Late War German vs Japanese Pilot Quality

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DarrenW

DarrenW

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Dec 24, 2017
Warren, MI USA
Any thoughts, views, assumptions, or hard data to share on this subject? I would think training, logistics, mission requirements, and overall aircraft performance would all figure into this comparison, but I'm sure there are other areas that affected overall pilot quality as well.

I'm trying to quantify in some way why it's often said on this forum and elsewhere that by 1944 a 'kill' in the Pacific theater was on average easier to obtain (not that I feel one way or the other). Outside of the ill-trained and equipped Kamikaze, were the Japanese that far behind in ability when compared to their German counterparts?
 
On October 1 1943, Japanese government launched a special law to secure 130,000 college students over 20 as recruits. After brief training, they were sent to the front line like Philippine and, later, Okinawa as suicide attackers. On the other hand, veteran fighters were asked to return to the homeland for the future homeland battle. I hesitate to say but American POWs told a lot about their future plan.
No idea about the German side.
 
Shinpachi said:
On the other hand, veteran fighters were asked to return to the homeland for the future homeland battle
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Interesting. So the trend from late 1943 onwards was the systematic withdrawal of seasoned pilots from forward combat areas, replacing them with disposable Kamikaze recruits. That dynamic says a lot about the general eroding quality of the Japanese pilots encountered during the allied island hoping campaign. Do you happen to know roughly how many of these raw recruits eventually ended up in a Kamikaze unit?
 
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A Kamikazi pilot and plane on a mission to attack a fleet cannot be equated to other combat aircraft. Their job was to fly into a ship and they were loaded with explosive to do maximum damage. From the moment it takes off it is a loss, whether it hits a ship, crashes on take off or is shot down by flak or aircraft is a matter of statistics.
 
Exactly and because of this they were basically sitting ducks, easy for allied fighters to engage and shoot down. Obviously this allowed carrier air wings to run up sizable scores against them. And while they weren't trained as pilots in the traditional sense, their planes were still counted as an aerial victory in the same fashion as one piloted by a seasoned combat veteran. I'm now wondering how wide-spread Kamikaze flight training was and did it eventually surpass the training provided to traditional pilots? If it did that would definitely lower the perceived aptitude of the traditionally trained Japanese combat pilot.
 
DarrenW said:
Exactly and because of this they were basically sitting ducks, easy for allied fighters to engage and shoot down. Obviously this allowed carrier air wings to run up sizable scores against them. And while they weren't trained as pilots in the traditional sense, their planes were still counted as an aerial victory in the same fashion as one piloted by a seasoned combat veteran. I'm now wondering how wide-spread Kamikaze flight training was and did it eventually surpass the training provided to traditional pilots? If it did that would definitely lower the perceived aptitude of the traditionally trained Japanese combat pilot.
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That is a given. The quality of training of Japanese pilots declined through the war as it did in Germany and also UK in 1940.
 


Excerpt from Pilot Training of German Luftwaffe mid- and late-war :

"By the beginning of 1944 German fighter pilots were joining their operational units with only about 160 hours flying training; this compared with more than double that figure for their counterparts in the RAF and the USAAF.

During the first half of 1944 the Luftwaffe day fighter units suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the better-trained American escort fighter pilots, whose P-51 Mustangs could in any case out-perform the best fighters the Germans then had in service at this time; during this period the home-defence units lost some 2,000 pilots killed, missing or wounded.

When the Luftwaffe training organization tried to make good these heavy casualties with similar numbers of new pilots, the result was a vicious circle: the ill-trained replacement fighter pilots were no match for their opponents and suffered heavy losses, and their places in the front line were taken by new pilots who had had a more hurried training and were even less of a match for their opponents.

