Most heavily Armed ship during ww2.

parsifal said:

...the DoY managed to hit the Scharnhorst 7 or 8 times. To achieve those 7-8 hits. One source I know of says the DoY expended 52 salvoes to achieve those hits, which would equate to 520 rounds. However, for the entire engagement, DoY only expended 443 14inch rounds, so in all probability some of those 52 salvoes were secondary only. Estimated ammunition expenditure 1947 to 1824 is around 240 rounds...

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http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_14-45_mk7.htm said:

During the early part of her action against Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems.

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a straddle is not a hit, though it is a worthwhile event to take note of. Good information just the same. Just bear in mind that Navweapons is a notoriously anti-RN source.

However applying that datqa to the analysis, if the Brtisih recorded 77 salvoes, to expend 443 round of 14 in ammo, thats an average of 5.7 shells per hit....or effectively the front two turrets...

I can find reference for 4-5 14-inch hits on Scharnhorst during 90 minute stern chase. But that is a key here: it was a stern chase so the average target area was small most of the time. Scharnhorst would occasional turn partly broadside to fire a 6 shot salvo at intervals. The seas were extremely heavy with gigantic breakers and high winds. It a wonder that both sides managed a few hits given the conditions.

Scharnhorst's shooting from the reports of British observers was actually fairly good throughout, as was Duke of York's.

Both opponents used star shell until the range opened up to the point that star shell was no longer useful. This was about 13,000 yards when Duke of York switched over to full radar direction. Scharnhorst obviously had to do the same. It was after Scharnhorst had to rely on radar that there was a noted improvement in its shooting, with Scharnhorst consistently straddling with its occasional salvoes and scoring 3 hits on Duke of York's upper works.

Duke of York was directing fire using Type 284M radar. This radar operated on 50cm wave length. The indication was by A-scope. The range accuracy using the new L42 precision ranging panel was 25 yards from the null point to the pip. However, in practice the range accuracy was 120 yards because of tiny variations of when the pulser actually initiated the transmitted pulse. Please don't misunderstand, 100 meters range accuracy is exceptional compared to optics and plenty accurate for naval artillery. The resolution for range was 150 meters. The bearing resolution was 4.5 *. Bearing accuracy using lobe switching was exceptional at about 0.10*. According to Derek Howse, an expert on British radar, the Duke of York had to quit firing at 1824 hours because they could not spot the fall of shot. Other sources report that the Type284 had developed a fault and was no longer operational. I trust Howse. Duke of York was indeed asking other ships to spot the fall of shot and report it to them. The fact that DoY could not spot the fall of shot with its firecontrol radar hints that it was landing salvoes with 150 meters of the target, provided the resolution for range had not opened up due to fault in the pulser.

Type 284M could not spot the fall of shot for bearing because it used an A-scope indicator which presents only range data. The operator knew if the antenna was on line for bearing using beam switching if the trace on the A-scope blinked or held steady. If it held steady then the antenna was aimed directly at the target.

Scharnhorst's radars had recently been upgraded. The upgrades included larger antenna which operated in common mode and provided similar bearing resolution to the British radar. Also a new fine ranging system was fitted that could provide an accuracy of 25 meters depending on the skill of the operator. Of course Scharnhorst no longer had the services of its foretop radar due to its destruction by direct hit at 0930 hours.

The shooting by Washington and South Dakota on Nov 15 1942 east of Savo Island illustrates the difficulty with accurate shooting at night even using radar. Washington expended 42 16-inch rounds in exchange for 0 hits at ranges of less than 18,000 yards. South Dakota expended 14 salvoes in exchange for no hits at 15,000 yards.

South Dakota thought it was scoring hit after hit because it could track the shells in flight flying right into the target pip on its radars. What was happening was that radars had resolution of 400 yards so that once shells landed with in 400 yards of the target they merged with the target echo on the indicator.

