Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

[pbehn]

I laughed at "trope", toilet paper word of the day, well over used

trope
[trəʊp]
NOUN

1. a figurative or metaphorical use of a word or expression.
   "both clothes and illness became tropes for new attitudes toward the self" · "my sense that philosophy has become barren is a recurrent trope of modern philosophy" · "perhaps it is a mistake to use tropes and parallels in this eminently unpoetic age"
   • a significant or recurrent theme; a motif.
     "she uses the Eucharist as a pictorial trope"

Now, any idea what it means? I havnt a clue.

 

[GrauGeist]

The word "trope" can have a vague application of an over used theme, but that's not it's primary definition.

 

[Schweik]

The P-40 in all of it's versions that saw service, did NOT have aerodynamic qualities that benefitted it's performance. It was a very capable aircraft and it's predecessor, the P-36, was a very maneuverable aircraft, well liked by it's pilots.

As was the P-40 by a lot of it's pilots, and was also maneuverable - per Jeff Ethel the most maneuverable American made fighter of the war.

Matter of fact, there were five different types of the XP-60...

You are perhaps accidentally forgetting that they also made numerous variations of the actual combat P-40 types.

Tomahawk / P-40C

Kittyhawk I / P-40E

P-40K

P-40F (late model) or L

P-40N

As should be obvious, aerodynamics changed from the early to the later types.

The point here, is that the P-40 was strong enough and solid enough that it was able to be a contender in battle. The true "trope" here, is the steadfast

Strong and solid doesn't cut it alone, if that was the case the Bf 110 would have been a world beater.

What gives it impressive victory numbers, is that it's nearly 14,000 airframes participated in every theater across the globe across the span of nearly five years.

If that was a valid argument, you could say the same thing about the 30,000 airframes of the Bf 109

S

 

[tomo pauk]

Well, that will teach David a lesson or two about P-40s, the aircraft he barely knows. Especially about the obvious things, like aerodynamics.

 

[Shortround6]

As should be obvious, aerodynamics changed from the early to the later types.

Aerodynamics changed significantly due to changing the reduction gearon the engine?
Adding 20in to the fuselage (but kept horizontal stabilizer and elevators at same relative position to the wing/CG)?
Aerodynamics changed by moving the carb intake from the top of the fuselage to the bottom on the Merlin engine examples?

yes they did to very minor extent/s.

However the compared to GrauGeist's post where the XP-46 (color photo) was an entirely new airplane, just used the same engine and the XP-60 used a new, larger wing with a different airfoil (not to mention changes in the fuselage to accommodate different engines/superchargers) the amount of change was minor.

 

[pbehn]

Reading the posts on the P-40 I find it hard to understand why production finished in 1944 and it was used in a training role. Was this a forward thinking practice to use your best types for training, as with the P-39?

 

[GrauGeist]

Waiting to hear how this variant was used in deep penetration raids, long-range escort and high altitude interception.

Oh wait! The USAAF already had one in service before this variant was made!

 

[Schweik]

I laughed at "trope", toilet paper word of the day, well over used

I don't appreciate the word 'toilet paper' friend. If you don't like the word "Trope", substitute what Jeff Ethel said: "the accepted History just isn't accurate."

I'm a history researcher on other time periods, far further back from the mid 20th Century. In ancient history, the word Trope means specific popular interpretations of certain types of stories. Kind of like literary cliches.

Spoiler: Segue about Tropes

David slaying Goliath is a trope. One common context is in Greek plays - certain stories tend to go a certain way and have a certain ending based on tradition and audience expectations. In a lot of academic literature, there are ongoing debates over whether historical events recorded in primary sources really happened the way it was written, or if they were written to conform to Literary (or oral tradition) tropes that were popular in the culture back then. There has been a lot of debate about Herodotus, whether he wrote Tropes or history, or Seutonious.

As another example, there was a long running debate about the Icelandic sagas as to whether they were telling true stories or Literary tropes. The best experts on the subject, academics in Iceland who spoke the language, insisted that these were totally made up stories, and therefore Literature ala Shakespeare or the Canterburry Tales, rather than any kind of history which they felt would reduce the stories to the status of Chronicles. Starting with the discovery of the L'Anse aux Meadows site on Newfoundland in the 60's, and now much more recently at least two others, we have come to accept that those documents were in part historically accurate.

In case anyone is interested in Tropes per say, this is a pretty good website which explains the concept and gives a lot of amusing examples from contemporary popular culture. They also have their own definition of the term as it relates to modern use. Personally I think Tropes exist but perhaps ironically, I don't think everything is a Trope and generally feel the concept is a little overused. It does fit in some cases though and I think it fits specifically in Aviation history.

