Midway with expanded Kido Butai? (1 Viewer)

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Look at USS Wasp. Torpedoes both released avgas and ruined the forward water mains, 5" shells exploding, so we have ordnance going off as well, but the aft mains were still working, the ship's command was intact, and DC parties sprang into action. Granted she's a smaller ship than Kaga, but toast all the same, even after Coral Sea lessons had begun to be absorbed. Good leadership and a broader American emphasis on DC still couldn't save her.
 
Not every ship can be saved and Wasp was hit by three torpedoes right on her avgas tanks and magazine area, about the worst place possible, the Japanese were fantastic fighters but their equipment had glass jaws.
 
Look at USS Wasp. Torpedoes both released avgas and ruined the forward water mains, 5" shells exploding, so we have ordnance going off as well, but the aft mains were still working, the ship's command was intact, and DC parties sprang into action. Granted she's a smaller ship than Kaga, but toast all the same, even after Coral Sea lessons had begun to be absorbed. Good leadership and a broader American emphasis on DC still couldn't save her.


USS WASP was a very small 'Treaty Carrier' which at the time of her build was accepted to be a very poor design with many omissions such as no armouring of the aviation fuel bunkers to keep her tonnage down to a 15,000 ton limit.
She was an exception that didn't prove the rule. US Carriers when not restricted by political contraints, were incredibly well found and tough ships. The Essex Class, a pre war design, proved capable of absorbing enormous punishment.
 
USS WASP was a very small 'Treaty Carrier' which at the time of her build was accepted to be a very poor design with many omissions such as no armouring of the aviation fuel bunkers to keep her tonnage down to a 15,000 ton limit.
She was an exception that didn't prove the rule. US Carriers when not restricted by political contraints, were incredibly well found and tough ships. The Essex Class, a pre war design, proved capable of absorbing enormous punishment.

Yes, thanks, I already made a caveat about her size making it an imperfect comparison. It doesn't change my point that under the circumstances, the Japanese losses at Midway were a matter of circumstances that even great DC couldn't overcome.
 
Yes, thanks, I already made a caveat about her size making it an imperfect comparison. It doesn't change my point that under the circumstances, the Japanese losses at Midway were a matter of circumstances that even great DC couldn't overcome.


A subsequent USN BoI concluded that WASP was perfectly saveable from the damage done by the torpedo hits. She was lost due to the uincontained aviation gasoline fire, a failing in the design that had been highlight at the time of her construction, and would be repeated in no other USN Fleet Carrier.

USS WASP was a one off with known and accepted poor design choices to meet a Treaty tonnage limit. The IJN however designed and built Fleet Carriers that made WASP seem like a paragon of design excellence.
The IJN paid scant interest to damage control, saving a lost ship was contrary to their code of Bushidio, fight or die, don't run away to live to fight another day. So you had ships designed with no protected, compartmentalised and isolated AVGAS storage, no means to isolate fuel lines, not enough fire mains to fight anything more than a minor hanger accident during their crazy doctrine of refuelling and arming their planes in the hanger spaces..
 
A subsequent USN BoI concluded that WASP was perfectly saveable from the damage done by the torpedo hits. She was lost due to the uincontained aviation gasoline fire, a failing in the design that had been highlight at the time of her construction, and would be repeated in no other USN Fleet Carrier.

USS WASP was a one off with known and accepted poor design choices to meet a Treaty tonnage limit. The IJN however designed and built Fleet Carriers that made WASP seem like a paragon of design excellence.
The IJN paid scant interest to damage control, saving a lost ship was contrary to their code of Bushidio, fight or die, don't run away to live to fight another day. So you had ships designed with no protected, compartmentalised and isolated AVGAS storage, no means to isolate fuel lines, not enough fire mains to fight anything more than a minor hanger accident during their crazy doctrine of refuelling and arming their planes in the hanger spaces..

Again, I'm not arguing that Japanese damage control was great. I have already pointed out my opinion that nothing could have saved the Japanese ships at Midway because of the timing and circumstances of the bombings. You put the exact same bombs in the exact same places with the Japanese air groups airborne, and I bet you'll see the carriers saved.
 
That is exactly the point, the flow of events conspired against the japanese to be caught at the worst possible moment, full of armed and fueled planes. But here's an angle, carrier's job was to launch dozens of planes filled with explosive fuel and ordnance, sooner or later they WILL be caught at that particuar time, it happened for the japanese at Midway, it happened for several US carriers later in the war. And don't forget details like Yorktown having armed and fuelled SBDs on board when bombed at noon (and narrowly avoided having them set on fire in the attack) . Also i believe at least Hornet (possibly Enterprise too) armed and fuelled it's planes (Ring's that returned) by about 13.10 but then sat on them for almost 3 hours. It's not clear if they were on the deck or they were in the hangars given that Hornet was launching and recovering CAP, the SBDs from Midway etc., but a potential japanese strike at this point might have caught it with armed and fueled planes on board too.

