Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

[Stig1207]

I'm not making up or misrepresenting anything, Parsifal.
You mentioned Murray in passing previously, so I guess that is a good enough source for you?

May-June 1940
Destroyed on operations:
Due to enemy action 1,129
Not due enemy action 216
Destroyed not on operations 83
Total: 1,428
Damaged are respectively 225; 183 and 80.
Total destroyed and damaged 1,916

 

[pbehn]

1) Firstly, the BoB was always portrayed in anything I read as the first time Germany had been stopped doing what it wanted to do

I don't disagree with that. I do disagree that in those earlier victories, the Luftwaffe did it easily. It did not. It suffered heavy casualties that affected it later.

2) The strength of the LW at the start of the conflict, that is, after the Battle of France is stated as it was. There is always a disagreement about numbers but they are broadly similar

Strongly disagree with that statement. Prior to the campaigns in the west, as of the end of March, LW returns including reserves was 3500 flyable airframes. By the end of the BoF it was under 1500. By the start of August it had recovered back to about 2800 and then levelled off, as the training schools were combed out to provide fillers for lost billets. The LW was already showing signs of combat stress by the time it went into battle over SE England

3) They may have shot some down even a lot down but they didn't stop the army below doing what it wanted to do.

This relates to two things, the doctrinal advantages the LW enjoyed and secondly the numbers they enjoyed. And factually it does ignore what happened over Dunkirk, or are you suggesting the LW let the BEF and the French 1st army group escape because they wanted them to???? Kleist was reporting that the LW had lost air superiority over that sector don't forget. People do tend to forget these details, papering over the cracks of the myths that we have all come to believe in.

4) The Germans didn't care about air losses, Goering was shocked at the reduction in strength of the LW prior to the BoB but he was the man in charge and he had paid no attention to it. The campaigns in Poland, Netherlands, Belgium and France had been a success.

The luftwaffes defeat was caught up against the losses it was sustaining and the inability to adequately replace those losses. It was a very shallow outfit, lacking the depth and resilience to undertake sustained heavy combat on a continuous basis. The Luftwaffe was structured towards short, sharp campaigns, with relatively long pauses between the campaigns. Whilst that tempo could be maintained they were going to win, if the war dynamic changed, they were going to lose.

The LW was in more or less continuous combat from April 1940. There were some periods that were quieter, but no periods of complete rest. This explains why in June 1941, the LW was the same or similar strength to what it had been prewar. By comparison, the RAF had tripled in size. In that intervening 22 month, from 9/39 to 6/41, the LW had lost 15000 airframes, roughly three times its force structure. A percentage of those losses occurred in the BoF.

5) After the first days of the war the Bf 109s were operating at increasing range and so their capacity to escort and protect became reduced. The French (like the B.E.F.) may have had some Stuka parties and other successes but down below their airfields were being over run

Bf109s also suffered from increasing serviceability issues. This slowed down their sortie rate as moreso over the increasing distances you mentioned. The very airfields you spoke about that were captured were quickly used by the LW as advanced airbases for LW a/c. conversely the allies were forced back to airfields across the channel and behind Paris, relatively speaking much further from the fighting than the advance LW bases, yet both the RAF and FAF increased their sortie rates, whilst the LW slumped.

6) To reduce air to air losses with a more conservative approach may well have slowed up things on the ground and created a front over which losses would be much greater and eventual defeat almost certain. This is an aviation forum which sometimes attaches far too much importance to what happened in the air.

German doctrine was an advantage, but tying one arm behind their backs and not providing the necessary logistic support to support their ambitions war plans was bordering on the criminal from the german perspective. Having made the decision to go to war, Germany absolutely needed to back up their war effort by going to a full war footing and stop loping along as if they were on a summer holiday romp. In this regard the British, even the French, were miles in front of the Germans. Their arrogance that they could win a war without raising a sweat is appalling history. They could have won, but chose to lose!!! Who does that!!!!!