Washington divided its fire between targets 13,000 yards away and a big pip 18,500 yards away. There were no Japanese warships 18,500 yards away so Washington sent its 16-inch shells after a phantom radar echo. After two salvoes Washington's radars all went out and failed to register any targets. The targets could no longer been seen either because of a smoke screen. Washington fired thereafter using "generated data" or to where its computor expected the targets to be based on the last data received.

Wavelength said:

The shooting by Washington and South Dakota on Nov 15 1942 east of Savo Island illustrates the difficulty with accurate shooting at night even using radar. Washington expended 42 16-inch rounds in exchange for 0 hits at ranges of less than 18,000 yards. South Dakota expended 14 salvoes in exchange for no hits at 15,000 yards.

South Dakota thought it was scoring hit after hit because it could track the shells in flight flying right into the target pip on its radars. What was happening was that radars had resolution of 400 yards so that once shells landed with in 400 yards of the target they merged with the target echo on the indicator.

Washington divided its fire between targets 13,000 yards away and a big pip 18,500 yards away. There were no Japanese warships 18,500 yards away so Washington sent its 16-inch shells after a phantom radar echo. After two salvoes Washington's radars all went out and failed to register any targets. The targets could no longer been seen either because of a smoke screen. Washington fired thereafter using "generated data" or to where its computor expected the targets to be based on the last data received.

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WL this sounds like it would be very interesting reading. Can you provide a source please?

Sure:

USS Washington Action Report A316-3 This is the best one regarding Washington's radar problems.

Also see USS South Dakota Action Report, BB57 damage report, Naval War College Battle Summary

(Some of these documents are available online if I recall correctly at hyperwar.com)

Also Eric Hammels Decision At Sea is an excellent secondary account tying things together. Also highly reccomended is James Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno.

I can find reference for 4-5 14-inch hits on Scharnhorst during 90 minute stern chase. But that is a key here: it was a stern chase so the average target area was small most of the time. Scharnhorst would occasional turn partly broadside to fire a 6 shot salvo at intervals. The seas were extremely heavy with gigantic breakers and high winds. It a wonder that both sides managed a few hits given the conditions.

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Ive got a couple of references that say that as well, but several others that have slightly different accounts of the battle (with respect to the hits received and inflicted). Just glancing at the WWII cruiser action reports, gives the follwing brief, but good account of the battle..

"At 16.17 Duke of York obtained radar contact at 45,500 yards to the north-east, and then Fraser knew he could bring the German ship to action. By 1632 Duke of York's gunnery radar had acquired Scharnhorst at 15 miles. He chose to hold on to close the range before opening fire. At 16.40 Belfast 10 miles astern, was ordered to illuminate Scharnhorst with star shells. However, Scharnhorst could not be seen from Duke of York. The latter then fired her own star shell which burst precisely beyond Scharnhorst, silhouetting her against the pale light, her guns trained fore-and-aft, completely caught by surprise"

and...

"She had been hit by at least 13 x 14in shells, 12 x 8in or 6in and by 11 torpedoes. Duke of York fired 443 rounds in 52 broadsides, of which 31 were straddles".

Note that for the last paragraph that relates to the total hits, some of which were inflicted after Scharnhorst had stopped. So its not the hits within the 90 mins of the main action (1647 to 1824), it relates to the full action up until the time of sinking, at 1945. In that full time, DoY fired 443 rounds to achieve a total of 14 hits an average of 1 hit per 31 rounds fired

During the first 90 minutes (up until 1825), the following 14inch hits were recorded

At 16:47, Admiral Fraser ordered Belfast to open fire with star shells from 17.500 meters, at 16:50 the starboard side 133 mm guns of Duke of York did the same from 11.000 meters, Scharnhorst got illuminated and was caught by surprise and unprepared especially by the presence of heavy ships between her track to south and Norway. The first salvo occurred at 1650, and knocked out A tutrret of the german ship, permanently, and remporarily caused B turret to be flooded

Scharnhorst got hit with first salvo and immediately reacted firing at Duke of York and Jamaica, turned to east and than to north increasing speed to the maximum. From that point until 1824, range continued to increase out to 18500m, but a good proportion of the fight was at ranges below 15000m because for a time both sides relied on visual spotting

At 17:08, another shot by Duke of York hit the Scharnhorst between the C turret and the airplane catapult damaging the aircraft hangar starting a fire due to aircraft fuel, fire was immediately extinguished.

