Mass produced HS-123s

[wiking85]

Seeing how helicopters were used post-WW2 and how the HS123 functioned as a CAS aircraft it seems as though it could have been the equivalent of a WW2 attack helicopter. So what if the Luftwaffe got over its obsession with having the latest and greatest dive bomber and instead focused on mass producing thousands of Hs123 C's and used them as helicopter equivalents? This would mean no HS129 and the Ju87 is limited to specialist heavy dive bombing missions. The goal would be to imbed 40 Hs123C's per panzer and motorized division, while every infantry corps would have a 40 aircraft support unit. How would this impact the course of the war or even just Barbarossa in 1941? Remember IOTL in 1941 the Luftwaffe fielded fewer aircraft than during the invasion of France in 1940, so this would see them having air support that would far exceed OTL 1941 if they hit the TOE I mentioned. It would be CAS more than operational interdiction, but the number of twin engine bombers wouldn't be impacted.

 

[tomo pauk]

What should be the production per, let's say', a quarter (= 3 months) after a quarter? How many should be produced; 'thousands' is pretty imprecise number.
Do we also got the pilots required?

 

[wiking85]

What should be the production per, let's say', a quarter (= 3 months) after a quarter? How many should be produced; 'thousands' is pretty imprecise number.
Do we also got the pilots required?

All good questions.
865 HS129s were produced historically and roughly 6,500 Ju87s were. Let's say half of OTL Ju87 production is eliminated and all of Hs129. We also have economies of scale from Hs123 production being concentrated on since 1936, so just from those numbers were have roughly 4,000 for the whole war without even getting into extras due to cost savings. None of this is counting the 265 produced IOTL. But since production starts in 1936 we could easily have quite a few more, as the Hs123 was stupid cheap to make. So 6,000 for the entire war is a very conservative estimate. That's roughly 250 per quarter for the whole war. Realistically if focused on since 1936 there is no reason they couldn't make 500 per quarter at full output or at least 12,000 over the course of the war. The engine itself is a 1933 design and used extensively, so choosing to make sufficient number from 1936 onwards should ensure plenty of supply.

If they treat it was a LA/AR aircraft, then you could even eliminate some of the army recon/liaison aircraft designs and focus on a single design for that role. Like the Hs126, of which 510 were made for WW2.

Biplane pilots aren't hard to train especially for a ground attack role and they had enough to use obsolete biplane trainers in the night harassment role.

So all that said realistically having say 3,000 for the invasion of France is viable, same with say 2500 for Poland. Since they wouldn't be useful for the Battle of Britain, by the time of Barbarossa 4,500 or even 5,000 might be viable. Contrast this with the OTL 40 Hs123s and 310 Ju87s used in Barbarossa. IOTL by the invasion of France they had some 10,000 reserve aircrew and probably could have had quite a bit more for the CAS aircraft with training limited to whatever a ground attack role and the expectation that those pilots would be fungible, so their quality could be marginal.

 

[Shortround6]

An interesting what if?

You needed to break Junkers hold on the Dive bomber

The next thing is that you need to increase the weapons load, or the diversity.
The often quoted under wing 20mm guns seem a little lacking in photos?
And they aren't very good for tank busting anyway.

Aircraft are not quite as fungible as some people think. Especially for transporting through time. The first Hs 129 didn't fly (with V-12 Argus engines) until after Hs 123 production had stopped. And the version with the radial didn't start until they had captured the French engines so the replacement of 1941 with aircraft built in back in 1938-39 requires a time machine.
The next thing is if the Hs 123 can really do the Ju 87s job. The Ju 87 was so effective in close support because the formations were in very close contact with Luftwaffe officers on the Ground traveling with the troops in vehicles (sometimes 1/2 tracks) using radios. Large panels laid out on the ground were sometimes used. There was a reason that a lot of those old two seat bombers carried two men, and it wasn't all the dire need of a single machine gun out the back. The rear seater was the radio operator in the days when radios weren't that good.

If you have enough materials for 2500 of these aircraft for Poland, you have enough material (engines/ props, etc) for an extra 1000 Do 17 bombers.
An extra 1000 Do 17s in 1939-40 would have made a huge difference in Poland, the Battle of France and in the BoB and in the Balkans and the Med and North Africa.