I have a tendency to use shorthand terms sometimes i had no idea the word 'Trope' would set people off or be so confusing. Like many of you, I have an amateur interest in Aviation history, I know we have some pilots and professionals here too. I have done serious academic research in other fields myself but for aircraft, it's a hobby for me. And like many others here, I read the books written in the post-war period, in the 60's and 70's and 80's, and took them at face value. However, I learned over time that not everything in those books was accurate. Some new data started to appear in the 90's and with the onset of the internets, we have a plethora of new data. Sites like ww2aircraftperformance.org aggregating ww2 era documents for example, or Shores most recent work, or this forum where many things come to light.

In the last twenty years or so I have learned many of the things I read in books in my youth were incorrect. For example I learned that P-39s were not primarily used as anti-tank weapons by the Soviets, but rather, for the most part, as air superiority fighters. I learned that the US didn't even ship them AP / anti-tank ammunition for their 37mm gun. That was a part of the inaccurate "accepted History" as Jeff Ethel put it. New data and sources, for example Soviet sources, helped us dispel some of these specific legends or whatever you pefer to call them, but they often have a certain inertia because "accepted History" becomes part of a general narrative that people become comfortable with. The whole notion that the Soviets used P-39s exclusively for CAS was a way to explain why the Soviets did so much better with that fighter than the Americans who actually designed and built it.

I think, similarly, some people are really invested in what I would call the Trope of German superiority in all things and don't like the notion that lots of German pilots were shot down by Soviet pilots. This too, touches on wider themes.

Schweik, air forces also have an interest in propaganda, and aces were, to some extent, the automatic box office heroes of the day.

Quite true, but for their internal records it was important for commanders to know how many enemy aircraft they were actually destroying. You can't make new plans if you don't know the results of your previous efforts. There was tension between these two agendas (and many others) and this helps explain why overclaiming did vary from time to time even in the same Theater.

But I think the implication that the Soviets overclaimed by some wild amount like 20 to 1 is not in fact supported by the evidence. Nor the Commonwealth. They did overclaim but not always and not by a huge amount. As i said the typical ratio seems to be about 3-1 across the board.

S

 

[Schweik]

Reading the posts on the P-40 I find it hard to understand why production finished in 1944 and it was used in a training role. Was this a forward thinking practice to use your best types for training, as with the P-39?

If anyone here had claimed that the P-40 was the best type in 1944 that would be a devastatingly effective argument.

Maybe you got confused with another discussion Thread somewhere else?

Or maybe the numbers rub you the wrong way for some reason so you feel the need to win an argument nobody is actually making. Who knows, maybe this site is wildly inaccurate. All I can say is that some of the numbers correspond with some of my other sources but those are secondary literature at best (Osprey books).

I'm eager to learn more hard numbers or pertinent data if you or anyone else has them. The Hurricane figure is quite impressive and interesting.

S

 

[Schweik]

Waiting to hear how this variant was used in deep penetration raids, long-range escort and high altitude interception.

Oh wait! The USAAF already had one in service before this variant was made!

Never claimed it was friend. For the record I stipulate that the P-51 was vastly better than any other Allied type for deep penetration raids, long-range escort and high altitude interception*. I don't believe I ever said anything that contradicts that.

S

* some Spitfire or P-47 variants may have been better in this role. But certainly not the P-40.

 

[pbehn]

If anyone here had claimed that the P-40 was the best type in 1944 that would be a devastatingly effective argument.

Maybe you got confused with another discussion Thread somewhere else?

Or maybe the numbers rub you the wrong way for some reason so you feel the need to win an argument nobody is actually making. Who knows, maybe this site is wildly inaccurate. All I can say is that some of the numbers correspond with some of my other sources but those are secondary literature at best (Osprey books).

I'm eager to learn more hard numbers or pertinent data if you or anyone else has them. The Hurricane figure is quite impressive and interesting.

S

If you are a history researcher I would respectfully suggest that the biggest "game changer" in the performance of the Spitfire against the Bf-109 in 1940 to 41 was the change in commanders from Dowding/Park to Leigh Mallory. Park performed his role as "general" of 11 group as close as anyone in military history to tactical and operational perfection, Leigh Mallory was an incompetent idiot un fit for the role, and unaware what the role was. You will never ever produce any "number" that rubs me up the wrong way because they are not my interest, I view history in a different way.