I disagreed with your post saying that the British downplayed the performance of the Poles Czechs Dutch and French while exaggerating the power of the LW for their own ends. The fact is that they all fell very quickly. The British overestimated both the strength of the LW and Germany's aircraft production. German propaganda in this respect was so successful that the RAF shot down non existent aircraft in the BoB. Until long after the war only LW records showed how many aircraft were lost and what their strength at any time was.

After the BoB, nothing happened in the invasion of Russia to change the opinion that the LW as part of the German military was a very, very formidable opponent. The figures you quote are known now, they were certainly not known in 1940 but could possibly be surmised from the "maximum effort" raids on London, they were clearly running out of bombers.

As to your question, as far as I have read, it was a small group of fanatics who led Germany into war, to keep the population quiet they made sure as little effect was felt at home as possible. Until the army halted in Russia the German victories had been achieved at almost no cost to Germany at home. Of course by the time things changed it was too late.

 

[Peter Gunn]

A few suggestions

Amazon product ASIN 0141030658View: https://www.amazon.com/Lose-Battle-France-1940/dp/0141030658


Maybe

Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend

E. R. Hooton,"Phoenix Triumphant"
Cornwells book though is formidable. He details every single known losses of German, British,France, Italy,Dutch and Belgian aircrafts loss

Many thanks, I'll give them a look.

Thanks for your input as well Ascent, much appreciated.

 

[fredleander]

Thank you again. 'Outflying' would've mean being better in crucial properties of a fighter, the P-36 did not offered that vs. Spitfire as far as we can read it.

TP, if you are of the opinion that the best property in a fighter is its ability to run because it is not able to hold its own at altitude, that is your prerogative. I would rather emphasize the other specifics mentioned in the RAF test - maneuverability, climb performance and controllability in a high power dive.

As for high power dive you shouldn't be surprised of the Hawk 75's diving ability. After all, the P-40 set a dive speed world record in 1942 and the P-36 was, apart from the engines, of a quite similar build. Here is a PR film of that P-40 record setting:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dzlJg5vZO8k

The P-36 550 mph. dive I mentioned (which you wanted to know more about) is referred to in Beauchamp and Cluny's book Curtiss Hawk 75 - the P-36 Bible (my opinion...). I have attached a scanned page from the book about the event. The background for the test was the final acceptance for the French orders, they wanted confirmation as to its ability to catch up with a Stuka in a dive. They got it. Please note the last paragraph in the text, which is why I was a little conservative in my "claim".

There is another item which is little talked about, the good range performance of the P-36. Its range, according to various manuals, was almost 1.000 miles at economic speed (200 mph.) at 15.000 feet. A nice feature in the Pacific. Curtiss test pilots in the USAAC acceptance trials stretched it to more than 1.200 miles flying at 170 mph. - at service weights, mind you! With the ability to stay with the bombers instead of diving away to save itself when enemy fighters approached.

Come to think if it, it would have been ideal for the Luftwaffe during Battle of Britain, flying circles around the Hurricanes and Spitfires and staying with the bombers with time and range to spare...

Fred

 

[tomo pauk]

TP, if you are of the opinion that the best property in a fighter is its ability to run because it is not able to hold its own at altitude, that is your prerogative. I would rather emphasize the other specifics mentioned in the RAF test - maneuverability, climb performance and controllability in a high power dive.

If it is a fair air fight, it means one didn't use it's fighters strong points. Spitfire vs. P-36 need to use same tactics as the F4U or P-51 will use against Zero or against Oscar, or Bf 109 vs. Hurricane - keep it's speed high (and alittude if possible), make a pass, fire a burst or two if you have time, climb up, repeat if ncessary.
Let's mention the part of report where it is said that P-36 was not as good as Spitfire in acceleration when in dive. Rate of climb when Spitfire I is outfitted with a CS prop? On same fuel used (87 or 100 oct), Spitfire I with CS prop will climb faster.
How good the P-36 will be in catching bombers when compared with Spitfire? What happens with performance of P-36 once we attach protection on it, both for pilot and fuel tank?

