Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

Thumpalumpacus said:

Without fighters for defense, you're going to see regular -- and perhaps daily -- B-24 raids. And with fighters, you're going to have to keep them flying, and that entails a logistics chain that would have further taxed their merchant fleet. It will be sailing in dangerous waters, too.

All that for an atoll they couldn't even use to hit Pearl with air attack. Midway only makes sense as bait, and that's exactly what Yamamoto planned to use it for.

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PH to Midway is ~1150nm* or 2300nm return. That's a long hop even for the B-24 and they'd be attacking without escort.

The USN used Midway as an advanced based for ASW, Recon, LR bombing and submarine resupply/refueling. It wasn't just bait. Simply denying it to the USN makes things a lot more difficult for the USN.

*Google Earth Midway to PH was 1135nm.

EDIT: looking at the SAC data for the B-24, 2300nm was right at the very limit of it's daylight bombing range, even with only a 1000lb bomb load.

Corespondingly, in japanese hands it could be used the same. there were supposed to be 36 Zeros and 27 G4M based on the island, plus the seaplanes (i need to look at the OOB to see how many, i think over 30?), plus some H6Ks. If they want they could easily stage atacks on PH with the new H8Ks, for nuisance if nothing else, and recce. IJN subs could use Midway as a springboard for ops around Hawaii. Recall the IJN subs were still deadly at this time.

Frankly i think the USN will move the heavy units out of PH, temporarily at least. I don't think they will chance a lucky hit on a carrier from a seaplane raid.

The IJN will also probably adance to islands immediately further down to set up at least some advanced seaplane bases, this within range of Midway based planes.
Conversely, initially at least how many B-24 raids are they going to be? How many were available in Hawaii? I looked at the raids on Wake and they were only a handful into 1943. And the US subs with their bad torpedoes are going to struggle in Midway waters, the IJN has the planes for ASW patrols, and i believe there were supposed to be some TBs as well? Plus midget subs.

I think the americans will take to build airfields on intermediate islands to at least get the B-17s within range, i believe they built an airfield at French Frigate Shoals, but not quite sure which other islands would be suitable (i did looked in the past at this subject and i think i've found some potentially suitable flat islands/atolls, but can't recall which ones now, Laysan, maybe Lisianski? they will be well within G4M bombing range though)

They could try the brute force method, ie send in the carriers and a landing force such as the one OTL used at Guadalcanal, but with about 5000 japanese defenders and US landing tactics still in their infancy, it will be a bloodbath like Tarawa, this on top of having lost the island in the first place in this scenario (if Nimitz doesn't fight - and i'm certain he will fight regardless of the CV ratio, but i'm going with the no fight premise for now- then he doesn't send the reinforcements to what looks like certain destruction, hence making it more likely for the IJN landing to succeed, especially if beefed up with the Aleutians troops).

Between the IJN aircraft and subs, the USN might lose some ships, even if a carrier is lost that's quite serious since KB still has all theirs. Plus the loss of several thousands US troops. Yes the IJN will lose the planes and the troops, though fewer planes compared to the OTL Midway disaster, while the garrison loss will be admitelly more than the 3000 sailors lost OTL, BUT KB is still largely intact with all those experienced crewmen not lost.

So Midway seems to have been a darned if you do, darned if you don't battle.

The US does some some advantages is a battle between Hawaii and Midway.
1 is that Kauai is a 30 mile island about 100 miles from Ford Island and offers both early warning radar site/s and airfield/s that little bit closer.

The US built 3 (?) airfields on intermediate Atolls during 1942-43 but it took time and engineering effort like dredging a filling in considerable area to do it. And Like Midway, there was no fresh water. Chances of the Japanese being able to build such airfields is about zero.

Tern Island in Sept 1943, they started in July 1942 and went operational in March of 1943. They expanded the the Island from 11 to 34 acres.

The US also expended a lot of effort to turn Midway into a submarine base.

A few years back I checked out Wiki for a picture of French Frigate Shoals. Tern Island looks like an aircraft carrier.

What about sending in the battleships?, What can/would the Japanese do if a force of heavy vessels sails for Midway and plasters it continuously for 12-24 hours until nothing is left?.

PAT303 said:

What about sending in the battleships?, What can/would the Japanese do if a force of heavy vessels sails for Midway and plasters it continuously for 12-24 hours until nothing is left?.

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Duck ?

PAT303 said:

What about sending in the battleships?, What can/would the Japanese do if a force of heavy vessels sails for Midway and plasters it continuously for 12-24 hours until nothing is left?.

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Historically the USN didn't have enough escorts to utilize their slower battleships until 1943 or so. I guess they could have used their fast battleships with suitable escorts but then they have to provide carrier support as well, and that means no Guadalcanal campaign.

The USN may have been short on carriers in '42, but they certainly were not short on Battleships or Cruisers.

