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All good questions.What should be the production per, let's say', a quarter (= 3 months) after a quarter? How many should be produced; 'thousands' is pretty imprecise number.
Do we also got the pilots required?
Sorry, accidentally postedSeeing how helicopters were used post-WW2 and how the HS123 functioned as a CAS aircraft it seems as though it could have been the equivalent of a WW2 attack helicopter. So what if the Luftwaffe got over its obsession with having the latest and greatest dive bomber and instead focused on mass producing thousands of Hs123 C's and used them as helicopter equivalents? This would mean no HS129 and the Ju87 is limited to specialist heavy dive bombing missions. The goal would be to imbed 40 Hs123C's per panzer and motorized division, while every infantry corps would have a 40 aircraft support unit. How would this impact the course of the war or even just Barbarossa in 1941? Remember IOTL in 1941 the Luftwaffe fielded fewer aircraft than during the invasion of France in 1940, so this would see them having air support that would far exceed OTL 1941 if they hit the TOE I mentioned. It would be CAS more than operational interdiction, but the number of twin engine bombers wouldn't be impacted.
There is also a question of finding the required number of pilots - extra 1000-1500 trained pilots was a huge number in any 'slice' of the ww2 we look at.If you have enough materials for 2500 of these aircraft for Poland, you have enough material (engines/ props, etc) for an extra 1000 Do 17 bombers.
An extra 1000 Do 17s in 1939-40 would have made a huge difference in Poland, the Battle of France and in the BoB and in the Balkans and the Med and North Africa.
How hard do you think it is to train biplane pilots? It is the same as the basic trainer that basic flight training is conducted on. You could easily turn out a competent pilot in 100 hours pre-war rather than the 400 or so hours that a mono-wing single engine fighter or twin engine aircraft required (shortened to 250-200 hours during the war, less after 1943). Really not that hard since you could speed up training by not having to do more advanced, complicated training. They could even use marginal quality manpower for it, since those pilot would be viewed as more easily replaced and likely to suffer higher casualty rates. Though judging by how many of the handful of 1940 Hs123s were still flying in 1944 the loss rates were shockingly low. Of course the more of them that there are the higher the loss rates would be.There is also a question of finding the required number of pilots - extra 1000-1500 trained pilots was a huge number in any 'slice' of the ww2 we look at.
Burning through the manpower like there is no tomorrow was not Germany's cup of tea. LW would've still wanted that those pilots actually hit the things they are ordered to do, to avoid enemy AA assets and fighters, and to land on less than ideal strips.How hard do you think it is to train biplane pilots? It is the same as the basic trainer that basic flight training is conducted on. You could easily turn out a competent pilot in 100 hours pre-war rather than the 400 or so hours that a mono-wing single engine fighter or twin engine aircraft required (shortened to 250-200 hours during the war, less after 1943). Really not that hard since you could speed up training by not having to do more advanced, complicated training. They could even use marginal quality manpower for it, since those pilot would be viewed as more easily replaced and likely to suffer higher casualty rates. Though judging by how many of the handful of 1940 Hs123s were still flying in 1944 the loss rates were shockingly low. Of course the more of them that there are the higher the loss rates would be.
If Germany has enough of pilots, bombs and fuel to field a few extra thousands of CAS aircraft, then they are in a better spot. It is a big 'if', however.All this said, if for the sake of argument we accepted my premise, how would that impact the fighting in 1941 and beyond? Having thousands of dedicated CAS aircraft (which would also remove the need for twin engines to conduct CAS missions which increasingly sapped the Luftwaffe bomber force in the east) embedded in divisions and corps rather than having a totally separate command structure would be a major boon.
Quite true.I have no idea of the requirements for agricultural spray aeroplane pilots but that would be some guide to the training I would imagine.
The force effect multiplier would be real time contact with the shlacht units and front line radio contacts with them in the air and practiced marking or indicating drills by the ground troops.
As ever one needs the whole package of a system for real effect.
880hp was the take off power for late model engines. The 1936 version was less than that and 500hp was the normal operating HP.There are several confused time lines here.
In 1936, when the Hs 123 was first delivered to the Luftwaffe the first Bf 109B-1 had not been delivered to a fighter squadron.
Not all biplanes are easy to fly. The Hs 123 used an 880hp engine, the 109 used a 600hp engine in the early B-0 versions and it wasn't until the B-1 showed up that it had 680hp for take-off.
