Non-turbo P-38 is also series-produced

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Between 900 and 3120 ft, depending on the head wind, elevation, type of material for the runaway, and temperature.
With a similar load the non- turbo plane is going to have a bit longer field length.
Without the turbos the plane will be a little lighter to help balance that out.
I get your points.
My point is that engines from the P-40 will still make the non-turbo P-38 a very useful aircraft.
It would quite useful, just not as useful as a P-38.
However if the turbos are not the problem why build it?
Even if it does 90% of what you want (mission types) the cost of manufacturing is going to be much closer, the cost of pilot and ground crew training is going to be nearly the same, the cost of shipping (they didn't fly that many P-38s to Europe let alone anywhere else) is going to be the same. The logistics tail is going to be with a few percent but you don't get the return on the investment with results, different missions.
And on the flip side, What will the SoB (Short of Breath) P-38 do that two P-40s won't do?
Granted they would have more range.
 
It would quite useful, just not as useful as a P-38.
However if the turbos are not the problem why build it?
Even if it does 90% of what you want (mission types) the cost of manufacturing is going to be much closer, the cost of pilot and ground crew training is going to be nearly the same, the cost of shipping (they didn't fly that many P-38s to Europe let alone anywhere else) is going to be the same. The logistics tail is going to be with a few percent but you don't get the return on the investment with results, different missions.
And on the flip side, What will the SoB (Short of Breath) P-38 do that two P-40s won't do?
Granted they would have more range.

The last sentence pretty much covers it - the (long) range matters.
Allies were hard pressed to have the long-range fighters anywhere, especially in Asia/Pacific, so here the long-range fighter will come in handy. Gen Kenney was pretty much angered due to the range deficiencies of the P-40, let alone P-39.
In the MTO, even the A-36 were tasked to provide the escort for the B-25s, so here again the need for a rangy fighter is evident.
The P-38 minus will be able to carry much more of bombs & rockets than a P-40 will be doing.
 
What time frame are we assuming.
If its early enough to truly make a difference I see a few problems.
1. In the early part of the war the P-38 is behaving as the world's largest lawn dart and nobody knows why. It would take a very brave man to order a second production source, particularly if it means a cut back in other fighters which leads to point 2.
2. Does Allison have the capacity to supply enough engines to power all these additional P-38s? If not, you are losing 2 P-40s for every P-38. Worse the P-51 is the lowest of the low in USAAF priorities and I can imagine that the 500 A-36s are the sacrifice and the P-51B never gets off the ground. Which brings me to my third point.
3. If you want a non turbo low level fighter with excellent performance and long range the P-51 is the answer. For the same investment you can build twice as many and there are no critical flaws.
 
What time frame are we assuming.
If its early enough to truly make a difference I see a few problems.
1. In the early part of the war the P-38 is behaving as the world's largest lawn dart and nobody knows why. It would take a very brave man to order a second production source, particularly if it means a cut back in other fighters which leads to point 2.
2. Does Allison have the capacity to supply enough engines to power all these additional P-38s? If not, you are losing 2 P-40s for every P-38. Worse the P-51 is the lowest of the low in USAAF priorities and I can imagine that the 500 A-36s are the sacrifice and the P-51B never gets off the ground. Which brings me to my third point.
3. If you want a non turbo low level fighter with excellent performance and long range the P-51 is the answer. For the same investment you can build twice as many and there are no critical flaws.
1. Disagree about the P-38 being the 'world's largest lawn dart' in the early part of the war. There was barely any P-38 in service in the early part of the war, ie. before Operation Barbarossa.
2. I'm okay if Bell makes non-turbo P-38s instead of P-39s.
3. P-51 - exellent as it was - is not the topic here.
 
I . . . can't . . help . . myself . . . Merlin XX P-38!!!

There I said it . . . and I am not sorry!!


Seriously, while I think the P-40F/L was an improvement over the P-40E model, was it really enough of an improvement to justify the use of the Merlin XX being produced by Packard? IMO no.

Maybe the Merlin XX used for the P-40F/L could be diverted to the non-turbo P-38 program.
 
1. Disagree about the P-38 being the 'world's largest lawn dart' in the early part of the war. There was barely any P-38 in service in the early part of the war, ie. before Operation Barbarossa.
2. I'm okay if Bell makes non-turbo P-38s instead of P-39s.
3. P-51 - exellent as it was - is not the topic here.
It is often claimed that the P -38 was shortchanged by the failure to develop a second source for them.
The following is based on the book "Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World War II". As its title suggests, to dramatically expand aircraft production in a short space of time was not easy.
The book notes that there was a lot of competition for resources to build aircraft. For example, machine tools were a bottleneck. Also mentioned is lack of production know how, difficulties in dissemination of manufacturing information and finding competent managers.
The need to add second sources for fighters was crystallized by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Table 1 of this book shows that second sources for fighters were added shortly to the preqwar program shortly after the attack. I have excerpted the part of that table dealing with second sources for fighters.
View attachment 705515
Building up production of anything at the beginning of the US involvement in the war was difficult. It was somewhat of a zero-sum game but assuming unlimited resources are available we can use the P-47 program as guide. The book does mention the P-38 as being particularly difficult to build due to its crowded interior but the P-47 cost almost as much to build as a P-38, so I consider it a reasonable analog.
Also note that in Dec 1941 the problems of the P-38 diving uncontrollably were not understood at all and I reiterate that it would take a very brave man to invest in addition resources for the P-38 program at that time.
In 1942 Evansville built a grand total of 10 P47s. By the halfway through 1943 they reached the 300 mark and built their 1000th in December 1943. Given the time between acceptance by the Airforce and actual use in combat overseas the second source does not make an impact until late 1943 just in time for the P-38 to suffer its problems in the ETO. I would say the US dodged a bullet by second sourcing the P-47 in lieu of the P-38.
The book I am referencing is not readily available however the following book, which I believe I posted previously, is an excellent source as well:
 
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There is a lot of wailing and gnashing of teeth claiming that the P -38 was shortchanged by the failure to develop a second source for the P-38.