Keeping the Hs 123 around for a while longer might have been a good idea but it was always going to be a niche aircraft.

 

[NevadaK]

Seeing how helicopters were used post-WW2 and how the HS123 functioned as a CAS aircraft it seems as though it could have been the equivalent of a WW2 attack helicopter. So what if the Luftwaffe got over its obsession with having the latest and greatest dive bomber and instead focused on mass producing thousands of Hs123 C's and used them as helicopter equivalents? This would mean no HS129 and the Ju87 is limited to specialist heavy dive bombing missions. The goal would be to imbed 40 Hs123C's per panzer and motorized division, while every infantry corps would have a 40 aircraft support unit. How would this impact the course of the war or even just Barbarossa in 1941? Remember IOTL in 1941 the Luftwaffe fielded fewer aircraft than during the invasion of France in 1940, so this would see them having air support that would far exceed OTL 1941 if they hit the TOE I mentioned. It would be CAS more than operational interdiction, but the number of twin engine bombers wouldn't be impacted.

Sorry, accidentally posted

 

[tomo pauk]

If you have enough materials for 2500 of these aircraft for Poland, you have enough material (engines/ props, etc) for an extra 1000 Do 17 bombers.
An extra 1000 Do 17s in 1939-40 would have made a huge difference in Poland, the Battle of France and in the BoB and in the Balkans and the Med and North Africa.

There is also a question of finding the required number of pilots - extra 1000-1500 trained pilots was a huge number in any 'slice' of the ww2 we look at.

 

[wiking85]

There is also a question of finding the required number of pilots - extra 1000-1500 trained pilots was a huge number in any 'slice' of the ww2 we look at.

How hard do you think it is to train biplane pilots? It is the same as the basic trainer that basic flight training is conducted on. You could easily turn out a competent pilot in 100 hours pre-war rather than the 400 or so hours that a mono-wing single engine fighter or twin engine aircraft required (shortened to 250-200 hours during the war, less after 1943). Really not that hard since you could speed up training by not having to do more advanced, complicated training. They could even use marginal quality manpower for it, since those pilot would be viewed as more easily replaced and likely to suffer higher casualty rates. Though judging by how many of the handful of 1940 Hs123s were still flying in 1944 the loss rates were shockingly low. Of course the more of them that there are the higher the loss rates would be.

All this said, if for the sake of argument we accepted my premise, how would that impact the fighting in 1941 and beyond? Having thousands of dedicated CAS aircraft (which would also remove the need for twin engines to conduct CAS missions which increasingly sapped the Luftwaffe bomber force in the east) embedded in divisions and corps rather than having a totally separate command structure would be a major boon.

 

[tomo pauk]

How hard do you think it is to train biplane pilots? It is the same as the basic trainer that basic flight training is conducted on. You could easily turn out a competent pilot in 100 hours pre-war rather than the 400 or so hours that a mono-wing single engine fighter or twin engine aircraft required (shortened to 250-200 hours during the war, less after 1943). Really not that hard since you could speed up training by not having to do more advanced, complicated training. They could even use marginal quality manpower for it, since those pilot would be viewed as more easily replaced and likely to suffer higher casualty rates. Though judging by how many of the handful of 1940 Hs123s were still flying in 1944 the loss rates were shockingly low. Of course the more of them that there are the higher the loss rates would be.

Burning through the manpower like there is no tomorrow was not Germany's cup of tea. LW would've still wanted that those pilots actually hit the things they are ordered to do, to avoid enemy AA assets and fighters, and to land on less than ideal strips.

All this said, if for the sake of argument we accepted my premise, how would that impact the fighting in 1941 and beyond? Having thousands of dedicated CAS aircraft (which would also remove the need for twin engines to conduct CAS missions which increasingly sapped the Luftwaffe bomber force in the east) embedded in divisions and corps rather than having a totally separate command structure would be a major boon.

If Germany has enough of pilots, bombs and fuel to field a few extra thousands of CAS aircraft, then they are in a better spot. It is a big 'if', however.

