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in the cost-benefit analysis we need to count that somewhere you can have a 110 but not a 109, or you can have a 109 for X minutes or a 110 for Y minutes, you can attack/photograph that installations with a 110 but not with a 109, or the same installation with more weapon load. it is out of doubt that a two engine aircraft is more expansive to build and use in comparison with a single engine, if the engine are the same
I can say it because it is true. However most "kills" in the BoB were not fair fights, both sides were looking for a bounce or an ambush that was given to them by cunning, guile, experience, RADAR, planning or luck. No FW 190 pilot would want to be on the receiving end of a Mosquito fighter bombers 4 cannon and 4 Mgs but a competent experienced pilot would back themselves in an FW190. Statistically a Hurricane pilot will spot a Bf110 before he is spotted, it is lighter and has better rate of turn and climb and generally faster.
1. A sustained war will always involve, and likely center around, attrition, which will mean that the amount of resources required are critical.
2. A Bf110 took approximately twice the amount of resources as did a Bf109, so the Luftwaffe could only afford half the loss rate of Bf110s vs Bf109s. Bluntly, this doesn't seem like a terribly complex logical sequence: if an aircraft requires twice the resources to produce it has either generate twice the exchange rate.
3. Your choice: 1000 Bf109s or 500 Bf110s. Which is likely to inflict more attrition on enemy fighter aircraft?
No Hurricane pilot was worried taking on a Bf 110 in combat 1 on 1.
Did the Germans consider a single seat, high performance Bf 110?
I can say it because it is true. However most "kills" in the BoB were not fair fights, both sides were looking for a bounce or an ambush that was given to them by cunning, guile, experience, RADAR, planning or luck. No FW 190 pilot would want to be on the receiving end of a Mosquito fighter bombers 4 cannon and 4 Mgs but a competent experienced pilot would back themselves in an FW190. Statistically a Hurricane pilot will spot a Bf110 before he is spotted, it is lighter and has better rate of turn and climb and generally faster.
1. Of course attrition is a factor. That is a 'given' is it not?
2 & 3. Battle of Britain loss rates (as posted previously):
Bf 109 losses in the BoB: 534,
Bf 110 losses in the BoB: 196.
I would suggest the exchange rate is in favour of the Bf 110, not the Bf 109.
.
A better example would be a breakdown of looses (and successes) compared to the number of aircraft involved both by numbers and sorties. Whilst better than an individual statistic, this is still less than perfect as the type of operation and its inherent risk is a significant and almost impossible factor to quantify.
tomo pauk,
1. You still haven't answered the query I raised against this: "...if the Bf 110 can't have a twice as favorable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter than Bf 109..."
2. You have moved on to this: "...twice the number of engines, cooling systems, propellers and raw pounds worth of airframes..."
Doesn't fool me. Answer the original point I raised with you. If the 110 can't have a twice as favourable exchange ratio as Bf 109 during the BoB, it's a worse fighter. Sorry, but that kind of logic is simply, fatally flawed, because you cannot prove it for a second.
And then you move on to production cost. Again, sorry, but what has production cost got to do with performance? The answer is 'nothing'. The two are not inter-dependent in any way.
"...So if the return of investment for Bf 110s is not way, way better than what it was for the 1-engined fighters in use in the crucial air campaign of ww2 (BoB), the Bf 110 is a worse fighter than those..." Again, you are simply making a statement with no proof to back up your assertion. You set investment against performance - there are so many variables that you cannot arrive at any logical conclusion.
As for training, well that is relative also. The pilots of 3./StG 77 who moved to 2./Erpr. Gr. 210 at the beginning of July 1940 went from flying the single-engined Ju 87 to flying the Bf 110 D fighter-bomber on 13th July on the first combat mission. Quite a swift conversion...
Oh, one final thing for you to consider:
Bf 109 losses in the BoB: 534,
Bf 110 losses in the BoB: 196.
So, you lose a 109, you lose a pilot.
You lose a 110, you lose a pilot. You lose a Bordfunker as well.
...
BTW - you also loose a rear gunner with a Bf 110.
the Bordfunker, is the radio operator and used also the rear MG
1. Pray tell, where in this thread's last few pages I used the word 'performance' when saying Bf 110 was a worse fighter (even it was not a performer)?
I was looking at Bf 110 vs. Bf 109 math from a RLM/LW point of view, not trying to win a bar bet in 21st century. RLM was investing the money/engines/fuel/worktime/etc. If the RLM/LW does not get far more from a given number of Bf 110s than it will get from the same number of Bf 109s, the Bf 109 is a better fighter in their eyes (or, Bf 110 is worse than Bf 109) - as proven by late 1940, when they curbed down production of Bf 110s, since it didn't lived up to the expectations and boosted production of Bf 109s.
2. I've arrived at a logical conclusion, so did the RLM.
3.Thank you.
4. Can we weight that against achievements, like number of actual kills, or vs. number of sorties or duration of sorties, or vs. enabling the bomber force to effectively attack British assets during the BoB while being covered by respective fighters?
5.
BTW - you also loose a rear gunner with a Bf 110.
1. You enter into discussion into the relative merits of the 109 v. the 110, and 'performance' does not come into it? Really? The whole ongoing discussion is about the relative performance merits. Or have you forgotten that?
