Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?

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One 20mm gun will kill a fighter IF you can get keep the gun on target long enough to get 3-5 hits. Two 20mm guns means you have to have the perfect firing solution for 1/2 the time. Four guns means.........

The Germans found that the average pilot's gunnery ability was such that they needed over 1000 rounds of 20mm ammo fired to kill a bomber.
1000 rounds of ammo weighed about 194kg (not including links) and you needed enough guns to allow the pilot to fire 1000 rounds of ammo in a reasonable number of firing passes of reasonable length. Not 10 different 10 second firing passes at the same target using a single gun. Obviously some compromises needed to made (10 guns are out of the question) and also obviously the 20mm wasn't a good solution no matter what compromise was reached.
 
Intruders as fighters to cause mayhem over RAF flight paths and airdromes
Intruders finding USAAF fields and dropping some bombs on them should not be a problem most of the time. Not trying to blowup the world, just cause mayhem. Cause fear. Cause delays. There are these things called RIVERS that you can guide from. Airfields are not particularly tiny. Failures will cause uncertainty, one or two successes would be worth the effort, cause a multitude of precautions, SOP changes. EVERY attempt will be looked-at, analyzed, preventions planned or executed thus tying up personnel and resources.

LW Fighters with R4M to hit the bombers after the escort have to turn back, ala 1943. Really stupid hunting ducks with a single shot weapon (21cm missile) when a shotgun is the better choice (R4M or similar barrage rockets).
 
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Steve (Stona) has really hit the nail on the head. Some of you guys really need a dose of reality. Germany already tried intruder operations on a small scale. RAF reacted, and losses (for the Nacht Jagd) went up. They tried sending small numbers of bombers to harass and disrupt. Worked a bit, but the RAF reacted crash tackling the effort along the way. Trying to deny enemy air operations by using disruptive tactics over enemy territory, in this case britain, is a very poor strategic choice, when you are working with inferior resources. Britain did it, with superior technology, with very limited levels of success. Their intruder ops, including serrate and standing patrols over known nightfighter airfields during raids, had some success, but at best it can only be described as somewhat successful. Germany, with decidedly inferior airborne radars is going to have a hard time if they commit large numbers to enemy dominated airspace, day or night.
 
parsifal said:
Steve (Stona) has really hit the nail on the head. Some of you guys really need a dose of reality. Germany already tried intruder operations on a small scale. RAF reacted, and losses (for the Nacht Jagd) went up.
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Apart from your somewhat condescending remark about a "dose of reality", you have missed the point; yes, the RAF was able to counter small-scale intruder operations, at a time when there were few allied aircraft around at night to muddy the waters. Of course the advantage went to the RAF.

The problems of locating and destroying said intruders would have been multiplied exponentially, had the intruders infiltrated with the hundred of bombers returning from their night raids, to well lit airfields. As already pointed out, the RAF nightfighters were not having everything their own way over Britain in late 1943, even with their superior technology - a properly timed and executed intruder campaign could well have stretched them even more.


The campaign was still successful, and it led to a distinct shakiness amongst Luftwaffe nightfighter crews, because they never knew when they were likely to become targets. The success isn't just measured by the number of aircraft shot down. How many Luftwaffe nightfighters were destroyed or damaged because of the fear of sudden attack? How often were exhausted crews diverted to another airfield because there was a Mosquito lurking nearby? It all adds up. The returning RAF bomber crews were never faced with the same challenge.

As I said, intruder operations over Britain might not have won the war, but it could have made life even more difficult for the RAF bombers at a time when life was already tough, and it would have forced the RAF to allocate extra resources, and devise new tactics.

Such an intruder campaign could have been a bust. It could have been a resounding success; the Germans didn't try, so we'll never know.
 

I visited RAF Elvington which was a victim of some of these attacks, from memory they were Ju88s joining the returning bomber stream, the problem with this type of raid is that after using the bomber stream for cover going in but they must then get home, at night it is a long flight from northern England and by day it is a very very dangerous flight in daylight from southern England
 

Elvington - a brief history


According to The Blitz Then and Now Vol 3, during Operation Gisela, some 70 Luftwaffe nightfighers were able to roam at will over Britain for 3½ hours. Three aircraft were lost over Britain; one hit a tree, another hit the ground, while the last one hit a car it was attacking. The majority of the Luftwaffe losses (12) were due to crashes caused by bad visibility over their bases. If the, admittedly complacent, late-war British night defenses couldn't cope with 70 nightfighters in 210 minutes, how would they have been able to deal with a few well-trained, dedicated intruders in, say, mid-1943?

