I'm not so sure that it was stupidity in either case when you look in detail at the circumstances.
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I'm not so sure that it was stupidity in either case when you look in detail at the circumstances.To be fair the RN lost Courageous and Glorious to stupidity not bad luck.
AIUI from Admiralty documents, Britain was responsible for sourcing and supplying the engines for the Martlet II aircraft to Grumman for installation in the airframes they manufactured. It was only with the Lend Lease orders that Grumman began to supply the complete aircraft.None of the FAA Martlets got the 2 stage superchargers until the Martlet V.
The two speed supercharger version was single source, P & W only, not farmed out to Buick or Chevrolet.
Perhaps Grumman was the stumbling block after 1941, Until the last 3 months of 1941 P & W was delivering under 50 engines a month. In 1942 they were delivering over 100 and ended the year at 320 engines for Dec. They were building hundreds of the single stage engines per month.
Pretty hard to call it something else, over confidence certainly springs to mind and the gap between over confidence and stupidity may be a rather narrow.I'm not so sure that it was stupidity in either case when you look in detail at the circumstances.
It took GM (Eastern Aircraft) from Jan 1942 to Dec 1942 to deliver the first 23 F4Fs (FM1s). OTOH, the folding wing Seafire III was in production by early 1943.Did Britain look at license production of the folding Martlet? The Empire/Commonwealth built several US types, including Curtiss Hawks in India, Curtiss SB2C and PBY Catalinas in Canada, P-51 Mustangs in Australia.
Long Island, along with Copahee & Nassau served in the Pacific in 1942, but virtually all their time was spent training pilots or acting as a transport for USN and USAAF units deploying to the South Pacific.The USN also had the USS Long Island (AVG-1) operating in the Pacific during 1942.
In 1940-41 P & W could not supply enough engines with two stage superchargers, I don't know why that is, but the USN got 65 F4F-3A's with two speed (not two stage) superchargers just like the Martlet II & III got. Chances of British getting two stage superchargers in 1941? about zero.AIUI from Admiralty documents, Britain was responsible for sourcing and supplying the engines for the Martlet II aircraft to Grumman for installation in the airframes they manufactured. It was only with the Lend Lease orders that Grumman began to supply the complete aircraft.
She was attached to TF1, which was in the vicinity of Pearl and Midway early June.Long Island, along with Copahee & Nassau served in the Pacific in 1942, but virtually all their time was spent training pilots or acting as a transport for USN and USAAF units deploying to the South Pacific.
The folding wing of the Seafire III began with a request on 27 March 1942 and, as Supermarine were fully stretched with Spitfire production they produced the drawings while general Aircraft dealt with the practicalities. A mock up was available for inspection on 20 April 1942. The prototype IIc (MA970) was then modified between 2 Oct 1942 and 9 Nov 1942. While the first Mk.III came off the production line in April 1943 production was slow to build up. Numbers were 1,1,1,2,3,8, 17, 28, April-Nov 1943 from Westland with Cunliffe Owen contributing 1 in Oct & 1 in each of Nov & Dec. Delays were caused getting the new jigs and machine tools.OTOH, the folding wing Seafire III was in production by early 1943.
Yes but only from 5 June to 17 July according to DANFS.She was attached to TF1, which was in the vicinity of Pearl and Midway early June.
She was attached to TF1, which was in the vicinity of Pearl and Midway early June.
Followed by risking a battleship and battlecruiser, again with only 4 destroyers to go amphib hunting.Risking a fleet carrier with only 4 destroyers to go sub hunting seems a bit risky in hind sight.
They also ignored the near miss by U-39 on Ark Royal 3 days earlier. That should have a huge red flag.Pretty hard to call it something else, over confidence certainly springs to mind and the gap between over confidence and stupidity may be a rather narrow.
Risking a fleet carrier with only 4 destroyers to go sub hunting seems a bit risky in hind sight. Of course they had asdic so that solved the submarine problem, even with 2 destroyers detached cutting down to two close escort.
Flying off and landing all planes at once instead up rotating them in groups to keep constant air cover wasn't the brightest thing ever either. But that might have used up more more fuel (both aircraft and ship) and reduced endurance.
It also ignored History
HMS Cressy Hogue and Aboukir
Now in their case nobody really knew what submarines could do.
In the 1939 they knew, they just assumed that Asdic and planes would provide the answer.
Sometimes you just have to go with what you have. There was a dreadful shortage of destroyers in the IO throughout 1942. So many demands for them in Home Waters and the Med.Followed by risking a battleship and battlecruiser, again with only 4 destroyers to go amphib hunting.
True but there was also a dreadful shortage decent carriers, The Argus, Hermes and Eagle were not decent carriers no matter how historic or pretty they were.Sometimes you just have to go with what you have. There was a dreadful shortage of destroyers in the IO throughout 1942. So many demands for them in Home Waters and the Med.
HiThey also ignored the near miss by U-39 on Ark Royal 3 days earlier. That should have a huge red flag.
Officially in 1939 Argus wasn't a carrier but an auxiliary.True but there was also a dreadful shortage decent carriers, The Argus, Hermes and Eagle were not decent carriers no matter how historic or pretty they were.
that left 4 with the Illustrious 9-10 months away from completing.