 

[Shortround6]

There are several confused time lines here.
In 1936, when the Hs 123 was first delivered to the Luftwaffe the first Bf 109B-1 had not been delivered to a fighter squadron.
Not all biplanes are easy to fly. The Hs 123 used an 880hp engine, the 109 used a 600hp engine in the early B-0 versions and it wasn't until the B-1 showed up that it had 680hp for take-off.
Just because your German student pilot has flown a Bucker Bu 133 for few hours

with it's 160hp engine and 134mph top speed does not mean that they are ready to fly combat in an 880hp dive bomber
anymore than the 100 hour pilot in a DH Moth was ready to fly combat in a Gladiator.

The first 5 Hs 123s sent to Spain did very well, however they also identified a lot of the shortcomings of close air support.
Short comings that existed regardless of the aircraft used and would be found out in all air forces.
Things like no ground to air radios. Or any effective signaling (flares, smoke, fabric panels staked out on the ground).
The Luftwaffe also did an about face and on Nov 1st 1938 they disbanded the Schlachtflieger.
Ju 87 were used not for close support but for pin point attacks on targets just behind the actual front lines.
A subtle distinction but an important one as it governed which level of command was responsible for ordering and co-ordinating attacks. It also affects the line/s of communication.
The Germans did come back to the close support by 1939/40 but they Ju-87 offered a greater war load and/or better range (more flexibility).

Maybe the Germans should have kept the Hs 123 in production as a supplement, But it could not do a lot of the jobs that the Ju-87 did or the jobs than the Do-17 did.
And you need a fully trained pilot, not a low time barely competent pilot.
You can't Stick an 800-900hp R-1820 on a Stearman and expect you low time pilots to fly it.

 

[yulzari]

I have no idea of the requirements for agricultural spray aeroplane pilots but that would be some guide to the training I would imagine.
The force effect multiplier would be real time contact with the shlacht units and front line radio contacts with them in the air and practiced marking or indicating drills by the ground troops.
As ever one needs the whole package of a system for real effect.

 

[Shortround6]

I have no idea of the requirements for agricultural spray aeroplane pilots but that would be some guide to the training I would imagine.
The force effect multiplier would be real time contact with the shlacht units and front line radio contacts with them in the air and practiced marking or indicating drills by the ground troops.
As ever one needs the whole package of a system for real effect.

Quite true.

Air power has partially replaced artillery. If you wanted massed close air support in 1939, it might have come at the cost of the Artillery branch. But Artillery was 24 hour, 7 days a week and 365 days a year. Support aircraft in WW II were not. They were useful, but they were limited.
And the two forces sometimes competed for the same resources.
In Germany at around 1940 (?) they stopped making 10kg bombs (or at least forged bomb bodies) for the Luftwaffe because that source had been turned over to artillery shell production. Turns out that the 10kg bombs were rather useful in cluster bombs but since the production facility was not longer available.......................................

 

[wiking85]

There are several confused time lines here.
In 1936, when the Hs 123 was first delivered to the Luftwaffe the first Bf 109B-1 had not been delivered to a fighter squadron.
Not all biplanes are easy to fly. The Hs 123 used an 880hp engine, the 109 used a 600hp engine in the early B-0 versions and it wasn't until the B-1 showed up that it had 680hp for take-off.
Just because your German student pilot has flown a Bucker Bu 133 for few hours

with it's 160hp engine and 134mph top speed does not mean that they are ready to fly combat in an 880hp dive bomber
anymore than the 100 hour pilot in a DH Moth was ready to fly combat in a Gladiator.

The first 5 Hs 123s sent to Spain did very well, however they also identified a lot of the shortcomings of close air support.
Short comings that existed regardless of the aircraft used and would be found out in all air forces.
Things like no ground to air radios. Or any effective signaling (flares, smoke, fabric panels staked out on the ground).
The Luftwaffe also did an about face and on Nov 1st 1938 they disbanded the Schlachtflieger.
Ju 87 were used not for close support but for pin point attacks on targets just behind the actual front lines.
A subtle distinction but an important one as it governed which level of command was responsible for ordering and co-ordinating attacks. It also affects the line/s of communication.
The Germans did come back to the close support by 1939/40 but they Ju-87 offered a greater war load and/or better range (more flexibility).

