8th USAAF as it could have spared them a lot of trouble.

So, by your account, practising dissimilar air combat against fighters is worthless? Glad you're not running things. Who said the British didn't provide that info to the Americans?

Without quoting range altitude your numbers are meaningless for comparison purposes.

Why? obviously at the ranges and loads mentioned the aircraft would be transitting at the best height and speed to take advantage of lower fuel consumption, and this differed depending on the aircraft. Bombing raids operated across a wide range of altitudes, for various reasons, including tactical necessity. Not every raid was conducted at the aircraft's maximum altitude - they didn't need to be and as Buffnut stated, height is a double edged sword.

Despite what the general perception of Arthur Harris was, he cared greatly for the welfare of his bomber crews, he was also cognisant of the fact that many of his bombers' target were in occupied territories and strived to conduct raids against targets in those countries during daylight hours and at low altitude, because it was easier to see the target and thus avoid collateral damage and flying at lower heights improved accuracy, important for the same reasons. As I've noted in other threads when this has been mentioned, he did have no objection to blowing up German civilians, though!

 

[Greyman]

... the cause and effect between losses due specifically to the B-17 (or all USAAF bombers?) and the addition of armour plate.

It's possible that this is the wrong way of looking at it. A post-war USAAF paper based on Luftwaffe analysis combat records/films showed that the Fw190 was over five times as effective as the Bf109 in destroying US bombers.

The majority of this discrepancy is attributed to the increased toughness of the 190 over the 109 -- and the subsequent determination it granted 190 pilots. This superior determination is indicated by the average ranges each fighter type did most of their shooting.

Fw190: Range inside of which +50% of firing was done: 460 metres​

Bf109: Range inside of which +50% of firing was done: 1000 metres​

So it's possible that the armour didn't necessarily have that large of an effect on making the 190 bullet-resistant -- but it seems to have greatly increased the number of enemy bombers destroyed. It's possible that this greatly increased aggressiveness even caused more 190s to be shot down than would have otherwise.

The study points out the data's main weak point is the fact that a destroyed Luftwaffe fighter results in no film or combat report.

 

[Greyman]

Recreation of a graph that came out very poorly in the photocopy. It's not pixel-perfect but it's pretty close. Gives a good idea on the difference.

Fw 190
Bf 109

 

[Ascent]

Another thing about the effectiveness of bomber defensive armament. Until the introduction of long range escorts the Germans were using two engines aircraft with heavier guns to allow engagement at longer ranges.
Obviously, once the escorts turned up they were too vulnerable to keep using.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Luftwaffe's primary bomber interceptor was always single-engined fighters.
With the exception of the Me410A-1/U4, the twin-engined "heavy fighters" carried comparable armament as the SE fighters, especially the Fw190 Sturmbocks.

 

[Koopernic]

Another thing about the effectiveness of bomber defensive armament. Until the introduction of long range escorts the Germans were using two engines aircraft with heavier guns to allow engagement at longer ranges.
Obviously, once the escorts turned up they were too vulnerable to keep using.

They were also firing adapted Nebelwerfer rockets time fused to burst in the bomber formation. The stedometric range finder in the sight was used to fire at 1200m to get the burst right. I was quite successful I belive.

 

[Denniss]

The rockets were highly effective if they came close to a target. But that wasnt easy due to their unstable flight path.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think the greater benefit of the Werfers was to break up the bomber formations.

As for the thread topic, I think Lancs would have done at least as well in daylight as the Americans, with the appropriate escort. I know they performed some low-level daylight precision strikes that are truly impressive; it was one handy airplane.

Now just fit it with IFR gear and drop the Bomb from Tinian. <grabs helmet, dives for slit-trench>

 

[ThomasP]

NOOOOOOOOOOOOO . .

 

[wuzak]

5 If they tried Lancasters in 1943 they'd get shredded. FLAK attrition probably 3 times greater, maybe 4. Operating at 20,000ft is also perfect for the German fighters.

The Germans didn't use flak, radar directed or otherwise, against Lancasters at night?

The bomber formations also had some influence on the effectiveness of flak.

The tight formations used by the USAAF were designed to defend against enemy fighters, but having them close together presented a better target for flak.

The RAF used loose formations, due to the difficulty of maintaining a tight formation at night. This may not have been ideal against enemy fighters, but spread flak targets wider.

Regarding cruising speeds, the B-17 was constrained by the need for formation flying, restricting the cruising speed. B-17Gs operating by the RAF method would likely have higher cruising speeds and possibly longer range (no need to loiter over the UK while forming up).

 

[wuzak]

Why does the Lancaster have to cruise at 20,000 feet. Most crews tried to get higher and plenty flew at 22/23,000 feet.

If you want better altitude then fit high altitude rated engines don't have to be 60 series if they're not available the Merlin 47 (RM6S) fitted to the high altitude Spitfire mk VI might work.