As for high power dive you shouldn't be surprised of the Hawk 75's diving ability. After all, the P-40 set a dive speed world record in 1942 and the P-36 was, apart from the engines, of a quite similar build. Here is a PR film of that P-40 record setting:

The P-36 550 mph. dive I mentioned (which you wanted to know more about) is referred to in Beauchamp and Cluny's book Curtiss Hawk 75 - the P-36 Bible (my opinion...). I have attached a scanned page from the book about the event. The background for the test was the final acceptance for the French orders, they wanted confirmation as to its ability to catch up with a Stuka in a dive. They got it. Please note the last paragraph in the text, which is why I was a little conservative in my "claim".

Thank you for the excerpt.
The penultimate paragraph in the text notes that such a high speed dive was not actually achieved. The 660 mph dive on P-40? The WW2 PR at it's best.

There is another item which is little talked about, the good range performance of the P-36. Its range, according to various manuals, was almost 1.000 miles at economic speed (200 mph.) at 15.000 feet. A nice feature in the Pacific. Curtiss test pilots in the USAAC acceptance trials stretched it to more than 1.200 miles flying at 170 mph. - at service weights, mind you! With the ability to stay with the bombers instead of diving away to save itself when enemy fighters approached.

Come to think if it, it would have been ideal for the Luftwaffe during Battle of Britain, flying circles around the Hurricanes and Spitfires and staying with the bombers with time and range to spare...

I'm not sure what kind of fighter was "diving away to save itself when enemy fighters approached", when it performed escort?
Granted, the P-36 have had range advantage over the European fighters that were without drop tanks. Yet, all of the sudden the 310-320 mph P-36 becames scourge for the RAF, while the 350+ mph Bf 109 cant do it.

 

[Shortround6]

Once you fit the Constant speed prop the Hurricane out-climbs the Hawk at altitude. You can't escort bombers or intercept them by flying thousands of feet lower where the Hawk engine made it's power. It doesn't matter how fast the Hawk could climb at sea level or 5000ft, that is not were the combats were starting.

 

[parsifal]

I'm not making up or misrepresenting anything, Parsifal.
You mentioned Murray in passing previously, so I guess that is a good enough source for you?

May-June 1940
Destroyed on operations:
Due to enemy action 1,129
Not due enemy action 216
Destroyed not on operations 83
Total: 1,428
Damaged are respectively 225; 183 and 80.
Total destroyed and damaged 1,916

what can I say. Murray is an older source and doesn't align with Campbell. For me Campbell is the go to reference for losses in the BoF. There are any number of idiosyncrasies in the reporting methodologies that might explain this.

if you want to claim that the FAF shot down 400 LW machines during the BoF, be my guest. I just don't agree with you.

 

[parsifal]

I disagreed with your post saying that the British downplayed the performance of the Poles Czechs Dutch and French while exaggerating the power of the LW for their own ends. The fact is that they all fell very quickly. The British overestimated both the strength of the LW and Germany's aircraft production. German propaganda in this respect was so successful that the RAF shot down non existent aircraft in the BoB. Until long after the war only LW records showed how many aircraft were lost and what their strength at any time was.

After the BoB, nothing happened in the invasion of Russia to change the opinion that the LW as part of the German military was a very, very formidable opponent. The figures you quote are known now, they were certainly not known in 1940 but could possibly be surmised from the "maximum effort" raids on London, they were clearly running out of bombers.

As to your question, as far as I have read, it was a small group of fanatics who led Germany into war, to keep the population quiet they made sure as little effect was felt at home as possible. Until the army halted in Russia the German victories had been achieved at almost no cost to Germany at home. Of course by the time things changed it was too late.

Actually LW records are hard to read and understand. Many aircraft listed as damaged and never repaired remained on the LW quartermasters "available" lists for long periods, when there was not not the slightest chance of that airframe ever returning to service. This was done to appease the senior german leadership at the time. They were besotted with numbers basically.

So whilst technically correct to rely on German records, in practice you have to be VERY careful.

