Making the Uralbomber work

[Thumpalumpacus]

Kharkov. The Soviets tried raiding German airfields IOTL to stop the June 1943 attacks on Gorky and they were a miserable failure due to radar and flak.
They also tried to do the same before Citadel to disrupt German air power, but that failed badly too:

Battle of Kursk - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Again the Soviets were an entirely different kind of foe compared to the Wallies and were nowhere near as capable. Their main ability was to suffer immense losses, but be able to continue to fight and wear down the Axis.

Do you think the Soviets are simply going to roll over and accept such a damaging fait accompli?

Never forget -- in any what-if, the other side has a panoply of possible responses. Me, I could see night-time incendiary attacks to reduce the threat from flak. At that time in the war, it's not like the LW has idle night-fighters laying around waiting to be used.

 

[wiking85]

Do you think the Soviets are simply going to roll over and accept such a damaging fait accompli?

Of course not, the problem is they cannot do much about it successfully if history is any example.

Never forget -- in any what-if, the other side has a panoply of possible responses. Me, I could see night-time incendiary attacks to reduce the threat from flak. At that time in the war, it's not like the LW has idle night-fighters laying around waiting to be used.

There are only so many options and so many realistic ones. A classic problem with people responding to what ifs is assuming there is always a counter to a change in action. Sometimes there is no effective counter. As for night attacks the Soviets lacked night guidance systems so good luck trying to drop bombs on flak or airfields; the Germans had gunnery radar for their flak and they did have night fighters on the eastern front. Keep in mind the Soviets too had resource limitations, so it is not like they can afford to waste missions or aircraft in 1942-43. The night witches were more propaganda than effective.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Of course not, the problem is they cannot do much about it successfully if history is any example.

You're appealing to history to defend your what-if. What if the Russians are inspired to try something different?

That is my point. What-ifs run only from one side will almost surely be less useful. As we say in the military, the enemy gets a vote.

There are only so many options and so many realistic ones. A classic problem with people responding to what ifs is assuming there is always a counter to a change in action. Sometimes there is no effective counter. As for night attacks the Soviets lacked night guidance systems so good luck trying to drop bombs on flak or airfields; the Germans had gunnery radar for their flak and they did have night fighters on the eastern front. Keep in mind the Soviets too had resource limitations, so it is not like they can afford to waste missions or aircraft in 1942-43. The night witches were more propaganda than effective.

The problem is that there have been plenty of cogent points that greatly weaken your what-if that do not rely upon any Russian response at all, but merely point out the tremendous difficulties the Germans will experience mounting the forces you suppose.

Of course, you've brushed those all aside, which makes this conversation pretty vapid, to me.

 

[wiking85]

You're appealing to history to defend your what-if. What if the Russians are inspired to try something different?

They had the same threat IOTL and failed in their response. What else could they try? Partisans couldn't get at the air bases and night attacks didn't work either.

That is my point. What-ifs run only from one side will almost surely be less useful. As we say in the military, the enemy gets a vote.

Sure, but they tried your proposed countermeasures IOTL and they failed.

The problem is that there have been plenty of cogent points that greatly weaken your what-if that do not rely upon any Russian response at all, but merely point out the tremendous difficulties the Germans will experience mounting the forces you suppose.

Which points do you think were cogent and why? I have responded to all the so-called tremendous difficulties in detail. It is hardly the problem you and others have made it out to be given historical production, the POD, and the slack due to mismanagement of projects and resources that could have been available had someone more competent lived and not died in 1936...

Of course, you've brushed those all aside, which makes this conversation pretty vapid, to me.

I've responded to and offered counters to them, you've clearly not read the thread if you think I've just brushed aside the objections.

 

[bf109xxl]

In 1941 sure, but that number changed over the course of the year into 1942 when it was stripped out for other areas, but then built back up during the invasion of the Caucasus.