 

[GrauGeist]

If that was a valid argument, you could say the same thing about the 30,000 airframes of the Bf 109

In regards to this statement, Messerschmitt spent a tremendous amount of time and effort to improve the Bf109, which was another 1930's design that was being edged out by newer types.
In the end, the Bf109 had to remain in front line service as Germany was not able to bring a new type into full production, so the Bf109's numbers (and victories) reflect that service from 1937 until 1945.

 

[pbehn]

In regards to this statement, Messerschmitt spent a tremendous amount of time and effort to improve the Bf109, which was another 1930's design that was being edged out by newer types.
In the end, the Bf109 had to remain in front line service as Germany was not able to bring a new type into full production, so the Bf109's numbers (and victories) reflect that service from 1937 until 1945.

To me it doesn't reflect badly at all on any aircraft type that the nation which produced it had the wit and resources to produce a better one a year later.

 

[Schweik]

Aerodynamics changed (snip) ?

yes they did

Thank you yes, yes they did. If you look at a P-40B/C and a late model P-40K or P-40F and can't tell that there are substantial aerodynamic differences then you are not trying hard enough.

I'm no engineer, and yes I know they had the same wing (why wouldn't they- it was a very good wing design) but I am aware of how little it takes to actually affect aerodynamics.

I'm also well aware of the various abortive attempts by Curtiss to replace the P-40 as well as the general saga of that company.

S

 

[Shortround6]

I would be a little leery of the 70in of MAP and especially the 1700hp.

The 1700hp is for standard conditions. That is 59 degrees F at sea level with a certain percentage of humidity (dry) and sea level pressure at 760mm or 29.92 in of mercury. As the temperature goes up the air density and the power goes down for the same manifold pressure.
One book on car engines claims the difference in power between 32 degrees F and 100 degrees F is 12.5%.
The 70in is pressure and not actual airflow in either cubic ft per minute or pounds per minute. The last is what is really needed to figure power production.
The use of 70in of MAP is also highly dependent on aircraft speed as it depends quite a bit on RAM.

please look at this;
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/V-1710_Service_Use_of_High_Power_Outputs.pdf

The ability to hit 70in of pressure is at very low levels only and only at high forward speed or by over revving the engine (or both).
Please note that without ram for all the talk about 1700hp and up the engine was down to around 1500hp at 5000ft at 3000rpm. At 5000ft the supercharger can not come close to supplying 70in of map.

 

[Schweik]

If you are a history researcher I would respectfully suggest that the biggest "game changer" in the performance of the Spitfire against the Bf-109 in 1940 to 41 was the change in commanders from Dowding/Park to Leigh Mallory. Park performed his role as "general" of 11 group as close as anyone in military history to tactical and operational perfection, Leigh Mallory was an incompetent idiot un fit for the role, and unaware what the role was.

I wonder which commander was responsible for switching to the wingmen / finger 4 type system (and it's variants) that was certainly a major improvement that came a little late. One thing I noticed reading about the Western Desert was that some of the important Tactical and Operational changes actually bubbled up from below. Clive Caldwell seems to have been the first suggest (or more precisely insist) that it made more sense to put bombs on the Tomahawks and Hurricanes than to escort Blenheims at 100 mph. And I already mentioned his innovation for gunnery training.

But certainly leadership does play an important role, it's one of many relevant factors to the success of a given unit in a given Theater.

You will never ever produce any "number" that rubs me up the wrong way because they are not my interest, I view history in a different way.

One thing that i have learned in doing research on my own period for about 20 years, is that it helps a lot if you can learn to view things from a variety of different perspectives. For example many people view history through the lens of "great men", there is even a whole body of theory based on this idea, dating back to the 19th Century.

For me, no historical model is iron clad, all theories and systems are provisional. History often fails to conform to theories and then it's always tempting to filter the data to better fit the model. I think it works better if you do it the other way around. Models, theories, and historical approaches are useful tools. I once learned a great deal in my own field from reading a book about salt. But I try not to be too welded to any one approach. I don't necessarily agree with 'great man' theory but I don't dismiss it outright either. The War in the Desert would have probably been different if Rommel hadn't been in charge of the Arfika Korps. Then again the availability of more or less fuel, inferior or superior tanks, and an extra division or two on one side or the other could also affect the outcome.

When it comes to WW2 aircraft, I think the technical specifications of the planes, the training of the pilots, their leadership as you pointed out, the maintenance, supply and ground conditions, and the nature of the fighting are all relevant. That is one of the reasons why I think it's better to consider a fighter or bomber in the context of the Theater rather than making broad generalizations. The Spitfire did better over England than it did in Burma or Darwin. The P-39 did better in Russia than in either of those places.