Merlin 47s would likely struggle to get a fully laden Lancaster off the ground. (The Merlin 46 and 47 were the same except the 47 had a cabin blower for pressurization).

A new 20-series variant using the larger (10.85in vs 10.25in) compressor could have provided the extra altitude required, while still maintaining goof take-off performance.

The Merlin XX had nearly 300hp more power at take-off than the Merlin 47. The Merlin 24 had 500hp more at take-off.

 

[pbehn]

You should note, however, that altitude is a double-edged sword. While greater altitude may help protect aircraft from flak, it also reduces bombing accuracy which means you need more aircraft to hit the target or repeat trips to finish the job, all of which expose more crews.

The other "thing" with altitude is vapour trails which are almost as visible by moonlight as by day. Bomber Command used altitude to separate squadrons within the bomber stream. The problem of vapour trails was noted as soon as the RAF started using the B-17, no need for any sophisticated ground control, they could be seen from miles away.

 

[Koopernic]

The Germans didn't use flak, radar directed or otherwise, against Lancasters at night?

The bomber formations also had some influence on the effectiveness of flak.

The tight formations used by the USAAF were designed to defend against enemy fighters, but having them close together presented a better target for flak.

The RAF used loose formations, due to the difficulty of maintaining a tight formation at night. This may not have been ideal against enemy fighters, but spread flak targets wider.

Regarding cruising speeds, the B-17 was constrained by the need for formation flying, restricting the cruising speed. B-17Gs operating by the RAF method would likely have higher cruising speeds and possibly longer range (no need to loiter over the UK while forming up).

Firstly even radar directed FLAK is more effective when combined with visual sighting and aiming.

The two main Luftwaffe FLAK radars were Wurzburg-D (3m diameter aerial) and Wurzburg-Riesse (7m diameter aerial) both had conical scan and were capable of accurate blind fire. The smaller Wurzburg-D had a on paper accuracy of 0.2 degrees but is sometimes quoted as 0.3/0.5 which is the 60% accuracy when low to ground and ground plane interference. The Bigger Wurzburg Riesse was about twice as accurate and was also well generally surveyed and aligned, about 0.1 degrees or 0.15/0.2 when low to ground. Range accuracy of both was 16m when pointing up. The Bigger radar was very accurate but rarer (4000 versus 500) and often used to direct fighter aircraft interceptions.

The accuracy of FLAK was thus better if optically tracked but ranged by radar. It was also possible to see the bursts. It was quicker to find the targets. Often Wurzburg would put a searchlight on the target and then provide the range as optical systems took over. Finally many engagements were optical only. A rarer German FLAK radar was the Mahnheim FuSE 64 FuMG 41 Radar which had auto track for the range gate. Even if heavily noise jammed, spoof jammed and jammed by windows if an operator happened to get the beam pointed at a target and scanned through he could get an autoblock even if it was manually impossible to track. So visual sightings helped.

The 8.8cm FLAK 37 had an engagement time of less than 14 seconds at 29,500ft so was ineffective at that altitude. It was moderately effective at 25,000ft where the B17's operated comfortably. It was considerably more effective at 23,000ft where B-24 Liberators often operated and was effective at 20,000ft where lancasters would be.

At 20,000ft where the Lancaster would be operating the 8.8cm FLAK 37 would be quite effective. The guns beauty was it was in mass production, not hard to transport and in very wide spread use.

The other two German guns the 10.5cm FLAK 38 and 39 and the 12.8cm FLAK 40. In small number the advanced high velocity 8.8cm FLAK 41.

Luftwaffe studies indicated that at 29,500 feet, the 88-mm/Model 18, 36, 37 had only fourteen seconds to effectively engage a target, the 105-mm had forty-nine seconds, and finally the 88-mm/Model 41 and the 128-mm 12.8cm FLAK 40 had approximately sixty-eight seconds of effective engagement time. At 36,000 feet, only the 88-mm/Model 41 and the 128-mm were able to engage a target for a period of only thirty-one seconds.

Incidentally there were 85 12.8cm FLAK 40 at Ploesti and many over parts of Berlin. These, the most powerful AAA gun of WW2 were what cost the RAF so much in the Battle of Berlin when they ventured above them and the USAAF over Ploesti. The gun was accurate and the burst was huge.

Secondly If the penetration height is reduced from 25,000ft to 20,000ft there is easily a doubling in FLAK burst accuracy (likely more) and the engagement time of the gun probably doubles or trebles to several minutes. FLAK is now 4-8 times more effective.