The structure of the 8th Air Defense Fighter Corps remained unchanged throughout the war. Some regiments were temporarily subordinated to the Army Air Force, for example, during the operation in Iran. But then they were again subordinated to the command of the 8th AD Fighter Air Corps. There was no noticeable weakening of Baku's air defense in 1942 - even when the regiments were reassigned to the army air force, they remained in the Caucasus region and continued to defend Baku.

I apologize - I checked the history of each fighter aviation regiment, the structure of the corps did change - there were regiments that were disbanded in 1942, but the largest reduction was in 1943, when there was no longer a threat to the oil fields.

 

[wiking85]

The structure of the 8th Air Defense Fighter Corps remained unchanged throughout the war. Some regiments were temporarily subordinated to the Army Air Force, for example, during the operation in Iran. But then they were again subordinated to the command of the 8th AD Fighter Air Corps. There was no noticeable weakening of Baku's air defense in 1942 - even when the regiments were reassigned to the army air force, they remained in the Caucasus region and continued to defend Baku.

Joel Hayward, "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production" : Joel Hayward : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Joel Hayward, Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64,...

archive.org

This paper (starting p. 786) claims otherwise.

 

[bf109xxl]

Joel Hayward, "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production" : Joel Hayward : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Joel Hayward, Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64,...

archive.org

This paper (starting p. 786) claims otherwise.

p.787

Of course, even if the Luftwaffe had struck Baku in August, when the Red Air Force remained very weak, it would not have done so without losses. Strong antiaircraft defences protected the oil metropolis. In the spring of 1942, "the Soviet High Command, continuing to strengthen the Soviet armed forces' defensive capabilities, devoted special attention to the strengthening of antiaircraft defences at critically important industrial-economic centres, particularly Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku."[46] The latter received the least attention, due to the Soviet High Command's mistaken belief throughout the first half of 1942 that the Germans would launch another major campaign against Moscow.47 Even so, by July 1942 fighters units formed part of Baku's antiaircraft defences, which included searchlights, early-warning systems, balloons, and numerous flak batteries. By the beginning of September, as the Germans inched towards Grozny, additional fighter units arrived in the southern Caucasus for Baku's defence.

In any case, Baku's air defense was incomparably more powerful than that of any other region of the USSR except Moscow and Leningrad, and was quite comparable to the latter's air defense.

 

[bf109xxl]

Joel Hayward, "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production" : Joel Hayward : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Joel Hayward, Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64,...

archive.org

This paper (starting p. 786) claims otherwise.

By the way, I looked at an old Soviet article (Military History Journal, 1973) referenced by the author of the article you mentioned. And although I don't like to refer to such sources, I will do so anyway.

Only fighter aircraft intended for the air defense of Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku were operationally subordinate to the air defense command of these centers, as they were in a special status.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Which points do you think were cogent and why?

Scroll up and reread. I'm not going to retype my points because you're not getting it. Your thinking is your responsibility.

I've responded to and offered counters to them, you've clearly not read the thread if you think I've just brushed aside the objections.

When you assume that objection or disagreement means ignorance, you're making a subtle but clear personal attack. You will not be permitted to waste my time any more; good evening to you.

 

[wiking85]

p.787

In any case, Baku's air defense was incomparably more powerful than that of any other region of the USSR except Moscow and Leningrad, and was quite comparable to the latter's air defense.

All I was saying is that Baku was not in the league of Moscow or leningrad even if stronger than any other cities, I don't agree that it was leningrad levels. As your quote says there was a significant difference in fighter defenses in August vs. September and Baku could be struck, whereas in leningrad even in 1941 it was a major risk to fly near leningrad. That's all.

 

[bf109xxl]

All I was saying is that Baku was not in the league of Moscow or leningrad even if stronger than any other cities, I don't agree that it was leningrad levels.