So they could wait until the Japanese developed and manned Midway and then pulverised it, once the Battle wagons were on station nothing could take off or land, the cost in aircraft and crews would be total.

Shortround6 said:

The US does some some advantages is a battle between Hawaii and Midway.
1 is that Kauai is a 30 mile island about 100 miles from Ford Island and offers both early warning radar site/s and airfield/s that little bit closer.

The US built 3 (?) airfields on intermediate Atolls during 1942-43 but it took time and engineering effort like dredging a filling in considerable area to do it. And Like Midway, there was no fresh water. Chances of the Japanese being able to build such airfields is about zero.
View attachment 729257
Tern Island in Sept 1943, they started in July 1942 and went operational in March of 1943. They expanded the the Island from 11 to 34 acres.

The US also expended a lot of effort to turn Midway into a submarine base.

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The US Army acquired Barking Sands airfield on Kauai Island, then called Mana Airport, in 1940 and expanded it, including paving the runway, in 1941. IIRC it was the airfield furthest west in the Hawaiian Is chain in 1942 before you get to Midway.

4 LB-30 Liberator bombers (some sources say 5) were sent to Hawaii in mid-1942. They attempted to raid Wake Island via a refuelling stop on Midway on a handful of occasions in June/July 1942 but only one of these missions was successful (26 June). Long distance navigation over water proved to be a huge problem for inexperienced crews.

The 52 early LB-30 Liberators retained by the USAAF from undelivered British orders went to Panama, Java, Alaska (3 aircraft), Hawaii (4) or were retained for training or as transports in the US. The first B-24D models left the US at the end of May (HALPRO Det with 23 aircraft).

The next B-24s to arrive in Hawaii didn't arrive until Sept 1942, when the 90th BG (only formed in April) arrived to complete their training before flying on to Australia in Nov. They were replaced by the 307th BG, again newly formed, which stayed until Feb 1943. They flew some missions to Wake.

RCAFson said:

PH to Midway is ~1150nm* or 2300nm return. That's a long hop even for the B-24 and they'd be attacking without escort.

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Oahu is not the only air basing available in the Hawaiian islands.

RCAFson said:

The USN used Midway as an advanced based for ASW, Recon, LR bombing and submarine resupply/refueling. It wasn't just bait. Simply denying it to the USN makes things a lot more difficult for the USN.

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Nimitz didn't regard it so valuable as to be indispensable. I'll see if I might find his orders to Fletcher and Spruance. He didn't deem it so important as you seem to.

RCAFson said:

*Google Earth Midway to PH was 1135nm.

EDIT: looking at the SAC data for the B-24, 2300nm was right at the very limit of it's daylight bombing range, even with only a 1000lb bomb load.

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We had and/or could develop fields closer. There's also the whole "bombard it with cruisers and old battleships" thing, not to mention keeping subs around it. It would have been a nightmare for the Japanese to retain, and Nimitz knew that.

This is all pre-supposing the Japanese were actually able to take Midway island, hardly a given. If you read on the defenses in place and how the Japanese planned to attack, M mack8 is right, it would be a bloodbath. But it's the Japanese that would be getting the shit kicked out of them considering the Marine defenses and the topology of the two islands. Shattered Sword has a good speculative account in I think Appendix 5.

Also, there's no way the US is going to let Japan develop Midway into anything other than a resource sink of both manpower and material. Midway would sit at the end of a very long logistics chain for Japan, but is a quick hop from Pearl Harbor for the US. All the breathless positing that the US would pull out their carriers etc. is pure hogwash. By 1942 Hawaii was already too tough of a nut to crack for the IJN and the stray flying boat raid would have to be a golden BB considering the air assets and AA it would face.

Midway was Yamamoto's way of "luring" the "Cowering" American CV's out of their lair, totally misreading his enemy that was not only looking to engage but was virtually spoiling for a fight. Anything past that is pretty much a non-starter as Japan had no real way of developing Midway into anything more that an extremely forward (read vulnerable) airbase.

The USN would not withdraw from Pearl Harbor. That would be political suicide for all involved.
The US position at PH would be far far better than Japanese position could possibly at Midway. In the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack the US had 27 P-40s ready for action with another 30 damaged as well as 16 P-36s ready for action with another 19 damaged. Since then they have had 6 months to bring the forces on PH back to strength. In other words they already outnumber the Japanese by an order of magnitude. The Japanese also have to rebuild the facilities at Midway before they launch any worthwhile attacks on PH. It would be a few months before the Beattys could launch a raid in strength (strength is a relative term)

The other thing to note is that the US finally understood the value of radar and now had a fully functioning early warning system. The chances of the Japanese getting an unopposed strike in would be virtually nil. As we know the Japanese generally found out that a raid was underway when the first bomb exploded.