At 17:20, Scharnhorst was sailing east at 26 knots , Duke of York and Jamaica on her wake were still firing at the Scharnhost from 13.000 meters. DoY was firing forward turrets only.

At 18:00, distance was 18.000 meters between Force 2 and Scharnhorst.

At 18:15 Scharnhorst's turret B went out of action when a further hit from Duke of York broke the turret ventilation system making the turret unusable because of smoke from the guns when fired.

At 18:19, a new message was sent from Rear-Admiral Bey to SKL: "The enemy is firing by radar at a range of more than 18.000 meters. Position AC4965, Course 110°, Speed 26 knots".

At 18:24, Duke of York was at 19.500 meters and ceased fire (after 52 broadsides), a shell from Scharnhorst passing through the mast had broken some wires of the Type 284 Artillery Radar consequently firing was going to be only a waste of ammunition. This is the only hit recordedd by Fraser on the DoY. RN DD Saumarez was also hit by a 280mm shell, later at 1850, when at range of 1800m. At that range the chances of a hit were greartly increased. these are the only two recorded hits by 280mm shells in British accounts, and we dont have any german accounts to make any conclusions from. all other sources must be considered secondary, and all claims of additional hits are very suspect.

Also at 1824, with one of the last salvoes fired Duke of York had hit a vital spot on the German battleship, penetrating the Nr. 1 boiler room, severing a steam-pipe that fed the turbines. This hit has been challenged as being the fatal blow (some claim the machinery just stopped, but the official British version is that the shell penetrated the engine space. Whatever the truth, Scharnhorst was hit at 1824 and then rapidly lost speed.

From 1824 through to 1901, DoY radar was out of action due to the Scharnhorst 280mm hit on the British BBs mast. There was no fire from DoY during this period. .

At 18:40, with the radar still out of action, and Scharnhorst apparently drawing away, Admiral Fraser signalled to Admiral Burnett: "I see little hope to catch Scharnhorst and I am proceeding to support convoy".

Thus, in the period 1647 to 1824, there were 4 hits by DoY 14in guns, and one hit by Scharnhorst on the DoY at 1824. There was a further second hit on a DD at range 1800 by the Scharnhorst

To complete the analysis, DoY radar is reecorded as repaired from 1901, and she re-commenced firing at that time. By that stage the Schanrhorst had been torpedoed and had her speed reduced to 10knots

At approximately 1904, Duke of York registered at least two further hits on the Scharnhorst, these were very damaging hits Schanhorst was again on fire in the hangar area, and B turret ceased fire again, this time permananetly (after the ventilation had been destroyed this turret was only firig very intermittently turret C was the only one responding fire at normal rof.

Between 1904 and 1928, Scharnhorst was hit 8 more times by Duke of York at a range of around 7000m In the final part of the battle (1824 to 1928), DoY had fired a further 28 salvoes , and in total had fired 80 broadsides on Scharnhorst (446 rounds).

After the battle, Fraser was highly complimentary of the Scvharnhorsts gallantry and fighting spirit.

Scharnhorst's shooting from the reports of British observers was actually fairly good throughout, as was Duke of York's.

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According to Fraser after action report Scharnhorst put one 11 in (280 mm) shells through Duke of York's masts severing a vital radar cable at 1824. This caused reduced DoY to cease firing until 1901 when the radar was repaired. During the first part of the battle (until 1824), DoY recorded 31 straddles out of 52 salvoes. Seriously, there is no comparison between the shooting accuracy of the DopY and the Scharnhorst, though I hasten to add this is hardly a fair comparison. DoY fire was radar controlled, Scharnhorsts was not

In the aftermath of the battle, the Kriegsmarine commander, Großadmiral Karl Dönitz remarked, "Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment."