The fact that they fell quickly means what? The BEF was defeated as quickly as the French in 1940, and again in Greece, and Crete. With one exception....around tobruk....the british suffered successive defeats in the air and on the ground until June 1941. The BoB was not an outright victory, it was an avoidance of defeat, which made it a victory in a roundabout way.

Despite all this success, the Germans, even in the context of the early part of the war were facing technical defeats. Each time they stepped into the ring with an opponent, they lost something, something they could not afford to lose.

Discounting the effects of the continental European nations is dangerous. If not for their efforts, my opinion is that Germany would have entered the BoB far stronger than it did and in position to defeat FC in that battle.

It was not a "small group of fanatics" that led Germany to war. the nation was itself fanatical and bent on war. all of the major interest groups were in favour of war. it is a post war fiction to blame just a "few bad eggs" for the conflagaration. Luckily we have written rulings in the form of the Nuremberg declarations to settle this largely moral question. Germany at the end of the war was found to be guilty of waging an aggressive, illegal war....not just hitler, the german nation was guilty .....its an indictment that still applies to every german man, woman and child to this day (an unforeseen an unfortunate byproduct perhaps), because the indictment was made against the nation, not a specific person or persons 9if it had been made against a specific person or persons, the indictment would resolve when the person or persons died. for this "nation related' indictment to die, the nation of Germany will have to cease to exist...that might have occurred incidentally in 1952 with the reformation of the west German Republic ). from that basic indictment of war guilt, all the findings against the Nazi war criminals as individuals could be made. Without that indictment of national guilt, the individual crimes under the Nuremberg rules cannot stand. that's why no Russians have ever stood trial (things are in theory different today under the ICC rules) Without this mechanism in place, the german underlings could have mounted successful defences about " we were just following orders" or ' everyone else was doing it, so why shouldn't we". The war guilt clauses as they are known made, among other things, the following of illegal orders a crime in itself, but it was at least harder to prove the illegaility of an order, unless the purpose for which that order had been issued was itself amoral and illegal. That's why it was important, and valid, to find Germany as a ntion, guilty of a war crime, so to speak.

Germany fuelled its war effort up to December 1941 by artificial pegging of the exchange rate , causing an influx of raw materials into Germany, the virtual complete shut down of industry outside Germany within the occupied territories. Opportunities to tap into European industrial complex were squandered by the Nazi short sighted policies, designed to prop up the failing german economy. It had other casualties, like destroying the economies of her allies as well . these allies were not impressed by that, and in the case of Rumania, extracted exorbitant special deals from the germans for their oil. In the case of finland, there was a virtual shut down of her vital mines. in the case of Spain, and Turkey, the germans were unable to pay for goods with their basically worthless currency ...they had to pay in manufactured items or foodstuffs ....a very inefficient way to run an advanced economy. The defeat in Russia was a product of that broken system, not a cause.

 

[Greyman]

Spitfire I - 6.25 lb, 2600 rpm (6,050 lb)
Hurricane I - 6.25 lb, 2600 rpm (6,316 lb)
Mohawk II - 87 cm, 2550 rpm (5,962 lb)

All A&AEE tests. The Mohawk is from the Norwegian order and has an R1830-SC3G engine.

Does anyone know if there was supposed to be a difference with the R1830-SC3G engines given to France? French numbers seem to indicate critical alt was about 14,000 feet, not 10,000 feet as in the Mohawk II.

 

[Stig1207]

what can I say. Murray is an older source and doesn't align with Campbell. For me Campbell is the go to reference for losses in the BoF. There are any number of idiosyncrasies in the reporting methodologies that might explain this.

if you want to claim that the FAF shot down 400 LW machines during the BoF, be my guest. I just don't agree with you.

Well, you suggested I take it up with Murray, now you pull a new rabbit out of your hat. So how about you provide the sources that indicate that the French shot down some 1500 enemy aircraft,
some 50% more than they claimed to have shot down.

