Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Where do you guys get some of this stuff? From a cracker jack box.
Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?
- Thread starter Lucky13
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Right?Where do you guys get some of this stuff? From a cracker jack box.
My Uncle lamented having his P-36 replaced by a P-39, but never "cried" about it. He then was assigned a P-38, which he held in high regard...but we have to look at how a pilot views his ride: familiarity invokes confidence.
Take that familiar ride away and stick him in a new type, he'll hate it...until he becomes familiar with it (assuming that the aircraft is not a Bell product) and the contempt will eventually give way.
drgondog
Major
'Eaker reckoned'??
Eaker made the case to Churchill at Casablanca that 8th AF could combine with RAF to destroy German Industry (Operation Pointblank). With reluctant agreement from Churchill, that objective became his marching orders. Eaker was under constant pressure from Arnold to step up the pace and move from bombing coastal targets to German Border - and extend to serious industrial targets in deep Germany, which became Blitz Week during which RAF and 8th bombed same targets 'by day and night'. Eaker's serious error in judgment was that with the '600' operational bombers he told Arnold and Churchill that was required to achieve Operation Pointlank (and USAAF AWPD-2) was based on belief that heavily armed bombers could achieve those objectives by seriously hurting the LW and win the battle of attrition. That belief was reinforced by faulty US intelligence and wildly optimistic post mission debriefings in which the claims for German aircraft shot down approached 10:1 over claiming.
Arnold and several senior AAC/AAF officers were seriously concerned in 1939/1940, based on war in Spain and ETO, that defending fighters would have the upper hand over unescorted bombers. The issue was that neither the technology nor the procurement practices of Materiel Command up to the task of giving US designers the challenge - and instead issued RFP for 'twin engine' escort. The P-61 was the only survivor and AAF-HQ understood that the P-38 was the only viable medium/long range escort.
Recall that Eaker demanded and received all four P-38 equipped FG be assigned to the AF. That the P-39 31st and 52nd FG's were assigned was strictly as a placeholder to gain combat experience and be equipped with either P-47 or P-38 as they became available. North Africa priorities raped Eaker's plans and capabilities by stripping ALL assigned FG save aircraft less 78th and the transferred Eagle squadons - Spitfire equipped - as 4t FG. It wasn't until one year later that VIII FC built back to 5 Operational FGs - all flying P-47C/D.
Last but perhaps as important as no long range fighters was serious under-training in bad weather flying training stateside- a serious and lingering issue for UK based operations.
IMO, Eaker had to go as the sacrificial lamb, but he did turn over a far more capable 8th AF to Jimmy Doolittle than he gets credit for. The fact that he transferred to take over US MTO operations including 12th and 15th AF was recognition that Arnold and Spaatz recognized that pointing fingers at Eaker for joint AAC/AAF inadequacies (procurement, training and allocation of critical assets like the P-38) in giving him the tools, was simply foolish.
drgondog
Major
EDIT: Recall that the P-51A contract was written as a transition vehicle for the NA-104 P-51B-5 contract should the B attain the hoped for capability. That said, the P-51A was an excellent escort fighter for medium and low level bombardment in the CBI - and had the same range as the B (and P-38G/H) without internal fuselage tank.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
So, Eaker "made the case" to Churchill that Americans could bomb Germany in the daylight, even as he knew there were not the fighters to escort those missions. I'm not sure how that's different than "Eaker reckoned".
drgondog
Major
Eaker was the spokesperson to make the case for the US Army/Army Air Force to perform daylight bombing - The 'US Army in this case was Marshall, Arnold, Spaatz". The US Army, Army Air Corps, Army Air Force was committed to execute according to the Air War Plan. Per AWPD-1 and -2, the Air Force was organized to support strategic bombardment on enemy manufacturing and production, as well as battlefield tactical airpower. In January 1943 the Only potential long range escort was the P-38 and Eaker got all of the 'ready for operations Fighter Groups'.
When they were pulled from his control two months into the 8th AF Heavy Bombardment operations - he 'reckoned' that he still had the job to execute the plan. Does that help explain the context of 'pout' versus 'salute and carry on'?
Dates are important. The Casablanca conference and directive was from 14 - 24 January 1943, the Casablanca directive was issued on 4 February 1943. How many unescorted B-17 missions had been performed up to the end of 1942?
The pointblank directive was issued on 14 June 1943 Blitz week was July 24-30 1943. Between January and July a lot was learned about unescorted missions and very little was good news.
The pointblank directive was issued on 14 June 1943 Blitz week was July 24-30 1943. Between January and July a lot was learned about unescorted missions and very little was good news.
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No, it exposed him as the ass he was. And that's being very nice.
Oh, Hi. Come back to talk to us merely mortal fanboys?
It is important to sort these 2007 issues out in the hope that a poster returns after 11 years..
drgondog
Major
Very true, although the losses on the whole were deemed 'acceptable'. Strictly speaking POINTBLANK codified the Combined Bomber Offensive to go after the targets agreed at Casablanca.
