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michaelmaltby
Colonel
".... This is a good example of "What we thought impossible ..."
As is this. Putin the Bond villain.
Meanwhile .. in Red Square
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".... This is a good example of "What we thought impossible ..."
As is this. Putin the Bond villain.
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- #83
michaelmaltby
Colonel
This is reassuring and speaks to the political climate of the times:
Air Force Material Command Announces Plans To Keep A-10 Warthogs Flying 'Indefinitely'
This is the 'Sandy' of the next war ... and it will be nursed and nursed for survivability. Good thing.
Question: Can the canon handle other rounds besides the Depleted Uranium used for anti-armor ... perhaps an anti-personnel round?
Air Force Material Command Announces Plans To Keep A-10 Warthogs Flying 'Indefinitely'
This is the 'Sandy' of the next war ... and it will be nursed and nursed for survivability. Good thing.
Question: Can the canon handle other rounds besides the Depleted Uranium used for anti-armor ... perhaps an anti-personnel round?
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
This from an Estonia acquaintance:
Combating 'Hybrid Warfare' in Estonia
A failed communist takeover of Tallinn in 1924 contains valuable lessons for holding out against potential invaders.
by Prem Mahadevan 28 October 2016
There has been widespread speculation about whether the Estonian border city of Narva might someday see "little green men" appearing on its streets. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 has created a suspicion that frontier territories with a predominantly ethnic Russian population could soon be infiltrated by foreign troops in unmarked uniforms, who would engineer civil unrest, and eventually, irredentist movements. Narva, whose population is 82 percent ethnic Russian, is thought to be a likely target, given that an ethnic conflict in this spot would potentially expose NATO's difficulties in combating "deniable" aggression, front-ended by local proxies.
Reports from the ground suggest a mixed picture. Estonia's troubled history with its Russian minority is real, but the worst days seem to have passed. Those ethnic Russians who wished to leave did so – mostly between 1991 and 1996 (*1) – after which emigration rates fell substantially. According to foreign journalists who have been to Narva, the city's inhabitants now seem to put the local identity before the national one, whether Estonian or Russian. Some even see themselves as possibly having the best of both worlds.
At least one-third of the total population are Russian citizens with a legal residency status in Estonia, thus enjoying visa-free travel throughout Schengen Europe, and simultaneous access to business opportunities in theRodina (Mother Russia). They and their Estonian neighbors know that Russia, despite its international importance, only offers a more entertaining electronic media, but not a higher standard of living. In the absence of specific, inter-communal tension (as opposed to a more diffuse animosity toward some aspects of central government policy), there seems little chance of Narva becoming another Crimea or Donbas. And Estonian security officials know what to do in the event of foreign-sponsored insurrection. After all, their predecessors defeated one in 1924.
Little-known outside Estonia, the Moscow-backed 1 December 1924 uprising was a forerunner of the "hybrid" tactics used in Crimea 90 years later – with the exception that the number of local saboteurs and foreign agents was smaller, and Estonian counterintelligence was highly effective at disrupting their plans. The main instrument of subversion was the Estonian Communist Party, whose leaders were trained in Leningrad. They hoped to replicate the communist takeover of Georgia, which had occurred in February 1924 over a 13-day period. At that time, an uprising was launched by Georgian communists, who within 96 hours declared the formation of a revolutionary government, and appealed for military support from the Soviet Union. Such aid was immediately provided, and in less than two weeks, the Red Army occupied Tbilisi. It was assumed that a similar coup would produce identical results in Estonia.
According to a 1999 article in theBaltic Defence Review, Estonian officials knew beforehand most details about the planned uprising in 1924, except for the start date. However, they desisted from taking pre-emptive action against the plotters, because, once the coup took place, it would give them an excuse for a comprehensive crackdown on the Estonian Communist Party. Irrespective of whether this is an accurate interpretation of events, it's undoubtable that the insurrection was poorly planned and executed. Instead of the expected 2,000 insurgents striking government facilities across the country, only 279 persons actually took to arms in the capital city Tallinn. The majority of them were only told about a general insurrection a few hours before it began – a tribute to the siege mentality felt by the local communist leadership, the result of previous Estonian police operations.