 
Looking at what the Lw might have been able to do in 1945, is of course not relevant, or at best, less relevant to the issue. The issue is mid war strategy tactics and equipment, or what the LW might do after the BoB. In terms of night intruder operations, the Germans historically mounted their blitz raids up until the end of may 1941, and beyond that on a much reduced scale. We get some idea of what might have happened if we choose to to look at the result of the raids mounted in that last month of the big attacks...that is May 1941.

in those raids, the LW mounted all manner of attacks, including night fighter sweeps, attacks on airfields, raids on "strategic" targets, even night attacks on shipping. across the board, and universally, the tables were turning against the LW. They were losing aircraft consistently at higher rate relative to the forces committed, though outright numbers sometimes went in their favour. here are a couple of examples, taken from Foremans book "The Turning Tide"

2/3 May: A few I/NJG2 intruders were over England and Lt Feuerbaum claimed a "hereford"....actually a 77 sqn Whitley as it made its final approach to topcliffe. Sgt Mills still managed to land safely, but the aircraft was damaged. Oberfelwebel Hahn claimed a stirling at oakington, where RAF records confirm a stirling from 7 sqn crashed in flames. Britian countered these incursions with corresponding British intruders over france and the north sea, a 23 sqn NF destroyed a He 111 of 4/KG53 at vendeville. meanwhile, over Britiain, the main focus of LW strategic strikes was Merseyside, again, and here the RAF NFs had some success .an a/c from 604 shot down a Ju88 bmbr of 8/KG77, near Lyndhurst, whilst a an a/c from 151 sqn destroyed another Ju88 bomber of 1/kg30. There was one further loss, written to unown causes, but now believed to be lost to British fighters, a He 111 of III/KG40 which crashed off St Agnes Head, observed at the time to be on fire and crashing into the sea.

Altogether that night the RAF lost 1 stirling, 1 hampden, 2 Spits, 3 whitleys, 1 Blen, 1 defiant, 3 wellingtons , 1 Manchester and 1 Hurricane. Thats a total of 14....9 were lost in landing or takeoff accidents, 4 were simply lost and did not return. 2 were the result of LW intruder interference. . In contrast, the LW lost 5 a/c, all bombers, of which 3 were the result of RAF night fighters.

3/4 May, there were further offensive operations by both sides. This time, the losses were far more one sided. RAF losses amounted to 2 wellingtons, 3 whitleys, a spitfire and a defiant. Both fighters were shot down by LW intruders, To achieve that result, the LW lost 14 a/c...4 NJGs on Intruder operations, the rest weree bombers. Of the LW losses 6 failed to return, 2 crash landed (one due to flak damage) and 6 were the subject of RAF fighter and NF attentions. Thats an exchange rate for the fighters of 6 for 2, even the bomber to fighter exchange rates are poor by the standards achieved later in the year by the far more outnumbered day fighters remaining in france.

We can look at night after night in that May period, and the results are remarkably consistent. Sending NFs over enemy territory when you dont have a clear advantage in numbers, or your radar is no better, or more usually worse, is not a recipe for success. It will lead to elevated losses, as the Germans found in early 1941.
 
Parsifal

Let me tell YOU about "dose of reality" sometime mister.

To NOT raid is to free the enemy to do what they will. I can tell you this as a career soldier, Ops NCO, and combat vet.

You were talking mid '41. Ya know what? There was still lot of war to fight. We're discussing ideas for future operations, tactics, and weapons.
I think that the LW OPS and ANALYSIS guys did not argue the case that the night missions then ('41) were LW thus easy to identify as LW. Aozora makes a good point. The more bombers the RAF puts up, the easier it is for intruders. Seems to me that someone pulled out the files and re-looked the situation.

Succeed or fail, this leads to more stress on the bombers and ground crew. Civilians too. Intrusions do not have to be daily or even weekly. Mix long gaps between attacks, then do some back-to-back. Tie up the enemy. Do some probes, gather intel, plan more, then strike hard. The next time, make it a whole different operation. With some planning, deception, even some day strikes at dawn should be in the mix.
 