ARGUEMENT further narrowed he list to German aircraft industry from England and Italy.
Actually nearly All were escorted, though not to any target as far as Paris. The first 8th AF mission to Germany was January 27, 1943. Most escorts were barely inland from Channel - by RAF and 4th FG. Between December and January 27 more missions were extended deeper into France and Holland, farther and farther away from escort combat radius. Most 1942 attacks were sub pens, marshaling yards and airfields.
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Thumpalumpacus
Major
Understood.
I'm not sure what issue you have with the word "reckoned", but I see you scare-quoting it again. Just so we're clear, "reckon" is perfectly good English, meaning "judge".
Nor did I at any point suggest any sort of pouting, so I don't see any need to address that "point" of yours. I've done my share of saluting and carrying out orders I didn't agree with. I don't know the level of Eaker's disagreement with his orders to carry out penetrations without fighter cover, but judging from his actions, it doesn't strike me as terribly high.
If you've got some reading to suggest I'll be happy to dig in.
drgondog
Major
I didn't take issue with 'reckoned' - just used it to start the rebuttal - and didn't mean to imply that you suggested that Eaker was pouting because he was carrying out orders he didn't agree with. Simply stated, he laid out the issues to Arnold - then saluted and soldiered on.
That said I do suggest that you read at least the following: Air Force Spoken Here by Parton, Global Conflict by Arnold, Forged in Fire by DeWitt Coop and Carl A Spaatz by Richard Davis. Another 'must read' is USAF Study 136 Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter by Boylon. In fact I suggest you read it first because it has the most complete set of references and correspondence surrounding the subject.
What I did take issue with is the characterization that Eaker didn't give a damn about the VIII BC crews and was stupidly misusing them for some personal megalomaniacal purpose - indifferent to the losses associated with ordering deep unescorted strikes against German industrial targets.
My opinions are based on a long history of the study of American airpower and the politics that placed Eaker at the point of the spear to achieve strategic results with an inadequately supplied tool kit. They are opinions, nevertheless.
When I wrote "P-51B Mustang: The NAA Bastard Stepchild that Saved the 8th AF", I devoted a great deal of effort to draw AAC/AAF deliberations and formation of Bomber Mafia ideology - that was crushed in Europe - and the EARLY awareness by Arnold that the 'bomber might not always get through'.
Eaker was charged with execution of a Plan that was never properly populated with planned assets and always the bastard stepchild to higher priorities issued by Eisenhower/Arnold and Marshall. The most severe drawdowns included sending the most experienced Bomb Groups to N.Africa, followed by ALL his long-range escort when the P-38 FG's followed - but replaced operationally (five months later) with P-47C/D that had half the combat radius. His B-24s , originally requested for nine weeks for Ploesti, stayed five months, further draining the VIII BC operational inventory well below the 800 level he was promised to execute POINTBLANK. The more subtle failures by AAF-HQ were Materiel Command deficiencies in operational testing - unleashing production aircraft to ETO that were unprepared for ETO combat conditions; Training command sending poorly trained aircrews which required significant and expensive 'on the job training' - after spending weeks at Base Depots for necessary mods; failure by Services Command (sub to Materiel Command) for not supplying tooling and equipment required for operational support at Airfield level. The list was long, discussed with Arnold about the same time Arnold was benched by his second heart attack in summer 1943.
If you wish to debate further on this, I will listen - but suggest that you read Study 136 first.
This is an awesome study course, Professor. Deserves more than the three credit hours listed in the catalog.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
True except I find the text book for this course a bit lacking...
I mean, when the prof teaching the class is also the author of the text book, let's just say I smell "Money Grab".
drgondog
Major
To be more complete, the view of American role in ETO/MTO operations should strongly consider the thoughts of Portal and Leigh-Mallory and Harris as they viewed the American 'doctrine'.
Oh ye of suspicious minds! In that case, Chem 1 + 2, Soc 21, and Poli Sci 42 were "money grabs" where I went to school. In fact you felt you were learning straight from the "guy who wrote the book" on the subject.True except I find the text book for this course a bit lacking...
I mean, when the prof teaching the class is also the author of the text book, let's just say I smell "Money Grab".
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Thanks for the reading suggestions.
1) I don't know whose posts you're reading, but I don't really appreciate you characterizing my posts this way; you'll struggle in vain to find a single reference I make to Eaker's personal feelings one way or the other.
2) I was approaching this as a discussion, not a "debate."
3) Quite frankly I'm uninterested in "debates", or discussions for that matter, with folks who'd mischaracterize my points so. Carry on.
Let's go to the pub, have a few pints, and relax...
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
I'm in!Let's go to the pub, have a few pints, and relax...
I'm not in the middle of the discussion but as my tag line suggests... BEER.