No, I have not claimed that the FAF shot down 400 LW machines; I have, however, linked to some French sources that regard the 1000 claims as being well optimistic. Their numbers are the 355-500 range, you don't agree with them, ok.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The Mohawk is from the Norwegian order and has an R1830-SC3G engine.

Does anyone know if there was supposed to be a difference with the R1830-SC3G engines given to France? French numbers seem to indicate critical alt was about 14,000 feet, not 10,000 feet as in the Mohawk II.

Different blower gear??

 

[tomo pauk]

...
Spitfire I - 6.25 lb, 2600 rpm (6,050 lb)
Hurricane I - 6.25 lb, 2600 rpm (6,316 lb)
Mohawk II - 87 cm, 2550 rpm (5,962 lb)

All A&AEE tests. The Mohawk is from the Norwegian order and has an R1830-SC3G engine.

Does anyone know if there was supposed to be a difference with the R1830-SC3G engines given to France? French numbers seem to indicate critical alt was about 14,000 feet, not 10,000 feet as in the Mohawk II.

Higher critical altitude was for 92 oct fuel, lower for 100 oct fuel?

 

[parsifal]

Well, you suggested I take it up with Murray, now you pull a new rabbit out of your hat. So how about you provide the sources that indicate that the French shot down some 1500 enemy aircraft,
some 50% more than they claimed to have shot down.

No, I have not claimed that the FAF shot down 400 LW machines; I have, however, linked to some French sources that regard the 1000 claims as being well optimistic. Their numbers are the 355-500 range, you don't agree with them, ok.

You have claimed that the LW lost "about 1000" airframes to the FAF, for an in-specific time period. You have quoted Murray with a figure of 1916, again time period not specified but that is a figure that is moving into the realm of the plausible.

Cornewell quotes figures of over 2180 a/c LW aircraft lost in the west from September 1939 through to 10 June 1940. over 1800 a/c were lost 9 May to 10 june by the LW. After 10 June the situation becomes very confused, plus none of these sources account for airframes that managed to return, were sent back to the factories for repair, but were written off. That process could take months sometimes ,

Damaged airframes would still be listed as 'available' in the LW quartermaster strength reports. those I don't have at the moment, but I have seen some of them in the past. To give some idea of the seriousness of these losses, for the polish campaign, losses immediately after the surrender stood at 280 LW machines, with 273 damaged. Of those 273, 203 were eventually written off, but they don't show up as losses in the immediate returns for the LW straight away. These losses are quietly spirited away from view by the quartermaster, and then eventually disappear while nobody is looking.

Same thing happened for the French campaign. There are 433 aircraft that were damaged in the French campaign that were written off, being dropped from the strength reports, weeks or months after the conclusion of the campaign.

Some of my figures are by deduction. Having worked out the total losses suffered by the LW based on

Cornewells figures, and then adding the write offs from other sources that were deducted months later, we arrive at a loss figure of 2500a/c lost on the western front September 1939 to June 10th​

We have fairly accurate losses inflicted by the RAF up to that time, as well as the Dutch, the Norwegians and other. by a process of subtraction from that raw, a figure of at least 1500 from the FAF is arrived at. That's a conservative figure and represents a minimum

 

[wuzak]

Higher critical altitude was for 92 oct fuel, lower for 100 oct fuel?

Different boost pressures to go with different fuels would explain different critical altitudes.

 

[Stig1207]

You have claimed that the LW lost "about 1000" airframes to the FAF, for an in-specific time period. You have quoted Murray with a figure of 1916, again time period not specified but that is a figure that is moving into the realm of the plausible.

No the 'about 1000' are the FAF victory claims. Murray's figure of 1916 destroyed and damaged to all causes is May-June 1940, look at the attached chart.