Maybe the Germans should have kept the Hs 123 in production as a supplement, But it could not do a lot of the jobs that the Ju-87 did or the jobs than the Do-17 did.
And you need a fully trained pilot, not a low time barely competent pilot.
You can't Stick an 800-900hp R-1820 on a Stearman and expect you low time pilots to fly it.

880hp was the take off power for late model engines. The 1936 version was less than that and 500hp was the normal operating HP.

Also your comments about the Schlachtflieger being disbanded is odd, because the HS123 was used in Poland, France, and Russia in the CAS role: Henschel Hs 123 - Wikipedia
What was disbanded was the one wing of Hs123's sent to Spain because the Ju87 was ready and replaced it and that was a diver bomber wing; the Schlachtflieger were created from the 40 remaining in German service by 1939. I'm positing a TL in which the Ju87 is used for a different role than the Hs123 and both are used for different things.

Not only that, but the HS129 was developed starting in 1937 based on experience in Spain: Henschel Hs 129 - Wikipedia

Yes I'm aware of how the Ju87 was conceived up, but in practice it mainly did CAS work even in 1939-41. The Ju87 could be retained for pinpoint tactical/operational attacks, but the lighter aircraft could be the 'maid of all work' and take over the CAS mission to free up the more advanced aircraft for its other missions.

 

[wiking85]

Quite true.

Air power has partially replaced artillery. If you wanted massed close air support in 1939, it might have come at the cost of the Artillery branch. But Artillery was 24 hour, 7 days a week and 365 days a year. Support aircraft in WW II were not. They were useful, but they were limited.
And the two forces sometimes competed for the same resources.
In Germany at around 1940 (?) they stopped making 10kg bombs (or at least forged bomb bodies) for the Luftwaffe because that source had been turned over to artillery shell production. Turns out that the 10kg bombs were rather useful in cluster bombs but since the production facility was not longer available.......................................

Not sure why that would matter as the HS123 used several 50kg bombs and could mount a 250kg one centerline. Probably could have rigged up a cluster mount for 4x 50kg bombs on the centerline mount if desired as well. Interestingly I found a 1970s paper from the USAF that argued something like the HS123 was ideal for CAS based on Vietnam war experience.

 

[wiking85]

Burning through the manpower like there is no tomorrow was not Germany's cup of tea. LW would've still wanted that those pilots actually hit the things they are ordered to do, to avoid enemy AA assets and fighters, and to land on less than ideal strips.


If Germany has enough of pilots, bombs and fuel to field a few extra thousands of CAS aircraft, then they are in a better spot. It is a big 'if', however.

So you're just not going to try to engage with the question in any serious way? I was asking you for a serious answer not 'well, they're in a better spot'. What does that functionally mean?

 

[tomo pauk]

So you're just not going to try to engage with the question in any serious way? I was asking you for a serious answer not 'well, they're in a better spot'. What does that functionally mean?

If I'm getting your idea right, it suggests a scenario where Germany has a few thousand aircraft more already against Poland and France, obviously with a few thousands of pilots extra. It does not take a genius to conclude that they steamlroll these countries in an even greater fashion.

From where the extra thousands of aircraft and pilots required will come from is a major question for your scenario, though.

Not sure why that would matter as the HS123 used several 50kg bombs and could mount a 250kg one centerline.

Drink is on me if someone can provide a photo of a Hs 123 with a 250 kg bomb under the centreline and 4x50 kg bombs under the wings.

 

[GTX]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_X48Sw9dqI

 

[SaparotRob]

If someone hadn't put that up by now, I was going to.

 

[wiking85]

If I'm getting your idea right, it suggests a scenario where Germany has a few thousand aircraft more already against Poland and France, obviously with a few thousands of pilots extra. It does not take a genius to conclude that they steamlroll these countries in an even greater fashion.

From where the extra thousands of aircraft and pilots required will come from is a major question for your scenario, though.

I was more curious about Barbarossa and the aftermath.

