Me-110 Underrated

[tomo pauk]

Seems like Bf 110C (engine DB 601A) was good for 326 mph per some German data (link, link).
Loss of one Bf 110 was twice as 'painful' for Luftwaffe logistics as it will be a loss of one Bf 109. Or, if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109.

 

[Vincenzo]

Seems like Bf 110C (engine DB 601A) was good for 326 mph per some German data (link, link).
Loss of one Bf 110 was twice as 'painful' for Luftwaffe logistics as it will be a loss of one Bf 109. Or, if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109.

maybe i've in mind data for a late variant with DB 601N (P) or E (F), however 325 mph is not few, (this are for combat&climb power? this deutsch...)

 

[tomo pauk]

maybe i've in mind data for a late variant with DB 601N (P) or E (F), however 325 mph is not few, (this are for combat&climb power? this deutsch...)

See the data sheet. Max speed was attained on 2x1025 PS - best power at critical altitude.

 

[Kevin J]

IDK is the Bf 110 was underrated or overrated, but i know that it was a good fighter until 1941, they could fight with most of fighters they encountered, only v/s a very few it's in clear inferiority but is not hopeless. Take in the count the world was full of old fighters, some were 200s mph, and a 350 mph Bf 110 not need to dogfighting for get result, like as the US fighters in late war don't need dogfighting with the Zero and the Ki 43.

If you compare the Hurricane with the Me 110, they're fairly evenly matched. The Me 110 must boom and zoom, the Hurricane dogfight.

 

[John Vasco]

Or, if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109.

I'm still trying to find the logical premise path of this.

I fear I never will...

 

[tomo pauk]

I'm still trying to find the logical premise path of this.

I fear I never will...

It is really simple. You tell me what to post and I will post it.
Really simple, I'm telling you.

 

[Denniss]

Chart is marked as prelimnary
Speed is given for 5 min rated engine power
It's possible the chart is for the old DB 601A with 4km rated alt as the 4.5km is stated as "mit Stauerhöhung" (with rammed air effect).
A 4.5km-rated DB 601A on a Bf 110 would lead to max speed achieved at an alt above rated alt due to rating being with static air.

 

[tomo pauk]

Chart is marked as prelimnary
Speed is given for 5 min rated engine power
It's possible the chart is for the old DB 601A with 4km rated alt as the 4.5km is stated as "mit Stauerhöhung" (with rammed air effect).
A 4.5km-rated DB 601A on a Bf 110 would lead to max speed achieved at an alt above rated alt due to rating being with static air.

Thank you.
FWIW, Mankau & Petrick give 530 km/h for the Bf 110C, and, for the Bf 110F-2, 570 km/h (engine DB 601E).

 

[John Vasco]

It is really simple. You tell me what to post and I will post it.
Really simple, I'm telling you.

So, you lose a 109, you lose a pilot.
You lose a 110, you lose a pilot. You lose a Bordfunker as well.

Now, show me the mathmatical calculation that proves your theory of "...if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109...", when the consideration of the performance of an aircraft type versus another aircraft type is in how the two actually perform against laid-down criteria. Is it not? The VARIABLE is the quality and ability of the pilot.

As I posted previously, all four of the main fighters in the BoB battered the hell out of their opponents. The loss figures prove that. Furthermore, a damaged engine in a 109 usually meant they had to come down in England or risk ending up in the Channel. A damaged engine on a 110 meant on many occasions that the pilot got back to France on one good engine. I can provide you with examples if you wish...

 

[swampyankee]

I'm still trying to find the logical premise path of this.

I fear I never will...

I'm thinking it revolves around the fact that the Bf110 had twice as many engines and significantly greater empty weight than the Bf109.

 

[tomo pauk]

So, you lose a 109, you lose a pilot.
You lose a 110, you lose a pilot. You lose a Bordfunker as well.