Cornewell quotes figures of over 2180 a/c LW aircraft lost in the west from September 1939 through to 10 June 1940. over 1800 a/c were lost 9 May to 10 june by the LW. After 10 June the situation becomes very confused, plus none of these sources account for airframes that managed to return, were sent back to the factories for repair, but were written off. That process could take months sometimes ,

Are you sure those are the figures Cornwell quotes? In case you didn't follow it the first time, I'll link it again:
Luftwaffe losses France, 1940 • Axis History Forum

Some of my figures are by deduction. Having worked out the total losses suffered by the LW based on

Cornewells figures, and then adding the write offs from other sources that were deducted months later, we arrive at a loss figure of 2500a/c lost on the western front September 1939 to June 10th​

We have fairly accurate losses inflicted by the RAF up to that time, as well as the Dutch, the Norwegians and other. by a process of subtraction from that raw, a figure of at least 1500 from the FAF is arrived at. That's a conservative figure and represents a minimum

So Cornwell does not specifically state that the FAF shot down 1500 enemy aircraft? What are these other sources, that Cornwell apparently missed?

 

[Smokey Stover]

I think the comment "France...tried to get the RAF to deplete its air strength ..." assumes the French thought the British were naive and altruistic, whereas the general assumption of the French government was closer to the British being selfish and untrustworthy: after all, it was the British who did nothing and even fought France in their attempts to limit German re-militarization. As for Stalin? This was a man who refused to believe Hitler would break their bilateral non-aggression pact, despite warnings, even after German troops were invading.

The RAF was in France to help Britain; helping France would be a side effect.

France lost for a mix of military reasons and domestic political ones, the latter probably responsible for many of the military ones, including the poor state of the French Air Force.

The fact remains, no matter how hard the French airforce had fought they simply didnt have the aircraft capable of even coming close to putting up a fight. The fact remains their best and most numerous fighter was the Morane Saulnier MS 406, and Dewoitine D.520
The Morane, although sturdy and highly maneuverable, it was underpowered and weakly armed. I will concede Britain at that time luckily had two of the most advanced fighter interceptors in the world. Not to mention a defence network that was unlike anything else. Plus i think there was a little more to it than just using France as a buffer. In the early days of May 1940 RAF Fairey Battles were thrown against German held bridges and ground forces, be it right or wrong. On the 14th May seventy-one British bombers took off; forty did not return. No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the Royal Air Force. The RAF lost 959 aircraft during the defence of France, of which 477 were fighters. The French also had all their hopes on the Dewoitine D.520 which coming so late in 1940 that pilots were simply not trained or savvy enough to make use of them. (Even though British Spitfire pilots had the same problem but faired a lot better)
Between May and June 1940, the German Luftwaffe overwhelmed the French Armée de l'Aire. While many French pilots such as Antoine Saint-Exupéry — author of The Little Prince — went on to fight for the Allied cause, most French warplanes fell into the hands of the French Vichy regime. So while the French Dewoitine fighters did see a lot more combat after the Battle of France, they mostly fought against the Allies.However the relatively lightweight liquid-cooled engine was prone to overheating and bulky underwing radiators created additional drag, causing the type to fly just below the desired speed of 332mph, which is questionable. The testers chastised the French fighter for its difficult handling characteristics compared to the 109. The D.520 had a tendency to fall into a spin and experience "brutal stalls." The Dewoitine's confusing control scheme also left it prone to cartwheeling while taxiing on the ground!. Between 85 and 106 Dewoitines were lost during the Battle of France — though only 28 to 32 fell in air-to-air combat. However the relatively lightweight liquid-cooled engine was prone to overheating and bulky underwing radiators created additional drag, causing the type to fly just below the desired speed. The rest were either destroyed on the ground, crashed or captured. So yes, imo the French airforce were about as effective as a chocolate fireguard. 33 units were equipped with the D.520. For what good they did they should have took out the guns and tried to stop the Germans on the ground like they should have in the beginning.....

Plus i think some of you guys have your German loss rates a little off. They swing wildly from 1000 to 2800? Please. The real number was around 1500 and i seriously doubt it was even that high.

 

[Shortround6]

Different boost pressures to go with different fuels would explain different critical altitudes.

The R1830-SC3G engine used a 7.15 blower gear and was rated on 87 octane fuel.