Aozora said:
If the, admittedly complacent, late-war British night defenses couldn't cope with 70 nightfighters in 210 minutes, how would they have been able to deal with a few well-trained, dedicated intruders in, say, mid-1943?
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Your comments are increasingly coming across as being highly contemptuous of the wartime U.K. Far from being "complacent," Bodenplatte, V1s V2s had kept the RAF concentrated on the job in hand. By 1941/2, bombers were fitted with rearward-shining low-voltage lights, which were not to be used outside the coastal limits, and were designed to help our nightfighters differentiate between friendly and enemy aircraft. By 1944, these "resin lamps" had been converted to infra-red, and N.F. Mosquitoes were equipped with I.R. scopes, again to identify enemy from friend.
The problems of locating and destroying said intruders would have been multiplied exponentially, had the intruders infiltrated with the hundred of bombers returning from their night raids, to well lit airfields
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"Well lit?" Sorry, but you really are wide of the mark, and it's obvious you do not know the meaning of the word "blackout," which ruled U.K. thinking throughout the war. This nation was black, with not a chink of light allowed to be seen (wardens patrolled throughout the night, and "Put that light out" was not just a figment of "Dad's Army.")
During 1940, a house near Bristol used to enrage a local A.A. guncrew, by continually having a bedroom window brightly lit during German air raids; complaints, and authority, had no effect, so they eventually put a Bofors round through the window, which finally solved the problem.
The only lights showing on a bomber base would have been the flarepath, which, on a permanent runway, consisted of lights angled so that they were visible only to landing aircraft, not from above; grass runways were "illuminated" by "goose-neck" lamps, which were paraffin lamps, with a cloth wick, which had to be individually lit by an airman usually on a bicycle.
When I visited Alconbury, in the 1970s, we were escorted to the control tower, and were shown a large brass button, which was a relic from WWII (and still worked,) which, when hit, switched off every light on the airfield. As well as radar, watchers would be out, on the airfield, listening, and any sound of the (very distinctive) unsynchronised beat of German engines, would ensure all lights were doused.
 
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Interesting - that type of technology is still in use. Is there any information as to what arc the low intensity lights covered? I would guess the ranges at which they would be visible would vary a lot, depending on conditions. Ditto the I.R lamps.


And if the lights are continually being doused when a squadron of bombers are landing? Disruptive, and possibly dangerous; intruders don't cause disruption just by shooting down aircraft.
 
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A little bit about techincalities, namely the engines. 1st, the DB V-12s.
Currently the DB-601N is being installed in the fighters, while the DB-601E is in the pipeline. The 601N was allowed for 2800 rpm during the late 1940/early 1941, to the best of my knowledge. So for the 601E, the priorities are to follow suit, from 2500 rpm, to 2700 (both values as historically) eventually to 2800 rpm - should almost equal the power of the DB-605A. Other possible improvements might include the installation of intercooler (in similar fashion as the Jumo 211J), MW 50 system, installation of a bigger supercharger, or a two-stage supercharger. With some of those improvements, we can skip the DB-605. The suitability for hi oct fuel (C3) also need to be explored, and engine up-rated according to that.
The DB-603 is the next. The work need to be resumed on it, so the engine is in a more usable state than it was historically case in 1943. Advantage over the BMW 801 will include a bit more power at all altitudes, less drag, ability for a S/E fighter to mount a powerful cannon to fire through the prop; usage of B4 fuel instead of C3. Disadvantage would be that 801 was, historically, a more 'mature' engine in 1943; should be a less of an issue with a more concentrated funded effort on the account of the DB 603. Once the 603 is in production, most of the improvements listed for the DB 601 can be applied for the 603.
 
Aozora said:
Read the page from The Blitz Then and Now I posted, along with the extracts from Rawnsley's book,.
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No, thank you, I do my research by reading the files (dozens of them) held in our National Archives, so I have some idea of what the Air Ministry were trying to do. Perhaps you need reminding that it was you who said they were being complacent, which is hardly complimentary in my book.
And if the lights are continually being doused when a squadron of bombers are landing? Disruptive, and possibly dangerous; intruders don't cause disruption just by shooting down aircraft
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Aircraft came back singly, not in Squadrons, and there was a control caravan stationed at the end of the runway, able to contact the aircraft with radio and signal lamp, so they could tell them when it was safe to try again, relight the runway, or, alternatively, advise them to buzz off to another airfield.
It's easy to be critical of defenders, after the event, but the advantage is always with the attacker, since only he knows where, when, and how he will attack. The Ardennes in 1940, the Luftwaffe switching to London, Pearl Harbour, El Alamein, Torch, Sicily, D-day, all succeeded because of secrecy.
 