In less than six hours, a quarter of the time the coup planners estimated necessary before asking Moscow to intervene, the revolt collapsed. Confused teams of saboteurs met unexpectedly stiff resistance at government buildings that they had been instructed to seize. Seeing their subordinates dither, the masterminds promptly fled to the Soviet Union.
Small wonder then that a top-ranking Estonian general recently observed that the most effective way to deal with any threat posed by "little green men" is to "shoot the first one to appear." As a small and prosperous state with a skilled workforce, Estonia offers few prospects for hostile agents to operate in a paramilitary role. This is because there is a smaller pool of manpower to fill the ranks of youth gangs within which foreign saboteurs can hide until activated (in Ukraine, such gangs played an ancillary role to the "green men" by disrupting public order during crucial moments of the takeover, thereby distracting the security response). But, as a sparsely populated country, Estonia also has limited capacity for resistance against a much stronger conventional opponent. Thus, the speed and decisiveness of a response are crucial.
The country has built a historical narrative that portrays the half-century of Soviet occupation in such a way that invading Russian soldiers can be sure of an unpleasant reception from civil defense militiamen. Even if occupying the entire country were not an objective, and a spate of civil unrest in Narva and a few other towns in eastern Estonia is all that plotters of a Crimea-type insurrection would hope for, it would still not make sense to trigger off public disturbances and then watch Estonian security forces arrest local "assets."
What the historical example of Estonia suggests is that levels of affection (or alienation) from the state as a political entity are objectively less important in determining a nation's capacity for resistance against a foreign threat. All that matters is to possess a vigilant security apparatus with extensive local surveillance networks, and a political leadership on the lookout for threats. Between them, these two attributes can ensure that any attempt to replicate the methods used in Crimea in March 2014 would meet the same fate as the Tallinn December 1924 uprising.
____________________
(*1) The occupying Russian troops withdrew from Estonian territory in 1994.
Combating 'Hybrid Warfare' in Estonia
A failed communist takeover of Tallinn in 1924 contains valuable lessons for holding out against potential invaders.
by Prem Mahadevan 28 October 2016
There has been widespread speculation about whether the Estonian border city of Narva might someday see "little green men" appearing on its streets. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 has created a suspicion that frontier territories with a predominantly ethnic Russian population could soon be infiltrated by foreign troops in unmarked uniforms, who would engineer civil unrest, and eventually, irredentist movements. Narva, whose population is 82 percent ethnic Russian, is thought to be a likely target, given that an ethnic conflict in this spot would potentially expose NATO's difficulties in combating "deniable" aggression, front-ended by local proxies.
Reports from the ground suggest a mixed picture. Estonia's troubled history with its Russian minority is real, but the worst days seem to have passed. Those ethnic Russians who wished to leave did so – mostly between 1991 and 1996 (*1) – after which emigration rates fell substantially. According to foreign journalists who have been to Narva, the city's inhabitants now seem to put the local identity before the national one, whether Estonian or Russian. Some even see themselves as possibly having the best of both worlds.
At least one-third of the total population are Russian citizens with a legal residency status in Estonia, thus enjoying visa-free travel throughout Schengen Europe, and simultaneous access to business opportunities in theRodina (Mother Russia). They and their Estonian neighbors know that Russia, despite its international importance, only offers a more entertaining electronic media, but not a higher standard of living. In the absence of specific, inter-communal tension (as opposed to a more diffuse animosity toward some aspects of central government policy), there seems little chance of Narva becoming another Crimea or Donbas. And Estonian security officials know what to do in the event of foreign-sponsored insurrection. After all, their predecessors defeated one in 1924.