Both opponents used star shell until the range opened up to the point that star shell was no longer useful. This was about 13,000 yards when Duke of York switched over to full radar direction. Scharnhorst obviously had to do the same. It was after Scharnhorst had to rely on radar that there was a noted improvement in its shooting, with Scharnhorst consistently straddling with its occasional salvoes and scoring 3 hits on Duke of York's upper works.

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According to Fraser, starshell was used to 15000m, slightly more than 13K. According to Fraser, there was only one hit on the DpY, at range 19500. I have no information on the number of straddles the Scharnhorst achieved.

DoY fire was radar controlled, Scharnhorsts was not

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And why not? Why would the Scharnhorst not use its aft radar?

There were three hits on DOY. One each passed through each mast. Another one past through the structure under the 273 radar office. = 3 Had Scharnhorst been firing nose fused HE instead of AP shells the damage would be greater. The British battle observers noted that Scharnhorst straddled with its second straddle and several accounts including Fraser's note that Scharnhorst straddled consistently from 17,000 yards out to 21,500 yards. How could it possibly do this without radar? Looks to be comparable to DOY's shooting to me.

Battle Summary 24 reads Duke of York switching over to full radar well before 16,500 yards.

According to Fraser after action report Scharnhorst put one 11 in (280 mm) shells through Duke of York's masts severing a vital radar cable at 1824. This caused reduced DoY to cease firing until 1901 when the radar was repaired

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This cable served the Type 281 air warning radar. A different radar from the Type 284M firecontrol set which either developed a fault or could not spot the fall of shot or both. The Type 281 remained unoperable until repairs at the Kola Inlet later. The hit which passed under the Type 273 office knocked out that radar temporarly also.

At 18:40, with the radar still out of action, and Scharnhorst apparently drawing away, Admiral Fraser signalled to Admiral Burnett: "I see little hope to catch Scharnhorst and I am proceeding to support convoy".

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Note how much time has passed since DoY has ceased fire. Quite a problem for the boiler room penetration theory there. It greatly supports a mechnical problem instead.

And why not? Why would the Scharnhorst not use its aft radar?

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I always thought that there were two hits to the Scharnhorsts radar, one in the earlier cruiser action at around 0930 and another at 1647 with the very first salvo from DoY.

Maybe you are right, but most accounts do comment on Scharnhorst having to fire blind and then having difficulty firing at those ships with flashless powder, since she relied heavily on seeing the gun flashes of her opponents for spotting.

If Scharnhorst did possess radar spotting in her last encounter, then her shooting is not that flash at all

There were three hits on DOY. One each passed through each mast. Another one past through the structure under the 273 radar office. = 3 Had Scharnhorst been firing nose fused HE instead of AP shells the damage would be greater. The British battle observers noted that Scharnhorst straddled with its second straddle and several accounts including Fraser's note that Scharnhorst straddled consistently from 17,000 yards out to 21,500 yards. How could it possibly do this without radar? Looks to be comparable to DOY's shooting to me.

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Fraser does not mention three hits, though it is possible. He simply refers to "a hit", but that is not conclusive one way or the other. Barnetts account also only mentions one hit. Kembles account doesnt shed a lot of light on the number of hits either. It may well be that there were three hits, but you need to give me verification of your source(s) before I am willing to accept it. Ive learned long ago about this battle that things are often not what they seem.....

Even so, this is three hits from the same salvo, all occurring at 1824. A very tight firing pattern and excellent shooting, if it did occur. You mention Frasers account, which i would like to re-check, since ive not found any mention of three hits in his account. his praise of German Gunnery I did find.