Secondly, about this angle some people take about how crappy IJN damage control was and how wonderful the USN one was, look at Lexington CV-2, that is a far better example than Wasp. By the same token, CV-2s damage control can be considered even crappier and inept than how is postulated to have been on the japanese carriers, the ship was good for 25kts, the crew was practically intact and the water mains was working, and they still lost it!

You can't even compare the situation on Kaga and Soryu in which the crew was practically massacred and decapitated in minutes, with very few able bodied men remaining to fight the fires. The situation on Akagi and Hiryu was a bit better regarding crew losses, again i rate these two as having the better chances of being saved that the first two, but in the end they decided to scuttle them which imo was a hasty decision, i don't know maybe Kurita's cruisers should have gone flank speed towards Nagumo to try to tow the carriers out of the combat area, though probably they need a BB to tow Akagi.

The point has been made about how it was a learning curve for both sides regarding damage control, so to deride the japanese for not knowing or acting according to something they haven't even encountered or learned, and keep comparing their 1942 DC with US 1944 DC, is beyond specious. Neither side has actually experienced a burning carrier until then, so how to deal with such was and the way each side prepared was just theoretical until the real test of combat, and both side experienced crippling losses as part of that. It is true that afterwards especially later war the USN was doing much better, but that wasn't quite the case in 1942.
 
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Exactly, without being caught will all their planes on board, most fully armed and fuelled, it's highly likely imo that NONE of the japanese carriers would have been sunk, or rather scuttled. At any rate, imo while Kaga and Soryu were beyond hope, probably scuttling Akagi and Hiryu was a rushed decision, but that's another subject.

I always found hypocritical that people keep comparing US 1944 DC with japanese 1942 DC, apart from Lexington probably Wasp can be given as an example too, torpedoes caused fuel fires which doomed the ship. And i recall reading how Parshall was mocking the japanese for trying to fight the fires on Kaga with bucket brigades from the latrines, well Hornet ended up pretty much the same, the vaunted US damage control was at some point reduced to bucket brigades too.

Conversely, if they would have scuttled Franklin in 1945 i don't think anyone could have faulted such a decision give how badly it was burning, the massive fires and explosions and the 800 dead it pretty much duplicated what happened to Kaga.
The USN evaluation of damage to the Franklin summed it up. The USN was able to save the Franklin because of its enormous superiority over the enemy in 1945. The USN had the resources to salvage it and there were no Japanese forces to dispute the area, which is why ships on both sides were scuttled in 1942. As noted the Franklin was literally saved by human sacrifice. I wonder how many would have lived if the looney toon captain (he court-martialed half the surviving crew) had made the decision to abandon ship.

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Yamamoto did not understand the principle of Schwerpunkt. The objective is the destroy the USN aircraft carriers and all resources should be devoted to that. If the USN carriers are destroyed the Aleutians can be taken at leisure.
The Aleutian force should have been used to directly support the invasion. I can think of no better use for the otherwise useless Fuso, Hyuga, Ise and Yamashiro than bombarding Midway. The airstrikes should have been conducted from all the junior carriers in close proximity to the island (I would even include the Hosho). When 14" shells are raining down it is a) very disruptive and b) the Marine air strikes would be devoted to the solving the immediate problem.
This solves the problem the Main Force faced in facing wave after wave of strikes and the whole rearming issue goes away.
 
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USS WASP was a very small 'Treaty Carrier' which at the time of her build was accepted to be a very poor design with many omissions such as no armouring of the aviation fuel bunkers to keep her tonnage down to a 15,000 ton limit.
She was an exception that didn't prove the rule. US Carriers when not restricted by political contraints, were incredibly well found and tough ships. The Essex Class, a pre war design, proved capable of absorbing enormous punishment.
The Soyru and the Hiyru were the same size as the Wasp and like the Wasp were compromised Treaty designs. If we are going to give the Wasp a free pass they get one too.
 
USS WASP was a very small 'Treaty Carrier' which at the time of her build was accepted to be a very poor design with many omissions such as no armouring of the aviation fuel bunkers to keep her tonnage down to a 15,000 ton limit.
She was an exception that didn't prove the rule. US Carriers when not restricted by political contraints, were incredibly well found and tough ships. The Essex Class, a pre war design, proved capable of absorbing enormous punishment.
The Wasp had about the same displacement as the late-war Commencement Bay class escort carriers. The Commencement Bay was rated for 35 aircraft. The Wasp theoretically could carry 84. I think that says something about the corners that had to be cut to carry so many aircraft.
 
The Wasp had about the same displacement as the late-war Commencement Bay class escort carriers. The Commencement Bay was rated for 35 aircraft. The Wasp theoretically could carry 84. I think that says something about the corners that had to be cut to carry so many aircraft.
What were the respective hangar dimensions of the Wasp and Commencment Bay?
 
That is exactly the point, the flow of events conspired against the japanese to be caught at the worst possible moment, full of armed and fueled planes. But here's an angle, carrier's job was to launch dozens of planes filled with explosive fuel and ordnance, sooner or later they WILL be caught at that particuar time, it happened for the japanese at Midway, it happened for several US carriers later in the war. And don't forget details like Yorktown having armed and fuelled SBDs on board when bombed at noon (and narrowly avoided having them set on fire in the attack) . Also i believe at least Hornet (possibly Enterprise too) armed and fuelled it's planes (Ring's that returned) by about 13.10 but then sat on them for almost 3 hours. It's not clear if they were on the deck or they were in the hangars given that Hornet was launching and recovering CAP, the SBDs from Midway etc., but a potential japanese strike at this point might have caught it with armed and fueled planes on board too.