Just because your German student pilot has flown a Bucker Bu 133 for few hours
with it's 160hp engine and 134mph top speed does not mean that they are ready to fly combat in an 880hp dive bomber
anymore than the 100 hour pilot in a DH Moth was ready to fly combat in a Gladiator.
The first 5 Hs 123s sent to Spain did very well, however they also identified a lot of the shortcomings of close air support.
Short comings that existed regardless of the aircraft used and would be found out in all air forces.
Things like no ground to air radios. Or any effective signaling (flares, smoke, fabric panels staked out on the ground).
The Luftwaffe also did an about face and on Nov 1st 1938 they disbanded the Schlachtflieger.
Ju 87 were used not for close support but for pin point attacks on targets just behind the actual front lines.
A subtle distinction but an important one as it governed which level of command was responsible for ordering and co-ordinating attacks. It also affects the line/s of communication.
The Germans did come back to the close support by 1939/40 but they Ju-87 offered a greater war load and/or better range (more flexibility).
Maybe the Germans should have kept the Hs 123 in production as a supplement, But it could not do a lot of the jobs that the Ju-87 did or the jobs than the Do-17 did.
And you need a fully trained pilot, not a low time barely competent pilot.
You can't Stick an 800-900hp R-1820 on a Stearman and expect you low time pilots to fly it.
Not sure why that would matter as the HS123 used several 50kg bombs and could mount a 250kg one centerline. Probably could have rigged up a cluster mount for 4x 50kg bombs on the centerline mount if desired as well. Interestingly I found a 1970s paper from the USAF that argued something like the HS123 was ideal for CAS based on Vietnam war experience.Quite true.
Air power has partially replaced artillery. If you wanted massed close air support in 1939, it might have come at the cost of the Artillery branch. But Artillery was 24 hour, 7 days a week and 365 days a year. Support aircraft in WW II were not. They were useful, but they were limited.
And the two forces sometimes competed for the same resources.
In Germany at around 1940 (?) they stopped making 10kg bombs (or at least forged bomb bodies) for the Luftwaffe because that source had been turned over to artillery shell production. Turns out that the 10kg bombs were rather useful in cluster bombs but since the production facility was not longer available.......................................
So you're just not going to try to engage with the question in any serious way? I was asking you for a serious answer not 'well, they're in a better spot'. What does that functionally mean?Burning through the manpower like there is no tomorrow was not Germany's cup of tea. LW would've still wanted that those pilots actually hit the things they are ordered to do, to avoid enemy AA assets and fighters, and to land on less than ideal strips.
If Germany has enough of pilots, bombs and fuel to field a few extra thousands of CAS aircraft, then they are in a better spot. It is a big 'if', however.
If I'm getting your idea right, it suggests a scenario where Germany has a few thousand aircraft more already against Poland and France, obviously with a few thousands of pilots extra. It does not take a genius to conclude that they steamlroll these countries in an even greater fashion.So you're just not going to try to engage with the question in any serious way? I was asking you for a serious answer not 'well, they're in a better spot'. What does that functionally mean?
Not sure why that would matter as the HS123 used several 50kg bombs and could mount a 250kg one centerline.
I was more curious about Barbarossa and the aftermath.If I'm getting your idea right, it suggests a scenario where Germany has a few thousand aircraft more already against Poland and France, obviously with a few thousands of pilots extra. It does not take a genius to conclude that they steamlroll these countries in an even greater fashion.
From where the extra thousands of aircraft and pilots required will come from is a major question for your scenario, though.
Just because the pictures were not taken doesn't mean it wasn't capable of it, as it is repeatedly listed as possible, but even 4 or 5x 50kg bombs plus 2x 20mm MGs is plenty for such a CAS aircraft.Drink is on me if someone can provide a photo of a Hs 123 with a 250 kg bomb under the centreline and 4x50 kg bombs under the wings.
I have series doubts about these armament lay outs.I was more curious about Barbarossa and the aftermath.
Just because the pictures were not taken doesn't mean it wasn't capable of it, as it is repeatedly listed as possible, but even 4 or 5x 50kg bombs plus 2x 20mm MGs is plenty for such a CAS aircraft.
So what if the Luftwaffe got over its obsession with having the latest and greatest dive bomber and instead focused on mass producing thousands of Hs123 C's and used them as helicopter equivalents? This would mean no HS129 and the Ju87 is limited to specialist heavy dive bombing missions.