That's simply not true. Moreover, both the article you quoted and the article from the Soviet magazine clearly testify to this. Even a slight weakening of Baku's air defense did not take it out of the same league as Moscow and Leningrad - the next league was just radically different. The air defense of Baku did not suffer such losses as the air defense of Leningrad, so I think that at certain periods, the fighter aviation of Baku's air defense could be even stronger than that of Leningrad. It is not easy to track the dynamics of the number of aircraft in Baku's air defense - the information is sometimes contradictory, with fighter regiments being both removed from the 8th Air Defense Corps and assigned to it. some sources say that in 1942, the corps had 14 air regiments under its command. Based on the available (unverified) data, I plotted the following timeline chart for the units of the 8th AD fighter air corps:

As your quote says there was a significant difference in fighter defenses in August vs. September

My quote says Baku and Leningrad were in the same league. And the timeline chart shows that the difference was not significant.

and Baku could be struck, whereas in leningrad even in 1941 it was a major risk to fly near leningrad.

The Baku Air Defense covered a much larger area, so the concentration of forces was lower than in Leningrad, although the total strength was comparable. And there is not enough evidence to estimate the risk for the Luftwaffe- there were no raids on Baku like on Leningrad.

That's all.

I doubt it.

 

[Airborne2001]

I just don't think the Germans had the resources and infrastructure to maintain a large strategic-bombing force. Okay, they built 1,200 He177s. Firstly, that was spread out over a couple of years, and they never had a bunch operating at one time. Secondly, the "resources and infrastructure" point is not so much about whether or not they could design or build such a plane, but about whether they could maintain its combat efficiency in the field.

When you're attacking an industrial base, you must do so continually and often to achieve effect. Supplying and maintaining such a force with replacement aircraft, replacement aircrew, ordnance, and fuel, not to mention groundcrew resources to keep operational rates high is not easy.

Operation Pointblank underlines both the pros and the cons. If you can pull it off, heavy bombers can certainly inflict severe economic damage, but look at the effort the Western Allies put in to Pointblank: thousands upon thousands of heavy bombers (each requiring a lot of sheet metal, four good engines, 6-10 crew, fuel for daaaaaays, over 100,000 men lost), and so on.

So if Germany goes whole-hog into Uralbomber, they're going to divert factory-floors, aluminum, fuel, and both air- and ground-crew from fighters defending the Reich or building FW-190s and so on. In fact, if they pursue this early, they may have troubles pivoting to confront Pointblank defensively? I don't know.

I don't think Germany had the economic and more importantly personnel strength to both build this strategic-bombing force, keep it supplied and in strength, and then fight air wars both in the Med and over the Reich.

See everyone says this without considering the possibility of dropping certain aircraft production. As much as I am a fan of the aircraft, the He-111 served its purpose by 1940. Cancel production of it then and divert all the necessary resources to a heavier bomber. Germany already had the right idea with cancelling the Do-17, but the He-111 should've gone next.

 

[Shortround6]

See everyone says this without considering the possibility of dropping certain aircraft production. As much as I am a fan of the aircraft, the He-111 served its purpose by 1940. Cancel production of it then and divert all the necessary resources to a heavier bomber. Germany already had the right idea with cancelling the Do-17, but the He-111 should've gone next.

I don't know what the Germans were thinking but it seems like they got a little too clever.
The He 111 was sort of the bomb truck, unsophisticated but of usable size.
Yes the Do 17 was too small but they were working on the Do-217 from 1938. It took 8 prototypes before the settled on the BMW 801 engines, without which the project would have failed in 1940-41.
This is the problem with most of these 'cancel the He 111' ideas. The Germans did not have the needed engines in place (developed and in production). And all of the wonder engines either bombed or took way to long to get into operation (DB 603 and Jumo 213 or even the BMW 801). For the last the Americans were building bombers with 1600hp engines in 1940.
The turbo engines in the B-17 and B-24 were sort of strange, they only gave 1200hp each for take-off but at 20-25,000ft they gave as much or more power than most peoples 1500-1700hp take-off rated engines.
The He 111 used a wing about 50% bigger than the Do 217 or the Ju-88 so for the same engines that the Ju-88 used, it was slower but it could lift more fuel and bombs. Not a sexy as the Ju 88 but you needed more Ju 88s to carry the same amount of bombs as far.
Trying to build 4 engine bombers in 1940-41 using DB 601 or Jumo 211s means you are trying to build planes sort of like the British 4 engine bombers but using engines making 100-200hp less each. UNLESS, you get tricky and go for the He 177 tricks of small wing and coupled engines to reduce drag, except that didn't work so well.
But the He 111 was yesterdays news and they didn't have the manpower/budget to improve it while working on the Vundar bombers.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

