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MS.406 was not weakly armed, it sported a 20 mm cannon that fired heavy shells at excellent muzzle velocity, on very good RoF; plus two MGs. It was indeed lack of air defence network that was French undoing, along with doctrine and startegy.
"According to Peter Cornwell's "The battle of France then and now": between Sep 1939 to May 9 1940 Luftwaffe lost 354 aircrafts and 445 air crews killed or missing in the west, and between May 10 to Jun 24 Jun 1940, Luftwaffe lost 1814 aircrafts and 3278 air crews killed or missing in the west". There is then some debate as to whether the cut off date should 24 June. With regard to that last comment, I cant be sure. But 1814 + 354 = 2168
No he doesn't say 1500. I don't know that he did miss anything. He cannot list an aircraft still recorded as being "available" as being "destroyed". An aircraft sitting in the corner of a factory, or at the edge of a runway, a total wreck, but still being listed as "available" is a loss in my book, but in the context of accurate reporting Cornewell cannot do that. Until the LW quartermaster is going to admit that aircraft as a loss, its hard to show that it is, but it is still a loss.
This sort of chicanery is not limited to the germans. There are credible sources that report total French losses as 550-600 aircraft during the battle. The catch is the phrase "during the battle". in reality the LW forced out of the fight more like 2000 FAF aircraft, before the armistice. The RAF lost more like 900. The trick is to try and understand the aircraft listed as "damaged" and work out whether they ever actually were returned to service. Sometimes also a given report will not include aircraft listed as "missing" as a loss, though that's a lot less prevalent.
The annoying thing about the German returns is that their loss returns could be fairly slow. The LW would not automatically list an aircraft as lost unless
it had suffered more than 70% damage, but in reality anything with more than about 40% damage was very unlikely to ever fly again. but because of the relative paucity of repair facilities at the front, these heavily damaged units would be transported back to the factories to await " further assessment"....and there they would stay for months sometimes, still listed as being on strength , but without the slightest chance of ever flying again. There were differences between the LW system and those of the RAF (and I think the French). The RAF system, in the first instance, a higher percentage of aircraft were repaired at the unit repair facilities, but if an aircraft was so damaged as to be returned to a factory, it was removed from the strength lists. I think also that the RAF were more realistic in declaring when an aircraft was a write off . it is likely the French were the same
So my conservative estimate is that the P-36 could probably top 400 MPH in a dive. I believe even the P-51D was rated to 505 MPH dive speeds.
I disagreed with this post because I have never seen any evidence of deliberate misinformation being used post war. What was known during the war was claims, only the Poles and Germans knew their losses and it took years for the information to become known. Is there any evidence of deliberate post war misinformation by the British?The misinformation about LW losses serves the victorious (by that I mean British) post war image, who want to portray the BoB as the pivotal battle in which the LW up to that point won cheap and easy victories over the continent, and were not finally defeated until they met the RAF over SE England. For the germans its convenient as well, because it provides their personas with a victory that they can laud, when if the truth came out the myth of their invincibility would be exposed.
Yes, the Luftwaffe suffered considerable losses prior to the summer of 1940 but are you really suggesting that it was those losses that meant the difference between success and failure for the Luftwaffe? Not sure I agree with that line of argument. Yes, there were losses in experienced crews but it's not like the Luftwaffe had a declining number of Gruppe between September 1939 and June 1940...indeed Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5 which were responsible for the Battle were reinforced by units from Luftflotten 1 and 4 in Germany. Simply throwing yet more aircraft into the fray isn't going to win the Battle of Britain for Germany.
Then, as I acknowledge in my previous post, there is some discussion about when losses might apply. I can tell you that is not how I read Cornewells account present the information. Several other commentators that have also quoted those loss figures agree that it is 1814 + 354, and not 1814 – 354.
That account is contrary to John Foreman. In his book "1941 Part 2 – The Blitz to the nonstop offensive – The Turning Point, there is an account somewhere as to how the German repair system worked. I will concede that I now unsure whether a damaged unit sent back to a factory was included in the on strength numbers for the front line units, but it looks like they do. Costello, in his statistical references has a number of tables dealing with the LW, in which he has separate columns for available and serviceable for given units. "Serviceable" would generally be at about 50% of "available" numbers, even after periods of relative quiet.
As to the cut off being 60%, I don't think that is correct.