During the late spring standards fell yet further, when the B flying schools were disbanded. Fighter pilots were now sent into action with only about 112 hours flying, made up as follows: A School, two hours glider flying and 50 hours powered flying on elementary types; Fighter School, 40 hours; Replacement Fighter Groupe, 20 hours.
Moreover, the so-called Windhund programme, which provided for the hasty conversion of ex-bomber pilots by giving them 20 hours flying in fighters resulted in a stream of pilots little able to stand up to the enemy.

In September 1944 the Luftwaffe flying training organization received its death blow. With the systematic wrecking of the German synthetic fuel industry by Allied strategic bombers, aviation fuel production fell so far beneath Luftwaffe requirements that operations had to be curtailed. In such a climate the training schools, always the poor relation, could not survive long. First the elementary and many of the specialist schools were closed then, as the last of the trainees passed through, the specialist fighter schools were also disbanded and their instructors sent to the front."

From Failure of the Japanese pilots training program | Military History Forum :

"The IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. The two most critically lacking areas were, first, a too long, into 1943, adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every one graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, secondly, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students' skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Most of them arrived in combat squadrons with less than 200 hours in all, by the very end of the war, less than 100 hours. Most had to learn combat skills on the job once assigned to a combat squadron. By then, it is too late and few survived."

Now I'm well aware that I'm quoting websites and not primary sources, but if this information is indeed true then by late '44/early '45 the average flight time before a pilot saw actual combat was quite similar between the two nations (aside from the hap-hazard Kamikaze training of course).

Which leads me to my original question. Why on average are aerial victories against German pilots given more credibility than those scored against the Japanese?
 
It is not my area of any real knowledge but the major difference between the two is that the Japanese experts were on carriers and these could and were lost "en masse" when a carrier was sunk. Young pilots learn from the old hands but the Japanese lost their old hands in a few disasters. When talking about "hours" it is my understanding that US pilots had around 200 hrs ON TYPE before being considered combat ready in Europe. That is in addition to all hours on basic and advanced trainers, I presume it was the same or even higher in the Pacific due to being from carriers.
 
That's a very good point. So in essence the rates of attrition that the Japanese experienced in these singular battles was much greater than the rather slow erosion of the skilled pilot pool found in Germany during the war.
 
DarrenW said:
That's a very good point. So in essence the rates of attrition that the Japanese experienced in these singular battles was much greater than the rather slow erosion of the skilled pilot pool found in Germany during the war.
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There are many facets to it. A German "expert" may have had his home airfield bombed, he can still land somewhere else or bail out behind his own lines. A carrier pilot just has nowhere to go whether he is on the ship or in the air. Another facet is that the German experten were as adept at protecting themselves on the ground as they were in the air. Having been promoted as national heroes they used their political clout to minimise the danger to themselves. I have no idea if this was possible in Japan or the IJN but to my mind the top German aces did while those with no clout at all were used in suicide missions against bridges.

Kampfgeschwader 200 - Wikipedia
 
Yes, I'm finding it to be a pretty cool place to spend some time....:cool:

Thanks again for the link. I have the "Dogfights" episode from the History Channel which focuses on that particular unit. They interview German pilots that served with it, along with American crew members that became victims of their extreme tactics. It seems to be a fairly balanced account.
 
both the Japanese airforces lacked the depth that the Luftwaffe possessed. The IJN went to war with just 1300 front line aircraft, and few reserves. Such a force structure was very vulnerable to taking losses. Japanese policies of allowing units to wither on the vine meant that when it came time to ramp up the training schools there were not the skilled cadres left to teach them properly.

Germany too began to cut corners, and undoubtedly a big mistake for them was sending nearly trained people out to the operational squadrons to "learn on the job so to speak. What they 9and thr Japanese) needed to do was establish a proper system of unit rotation so that formations could assimilate new billets.
 