See everyone says this without considering the possibility of dropping certain aircraft production. As much as I am a fan of the aircraft, the He-111 served its purpose by 1940. Cancel production of it then and divert all the necessary resources to a heavier bomber. Germany already had the right idea with cancelling the Do-17, but the He-111 should've gone next.

I certainly had diversions in mind when I wrote "So if Germany goes whole-hog into Uralbomber, they're going to divert factory-floors, aluminum, fuel, and both air- and ground-crew from fighters defending the Reich or building FW-190s and so on".

The fact I didn't mention He-111s specifically doesn't exclude them from the equation.

 

[WARSPITER]

The HE-111 was an important cog in the attack system for Germany when used in conjunction with ground forces.
A watering down of the Luftwaffe medium and dive bomber capacity in favour of heavy bombers for 1940 would
have meant a lowering of the chance of the success on the ground that was achieved in France. The bigger you
go with the heavy bomber force the smaller the ground attack force gets along with the chances of a win.

The chances in the Soviet Union in these conditions would have been even worse. Much of what was taken early on
would not have happened so the big airfields East of Poland would most likely not end up in German hands so soon
if at all.

This is all predicated on Germany knowing in advance that so much industry would be shifted away from Moscow etc.

This in turn becomes a case of building a strategic bomber force for an as yet unknown purpose so it's not a wonder
it didn't happen.

 

[Airborne2001]

I don't know what the Germans were thinking but it seems like they got a little too clever.
The He 111 was sort of the bomb truck, unsophisticated but of usable size.
Yes the Do 17 was too small but they were working on the Do-217 from 1938. It took 8 prototypes before the settled on the BMW 801 engines, without which the project would have failed in 1940-41.
This is the problem with most of these 'cancel the He 111' ideas. The Germans did not have the needed engines in place (developed and in production). And all of the wonder engines either bombed or took way to long to get into operation (DB 603 and Jumo 213 or even the BMW 801). For the last the Americans were building bombers with 1600hp engines in 1940.
The turbo engines in the B-17 and B-24 were sort of strange, they only gave 1200hp each for take-off but at 20-25,000ft they gave as much or more power than most peoples 1500-1700hp take-off rated engines.
The He 111 used a wing about 50% bigger than the Do 217 or the Ju-88 so for the same engines that the Ju-88 used, it was slower but it could lift more fuel and bombs. Not a sexy as the Ju 88 but you needed more Ju 88s to carry the same amount of bombs as far.
Trying to build 4 engine bombers in 1940-41 using DB 601 or Jumo 211s means you are trying to build planes sort of like the British 4 engine bombers but using engines making 100-200hp less each. UNLESS, you get tricky and go for the He 177 tricks of small wing and coupled engines to reduce drag, except that didn't work so well.
But the He 111 was yesterdays news and they didn't have the manpower/budget to improve it while working on the Vundar bombers.

This is a fair point. The He-111 did have a large bomb load capacity that other types didn't (necessarily) have. Regarding the He-177, wasn't the main issue the specifications leading to a ridiculously tight cowling? I feel like a much large one like the Ju-288C (plus getting rid of ridiculous requirements like the dive bombing requirement) would've dealth with this issue.

The HE-111 was an important cog in the attack system for Germany when used in conjunction with ground forces.
A watering down of the Luftwaffe medium and dive bomber capacity in favour of heavy bombers for 1940 would
have meant a lowering of the chance of the success on the ground that was achieved in France. The bigger you
go with the heavy bomber force the smaller the ground attack force gets along with the chances of a win.

The chances in the Soviet Union in these conditions would have been even worse. Much of what was taken early on
would not have happened so the big airfields East of Poland would most likely not end up in German hands so soon
if at all.