We don't even disagree on the effect of the lead in campaigns. What we disagree on is whether the British misrepresented known facts to boost their ego's. The RAF especially fighter command is always represented as a multi national force. At the climax to the Battle of Britain the British were desperately holding on against what they thought was a much stronger force than it actually was while the Germans were certain the British were down to their last 50 fighters. When British fighter production reached 500 a month the British thought they were approaching parity, in fact Germany was only producing 200. A staggering number of German losses for whatever reason occurred on their own airfields. The British in France Belgium lost aircraft in the air, destroyed on the ground and captured on the ground. The only way to make any sense of any of it was to examine records after the war but they are not complete, not presented in the same manner and in the case of East Germany and Poland especially were not freely available.It probably isn't deliberate misinformation, as a lack of in depth analysis.
I don't think ther is much evidence of deliberate misinformation, but there is a ton of poor information. The best myths that can stick are those with a half truth attached. It has always served British egos for them to be able to say they alone stopped the LW. in fact the truth is different to that. in part the LW stopped the LW, but so too were the losses they had already suffered before the battle with FC started. FC fought a near perfect battle and you are right that for the first time the LW was prevented from doing what they wanted. I think we agree on that. Where we differ is the effect of the lead in campaigns on the achievement of that win
Then I suggest that you do some further research on the Lw loss classifications before making sweeping conclusions.
I agree about the servicability issue; but while some unserviceable aircraft may be the result of combat damage that was deemed repairable at unit level, others would be unserviceable due to mechanical problems, etc.
Do you think that immediately after the war, and perhaps for 20 years after that, the popular histories were accurate in their reports for losses and effects of the battle?We don't even disagree on the effect of the lead in campaigns. What we disagree on is whether the British misrepresented known facts to boost their ego's. The RAF especially fighter command is always represented as a multi national force. At the climax to the Battle of Britain the British were desperately holding on against what they thought was a much stronger force than it actually was while the Germans were certain the British were down to their last 50 fighters. When British fighter production reached 500 a month the British thought they were approaching parity, in fact Germany was only producing 200. A staggering number of German losses for whatever reason occurred on their own airfields. The British in France Belgium lost aircraft in the air, destroyed on the ground and captured on the ground. The only way to make any sense of any of it was to examine records after the war but they are not complete, not presented in the same manner and in the case of East Germany and Poland especially were not freely available.
A bit of copy/ paste of my own:
Interesting discussion!
Mars
Quote:"According to Peter Cornwell's "The battle of France then and now": between Sep 1939 to May 9 1940 Luftwaffe lost 354 aircrafts and 445 air crews killed or missing in the west, and between May 10 to Jun 24 Jun 1940, Luftwaffe lost 1814 aircrafts and 3278 air crews killed or missing in the west"
Is the 1814 a/c LW losses really for 10.5. - 24.7.40? The reason I ask is that if it is for 3.9.1939 - 24.6.40 it would be in line of the numbers given by Groehler and Hooton, but if it is number for those lost 10.5. - 24.6.40 it is 386 - 413 a/c bigger than those given by the other 2 authors.
Juha
you are correct, Juha, it is for 3.9.1939 - 24.6.40 ,I got confused in those tables
They are quite obviously inaccurate otherwise everyone contributing to this thread would be in complete agreement. The question is which is correct. Everyone has a different take on things. From my side, in the Battle of France, almost the whole of France including its military were knocked out of the war in 10 weeks. That is a success that the German leadership would be willing to suffer high losses for. Kill ratios in the air were only a part of the story when airfields were being over run and their planes, spares, pilots and technicians were being captured en masse. That is not to detract in any way from the performance of the men defending their country, or to exaggerate the strength of the Luftwaffe, it wasn't the LW doing the most damage, they were just part of it.Do you think that immediately after the war, and perhaps for 20 years after that, the popular histories were accurate in their reports for losses and effects of the battle?
France was doomed no later than 3 June. The decisive battles that sealed her fate were fought 14 May to 26May. She succumbed for a number of reasons, some of them stretching as far back as 1917.They are quite obviously inaccurate otherwise everyone contributing to this thread would be in complete agreement. The question is which is correct. Everyone has a different take on things. From my side, in the Battle of France, almost the whole of France including its military were knocked out of the war in 10 weeks. That is a success that the German leadership would be willing to suffer high losses for. Kill ratios in the air were only a part of the story when airfields were being over run and their planes, spares, pilots and technicians were being captured en masse. That is not to detract in any way from the performance of the men defending their country, or to exaggerate the strength of the Luftwaffe, it wasn't the LW doing the most damage, they were just part of it.