For sources, pilot interviews, commanders memoirs, day to day records of operations, corporate and government memos, archeological data, old photographs and film footage, and various forms of analysis (like comparing victory claims to loss ratios) are all valuable sources. General interpretations and theories sometimes have more to tell us about the time and place they were written than about the historical subject they cove. The histories which do rise above that are the ones which become widely read and renowned among scholars.

S

 

[Schweik]

I would be a little leery of the 70in of MAP and especially the 1700hp.

(snip)

please look at this;
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/V-1710_Service_Use_of_High_Power_Outputs.pdf

The ability to hit 70in of pressure is at very low levels only and only at high forward speed or by over revving the engine (or both).
Please note that without ram for all the talk about 1700hp and up the engine was down to around 1500hp at 5000ft at 3000rpm. At 5000ft the supercharger can not come close to supplying 70in of map.

Shortround, I am very familiar with that document, thank you! I highly recommend you read this document.

E-GEH-16

In particular I bring to your attention items 33 and 36:

" 33. This aircraft is powered with the Allison 1710-39 engine having a rated power of 1150 H.P. at 3000 R.P.M. and 44" Hg. at 12,000 ft. The engine was originally equipped with an automatic boost control limiting the manifold pressure at the lower altitudes to 44". The British remove this so as to get the vastly increased performance at lower altitudes thru the judicious use of over-boost. As has been mentioned before, they have had exceptionally good service out of these engines and due to its smoothness at low RPM's, they are able to operate it so as to obtain a remarkably low fuel consumption giving them an operational range greater than any single engine fighter they possess (the fact that the Merlin engine will not run well below 1600 prevents them from obtaining an equivalent low fuel consumption and therefore limits its usefulness for similar operations).

36. In view of the British operation and the fact that we have an approved war emergency rating on the 1710-39 engine of 56", it is suggested that immediate steps be taken to remove the automatic boost controls from our P-51 airplanes in this theatre and that the instrument dials be marked with the proper lights. The British have operated at full throttle at sea level (72" Hg) for as much as 20 min. at a time without hurting the engines. According to them, the Allison is averaging 1500 hours between bearing failures as compared to 500 to 600 hours for the Merlin. The Allison, they have found, will drag them home even with the bearing ruined. "

Bold emphasis was added by me.

In my opinion this further corroborates the practices described in the Allison memo, and in fact expands on it a bit. As you are well aware the V-1710-39 is the same engine used in the P-40E.

S

 

[pbehn]

I wonder which commander was responsible for switching to the wingmen / finger 4 type system (and it's variants) that was certainly a major improvement that came a little late. One thing I noticed reading about the Western Desert was that some of the important Tactical and Operational changes actually bubbled up from below. Clive Caldwell seems to have been the first suggest (or more precisely insist) that it made more sense to put bombs on the Tomahawks and Hurricanes than to escort Blenheims at 100 mph. And I already mentioned his innovation for gunnery training.

But certainly leadership does play an important role, it's one of many relevant factors to the success of a given unit in a given Theater.



One thing that i have learned in doing research on my own period for about 20 years, is that it helps a lot if you can learn to view things from a variety of different perspectives. For example many people view history through the lens of "great men", there is even a whole body of theory based on this idea, dating back to the 19th Century.

For me, no historical model is iron clad, all theories and systems are provisional. History often fails to conform to theories and then it's always tempting to filter the data to better fit the model. I think it works better if you do it the other way around. Models, theories, and historical approaches are useful tools. But you shouldn't be too welded to any one. I don't necessarily disagree with 'great man' theory but I don't dismiss it outright either. The War in the Desert would have probably been different if Rommel hadn't been in charge of the Arfika Korps. Then again the availability of more or less fuel, inferior or superior tanks, and an extra division or two on one side or the other could also affect the outcome.

When it comes to WW2 aircraft, I think the technical specifications of the planes, the training of the pilots, their leadership as you pointed out, the maintenance, supply and ground conditions, and the nature of the fighting are all relevant. That is one of the reasons why I think it's better to consider a fighter or bomber in the context of the Theater rather than making broad generalizations. The Spitfire did better over England than it did in Burma or Darwin. The P-39 did better in Russia than in either of those places.

For sources, pilot interviews, commanders memoirs, day to day records of operations, corporate and government memos, archeological data, old photographs and film footage, and various forms of analysis (like comparing victory claims to loss ratios) are all valuable sources. General interpretations and theories sometimes have more to tell us about the time and place they were written than about the historical subject they cove. The histories which do rise above that are the ones which become widely read and renowned among scholars.