Little-known outside Estonia, the Moscow-backed 1 December 1924 uprising was a forerunner of the "hybrid" tactics used in Crimea 90 years later – with the exception that the number of local saboteurs and foreign agents was smaller, and Estonian counterintelligence was highly effective at disrupting their plans. The main instrument of subversion was the Estonian Communist Party, whose leaders were trained in Leningrad. They hoped to replicate the communist takeover of Georgia, which had occurred in February 1924 over a 13-day period. At that time, an uprising was launched by Georgian communists, who within 96 hours declared the formation of a revolutionary government, and appealed for military support from the Soviet Union. Such aid was immediately provided, and in less than two weeks, the Red Army occupied Tbilisi. It was assumed that a similar coup would produce identical results in Estonia.
According to a 1999 article in theBaltic Defence Review, Estonian officials knew beforehand most details about the planned uprising in 1924, except for the start date. However, they desisted from taking pre-emptive action against the plotters, because, once the coup took place, it would give them an excuse for a comprehensive crackdown on the Estonian Communist Party. Irrespective of whether this is an accurate interpretation of events, it's undoubtable that the insurrection was poorly planned and executed. Instead of the expected 2,000 insurgents striking government facilities across the country, only 279 persons actually took to arms in the capital city Tallinn. The majority of them were only told about a general insurrection a few hours before it began – a tribute to the siege mentality felt by the local communist leadership, the result of previous Estonian police operations.
In less than six hours, a quarter of the time the coup planners estimated necessary before asking Moscow to intervene, the revolt collapsed. Confused teams of saboteurs met unexpectedly stiff resistance at government buildings that they had been instructed to seize. Seeing their subordinates dither, the masterminds promptly fled to the Soviet Union.
Small wonder then that a top-ranking Estonian general recently observed that the most effective way to deal with any threat posed by "little green men" is to "shoot the first one to appear." As a small and prosperous state with a skilled workforce, Estonia offers few prospects for hostile agents to operate in a paramilitary role. This is because there is a smaller pool of manpower to fill the ranks of youth gangs within which foreign saboteurs can hide until activated (in Ukraine, such gangs played an ancillary role to the "green men" by disrupting public order during crucial moments of the takeover, thereby distracting the security response). But, as a sparsely populated country, Estonia also has limited capacity for resistance against a much stronger conventional opponent. Thus, the speed and decisiveness of a response are crucial.
The country has built a historical narrative that portrays the half-century of Soviet occupation in such a way that invading Russian soldiers can be sure of an unpleasant reception from civil defense militiamen. Even if occupying the entire country were not an objective, and a spate of civil unrest in Narva and a few other towns in eastern Estonia is all that plotters of a Crimea-type insurrection would hope for, it would still not make sense to trigger off public disturbances and then watch Estonian security forces arrest local "assets."
What the historical example of Estonia suggests is that levels of affection (or alienation) from the state as a political entity are objectively less important in determining a nation's capacity for resistance against a foreign threat. All that matters is to possess a vigilant security apparatus with extensive local surveillance networks, and a political leadership on the lookout for threats. Between them, these two attributes can ensure that any attempt to replicate the methods used in Crimea in March 2014 would meet the same fate as the Tallinn December 1924 uprising.
____________________
(*1) The occupying Russian troops withdrew from Estonian territory in 1994.
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Funny how Russia claims that a defense shield is grounds for deploying offensive weapons.
That is like saying "well, they locked their doors, so it forced me to break into their house"...
That is like saying "well, they locked their doors, so it forced me to break into their house"...
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
I meant to answer this a while back and kept forgetting (a sure sign of old age, perhaps?)
Anyway, the ammunition types available for the GAU-8 are:
PGU-14/B API - Armor Piercing Incendiary. This is the Depleted Uranium round
PGU-13/B HEI - High Explosive Incendiary. This is one that's most often used against entrenched enemy personnel and soft targets and would be the best answer to your question - so yes.
PGU-15/B TP - Target Practice. While this isn't explosive, it would still rip any soft target to shreds - including bad guys.
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
Thanks GG for the follow-up 
Yes, Shin. I agree he needs $$$$. His lifestyle exceed his income.
Yes, Shin. I agree he needs $$$$. His lifestyle exceed his income.
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
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Old Wizard
2nd Lieutenant
vikingBerserker
Lieutenant General
Whoa
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michaelmaltby
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