Now, show me the mathmatical calculation that proves your theory of "...if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109...", when the consideration of the performance of an aircraft type versus another aircraft type is in how the two actually perform against laid-down criteria. Is it not? The VARIABLE is the quality and ability of the pilot.

As I posted previously, all four of the main fighters in the BoB battered the hell out of their opponents. The loss figures prove that. Furthermore, a damaged engine in a 109 usually meant they had to come down in England or risk ending up in the Channel. A damaged engine on a 110 meant on many occasions that the pilot got back to France on one good engine. I can provide you with examples if you wish...

A fellow member is right on the money in the post #310 - Germany/RLM invested twice the number of engines, cooling systems, propellers and raw pounds worth of airframes to make Bf 110 vs. how much they invested in Bf 109. It will took more to train a fighter pilot for a 2-engined aircraft than for a 1-engined aircraft. The 2-engined aircraft will use twice as much fuel than it will the 1-engined aircraft (provided about the same engines and similar aerodynamic properties). The undercarriage will be heavier & more expensive, the flight controls might require power boost; 4 fuel tanks vs one. German industry will have far heavier task to replace combat losses of the Bf 110s than it was the case for Bf 109s.
So if the return of investment for Bf 110s is not way, way better than what it was for the 1-engined fighters in use in the crucial air campaign of ww2 (BoB), the Bf 110 is a worse fighter than those.

Same day-fighter math applied to Japanese (Ki-45 vs. Ki-43), for the US once Merlin Mustang was in use vs. P-38 (even the P-47 started loosing the appeal), and for the British (Whirlwind vs. Hurricane and Spitfire).

 

[pbehn]

I posted this: "...Too little, too late? Are you sure?..."
Is the 13th July 1940 too late? That's when Erprobungsgruppe 210 carried out its first mission during the Battle of Britain. Too late - I don't understand what you mean. And of course, we are posting in English, given that it my first language.

The Me 110 wasn't batted out of the game. If you examine the losses of the Spitfire, Hurricane, Bf 109 and Bf 110, you will see that all four fighters battered the hell out of their opponents during the Battle. The losses of each ran into hundreds. Yet the 109 appears to get a 'free pass' despite the fact it got knocked down in massive numbers during the Battle. Truth be told, it was no more effective in protecting the Lw bombers than the 110. When you tie the 109 & 110, capable of 350 m.p.h., to close escort to bombers flying at around 200 m.p.h. (less into a headwind), while opposing fighters have no such speed constraint, those 109s and 110s are going to suffer losses they would otherwise not have had, had they been free to range ahead of the bombers at combat speed to intercept the intercepting RAF fighters.

I would suggest that the decisions of those higher up than unit level resulted in the Lw having no effect on the ultimate course of the Battle. 210's raids on the RDF stations on 12th August (when 3 were initially knocked out for some hours) should have been followed up with consistent attacks to wipe them out completely, but those higher up the chain decided not to do so. 210 was almost certainly the main protagonist in having Manston turned into an emergency landing ground by 24th August.

One can argue that whatever ANY LW unit did had no effect on the course of the Battle, for the simple reason that we won.

My post said too little, too late and I am sure! You cannot make one part of the expression bold and not the other. Yes they were there at the start, but what EPG 210 worked on had to be perfected and part of LW strategy before the battle started. By batted out of the game I meant it was proved uncompetitive with single engined fighters as a fighter. In total, its losses amounted to all its front line strength at the start, what was left in service represented what had been produced during the battle, substantially less than produced which is unsustainable. By the end Spitfire and Hurricane numbers were substantially more. If the Bf 110 was used as a precision ground attack weapon things may have been different. However "Erprobungsgruppe" has a clue in its name, it was a test unit ( from my knowledge of German where I worked but not in 1940), experimenting with a new use for the Bf110. To have a dramatic and game changing effect many or most Bf 110 should have been used that way. But then you must remove many units from the Battle of France with their kills and in the Battle of Britain with their kills because they were bombers. I agree they should have concentrated on the RADAR stations and they should have concentrated on airfields. Having Manston downgraded to an emergency field by late August sums up the issue, it was closer to LW airfields in France than it was to London, it should have been rendered inoperable in the first few days. From German intelligence they won. They eliminated the front line strength of the RAF during the battle but completely underestimated British production of fighters and pilots. Their lack of "intelligence" in the military sense also meant they successfully wrecked airfields that were nothing to do with defence, like coastal command fields a complete waste of effort.