S

So it isn't all about numbers then? That is why no number "rubs me up the wrong way". One pilots anecdote about an aircrafts handling doesn't change anything, neither does one anecdote in a aerial victory. A war is a meeting of national forces using all they have at hand to win. The Hurricane set the base level of performance in 1939 (the Spitfire was only just an operational type). By 1940 the Spitfire was taking over the "base level" but the UK was out producing Germany in single engine fighters, this meant that Germany had to produce much better fighters or lose the game. This is only discussing combat between UK and Germany, by 1941 Germany had taken on Russia and at the end of 1941 also the USA.

 

[Schweik]

So it isn't all about numbers then? That is why no number "rubs me up the wrong way".

Any number, whether it's top speed, roll rate, production totals or total victory claims, is just another data point. It's the combination of different data that make the picture. And the picture does always change at least a little.

As for the idea that it rubbed you the wrong way, all I did was link to and mention the total number of victories by type when the subject came up. I was surprised by that list, and I thought it was pretty interesting. Then all the sudden several people including yourself started making snarky posts. That the number bothered you was my best guess.

One pilots anecdote about an aircrafts handling doesn't change anything, neither does one anecdote in a aerial victory.

No but the commentary of say, a dozen of the top aces for a given Theater might carry a bit more weight. The plural of anecdote is not a statistic, but when it comes to this kind of war where a small number of people can be so influential on the outcome of the battle, it isn't something you just dismiss outright, in my opinion. 15 experten in North Africa scored well over half of the victory claims in that Theater, for example. On the other hand, one Australian pilot seems to have shot down 4 of those experten* and killed two of them, another Canadian ace shot down two more and killed another. So I feel like these fellows were significant to the Air War in this Theater and value their analysis.

Nothing is decisive needless to say. But even small details can be relevant. Something like learning about the aileron problem with the P-51A / A-36 / Mustang I / Mustang II / F-6A / F-6B did help me understand some larger issues.

S

* These "experten" were:
Leutnant Heinz Schmidt of JG 27, 26 June 1941
Haptmann Wolfgangg Lippert (KIA), Gruppenkommandeur of II.JG27, 29 August 1941
Haputman Ergo Graf von Kageneck (KIA) (claimed as 'damaged'), III.JG27, 24 December 1941
Leutnant Arnold Stahlschmidt I./JG 27, Feruary 1942

Caldwell also fought off experten Leutnent Werner Schorer, severely damaging his Bf 109E7, and shot down his wingman in a heavily damaged P-40 after being bounced and wounded.

 

[pbehn]

Any number, whether it's top speed, roll rate, production totals or total victory claims, is just another data point. It's the combination of different data that make the picture. And the picture does always change at least a little.

As for the idea that it rubbed you the wrong way, all I did was link to and mention the total number of victories by type when the subject came up. I was surprised by that list, and I thought it was pretty interesting. Then all the sudden several people including yourself started making snarky posts. That the number bothered you was my best guess.



No but the commentary of say, a dozen of the top aces for a given Theater might carry a bit more weight. The plural of anecdote is not a statistic, but when it comes to this kind of war where a small number of people can be so influential on the outcome of the battle, it isn't something you just dismiss outright, in my opinion. 15 experten in North Africa scored well over half of the victory claims in that Theater, for example. On the other hand, one Australian pilot seems to have shot down 4 of those experten* and killed two of them, another Canadian ace shot down two more and killed another. So I feel like these fellows were significant to the Air War in this Theater and value their analysis.

Nothing is decisive needless to say. But even small details can be relevant. Something like learning about the aileron problem with the P-51A / A-36 / Mustang I / Mustang II / F-6A / F-6B did help me understand some larger issues.

S

* These "experten" were:
Leutnant Heinz Schmidt of JG 27, 26 June 1941
Haptmann Wolfgangg Lippert (KIA), Gruppenkommandeur of II.JG27, 29 August 1941
Haputman Ergo Graf von Kageneck (KIA) (claimed as 'damaged'), III.JG27, 24 December 1941
Leutnant Arnold Stahlschmidt I./JG 27, Feruary 1942

Caldwell also fought off experten Leutnent Werner Schorer, severely damaging his Bf 109E7, and shot down his wingman in a heavily damaged P-40 after being bounced and wounded.

Thanks for producing an individual anecdote to prove your point, or were you proving mine?