In the realm of logistics its no contest. The US has a well developed supply chain to Hawaii whereas the Japanese have to find the shipping to support Midway.

Add in the US ability to read Japanese's codes and it seems all the cards are in US hands

Reluctant Poster said:

It would be a few months before the Beattys could launch a raid in strength (strength is a relative term)

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Bettys would not be able to strike PH with any meaningful bombload. it's a 2200-mile round-trip not counting warm-up/take-off etc.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Oahu is not the only air basing available in the Hawaiian islands.

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True but as mentioned above the only existing airfield/s NW of Oahu was/were on Kauai which only gains about 100 miles. For the US this is huge as far as defense goes. For attacking Midway, not so much. Kauai gives the US about 30 minutes more notice of an incoming raid or forces a 100+ detour. This does not count ships acting as pickets. It also means that Kauai based fighters can pursue escaping enemy aircraft over 100 miles further than Oahu based fighters or the Oahu fighters can land on Kauai to refuel after pursuing the Japanese fighters.

The problem for both the US and the Japanese in trying to extend the chain of air bases it there really wasn't much suitable in between Kauai and Midway and most of the Islands/atolls were very small, ringed with reefs, sometimes less than 10 ft high, had no water, etc. The US did it but it took months and considerable engineering effort.

There were a couple of larger Islands, Laysan about 1000 acres and 808nm NW of Honolulu and Lisianski Island of about 384 acres and 905 nm NW of Honolulu. These might be more useful to the Japanese or at least are harder for the US to build on if Midway was in Japanese hands being within range of Japanese aircraft.

The two closest Islands to Kauai were pretty useless to both sides.

Necker Island 370nm from Honolulu and Nihoa which is bigger but just as rough.

The Japanese did try to bomb Pearl Harbor with H8K s without sucess.

GrauGeist said:

The USN may have been short on carriers in '42, but they certainly were not short on Battleships or Cruisers.

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They were short on destroyers right from the start, and the lack of destroyers kept many of the older battleships tied to the dock on the west coast, under the command of Admiral Pye. The USN was also short on cruisers which is why 2nd Guadalcanal was fought by 2 fast battleships and 4 destroyers.

RCAFson said:

They were short on destroyers right from the start, and the lack of destroyers kept many of the older battleships tied to the dock on the west coast, under the command of Admiral Pye. The USN was also short on cruisers which is why 2nd Guadalcanal was fought by 2 fast battleships and 4 destroyers.

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TF1 was not "tied to the dock", they were all over the West Coast and between Hawaii. TF1 was comprised of an Escort Carrier, five Battleships (or more) and at least five Destroyers.
TF1 also spoiled to get into the fight at Midway, too.

Peter Gunn said:

This is all pre-supposing the Japanese were actually able to take Midway island, hardly a given. If you read on the defenses in place and how the Japanese planned to attack, M mack8 is right, it would be a bloodbath. But it's the Japanese that would be getting the shit kicked out of them considering the Marine defenses and the topology of the two islands. Shattered Sword has a good speculative account in I think Appendix 5.

Also, there's no way the US is going to let Japan develop Midway into anything other than a resource sink of both manpower and material. Midway would sit at the end of a very long logistics chain for Japan, but is a quick hop from Pearl Harbor for the US. All the breathless positing that the US would pull out their carriers etc. is pure hogwash. By 1942 Hawaii was already too tough of a nut to crack for the IJN and the stray flying boat raid would have to be a golden BB considering the air assets and AA it would face.

Midway was Yamamoto's way of "luring" the "Cowering" American CV's out of their lair, totally misreading his enemy that was not only looking to engage but was virtually spoiling for a fight. Anything past that is pretty much a non-starter as Japan had no real way of developing Midway into anything more that an extremely forward (read vulnerable) airbase.

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Ultimately IJ was playing a losing hand; we all know this but the loss of Midway and one or more USN fleet carriers in June 1942, but with the IJN loosing one or even two would have delayed the Allied counteroffensive in the SW Pacific until Midway was retaken.

If we concentrate all the IJN carriers at Midway and the IJN use the extra aircraft to improve their recon, then it's quite possible that Midway could have been a resounding defeat for the USN despite their sigint advantages, and even the actual historical encounter could have turned into a draw, if IJN recon had been a bit more successful.

The Allied strategic position on 1 June 1942 was quite precarious; Malta was just holding on, the Axis armies were pushing rapidly towards Stalingrad and the Baku oil fields, and IO was up for grabs so the RN had to gamble in the IO by pulling out their carriers to try and resupply Malta.

GrauGeist said:

TF1 was not "tied to the dock", they were all over the West Coast and between Hawaii. TF1 was comprised of an Escort Carrier, five Battleships (or more) and at least five Destroyers.
TF1 also spoiled to get into the fight at Midway, too.

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But they were never committed to a combat zone because 'five' destroyers was an insufficient screen.