All this is a "what if". The German military in all other battles had rolled up the opposition. Once you over run the first airfields, even if planes and pilots escape you have the spares ground crew and any plane that couldnt fly that day. Very quickly you have the opposition on the run and less and less effective. When the LW came up against the channel it was a different opponent and a different situation. They never really understood the role of RADAR, when they knocked some out and they were still intercepted they gave up trying. Did they not consider that they overlapped? Even their intelligence told them they did. To really knock a hole in it you need to take three out side by side along the coast and keep them out then the middle one is the hole.

I think the fall of France took everyone by surprise, most of all Germany. They hadnt considered at all what they would do or how they would attack UK because they didnt expect to be in that situation. They hadnt come across a defence system using RADAR as the basis for command and control, even when it was over they (or Goering) were pretty much unaware of what happened and how it happened.

 

[John Vasco]

tomo pauk,

1. You still haven't answered the query I raised against this: "...if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109..."

2. You have moved on to this: "...twice the number of engines, cooling systems, propellers and raw pounds worth of airframes..."

Doesn't fool me. Answer the original point I raised with you. If the 110 can't have a twice as favourable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter. Sorry, but that kind of logic is simply, fatally flawed, because you cannot prove it for a second.

And then you move on to production cost. Again, sorry, but what has production cost got to do with performance? The answer is 'nothing'. The two are not inter-dependent in any way.

"...So if the return of investment for Bf 110s is not way, way better than what it was for the 1-engined fighters in use in the crucial air campaign of ww2 (BoB), the Bf 110 is a worse fighter than those..." Again, you are simply making a statement with no proof to back up your assertion. You set investment against performance - there are so many variables that you cannot arrive at any logical conclusion.

As for training, well that is relative also. The pilots of 3./StG 77 who moved to 2./Erpr. Gr. 210 at the beginning of July 1940 went from flying the single-engined Ju 87 to flying the Bf 110 D fighter-bomber on 13th July on the first combat mission. Quite a swift conversion...

Oh, one final thing for you to consider:
Bf 109 losses in the BoB: 534,
Bf 110 losses in the BoB: 196.

 

[pbehn]

tomo pauk,

1. You still haven't answered the query I raised against this: "...if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109..."

2. You have moved on to this: "...twice the number of engines, cooling systems, propellers and raw pounds worth of airframes..."

Doesn't fool me. Answer the original point I raised with you. If the 110 can't have a twice as favourable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter. Sorry, but that kind of logic is simply, fatally flawed, because you cannot prove it for a second.

And then you move on to production cost. Again, sorry, but what has production cost got to do with performance? The answer is 'nothing'. The two are not inter-dependent in any way.

"...So if the return of investment for Bf 110s is not way, way better than what it was for the 1-engined fighters in use in the crucial air campaign of ww2 (BoB), the Bf 110 is a worse fighter than those..." Again, you are simply making a statement with no proof to back up your assertion. You set investment against performance - there are so many variables that you cannot arrive at any logical conclusion.

As for training, well that is relative also. The pilots of 3./StG 77 who moved to 2./Erpr. Gr. 210 at the beginning of July 1940 went from flying the single-engined Ju 87 to flying the Bf 110 D fighter-bomber on 13th July on the first combat mission. Quite a swift conversion...

Oh, one final thing for you to consider:
Bf 109 losses in the BoB: 534,
Bf 110 losses in the BoB: 196.

No Hurricane pilot was worried taking on a Bf 110 in combat 1 on 1.