Secondly, about this angle some people take about how crappy IJN damage control was and how wonderful the USN one was, look at Lexington CV-2, that is a far better example than Wasp. By the same token, CV-2s damage control can be considered even crappier and inept than how is postulated to have been on the japanese carriers, the ship was good for 25kts, the crew was practically intact and the water mains was working, and they still lost it!

You can't even compare the situation on Kaga and Soryu in which the crew was practically massacred and decapitated in minutes, with very few able bodied men remaining to fight the fires. The situation on Akagi and Hiryu was a bit better regarding crew losses, again i rate these two as having the better chances of being saved that the first two, but in the end they decided to scuttle them which imo was a hasty decision, i don't know maybe Kurita's cruisers should have gone flank speed towards Nagumo to try to tow the carriers out of the combat area, though probably they need a BB to tow Akagi.

The point has been made about how it was a learning curve for both sides regarding damage control, so to deride the japanese for not knowing or acting according to something they haven't even encountered or learned, and keep comparing their 1942 DC with US 1944 DC, is beyond specious. Neither side has actually experienced a burning carrier until then, so how to deal with such was and the way each side prepared was just theoretical until the real test of combat, and both side experienced crippling losses as part of that. It is true that afterwards especially later war the USN was doing much better, but that wasn't quite the case in 1942.

You've said it much better than my several attempts. Thank you.
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A significant design advantage US carriers enjoyed was their open hanger decks. Explosion and fire was vented, rather than contained.

Right -- but that can work both ways, as venting a fire can aggravate it too by providing more oxygen. It's how you vent and where the venting is carrying flames and smoke. The advantage US carriers had, imo, was that while the hangars were open, at least the Essex-class (I'm unsure of other classes) had roll-down sides to have the hangar either open or closed.

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Unrelated to your post, this vid from Drachinifel has food for thought on this topic:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iC6LN3U5ELk
 
The Admiralty spent much time on the open v closed hangar debate between 1943 and 1945 as part of the abortive Malta class design process. DK Brown, himself a naval architect, devoted 2 pages of his book Nelson to Vanguard on the pros and cons of each. At the end he summarised it as follows (with my emphasis):-

"Summary of advantages
Open Hangar. Good ventilation, easy to warm up planes, mount large strikes, side lifts, more planes.
Closed Hangar. Stronger, lighter hull. Much safer against fire, easy to armour, planes protected against weather and some enemy action."


On the subject of fire, at least so far as the RN was concerned, he noted:-

"Because of the fire on Ben-my-Chree [a WW1 seaplane carrier lost to a tinned petrol fire] when she was sunk, the RN was always very conscious of the fire hazard in the hangar (see also petrol storage). The closed hangar was separated from the rest of the ship by air locks and with the lifts up was reasonably airtight so there was insufficient oxygen to support a major fire....The hangar was then divided by fire curtains (usually three) so that an accidental fire could be contained to a small section. If an enemy weapon exploded in the hangar these precautions would be less effective as the curtains would almost certainly be destroyed by blast and the entry hole would admit air. However the fire would be unlikely to spread to the rest of the ship.

There could be no such limits placed on the spread of fire in an open hangar. Access below was from the hangar deck and there were cases of burning petrol leaking into spaces below and of men trapped below an inferno. On the other hand, ventilation in tropical waters was excellent - conversely, the closed hangar was warmer in cold climates! Refuelling aircraft in the open hangar was probably safer as it was less likely that petrol vapour would build up."


Post war of course the USN had to move to a closed hangar design in the Forrestal and subsequent classes, but that is another story.
 
The Admiralty spent much time on the open v closed hangar debate between 1943 and 1945 as part of the abortive Malta class design process. DK Brown, himself a naval architect, devoted 2 pages of his book Nelson to Vanguard on the pros and cons of each. At the end he summarised it as follows (with my emphasis):-

"Summary of advantages
Open Hangar. Good ventilation, easy to warm up planes, mount large strikes, side lifts, more planes.
Closed Hangar. Stronger, lighter hull. Much safer against fire, easy to armour, planes protected against weather and some enemy action."
The much touted 'enclosed armoured hanger' actually resulted in all the RN's Fleet Carriers that suffered bomb damage or hanger fires needing to be written off due to structural damage. In each case, the hanger either fed the shock damage down into the hull doing such nice things as bending the keel, or acted as a blast furnace causing a minor hanger fire to turn into a raging conflagration that once again wrecked the hull - see HMS Indomitable and HMS Formidable both constructively wrecked after hanger fires.

The Malta Class abandoned not only the much over vaunted armoured flight deck, but used open hangers as per USN practice.

"More fighters would have been better protection than armour."
D K Brown
 

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