Drink is on me if someone can provide a photo of a Hs 123 with a 250 kg bomb under the centreline and 4x50 kg bombs under the wings.

Just because the pictures were not taken doesn't mean it wasn't capable of it, as it is repeatedly listed as possible, but even 4 or 5x 50kg bombs plus 2x 20mm MGs is plenty for such a CAS aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

I was more curious about Barbarossa and the aftermath.

Just because the pictures were not taken doesn't mean it wasn't capable of it, as it is repeatedly listed as possible, but even 4 or 5x 50kg bombs plus 2x 20mm MGs is plenty for such a CAS aircraft.

I have series doubts about these armament lay outs.
The Paintings show a drop tank under the Fuselage.
I don't know if the drop tank was as heavy as a 250kg bomb.
The 20mm guns were supposed to go underwing, mounted on the bomb racks, so there is no 4-5lbs plus 20mm cannon.
We can also throw in a round of drinks for photo of the under wing 20mm guns? Models do not count
The often quoted "2 containers 92 4.4lb SC 2 anti-personnel bombs" also needs some clarification.

2 containers each of 92 4.4lb bombs or 2 containers totaling 92 4.4lb bombs?

Now 92 X 4.4lbs is 404.8lbs so we are in trouble already. For two big containers we are roughly double the capacity of the wing racks.
Then we get into weeds. There was no container for 92 4.4lb bombs. There was a container for 144 bombs (and that weighed 280kg).
It was also about 1.6 meters long and 373-381mm in diameter.
There were several smaller containers and the most likely was the Abwurfbehalter AB-23
This was 1,105mm long and 203mm in diameter. Weighed 14kg empty and 60kg full and held 23 SD-2 2kg (4.4lb) bombs. They fit on the ETC-50 racks.
We get the 92 bomb total but with 4 containers. This was introduced in the beginning of 1942.
There was also the Abwurfbehalter AB-70 that could hold 23 of the SD-2 bombs, it could also hold 50 SD-1 bombs (mostly modified 50mm mortar rounds)
There are a few other containers but they hold either 22 or 24 bombs each and resemble two parallel tubes that split open rather than more conventional enclosed container.

Now you can put the same loads under a Fw 189, or under a number of other aircraft.

More could have been done with Hs 123 but the current armament descriptions are seem mixed up.

 

[nuuumannn]

So what if the Luftwaffe got over its obsession with having the latest and greatest dive bomber and instead focused on mass producing thousands of Hs123 C's and used them as helicopter equivalents? This would mean no HS129 and the Ju87 is limited to specialist heavy dive bombing missions.

There is a serious degree of memory telescoping going on here. Helicopters were not perceived as ground attack aircraft, certainly not in 1939 through to 1942, which then brings us to the fact that between the end of production of this aircraft and when a potential need for a cheap, affordable low maintenance attack aircraft is actually required, a lot happens that renders the Hs 123 obsolete.

Firstly, the Ju 87. It is superior to the Hs 123 simply because it has two crew, radio, better radius of action, heavier bomb load and is available in numbers. Sure, it is a dive bomber, but it is a more versatile airframe; the Hs 123 is far too lacking in capability. Not only that Bf 109s and Bf 110s were used as jabos during the Battle of Britain and in North Africa and the Med, and they were designed as fighters, the Bf 110 a multi-role aircraft.

Bear in mind that during the Battle of Britain the Ju 87's low performance in a enemy fighter heavy environment led to such high losses to the extent that the LW decided to withdraw it from the theatre. It is worth noting that the Hs 123 was not employed during the Battle of Britain because of its low performance, which provides another good reason not to keep it in production. The arrival of the Ju 87D is another reason why the Hs 123 is not necessary.

The Germans had aircraft that were fulfilling the ground attack/CAS role in the Bf 110, Ju 87 and the Bf 109, followed by the Fw 190F and Gs, all of which were better uses of production materials as alternatives to keeping the Hs 123 in production. If I can remember, other types, such as the Fw 189 and Bu 181 were employed as low rent strike airtcraft, which certainly the Hs 123 could have been used for, but to keep it into production for that long, when the need for these aircraft arose is just a waste of resources.