And you introduce math (sic) into the equation. Were the Staff personnel, ground personnel and flying personnel considering the mathematics of every single thing they did, on the ground and in the air? Seriously? Come on, please don't obfuscate, and introduce matters that are only at best tangential to the matter being discussed.
And you say this: "...as proven by late 1940, when they curbed down production of Bf 110s, since it didn't lived up to the expectations..." I don't know where you got that information from, because here is the real information:
From Bf 110 B production to March 1941 - 1627 Bf 110s built.
From April 1941 to end of production - 4406 Bf 110s built.
(Source: Bf 110, Me 210, Me 410 by Heinz Mankau & Peter Petrick, pages 324-326)
I don't see nearly tripling production as 'curbing down'...
2. Ah, but this is what I repied to: "...So if the return of investment for Bf 110s is not way, way better than what it was for the 1-engined fighters in use in the crucial air campaign of ww2 (BoB), the Bf 110 is a worse fighter than those..." And I replied: "...Again, you are simply making a statement with no proof to back up your assertion. You set investment against performance - there are so many variables that you cannot arrive at any logical conclusion..." I repeat, your are making a statement with no proof. It is NOT a logical conclusion you arrive at. It is a financial opinion - no more, no less.
4.
Yes we can, from the latest research, as follows:
Spitfire: Claims - c560 Losses - 394 Ratio - 1.42:1
Hurricane: Claims - c715 Losses - 603 Ratio - 1.19:1
Bf 109: Claims - c760 Losses - 534 Ratio - 1.42:1
Bf 110: Claims - c290 Losses - 196 Ratio - 1.48:1
Given that overclaiming was pretty much the same on both sides, the Bf 110, with regards to claims-to-losses, fared no worse than the other three main fighters.
(Source of information: Christer Bergstrom - The Battle of Britain, an epic conflict revisited.)
5. The role of 'Bordfunker' encompassed both radio operator and rear gunner. It was only with the night-fighter variants with radar that the function was split, one manning the radar equipment, the other the rear gun, so it became a crew of three.
But RADAR planning and luck were too, Park tried to place his squadrons to get a bounce and to make sure they weren't caught climbing by the LW. The LW planned to catch the RAF by surprise and Bob Doe with a dead engine found himself descending through a German squadon so he opened fire and shot one down on his way though.What I have highlighted is true, from speaking to pilots on both sides. Many still have this romantic notion of 'duelling knights of the air', when in fact it was most times brutal, and as you describe. That is why, when tying fighters to close escort of far slower bombers, height and high speed were sacrificed. And also, on many occasions, pilots on both sides recounted (RAF Fighter Command pilots in their combat reports, and Lw fighter pilots in their interrogation reports) that suddenly their aircraft was hit and the only thing to do was to get out (in so many words). A classic case in point being Oberleutnant Gerhard Schöpfel of JG 26 shooting down four Hurricanes of 501 Squadron, moving in behind their formation and picking them off one-by-one without even being noticed.
I said 1 on 1 which was a very rare case in the BoB. Yes it had devastating armament but so did many aircraft, within a year the Hurricane had 4 x 20mm cannon but that wasnt enough to make it a competitive fighter.That is simply not true. The Bf 110 was a formidable opponent and any Hurricane pilot would be well aware of its devastating armament. I can give you examples of Hurricane pilots saying exactly that.
Once a Bf 110 headed back to France a Hurricane pilot had the added problem of trying to catch it. They often failed, again, plenty of examples.
Yes they did, there are few planes ever made that would survive 1 seconds worth of 4 cannon and 4 MGs but the only sensible course for a mosquito pilot would be to get out of there. unless you are against a novice or have some other conspicuous advantage your chances of getting that shot in are much less than his of hitting you.And FB VIs did shoot down some Fw 190s.
But RADAR planning and luck were too, Park tried to place his squadrons to get a bounce and to make sure they weren't caught climbing by the LW. The LW planned to catch the RAF by surprise and Bob Doe with a dead engine found himself descinging through a German squadon so he opened fire and shot one down on his way though.
Of course controllers don't get it right, it is known in warfare that things go FUBAR. But the same is true on both sides. The LW made some very well executed raids in the BoB on airfields of Coastal and Bomber command. They were also making raids and developing tactics that were based on the RAF being down to their last 50 aircraft (an exaggeration but things like that were said) They were making raids to deliver the knock out blow to an enemy that was numerically as strong as ever.I agree that RDF 'planning' had an important role to play, and luck also.
But controllers did not always get it right with the RDF information given to them. Witness the 12th August when Erprobungsgruppe 210 were over the Channel to attack the RDF sites, and control designated it as an 'X' raid. WHen control phoned one of the stations a few minutes later to ask what was happening, they were told 'Your X-raid is bombing us!'
Also 31st August when 85 Squadron were held on the ground at Croydon so long that they barely took off on time.
When the information was interpreted correctly, it gave our fighters a good chance to engage on equal terms, or better...
As for luck, I think it played a part for all those who came out the other end at the end of the war. I interviewed several who had gone the distance from start to finish, and all agreed luck had a part to play in their survival.