 

[John Vasco]

My post said too little, too late and I am sure! You cannot make one part of the expression bold and not the other. Yes they were there at the start, but what EPG 210 worked on had to be perfected and part of LW strategy before the battle started. By batted out of the game I meant it was proved uncompetitive with single engined fighters as a fighter. In total, its losses amounted to all its front line strength at the start, what was left in service represented what had been produced during the battle, substantially less than produced which is unsustainable. By the end Spitfire and Hurricane numbers were substantially more. If the Bf 110 was used as a precision ground attack weapon things may have been different. However "Erprobungsgruppe" has a clue in its name, it was a test unit ( from my knowledge of German where I worked but not in 1940), experimenting with a new use for the Bf110. To have a dramatic and game changing effect many or most Bf 110 should have been used that way. But then you must remove many units from the Battle of France with their kills and in the Battle of Britain with their kills because they were bombers. I agree they should have concentrated on the RADAR stations and they should have concentrated on airfields. Having Manston downgraded to an emergency field by late August sums up the issue, it was closer to LW airfields in France than it was to London, it should have been rendered inoperable in the first few days. From German intelligence they won. They eliminated the front line strength of the RAF during the battle but completely underestimated British production of fighters and pilots. Their lack of "intelligence" in the military sense also meant they successfully wrecked airfields that were nothing to do with defence, like coastal command fields a complete waste of effort.

All this is a "what if". The German military in all other battles had rolled up the opposition. Once you over run the first airfields, even if planes and pilots escape you have the spares ground crew and any plane that couldnt fly that day. Very quickly you have the opposition on the run and less and less effective. When the LW came up against the channel it was a different opponent and a different situation. They never really understood the role of RADAR, when they knocked some out and they were still intercepted they gave up trying. Did they not consider that they overlapped? Even their intelligence told them they did. To really knock a hole in it you need to take three out side by side along the coast and keep them out then the middle one is the hole.

I think the fall of France took everyone by surprise, most of all Germany. They hadnt considered at all what they would do or how they would attack UK because they didnt expect to be in that situation. They hadnt come across a defence system using RADAR as the basis for command and control, even when it was over they (or Goering) were pretty much unaware of what happened and how it happened.

An excellent post, pbehn!
I'll answer some points.
First paragraph:
I highlighted too late because I was surprised at that, given 210 were already in action on 13th July.

Too little - yes as far as deploying far more Bf 110 units as fighter-bombers. But the concept was in its infancy. It was worked up at Rechlin, and Hauptmann Karl Valesi was seconded from Rechlin to the unit (3. Staffel) because of the work he had done on the Bf 109 E as a fighter-bomber there.

I'm not so sure of this: "...it was proved uncompetitive with single engined fighters as a fighter..." It knocked down its share in the Western Campaign in the Spring of 1940, and also in the Battle of Britain. That is not to say it didn't get knocked down in numbers itself, because it did, but as I pointed out, lossed for all four main fighters in the BoB ran into hundreds.

And yes, 'Erprobungsgruppe 210' was, as its name implies, a test unit. I believe the speed of the German victory caught the Luftwaffe High Command by surprise. From working up the Me 210, matters changed to the Bf 109 and Bf 110 as fighter-bombers. In transferring 1/.ZG 1 to 1./Erpr. Gr. 210, they took their Bf 110 C-6s with them (single 30 mm, cannon in place of the two 20 mm. cannon), and 1./Erpr. Gr. 210 did not get their first fighter-bombers until early August, with the first mission being flown as fighter-bombers on 11th August.

It is also a fact British aircraft production (and repair through the Civilian Repair Organisation [CRO]) totally out-performed German production.

And I agree it was a mistake to back off the RDF stations. The German High Command simply did not know the workings of the 'command and control' in place within RAF Fighter Command. But I believe the ordinary aircrews did. Edmund Ernst (1./Erpr. Gr. 210, PoW 6th September 1940) once said to me, in so many words 'Mr. Vasco, once we took off and headed over the Channel, we knew you were watching us. We knew young lads like us were climbing into fighters, taking off, and being guided on to us. It had happened too often for it to be coincidence. That fear in the pit of your stomach was always there'.