I will certainly not wail and gnash my teeth about the lack of the second source for the P-38s - instead, I'll just simply say that it would've been a very good add-on for the USAAF if there was the actual second source to be had.

The following is based on the book "Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World War II". As its title suggests to dramatically expand aircraft production in a couple of years was not easy.
The book notes that there was a lot of competition for resources. Machine tools for example were a bottleneck. Also mentioned is lack of production know how, difficulties in dissemination of manufacturing information and finding competent managers.
The need to add second sources for fighters was crystallized by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Table 1 of this book shows that second sources for fighters were added shortly to the program shortly after the attack. I have excerpted the part of that table dealing with second sources for fighters.
View attachment 705515
Building up production of anything at the beginning of the US involvement in the war was difficult. It was somewhat of a zero-sum game but assuming unlimited resources are available we can use the P-47 program as guide. The book does mention the P-38 as being particularly difficult to build due to its crowded interior but the P-47 cost almost as much to build as a P-38, so I consider it a reasonable analog.

I'm perfectly willing to have Bell making the P-38s, and accept having two P-38s for each P-39 not manufactured.

Also note that in Dec 1941 the problems of the P-38 diving uncontrollably were not understood at all and I reiterate that it would take a very brave man to invest in addition resources for the program

No extra bravery is needed to cancel the P-39 program once the XP-39 falls flat in Spring of 1939, and order P-38s from Bell in Summer of 1939.

Given the time between acceptance by the Airforce and actual use in combat overseas the second source does not make an impact until late 1943 just in time for the P-38 to suffer its problems in the ETO. I would say the US dodged a bullet by second sourcing the P-47 in lieu of the P-38.
You have me scratching my head trying to remember where I've suggested that P-38 should've gained the second source by cancelling the Evansville production of P-47s.
 
It is often claimed that the P -38 was shortchanged by the failure to develop a second source for them.
The following is based on the book "Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World War II". As its title suggests, to dramatically expand aircraft production in a short space of time was not easy.
The book notes that there was a lot of competition for resources to build aircraft. For example, machine tools were a bottleneck. Also mentioned is lack of production know how, difficulties in dissemination of manufacturing information and finding competent managers.
The need to add second sources for fighters was crystallized by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Table 1 of this book shows that second sources for fighters were added shortly to the preqwar program shortly after the attack. I have excerpted the part of that table dealing with second sources for fighters.
View attachment 705515
Building up production of anything at the beginning of the US involvement in the war was difficult. It was somewhat of a zero-sum game but assuming unlimited resources are available we can use the P-47 program as guide. The book does mention the P-38 as being particularly difficult to build due to its crowded interior but the P-47 cost almost as much to build as a P-38, so I consider it a reasonable analog.
Also note that in Dec 1941 the problems of the P-38 diving uncontrollably were not understood at all and I reiterate that it would take a very brave man to invest in addition resources for the P-38 program at that time.
In 1942 Evansville built a grand total of 10 P47s. By the halfway through 1943 they reached the 300 mark and built their 1000th in December 1943. Given the time between acceptance by the Airforce and actual use in combat overseas the second source does not make an impact until late 1943 just in time for the P-38 to suffer its problems in the ETO. I would say the US dodged a bullet by second sourcing the P-47 in lieu of the P-38.
The book I am referencing is not readily available however the following book, which I believe I posted previously, is an excellent source as well:
Heres the table
1675634637445.png
 
I will certainly not wail and gnash my teeth about the lack of the second source for the P-38s - instead, I'll just simply say that it would've been a very good add-on for the USAAF if there was the actual second source to be had.



I'm perfectly willing to have Bell making the P-38s, and accept having two P-38s for each P-39 not manufactured.



No extra bravery is needed to cancel the P-39 program once the XP-39 falls flat in Spring of 1939, and order P-38s from Bell in Summer of 1939.


You have me scratching my head trying to remember where I've suggested that P-38 should've gained the second source by cancelling the Evansville production of P-47s.
I didn't mean you were wailing and gnashing I meant that as a general comment. It is a common internet theme.

I would have Bell making P-40s. I think numbers were important in the early stages of the war. The P-40 was a well-developed design in comparison to both the P-38 and the P-39 at that point in time. Bell would have easier access to Curtis as they were in the same city.
 
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order P-38s from Bell in Summer of 1939.
This may not buy you much.

Bell in 1939 was a bunch dreamer design staff with a shop that built PBY wing panels under subcontract.
They had a contract for 13 YFM-1s signed in May of 1938 but the first wasn't delivered until Feb 1940, the last three were delivered in Oct 1940.
Many believe the Airacuda was a pre-war aircraft, the concept was but the execution was not.

Before 1940 they had built one XFM-1 and one XP-39. To be honest they were working on the YFM-1s through the fall and winter of 1939/40 but these were 13-14,000lb empty weight aircraft with a crew of five and were rather difficult to build.

This may be better than starting with a bare piece of land but not by a whole lot.
 
Couple of thoughts, it's evident that once any company, let's say North American for example, has a winning design, they really have to have the manufacturing capacity online to make an impact on the war in time.

Going from R Reluctant Poster table, it looks like up to a year before any Dallas built Mustang's would have made it to a combat theater, quite a lead time.

Also, I wouldn't malign Bell Aircraft too much, after all:

Bell X 1.png
 

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