As to your last sentence, it would be difficult, I agree, but not impossible. Most contemporary accounts say that Scharnhorst relied on the muzzle flashes of the RN ships, and DoY was not using flashless powder. Despite the poor weather, visibility was actually not that bad....it was dark, for sure, the sea state terrible and radar did give a big advantge, but not impossible to hit by visual alone. if the rangefinders could stay out of the sea spray, they could in theory find a firing solution for the guns

According to an eyewitness account of a sailor that was actually working in the Type 273 office, there was no penetration of that office.....the claimed hit actually passed overhead

This cable served the Type 281 air warning radar. A different radar from the Type 284M firecontrol set which either developed a fault or could not spot the fall of shot or both. The Type 281 remained unoperable until repairs at the Kola Inlet later. The hit which passed under the Type 273 office knocked out that radar temporarly also.

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Im more than a litle confused by this. it was indeed the Type 281 mast that was knocked out, but RN accounts say that this wire was reconnected by Lt Bates, some 36 minutes later. Are you sure it wasnt the Type 284 that was out of action for the engagement, and repaired post event. Which radar did Bates repair?

Note how much time has passed since DoY has ceased fire. Quite a problem for the boiler room penetration theory there. It greatly supports a mechnical problem instead

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The basis of the "engine failure" theory is mostly that in theory the engine spaces of the scharnhorst were too well protected for the 14 inch guns to penetrate, and hence the loss of boiler pressure arose from a ruptered line, rather than the destroyed boiler claimed in the RN reports. A ruptured line should take only a few minutes to repair. Id agree that it was difficult to penetrate the armour belt and protection system around the machinery spaces and further, it seems unlikley that a ruptured line would cause a loss of power for nearly 40 minutes. However, on its final discovery around 2004 (as I recall), the ROV undertaking the survey of the hull showed massive blowouts of the plating under the magazines of A Turret, and numerous shell penetrations of the main belt. This suggests the armouring scheme was not as impervious as is often claimed. There is evidence of the DoY penetrating the protection of the Scharnhorst. Exactly at what range (and hence when) we cannot be sure. However, the jury is out as to what caused the Scharnhorst to lose speed. It is clearly more plausible than is often admitted that she indeed suffered a wrecked boiler rather than a ruptured line.

I find the shooting a gun flashes theory completely implausable.

Bates repaired the 273 antenna. The 281 wasn't repaired until later.

I would agree, its hard to imagine, but that is the often quoted reason why she concentrated almost exclusively on the ships with flah powder only. Flashless powder certainly made a difference in the Pacific Night battles.

With regard to the 273 being repaired, certainly makes sense, but the official report to the admiralty does say the 284 was repaired Then again, the admiralty report is also out by more than 20 miles in scharnhorsts sinking position....even the official records can be wrong....

Wavelength said:

Sure:

USS Washington Action Report A316-3 This is the best one regarding Washington's radar problems.

Also see USS South Dakota Action Report, BB57 damage report, Naval War College Battle Summary

(Some of these documents are available online if I recall correctly at hyperwar.com)

Also Eric Hammels Decision At Sea is an excellent secondary account tying things together. Also highly reccomended is James Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno.

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Read Hornfischer's (3 times) and Franks which isn't quite so focused on the sea dimension of the campaign but does provide some detail lacking in Neptune's (Hornfischer's) more personal account.

Based upon Hornfischer, the problem with misinterpreting the fall of shells observed to be disappearing into the ship's echo with resolution defined by the pulse width seems to appear coincident with the first use of the SG set in a theater engagement. In other words, at Cape Esperance. It would appear that the advantage of radar wasn't so much that you got more hits, but that statistically they came a lot sooner by essentially eliminating the process of ranging salvoes (walking the ordnance onto the target). Once established, the moving target ship was just as likely to be subjected to straddles as hits as during an optically managed fight and perhaps, depending on conditions, even less so?