This is all predicated on Germany knowing in advance that so much industry would be shifted away from Moscow etc.

This in turn becomes a case of building a strategic bomber force for an as yet unknown purpose so it's not a wonder
it didn't happen.

I do agree that it was important, but I feel like getting rid of only one of three bomber types (this wouldn't include getting rid of the Ju-87 either because it is too important to lose) wouldn't be that big of an issue.

 

[Shortround6]

This is a fair point. The He-111 did have a large bomb load capacity that other types didn't (necessarily) have.

The He-111 had a bomb capacity AND fuel capacity that the Do 17 and Ju-88 did not have.
Standard tankage for even the Do-217E was about 58% of the wing tankage in the He 111 although the 217's bomb bay allowed for more flexibility.

Regarding the He-177, wasn't the main issue the specifications leading to a ridiculously tight cowling? I feel like a much large one like the Ju-288C (plus getting rid of ridiculous requirements like the dive bombing requirement) would've dealth with this issue.

Everything about the He 177 was one or two or three steps away from being practical and rather than just start over again they kept trying to paste on one modification after another.
The Plane was designed to use surface evaporative cooling as were a number of German designs in 1938-39, but it didn't work as advertised and more and more conventional radiator space was needed which add drag which reduced range which was corrected by adding fuel tanks which added weight which required stronger structure which required more weight and...........
They also jumped right over manned power turrets to remote powered turrets/barbettes but they initially designed small ones, like single 7.9mm or 13mm gun installations. Early prototype 177s had 4 gun stations. One the front of the gondola, one (remote) dorsal behind the cockpit, one rearward firing out the back of the gondola and one in the tail (gunner laid prone?). By Sept of 1940 they could see this was not going to work (plane was already about 50mph slower than the spec so adding guns was going to be a problem).
Now since they had already gone with a small wing, only about 16.5% bigger in area than the He-111 cutting wing area was not going to work.
Maybe using a Ju-288C style cowling would have helped solve the engine problems but they needed solve a bunch of other things. The He 177 was not fasted enough to evade Spitfires (Hurricanes maybe) and didn't have the gun power of even a Wellington. Without escort fighters it was going to be a night bomber.
He 111 bomb bay could not hold large bombs but it could hold eight 250kg bombs. He 177 could hold twelve 250kg bombs but it could hold four 1000kg bombs. Any heavier loads in the early He 177s required AP bombs to fit and dropping iron instead of HE was not the usual bomb load.
Short range (450-500km radius) night bombing three He 111s (6 engines) could carry as many 250kg bombs as two He 177s (8 engines).

The Germans needed a He 111 replacement but they needed a less technically advanced one. A twin with 1600-1700hp engines and a larger bomb bay that could hold bigger bombs and somewhat better defensive armament while carrying decent fuel and able to use less than very large runways.

I do agree that it was important, but I feel like getting rid of only one of three bomber types (this wouldn't include getting rid of the Ju-87 either because it is too important to lose) wouldn't be that big of an issue.

The He 111 was sort of one end of the spectrum of German bombers, The Germans were already replacing the Do 17 with the 217 but they kept about same wing size as the Do 17 and while it could hold the same number of 250kg bombs and fly faster (and had slightly better guns) it didn't have the range of the He 111 and doing away with that range without replacing it limits future options.
He 111s were used for maritime strike off Norway and in the Med and in very, very small numbers used for some long range missions in the Mid east.

 

[SaparotRob]

Neither here nor there but my blurry vision keeps seeing the thread title as "Making the Unabomber work".

 

[Howard Gibson]

The He-111 had a bomb capacity AND fuel capacity that the Do 17 and Ju-88 did not have.
Standard tankage for even the Do-217E was about 58% of the wing tankage in the He 111 although the 217's bomb bay allowed for more flexibility.

Everything about the He 177 was one or two or three steps away from being practical and rather than just start over again they kept trying to paste on one modification after another.