Second paragraph:
Yep, all other campaigns had been in support of the ground forces. Advancing and moving forward from base to base. Suddenly, a 'static' campaign, with no movement of a 'front'. Fighting on their own, not co-ordinating. On the other hand, we had our battle lines drawn, backed up by the then most modern defence system in the world.

 

[John Vasco]

No Hurricane pilot was worried taking on a Bf 110 in combat 1 on 1.

I don't know how you can say that unequivocally. One mistake and you were in front of two cannon and four MGs...

And Hurricane pilots were shot down by 110s. Check out information in the 'Battle of Britain Combat Archive' series (Red Kite) for examples.

 

[pbehn]

I don't know how you can say that unequivocally. One mistake and you were in front of two cannon and four MGs...

And Hurricane pilots were shot down by 110s. Check out information in the 'Battle of Britain Combat Archive' series (Red Kite) for examples.

I can say it because it is true. However most "kills" in the BoB were not fair fights, both sides were looking for a bounce or an ambush that was given to them by cunning, guile, experience, RADAR, planning or luck. No FW 190 pilot would want to be on the receiving end of a Mosquito fighter bombers 4 cannon and 4 Mgs but a competent experienced pilot would back themselves in an FW190. Statistically a Hurricane pilot will spot a Bf110 before he is spotted, it is lighter and has better rate of turn and climb and generally faster.

 

[Admiral Beez]

So, you lose a 109, you lose a pilot.
You lose a 110, you lose a pilot. You lose a Bordfunker as well.

Did the Germans consider a single seat, high performance Bf 110?

 

[swampyankee]

tomo pauk,

1. You still haven't answered the query I raised against this: "...if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109..."

2. You have moved on to this: "...twice the number of engines, cooling systems, propellers and raw pounds worth of airframes..."

Doesn't fool me. Answer the original point I raised with you. If the 110 can't have a twice as favourable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter. Sorry, but that kind of logic is simply, fatally flawed, because you cannot prove it for a second.

And then you move on to production cost. Again, sorry, but what has production cost got to do with performance? The answer is 'nothing'. The two are not inter-dependent in any way.

"...So if the return of investment for Bf 110s is not way, way better than what it was for the 1-engined fighters in use in the crucial air campaign of ww2 (BoB), the Bf 110 is a worse fighter than those..." Again, you are simply making a statement with no proof to back up your assertion. You set investment against performance - there are so many variables that you cannot arrive at any logical conclusion.

As for training, well that is relative also. The pilots of 3./StG 77 who moved to 2./Erpr. Gr. 210 at the beginning of July 1940 went from flying the single-engined Ju 87 to flying the Bf 110 D fighter-bomber on 13th July on the first combat mission. Quite a swift conversion...

Oh, one final thing for you to consider:
Bf 109 losses in the BoB: 534,
Bf 110 losses in the BoB: 196.

A sustained war will always involve, and likely center around, attrition, which will mean that the amount of resources required are critical. A Bf110 took approximately twice the amount of resources as did a Bf109, so the Luftwaffe could only afford half the loss rate of Bf110s vs Bf109s. Bluntly, this doesn't seem like a terribly complex logical sequence: if an aircraft requires twice the resources to produce it has either generate twice the exchange rate.

Your choice: 1000 Bf109s or 500 Bf110s. Which is likely to inflict more attrition on enemy fighter aircraft?

 

[Vincenzo]

in the cost-benefit analysis we need to count that somewhere you can have a 110 but not a 109, or you can have a 109 for X minutes or a 110 for Y minutes, you can attack/photograph that installations with a 110 but not with a 109, or the same installation with more weapon load. it is out of doubt that a two engine aircraft is more expansive to build and use in comparison with a single engine, if the engine are the same