The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Aircraft Pilots :

"When war broke out, the average Japanese Navy pilot had 700 hours' flying time while Army pilots averaged 500 hours' flying time. This had dropped to 275 hours in the Navy and 130 in the Army by 1 January 1945, reflecting a precipitous decline in the level of training of replacement pilots. By late 1944, a new Japanese Navy pilot graduated with just 40 hours flying time, while his American opponent had at least 525 hours flying time. Relative losses in combat were correspondingly disproportionate: The U.S. Navy lost just two dive bombers and five torpedo planes in aerial combat in the last eight months of the war. The Japanese Army was likewise forced to reduce pilot training to 60 or 70 hours' flight time by 1945, while the U.S. Army held firmly to its requirement of at least 200 hours' flight time to the end of the war."

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Aircraft Pilots :

"The Japanese system was suitable for a nation that hoped to win quick, limited wars. When the Japanese attacked in the Pacific, they held nothing back. There was no reserve of skilled pilots to speak of. Indeed, Peattie (2001) has pointed out that, when war broke out, 11 Air Fleet had been drawn on so heavily for cadre for the new Shokakus that its rosters already included significant numbers of incompletely trained pilots. As attrition set in, particularly during the Guadalcanal campaign, the training system proved entirely inadequate to replace losses. Japanese commanders complained about the quality of replacement G3M "Nell" aircrew at Rabaul as early as the Battle of the Coral Sea. Though Japanese carrier pilots continued to show superb combat skill through the end of 1942, by mid-1943 Allied pilots began to notice a sharp decline in their opponent's flying skills. There were other indications, such as the loss of much of 68 Air Regiment in March 1943 due to poor navigation on the flight from Truk to Rabaul. By 1944, Japan's supply of skilled pilots was so limited that many flight instructors were reassigned from training units to Ozawa's Mobile Force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in an all-or-nothing effort to stop the American counteroffensive. The outcome was the slaughter of the Japanese pilots in what the Americans dubbed "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."

FalkeEins - the Luftwaffe blog: Pilot training in the Luftwaffe - flight discipline, pilot culture and the development of procedures and check lists - "Why Air Forces Fail " (2) :

"By late 1943 the Luftwaffe had lost most of its original complement of pilots. In the first six months of 1943, Germany lost 1,100 fighter pilots, which was about 60% of the number at the start of the year. It lost another 15 percent in each of July and August. It is interesting to note that of the 100+ Luftwaffe 'aces' credited with over 100 victories during WW II only eight of them started their flying career after 1942. The high pilot losses had two disastrous effects. First, even if they had been well trained, newer pilots were inexperienced and inevitably sustained more accidents and combat casualties than the pilots they replaced. Aside from the fact that the Luftwaffe's leadership expected every campaign to be a short one and for many of them stripped training schools of experienced instructors, pilot training programmes in the Luftwaffe were heavily curtailed. Already in early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. Finally, in the spring of 1944, the B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours. Meanwhile, the average USAAF or RAF fighter pilot's training consisted of 225 flight hours. German survival rates correspondingly reached a nadir. During the first five months of 1944 Luftwaffe fighter units underwent a complete turnover of pilots so that the German achievements in production during 1944 were entirely hollow."
 
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The main factor, decline in fuel reserves and spares because of Allied sustained bombing. Both the Germans and Japanese were in a constant high wire balancing act, between the immediate operational needs of combat units, and the need to train replacements. A training unit requires close to the same level of fuel and maintenance spares as combat units. Also, sustained, high tempo operations, with its subsequent aircrew and maintenance fatigue, increases the likelihood for mishaps, decreases reliability, and usually results in rapid, near catastrophic breakdown in overall performance.
The allies, primarily the U.S., enjoyed the luxury of rotating pilots out of the combat theater after "X" number of missions. Also, American aircrew were given a "break-in" period when getting assigned to combat units. They weren't thrust into operational missions upon arrival. Instead, they flew orientation and area familiarization flights, and were evaluated before flying into combat. Even then, they were given smaller side missions in order to acclimate them.
German and Japanese pilots did not enjoy such luxuries. Once assigned to a combat unit, they were immediately thrust into a steep learning curve.
 
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