For any mission out of the range of escorting fighters, you need a bomber that can out-run interceptors. Exceeding 300mph is not good enough. If you can suppress flak and escort He111s, they can survive missions and bomb stuff successfully. A bomber that does 350mph at 20,000ft with its bomb load, will be a terrible shock to the Russians, and you will fly some successful missions. Then, the Russians will restart their high altitude programs, they will graciously thank the British for the Spitfire_IXs (in the real war, they did not appreciate them), and they will work out some form of ground control to track the incoming bombers. The bombers will get massacred.

Meanwhile, you have stripped the Heer of several tank divisions, or perhaps the unescorted Americans will fly over
Schweinfurt–Regensburg and provide you evidence that my theories about long range bombing are wrong. Maybe they don't need so many U-boats!

Long range strategic bombing is expensive, in resources and in the lives of aircrew.

 

[wiking85]

I don't know what the Germans were thinking but it seems like they got a little too clever.
The He 111 was sort of the bomb truck, unsophisticated but of usable size.
Yes the Do 17 was too small but they were working on the Do-217 from 1938. It took 8 prototypes before the settled on the BMW 801 engines, without which the project would have failed in 1940-41.
This is the problem with most of these 'cancel the He 111' ideas. The Germans did not have the needed engines in place (developed and in production). And all of the wonder engines either bombed or took way to long to get into operation (DB 603 and Jumo 213 or even the BMW 801). For the last the Americans were building bombers with 1600hp engines in 1940.
The turbo engines in the B-17 and B-24 were sort of strange, they only gave 1200hp each for take-off but at 20-25,000ft they gave as much or more power than most peoples 1500-1700hp take-off rated engines.
The He 111 used a wing about 50% bigger than the Do 217 or the Ju-88 so for the same engines that the Ju-88 used, it was slower but it could lift more fuel and bombs. Not a sexy as the Ju 88 but you needed more Ju 88s to carry the same amount of bombs as far.
Trying to build 4 engine bombers in 1940-41 using DB 601 or Jumo 211s means you are trying to build planes sort of like the British 4 engine bombers but using engines making 100-200hp less each. UNLESS, you get tricky and go for the He 177 tricks of small wing and coupled engines to reduce drag, except that didn't work so well.
But the He 111 was yesterdays news and they didn't have the manpower/budget to improve it while working on the Vundar bombers.

Even with the BMW engines the Do217 was too underpowered per Eric Brown when he test flew it. It really needed the Jumo 222 or a similarly powered engine. Maybe a boosted Jumo 213 or perhaps an earlier developed DB603, but 2000hp per engine was the minimum that aircraft needed. Making it dive bomb capable was a bad idea, but once again a product of the Udet technical department.

The Ju288 in the original configuration would have worked with the 2000-2500hp Jumo 222A2, but that's a whole saga that we don't need to fight over yet again on this forum.
Goering/Udet really bungled the 2nd generation Luftwaffe developments, which arguably cost the Luftwaffe the air war.

The Americans didn't have the restrictions, human material loss, or financial constraints that were the product of Germany losing WW1, so no wonder they were ahead in certain engine developments. They also didn't have the restrictions on certain metals that were hard to source in wartime Germany.

BTW the Jumo 207 had a similar supercharger and was doing about the same HP at the same altitude as the B17 operated at.

The HE111 was also quite a bit more stable than the Ju88 or Do217 in flight as a result of lower wing loading. The Ju88 was not really all that useful until they fixed the wing design to make it more stable and IIRC made the engine more powerful to make up for the high wing loading. Trying to turn the Ju88 into a dive bomber and a jack of all trades really compromised the design and its intended purpose. But there were political power plays being made that Junker's leaders ultimately lost.

By 1940 the German engines of the 601 and 211 variety were producing the same power as the US B17's had in 1943. 1200hp. The British engines were of the same power at the time. Hence the whole issue in the BoB when both sides were evenly matched, but the British had homefield advantage and more fighters as well as pilots.