Is it your impression that the gunnery teams understood that their shells may not have been hitting metal simply because they were merging with the echo? Not having read the after action reports, but only historical accounts, I had no idea that there was any problem with BB-56's radar and the accuracy against Kirishima seemed very effective. Are you saying the hits registered were based on predictions and not real-time radar data?

Mention was made in the discussion about BBs Washington and Sth Dakota on the Kirishima. The best detailed account that I know of is Kirishima Damage Analysis By Robert Lundgren Edited by Tony DiGiulian. It is available at Nav weapons , and a link is provided here. http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

What has been written in the US "final reports" about her final hours has largely been taken from a single USSBS entry. This includes the interrogation of Lt.Cdr. Tokuno Horishi. In this report Horishi writes that Kirishima received nine 16-inch shell hits and forty 5-inch shell hits and that Captain Iwabuchi had Kirishima scuttled. The estimate of nine major caliber hits was consistent with Admiral Lee's estimate of eight 16-inch shell hits documented in his action report to Admiral Nimitz. There however was no information on the location of these hits or the damage suffered (however details can now be added following Ballards details survey of the wreck in recent years). There was no information on what attempts were made to save her after the battle if any.

The detailed action report for Kirishima were lost in 1945. However, pieces of the battle from the Japanese side are available from the after action reports of other ships that participated and whose action reports survive, and from other survivors who were not interviewed by the USSBS. There were some brief and incomplete action reports from Kirishima (Japanese practice was to submit a brief report more or less immediately, and then a more detailed after action report perhaps a month later, similar to RN practice). Detailed after action reports are, however available from Takao, Sendai, dand Atago (all of which were not addressed in the US final report). There were also quite a number of surviving officer testimony post war, and Japanese secondary sources written on the subject. The most important piece of new evidence was supplied by Lt.Cdr. Shiro Hayashi who was Kirishima's Chief Damage Control Officer and before the ship sank he sketched a drawing of the hit locations suffered by his ship. Lt.Cdr. Tsurukichi Ikeda was his good friend and when they were about to abandon ship Ikeda copied these hit locations meticulously and published it post war in a small Japanese book Shikikan-tachi no Taiheiyô Sensô [Pacific War as Described by the Senior Officers]. What was reported was vastly different then Horishi's account. Ikeda shows 20 16" caliber hits and seventeen smaller caliber hits.

In 1992 Dr. Robert Ballard discovered Kirishima's wreck and was shocked to see her upside down with her forward section completely destroyed and her forward anchor chain draped over the stern. Dr Ballards survey of the wreck confirms Hayashi's and Ikeda's account (ie the US report significantly underestimates the amount of damage and the number of hits suffered by the Kirishima). Unfortunately, when it was discovered she was upside down, Dr. Ballard decided not to film the entire wreck and so not all hit locations were caught on tape.

So, virtually all the accepted (American) accounts of the damage suffered by the Kirishima....the numbers of hits sustained, and when, are suspect. Read the article, look at the damage diagrams, and come to your own conclusions is what I would recommend......

parsifal said:

I would agree, its hard to imagine, but that is the often quoted reason why she concentrated almost exclusively on the ships with flah powder only. Flashless powder certainly made a difference in the Pacific Night battles.

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I've posted a photo, looking aft from the bow, of the Washington (BB-56) at Guadalcanal during the November 14-15 night battle. It presumably shows the night engagement flash problem that put USN combatants at a disadvantage. It would be interesting to see a similar photo, taken aboard an IJN ship that might reveal the difference in illumination during main battery discharge.

Yep, that might tell the enemy where you are!

Great images, would love to see the others that you have.

I dont have any images of Japanese flashless cordite in operation, but I do have this link of HMAS Shropshire firing flashless cordite ammunition in October 1944, off Leyte.

Each nation developed flashless powder to deiffernet detail specifications. I dont know the flash characterisitcs of each different propellant. Scharnhorst was using a somewhat flashless cordite, but it still gave off a dull red glow by some eyewitness statements

October 1944. HMAS SHROPSHIRE fires flashless cordite broadside at the Philippines invasion - USN. | Flickr - Photo Sharing!

