Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Where do you guys get some of this stuff? From a cracker jack box.
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Where do you guys get some of this stuff? From a cracker jack box.3P51 s could be built for 2P47s.
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Pilots cried when they had to switch to the Mustang,
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Right?Where do you guys get some of this stuff? From a cracker jack box.
!) They did not have escorts for deep penetration missions. The 1942 missions over France and Belgium were planned with escort in mind; but Eaker and others reckoned that deeper, unescorted missions attacking Germany proper were viable. This is a fact, as borne out by many dumb missions carried out in 1943.
2) You're not paying attention to the power of dogma. The USAAF bomber generals wanted to show the supremacy of the bombers, in order to justify an independent Air Force post-war. Whether or not escort was available, they tried ... and failed.
Eaker frantically requested P-51B and P-38H in July 1943 during Blitz Week. Arnold dispatched Gen Barney Giles to kick start 'extra range' projects for the new P-51B, the newP-38J and the P-47D while prodding Echols to issue go/no g on XP-75 with mandate that t had to be operational y December (impossible).
Eaker and Spaatz and Arnold, along with Gen Muir Fairchild were responsible for A-36 and P-51-1 holding the NAA production while progress was being made on both sides of the ocean to convert P-51/Mustang I to Merlin.
'Eaker reckoned'??
Eaker made the case to Churchill at Casablanca that 8th AF could combine with RAF to destroy German Industry (Operation Pointblank). With reluctant agreement from Churchill, that objective became his marching orders. Eaker was under constant pressure from Arnold to step up the pace and move from bombing coastal targets to German Border - and extend to serious industrial targets in deep Germany, which became Blitz Week during which RAF and 8th bombed same targets 'by day and night'. Eaker's serious error in judgment was that with the '600' operational bombers he told Arnold and Churchill that was required to achieve Operation Pointlank (and USAAF AWPD-2) was based on belief that heavily armed bombers could achieve those objectives by seriously hurting the LW and win the battle of attrition. That belief was reinforced by faulty US intelligence and wildly optimistic post mission debriefings in which the claims for German aircraft shot down approached 10:1 over claiming.
Arnold and several senior AAC/AAF officers were seriously concerned in 1939/1940, based on war in Spain and ETO, that defending fighters would have the upper hand over unescorted bombers. The issue was that neither the technology nor the procurement practices of Materiel Command up to the task of giving US designers the challenge - and instead issued RFP for 'twin engine' escort. The P-61 was the only survivor and AAF-HQ understood that the P-38 was the only viable medium/long range escort.
Recall that Eaker demanded and received all four P-38 equipped FG be assigned to the AF. That the P-39 31st and 52nd FG's were assigned was strictly as a placeholder to gain combat experience and be equipped with either P-47 or P-38 as they became available. North Africa priorities raped Eaker's plans and capabilities by stripping ALL assigned FG save aircraft less 78th and the transferred Eagle squadons - Spitfire equipped - as 4t FG. It wasn't until one year later that VIII FC built back to 5 Operational FGs - all flying P-47C/D.
Last but perhaps as important as no long range fighters was serious under-training in bad weather flying training stateside- a serious and lingering issue for UK based operations.
IMO, Eaker had to go as the sacrificial lamb, but he did turn over a far more capable 8th AF to Jimmy Doolittle than he gets credit for. The fact that he transferred to take over US MTO operations including 12th and 15th AF was recognition that Arnold and Spaatz recognized that pointing fingers at Eaker for joint AAC/AAF inadequacies (procurement, training and allocation of critical assets like the P-38) in giving him the tools, was simply foolish.
So, Eaker "made the case" to Churchill that Americans could bomb Germany in the daylight, even as he knew there were not the fighters to escort those missions. I'm not sure how that's different than "Eaker reckoned".
He would of been scared of any enemy fighter flying over Berlin in numbers that surpased his own total of fighters defending Berlin. Who wouldn't be, so it was not so much the fact it was the "P-51" he feared so much as the fact that some enemy fighter could actually reach Berlin and surpased in numbers his own defending fighter protection.
He then knew that USA production of bombers and fighters were going to destroy his beloved LW. Not to mention it made him eat crow and look like an azz.
It is important to sort these 2007 issues out in the hope that a poster returns after 11 years..Oh, Hi. Come back to talk to us merely mortal fanboys?
Dates are important. The Casablanca conference and directive was from 14 - 24 January 1943, the Casablanca directive was issued on 4 February 1943. How many unescorted B-17 missions had been performed up to the end of 1942?
The pointblank directive was issued on 14 June 1943 Blitz week was July 24-30 1943. Between January and July a lot was learned about unescorted missions and very little was good news.
Eaker was the spokesperson to make the case for the US Army/Army Air Force to perform daylight bombing - The 'US Army in this case was Marshall, Arnold, Spaatz". The US Army, Army Air Corps, Army Air Force was committed to execute according to the Air War Plan. Per AWPD-1 and -2, the Air Force was organized to support strategic bombardment on enemy manufacturing and production, as well as battlefield tactical airpower. In January 1943 the Only potential long range escort was the P-38 and Eaker got all of the 'ready for operations Fighter Groups'.
When they were pulled from his control two months into the 8th AF Heavy Bombardment operations - he 'reckoned' that he still had the job to execute the plan. Does that help explain the context of 'pout' versus 'salute and carry on'?
Understood.
I'm not sure what issue you have with the word "reckoned", but I see you scare-quoting it again. Just so we're clear, "reckon" is perfectly good English, meaning "judge".
Nor did I at any point suggest any sort of pouting, so I don't see any need to address that "point" of yours. I've done my share of saluting and carrying out orders I didn't agree with. I don't know the level of Eaker's disagreement with his orders to carry out penetrations without fighter cover, but judging from his actions, it doesn't strike me as terribly high.
If you've got some reading to suggest I'll be happy to dig in.
This is an awesome study course, Professor. Deserves more than the three credit hours listed in the catalog.That said I do suggest that you read at least the following: Air Force Spoken Here by Parton, Global Conflict by Arnold, Forged in Fire by DeWitt Coop and Carl A Spaatz by Richard Davis. Another 'must read' is USAF Study 136 Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter by Boylon. In fact I suggest you read it first because it has the most complete set of references and correspondence surrounding the subject.
True except I find the text book for this course a bit lacking...This is an awesome study course, Professor. Deserves more than the three credit hours listed in the catalog.
To be more complete, the view of American role in ETO/MTO operations should strongly consider the thoughts of Portal and Leigh-Mallory and Harris as they viewed the American 'doctrine'.This is an awesome study course, Professor. Deserves more than the three credit hours listed in the catalog.
Oh ye of suspicious minds! In that case, Chem 1 + 2, Soc 21, and Poli Sci 42 were "money grabs" where I went to school. In fact you felt you were learning straight from the "guy who wrote the book" on the subject.True except I find the text book for this course a bit lacking...
I mean, when the prof teaching the class is also the author of the text book, let's just say I smell "Money Grab".
What I did take issue with is the characterization that Eaker didn't give a damn about the VIII BC crews and was stupidly misusing them for some personal megalomaniacal purpose - indifferent to the losses associated with ordering deep unescorted strikes against German industrial targets.
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If you wish to debate further on this, I will listen - but suggest that you read Study 136 first.
I'm in!Let's go to the pub, have a few pints, and relax...