The problem with the He177 design is why I'm suggesting 6x diesel engines. The drag is significantly higher due to the bigger wings and more propellors, but the fuel economy is so much better than it more than negates that problem while being more powerful overall by 1940/41 so performance also improves the overall range. Quicker time to altitude ends up wasting less fuel due to less drag at altitude and that's where the greater wing area really shines. With the Jumo 207 and its altitude performance it would actually let it well outperform the He177.

I certainly had diversions in mind when I wrote "So if Germany goes whole-hog into Uralbomber, they're going to divert factory-floors, aluminum, fuel, and both air- and ground-crew from fighters defending the Reich or building FW-190s and so on".

The fact I didn't mention He-111s specifically doesn't exclude them from the equation.

No relevant factors in 1940/41 since this wouldn't divert anything from that. Also there are a whole host of butterflies that result from Wever living and much better management of production and development from 1936 onwards.

The HE-111 was an important cog in the attack system for Germany when used in conjunction with ground forces.
A watering down of the Luftwaffe medium and dive bomber capacity in favour of heavy bombers for 1940 would
have meant a lowering of the chance of the success on the ground that was achieved in France. The bigger you
go with the heavy bomber force the smaller the ground attack force gets along with the chances of a win.

The chances in the Soviet Union in these conditions would have been even worse. Much of what was taken early on
would not have happened so the big airfields East of Poland would most likely not end up in German hands so soon
if at all.

This is all predicated on Germany knowing in advance that so much industry would be shifted away from Moscow etc.

This in turn becomes a case of building a strategic bomber force for an as yet unknown purpose so it's not a wonder
it didn't happen.

Since the POD is caused by Wever living you avoid a lot of the problems of the Udet period. That means the Ju88 isn't bungled since there isn't mass adoption of the dive bombing concept for all aircraft, and production is more appropriately balanced, plus the Do217 might be less ridiculous in development and more matched to the engines available (it was also a victim of the dive bombing concept). So rather than running into the issues you're talking about, the production situation for the Luftwaffe could actually be far better managed, same with development. The Ju88 as a pure speed bomber rather than a Frankenstein's monster of an aircraft that delayed its introduction for 12 months could actually be ready before September 1939 and in production, rather than being rushed at the start of the war and turning into a disaster for months. However that is a separate discussion.

Also in 1940 production would just be starting for this aircraft, so it really doesn't impact France at all. Maybe bomber production for the Battle of Britain and beyond, but not in time for France. The development cycle would just not really impact production that early. In fact, I'm proposing that the Ural Bomber is not ready until Spring 1942 for operations, so arguably due to the development cycle it may not even enter mass production until early 1941.

For any mission out of the range of escorting fighters, you need a bomber that can out-run interceptors. Exceeding 300mph is not good enough. If you can suppress flak and escort He111s, they can survive missions and bomb stuff successfully. A bomber that does 350mph at 20,000ft with its bomb load, will be a terrible shock to the Russians, and you will fly some successful missions. Then, the Russians will restart their high altitude programs, they will graciously thank the British for the Spitfire_IXs (in the real war, they did not appreciate them), and they will work out some form of ground control to track the incoming bombers. The bombers will get massacred.

Meanwhile, you have stripped the Heer of several tank divisions, or perhaps the unescorted Americans will fly over
Schweinfurt–Regensburg and provide you evidence that my theories about long range bombing are wrong. Maybe they don't need so many U-boats!

Long range strategic bombing is expensive, in resources and in the lives of aircrew.

Not at all. The Allies ran into a very different problem than the one facing Germany over Russia. As I mentioned before even in 1944 the He111 was still able to operate during daylight hours over Russia, but hadn't been able to in the west since 1940. The Soviets lacked high flying fighters and even those they had didn't have heavy enough armament to deal with a heavy bomber, as they were equipped to fight enemy fighters. Against a bomber box, even one without the same firepower of the B17, they couldn't even get close enough to do damage other than maybe via ramming, but due to the lack of altitude performance that would be difficult and depend on them not being too damaged by defensive fire from 13-20mm heavy guns on the bombers.