The Handbook (advertising brochure?) for the Hawk 75 lists the the R1830-S3C3G in print with the R1830-SC3G written in pencil.
The R1830-S3C3G used 8.0 supercharger gears and was rated on 95 octane fuel, however the list of P & W engines shows no users.
These engines seem to be the commercial equivalents of the R-1830-17 (SC3G) except the -17 was rated on 100 octane and the R-1830-23 (S3C3G)
used in ONE P-36B and then converted back to -17 specifications, also the -23 used 100 octane.
There is also a difference in that allowable max rpm may have changed. The -17 had no "military" rating for example.
Max take-off rpm was 2700rpm for all engines, Military Power, when given, was also at 2700rpm and in some case was only allowable with the higher grade fuels.
With the 87 octane fuel boost was restricted and in some cases it appears that max rpm was restricted to 2550rpm.

From a post war FAA type certificate sheet the SC3G engine was rated at 1050hp at 2700rpm for take-off using 42in of boost.
It was rated max continuous at 900hp at 2550rpm at 34in at 12,000ft. Max continous at sea level was 900hp at 2550rpm and 36in of boost.

This is all on 87 octane fuel.
The almost identical S1C3-G engine was rated on 91-98 octane (didn't exist pre-war may may substitute for either 95 octane or prewar American 100 octane?)
For take-off it gave 1200hp at 2700rpm at 48in. Max continuous at altitude was either 1050hp at 2550rpm at 39.5in at 7500ft or 1000hp at 2700rpm at 37.5in at 10,000ft.
The P & W data sheets say the S1C3-G engine was originally certified on 100 octane fuel and I would be pretty confident in say that was the American 100 octane prewar fuel.
P & W had used a different supercharger with higher gear ratios on the Mid 1930s R-1830 engines but once you get to the engines of 1000hp and more it seems they had gone to a larger impeller and pretty much stuck to the 7.15 gear ratio for single speed engines, at least the ones they built in quantity.
Changes in either strength of parts or cooling may have affected later engines in their ability to be rated at higher powers.

 

[tomo pauk]

The fact remains, no matter how hard the French airforce had fought they simply didnt have the aircraft capable of even coming close to putting up a fight. The fact remains their best and most numerous fighter was the Morane Saulnier MS 406, and Dewoitine D.520

These fact don't simply remain. The Curtiss Hawk was more numrous than D.520.

The Morane, although sturdy and highly maneuverable, it was underpowered and weakly armed. I will concede Britain at that time luckily had two of the most advanced fighter interceptors in the world. Not to mention a defence network that was unlike anything else. Plus i think there was a little more to it than just using France as a buffer. In the early days of May 1940 RAF Fairey Battles were thrown against German held bridges and ground forces, be it right or wrong. On the 14th May seventy-one British bombers took off; forty did not return. No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the Royal Air Force. The RAF lost 959 aircraft during the defence of France, of which 477 were fighters. The French also had all their hopes on the Dewoitine D.520 which coming so late in 1940 that pilots were simply not trained or savvy enough to make use of them. (Even though British Spitfire pilots had the same problem but faired a lot better)

MS.406 was not weakly armed, it sported a 20 mm cannon that fired heavy shells at excellent muzzle velocity, on very good RoF; plus two MGs. It was indeed lack of air defence network that was French undoing, along with doctrine and startegy. RAF did not use any Spitfires in combat above France. Actually, with no Spitfires in France, and just a number of Hurricanes, the air war above France was mostly French affair. UK opted to defend itself over UK, not over France.