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Running night intruder operations is not just a question of getting experienced pilots, you need an experienced air force with the equipment and infrastructure, navigation aids, landing aids, weather intelligence over the target and forecast for landing times.. The British AND the Americans learned some hard lessons in the early days. Trained pilots from the USA and Canada fell victim to foul weather over the UK. I would throw open the question that an inexperienced but trained pilot with an experienced navigator is a better combination that an experienced pilot with a rookie navigator on a night time op. From what I read the guy who gives the go ahead for a mission must take account of the prevailing conditions or he can cause a disaster for almost no loss to the enemy.

The referenced sneak raids were just 9 weeks before the war ended. It was like a night time Bodenplatt with the same result, losses out of any proportion to damage caused. The LW never had enough aircraft/pilots/fuel throughout the war, to win against the British and Americans they would need to inflict losses at a massively high ratio. Those raids were a success in terms of surprise and a disaster in terms of the losses sustained. In view of the weather which caused most losses the raids shouldnt have gone ahead but the guys who dreamed up the mission simply didnt care. If such raids were repeated they would have been counterred
 
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Edgar, please read the extract from Ramsay, before jumping down my throat:



The element of surprise caught the British defences napping, having become complacent that no further attacks would be made by manned aircraft over Britain.
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Exactly my point! A first-rate, frontline officer of the RAF, who was part of one of Britain's finest nightfighter crews, made it quite clear that in late 1943 the defences were being stretched (note: not complacent). Had the Luftwaffe chosen such a time to mount a series of intruder raids against the heavy bombers, and their bases, they may well have created real problems.

How, exactly, has mooting such a possibility been turned into the sweeping generalisation that I am "highly contemptuous of the wartime UK"?
 
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Oh please .....from the article "in the worst incident in Ipswich 2 bombs demolished houses, 3 people killed in Gainsborough and 3 trains attacked in Yorkshire home security reported 13 killed and 28 injured" this cost the LW 21 Ju88 lost and another 11 damaged. Today I went to the Town Hall in Hanover, there are three models one of today one from 1945 and one from medieval times ....about 7000 civilians were killed in Hanover alone which is a very open city and difficult to bomb of the main city centre only the Town hall really remains. The sneak raids in 1945 were a surprise in England but the attacks weren't repeated,the losses were completely unjustifiable. i am sure on a lower level on the ground 9 weeks before the war ended many others in the Army and Navy were similarly complacent they may not have seen any action for months or years. My father went to the Pacific because there was nothing for his RN destroyer to do in 1945.

In the dog days of the war a few planes sneaked through the UK defenses and caused more harm to their own miitary than the enemy, it wasnt Singapore Pearl Harbour Stalingrad or Taranto.

Please compare the damage/losses of the sneak raids by the LW with the damage/losses inflicted by the raids they were infiltrating
 
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I wonder if some of these comments are coming across as being highly contemptuous of wartime Germany?
I say that tongue-in-cheek, as the Germans weren't idiots - it seems that they tried these tactics and, evidently, found them unprofitable.
Otherwise they would have tried them more often.
 
Aozora said:
Edgar, please read the extract from Ramsay, before jumping down my throat: How, exactly, has mooting such a possibility been turned into the sweeping generalisation that I am "highly contemptuous of the wartime UK"?
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I'm sorry; I said that's how you were coming across, but I didn't realise you were quoting from someone else's writings.
I don't know when he wrote that, but there's a lot of information, which has become available recently (after 1975, at least,) which is putting a new slant on all sorts of things.
There have been authors saying that Germany lost the Battle of Britain due to Enigma intercepts giving us advance notice, but Dowding was not on the list of approved recipients, so he was not allowed to read them; this makes Park's achievements all the more remarkable, and shows how lucky we were to have him.
There have been all sorts of fanciful theories about the reasons for not allowing the Meteor into Germany, but it's now known that we didn't want to present the Germans with a free sample of our metal technology, in the event of one coming down; eventually, of course, as the end came closer, it no longer mattered.
Can we start again?
 
People write books to sell them and they must be populated with interesting wording ... neat wording does not make it true. I seriously doubt complacent was the word to use.

If a country declares war, they do NOT become complacent, they merely get surprised when an attack comes at an unexpected time or from an unexpected direction. Then they start planning for those contingencies, too, once burned by them. People who go into combat for the first time are not very well equipped to do so, even when coached by former combat verterans. After awhile, they die or learn that the old vets were pretty much right most of the time unless a new technology comes into play.

But it they're fighting in hedgerows and house-to-house, then it's all been done before, and there are no real surprises unless you don't listen to the voices of experience.
 
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