Ill have a quick look and see if I can find anything elsse showing flashless cordite

Neat photo Pars. It seems to provide some confirmation of a suspicion I've had that there may have existed an untested assumption by USN officers that the optically thick muzzle smoke might mask the gun flash at night. It certainly seems to do so during the day, but based on the Washington photo, I can imagine so much scattered light propagating through the smoke cloud from the initial muzzle flash to make the smoke appear as a large, easily observed, luminous ball. I've heard that the USN did very little night engagement practice so it may not have occurred to anyone that they were providing an optical firing solution to enemy vessels during a night engagement. I've seen paintings of the engagement that show dull red muzzle flashes on the horizon issuing from IJN ships.

Hornfischer in Neptune's Inferno, tells the story of the USS Atlanta (CLAA-51) engaged during the preceding night's action of 12-13 November. When illuminated by IJN search lights its Captain responds with "Counter Illuminate!" (instead of the "Open Fire!" immediately called for by the, evidently better adapted, gunnery officer) demonstrating the rather peacetime mindset that handicapped USN officers well into the Guadalcanal campaign.

Unfortunately, while I wish I had more such photos, I just happened to stumble upon this one while doing research to support a prior post.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Is it your impression that the gunnery teams understood that their shells may not have been hitting metal simply because they were merging with the echo? Not having read the after action reports, but only historical accounts, I had no idea that there was any problem with BB-56's radar and the accuracy against Kirishima seemed very effective. Are you saying the hits registered were based on predictions and not real-time radar data?

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It is pretty clear that gunnery/radar personal didn't understand the science of radar all that well during WWII.

To be clear I'm talking about the radar problems which occured to the east of Savo Island some 45 minutes before the engagement with the Kirishima to the west of Savo.

Adm Lee and Capt Murrey (in the action reports) are puzzled by the phantom radar contacts they keep having problems with operating among south pacific islands. But it was a function of the pulse repetition rate being too high on the American radars. The other problems are minor lobes (side lobes) and the resolution for range operating so close to islands.

On Washington they did indeed fire at Hashimoto's cruisers (and the radar phantom) based on predictions after the first two salvos. Once the targets could not be found with radar (because they went out temporarly after salvo 2) or visually (because of the Japanese smoke screen) they just assumed they had sunk them.

South Dakota credited itself with sinking 1 battleship, two cruisers, and another cruiser later on, when it actually hit nothing all night long.

In the BB56 action report they also report the problem of their own gun flashes blinding the night vision of their own personal and making rangefinder optics useless. They report that gunnery officers resorted to hand held binoculars in a vain effort to spot the fall of shot. Radar could not spot of shot and the optics were blinded by their own ship's gunflashes.

South Dakota credited itself with sinking 1 battleship, two cruisers, and another cruiser later on, when it actually hit nothing all night long

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Im not going to defend Sth dakotas claims, they seem outrageious to me to be honest. To that extent I agree with the thrust of what you are saying. However, I cannot agree with the vercity of your statement as to whether she made or achieved any hits or not. Thats because of the latent innaccuracies of the USN after action reports, that appear to be the main basis of your conclusions. These reports in more recent post war analyses, are shown to be clearly inadequate, and not in a small way. Lees final report claimed just 8 hits (of heavy BB calibre), the USSBS report, based on that report, plus Harashi's testimony concluded 9 hits. These were all pretty much debunked by the Kirishimas Damage Control Officers account, the after action reports of other ships nearby and of course Ballards underwater survey which all attested to more than twenty hits of BB calibre on the Japanese BB. Conclusion: the USN after action reports arent worth the paper they are written on, because they grossly underestimate hits achieved. 20 actual to 8 estimated. Further conclusion, it is entirely plausible, indeed, likley, that Sth Dakota achieved some of the hits she claimed.