Between May and June 1940, the German Luftwaffe overwhelmed the French Armée de l'Aire. While many French pilots such as Antoine Saint-Exupéry — author of The Little Prince — went on to fight for the Allied cause, most French warplanes fell into the hands of the French Vichy regime. So while the French Dewoitine fighters did see a lot more combat after the Battle of France, they mostly fought against the Allies.However the relatively lightweight liquid-cooled engine was prone to overheating and bulky underwing radiators created additional drag, causing the type to fly just below the desired speed of 332mph, which is questionable. The testers chastised the French fighter for its difficult handling characteristics compared to the 109. The D.520 had a tendency to fall into a spin and experience "brutal stalls." The Dewoitine's confusing control scheme also left it prone to cartwheeling while taxiing on the ground!. Between 85 and 106 Dewoitines were lost during the Battle of France — though only 28 to 32 fell in air-to-air combat. However the relatively lightweight liquid-cooled engine was prone to overheating and bulky underwing radiators created additional drag, causing the type to fly just below the desired speed. The rest were either destroyed on the ground, crashed or captured. So yes, imo the French airforce were about as effective as a chocolate fireguard. 33 units were equipped with the D.520. For what good they did they should have took out the guns and tried to stop the Germans on the ground like they should have in the beginning.....

Plus i think some of you guys have your German loss rates a little off. They swing wildly from 1000 to 2800? Please. The real number was around 1500 and i seriously doubt it was even that high.

Seems like that fact that cooling problems were remedied via installation of fuselage-mounted radiator on the D.520 is somehow lost on you.
Radiator of the D.520 were not any single bit bulkier than those of Bf 109, Spitfire, let alone Hurricane. The 'relatively light liquid-cooled engine' was not prone to overheating in series-produced D.520. Since when the D.520 featured "confusing control scheme"? More prone to ground accidents than Bf 109??

 

[Peter Gunn]

A P-36 exceeding 575 - 600 MPH in a dive? Uh... my guess would be "No".

As the posted excerpt from the book states, instrumentation in the late '30's early '40's left a bit to be desired and even the Thunderbolt never exceeded 600 MPH.

So my conservative estimate is that the P-36 could probably top 400 MPH in a dive. I believe even the P-51D was rated to 505 MPH dive speeds.

 

[parsifal]

Are you sure those are the figures Cornwell quotes? In case you didn't follow it the first time, I'll link it again:


"According to Peter Cornwell's "The battle of France then and now": between Sep 1939 to May 9 1940 Luftwaffe lost 354 aircrafts and 445 air crews killed or missing in the west, and between May 10 to Jun 24 Jun 1940, Luftwaffe lost 1814 aircrafts and 3278 air crews killed or missing in the west". There is then some debate as to whether the cut off date should 24 June. With regard to that last comment, I cant be sure. But 1814 + 354 = 2168
.
So Cornwell does not specifically state that the FAF shot down 1500 enemy aircraft? What are these other sources, that Cornwell apparently missed?

No he doesn't say 1500. I don't know that he did miss anything. He cannot list an aircraft still recorded as being "available" as being "destroyed". An aircraft sitting in the corner of a factory, or at the edge of a runway, a total wreck, but still being listed as "available" is a loss in my book, but in the context of accurate reporting Cornewell cannot do that. Until the LW quartermaster is going to admit that aircraft as a loss, its hard to show that it is, but it is still a loss.

This sort of chicanery is not limited to the germans. There are credible sources that report total French losses as 550-600 aircraft during the battle. The catch is the phrase "during the battle". in reality the LW forced out of the fight more like 2000 FAF aircraft, before the armistice. The RAF lost more like 900. The trick is to try and understand the aircraft listed as "damaged" and work out whether they ever actually were returned to service. Sometimes also a given report will not include aircraft listed as "missing" as a loss, though that's a lot less prevalent.

The annoying thing about the German returns is that their loss returns could be fairly slow. The LW would not automatically list an aircraft as lost unless
it had suffered more than 70% damage, but in reality anything with more than about 40% damage was very unlikely to ever fly again. but because of the relative paucity of repair facilities at the front, these heavily damaged units would be transported back to the factories to await " further assessment"....and there they would stay for months sometimes, still listed as being on strength , but without the slightest chance of ever flying again. There were differences between the LW system and those of the RAF (and I think the French). The RAF system, in the first instance, a higher percentage of aircraft were repaired at the unit repair facilities, but if an aircraft was so damaged as to be returned to a factory, it was removed from the strength lists. I think also that the RAF were more realistic in declaring when an aircraft was a write off . it is likely the French were the same