Thirdly The Germans had some statistics of the relative effect of targeting individual aircraft with a direct hit by the FLAK 37 versus direct hit. The double fuse (nose contact plus timed burst time to burst slightly after the bomber) was reckoned 3-4 times more effective against bombers in formation and 2.4 times against individual bombers so they Germans clearly missed an opportunity. So this suggests the ratio 1.25 to 1.66 of FLAK effectiveness of formation versus individual aircraft.

Fourthly American aircraft such as the B17 had much more armour and redundancy. The US aircraft had 4 generators and multiple hydraulic pumps. If a single hydraulic pump was lost on the Lancaster then all of the Lancaster's defensive turrets were shutdown. The US aircraft had more armour, they had radial engines.

The higher drag of the B17 heavier armament and radials was a moot point when the aircraft was flying at high altitude in thin low drag air.

Fifthly. The claim that the Lancaster can fly higher with a reduced load doesn't scan. The aircraft can fly higher at reduced load, with reduced speed and still has less armour and redundancy.

Finally Operating the Lancaster Mean operating at 20,000-21,000ft where the German fighters are at their peak of performance. The Lancaster 303 guns also are far less of a deterrent since the well armoured German fighters could deal with the 303 round.

 

[Simon Thomas]

Deleted. I should know better than to get involved.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Up the Lancaster's armament. Four gun dorsal turret out of the Defiant. Return the ventral turret. Can we get four guns into the nose?

Further to my earlier post, IIRC none of the heavies carried waist gunners like the Wellington. Perhaps that's a good place to start, in addition to returning the ventral turret.

If this prototype Dalek can have a four gun BP turret, so can the Lancaster's dorsal gunner.

 

[Glider]

I found a copy of the posting I mentioned earlier in the thread about the losses of the Lancaster when compared to the B24 and its as follows, note I left the typo's in for authenticity:-

ok sys i did want you want, it took me several hours but i did it!
ok so you stated over Europe the B-24 did 715 sorties from january 1st 1942 'til june 30th 1943 for 24 lost, i make that a loss rate of 3.4% agreed?

well, the lancaster, in the above time period (although her first opperational was in March '42) completed, accounting for day and night sorties, 17,100 sorties exactily, and 585 were lost, believe it or not, that comes out as 3.4% too however i had this feeling you were going to say that's just because the lanc flew by night, so i calculated the the figures for the lancaster's daytime operations for the same period (1st jan. '42 - 30th June '43)...........

just to clarify by a daytime sortie is considdered one in which the aircraft is dispatched at returns in the same day, and so for this period the lanc did 382 daytime sorties for 13 aircraft lost, believe it or not but AGAIN that comes out to a loss rate of 3.4%

but as i was on a role, i thought why stop at the daytime sorties for that period? why not do the whole war?

so i did!

and i can confirm that throughout the entire war the lancaster did 40,139 daytime sorties! and only 281 were lost on these daytime raids, you know what that makes the lancaster's loss rate for daytime sorties in WWII?? 0.7% !!!!

 

[Koopernic]

Deleted. I should know better than to get involved.

It was quite an interesting post you did. The claim that the Lancaster lost all of it turrets when the port outer engine failed is common, in fact as your picture shows it is only the tail turret. The question now is was there a cross connection or a hydraulic motor-pump to power this system from another engine.

US aircraft tended to have electrical power for their turrets (say dorsal) that could easily be cross connected though some turrets might be electro hydraulic such as the sperry ball turret. Electrical systems don't bleed out and can easily be isolated by circuit breakers and cross connected.

 

[buffnut453]

I found a copy of the posting I mentioned earlier in the thread about the losses of the Lancaster when compared to the B24 and its as follows, note I left the typo's in for authenticity:-

ok sys i did want you want, it took me several hours but i did it!
ok so you stated over Europe the B-24 did 715 sorties from january 1st 1942 'til june 30th 1943 for 24 lost, i make that a loss rate of 3.4% agreed?

well, the lancaster, in the above time period (although her first opperational was in March '42) completed, accounting for day and night sorties, 17,100 sorties exactily, and 585 were lost, believe it or not, that comes out as 3.4% too however i had this feeling you were going to say that's just because the lanc flew by night, so i calculated the the figures for the lancaster's daytime operations for the same period (1st jan. '42 - 30th June '43)...........

just to clarify by a daytime sortie is considdered one in which the aircraft is dispatched at returns in the same day, and so for this period the lanc did 382 daytime sorties for 13 aircraft lost, believe it or not but AGAIN that comes out to a loss rate of 3.4%

but as i was on a role, i thought why stop at the daytime sorties for that period? why not do the whole war?

so i did!

and i can confirm that throughout the entire war the lancaster did 40,139 daytime sorties! and only 281 were lost on these daytime raids, you know what that makes the lancaster's loss rate for daytime sorties in WWII?? 0.7% !!!!

Ahhh, the joys of statistics that don't match people's pre-conceived notions. Lancasters successfully operating in daylight? Impossible!