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tropeI laughed at "trope", toilet paper word of the day, well over used
The P-40 in all of it's versions that saw service, did NOT have aerodynamic qualities that benefitted it's performance. It was a very capable aircraft and it's predecessor, the P-36, was a very maneuverable aircraft, well liked by it's pilots.
Matter of fact, there were five different types of the XP-60...
The point here, is that the P-40 was strong enough and solid enough that it was able to be a contender in battle. The true "trope" here, is the steadfast
What gives it impressive victory numbers, is that it's nearly 14,000 airframes participated in every theater across the globe across the span of nearly five years.
As should be obvious, aerodynamics changed from the early to the later types.
I laughed at "trope", toilet paper word of the day, well over used
Schweik, air forces also have an interest in propaganda, and aces were, to some extent, the automatic box office heroes of the day.
Reading the posts on the P-40 I find it hard to understand why production finished in 1944 and it was used in a training role. Was this a forward thinking practice to use your best types for training, as with the P-39?
Waiting to hear how this variant was used in deep penetration raids, long-range escort and high altitude interception.
Oh wait! The USAAF already had one in service before this variant was made!
If you are a history researcher I would respectfully suggest that the biggest "game changer" in the performance of the Spitfire against the Bf-109 in 1940 to 41 was the change in commanders from Dowding/Park to Leigh Mallory. Park performed his role as "general" of 11 group as close as anyone in military history to tactical and operational perfection, Leigh Mallory was an incompetent idiot un fit for the role, and unaware what the role was. You will never ever produce any "number" that rubs me up the wrong way because they are not my interest, I view history in a different way.If anyone here had claimed that the P-40 was the best type in 1944 that would be a devastatingly effective argument.
Maybe you got confused with another discussion Thread somewhere else?
Or maybe the numbers rub you the wrong way for some reason so you feel the need to win an argument nobody is actually making. Who knows, maybe this site is wildly inaccurate. All I can say is that some of the numbers correspond with some of my other sources but those are secondary literature at best (Osprey books).
I'm eager to learn more hard numbers or pertinent data if you or anyone else has them. The Hurricane figure is quite impressive and interesting.
S
In regards to this statement, Messerschmitt spent a tremendous amount of time and effort to improve the Bf109, which was another 1930's design that was being edged out by newer types.If that was a valid argument, you could say the same thing about the 30,000 airframes of the Bf 109
To me it doesn't reflect badly at all on any aircraft type that the nation which produced it had the wit and resources to produce a better one a year later.In regards to this statement, Messerschmitt spent a tremendous amount of time and effort to improve the Bf109, which was another 1930's design that was being edged out by newer types.
In the end, the Bf109 had to remain in front line service as Germany was not able to bring a new type into full production, so the Bf109's numbers (and victories) reflect that service from 1937 until 1945.
Aerodynamics changed (snip) ?
yes they did
If you are a history researcher I would respectfully suggest that the biggest "game changer" in the performance of the Spitfire against the Bf-109 in 1940 to 41 was the change in commanders from Dowding/Park to Leigh Mallory. Park performed his role as "general" of 11 group as close as anyone in military history to tactical and operational perfection, Leigh Mallory was an incompetent idiot un fit for the role, and unaware what the role was.
You will never ever produce any "number" that rubs me up the wrong way because they are not my interest, I view history in a different way.
I would be a little leery of the 70in of MAP and especially the 1700hp.
(snip)
please look at this;
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/V-1710_Service_Use_of_High_Power_Outputs.pdf
The ability to hit 70in of pressure is at very low levels only and only at high forward speed or by over revving the engine (or both).
Please note that without ram for all the talk about 1700hp and up the engine was down to around 1500hp at 5000ft at 3000rpm. At 5000ft the supercharger can not come close to supplying 70in of map.
So it isn't all about numbers then? That is why no number "rubs me up the wrong way". One pilots anecdote about an aircrafts handling doesn't change anything, neither does one anecdote in a aerial victory. A war is a meeting of national forces using all they have at hand to win. The Hurricane set the base level of performance in 1939 (the Spitfire was only just an operational type). By 1940 the Spitfire was taking over the "base level" but the UK was out producing Germany in single engine fighters, this meant that Germany had to produce much better fighters or lose the game. This is only discussing combat between UK and Germany, by 1941 Germany had taken on Russia and at the end of 1941 also the USA.I wonder which commander was responsible for switching to the wingmen / finger 4 type system (and it's variants) that was certainly a major improvement that came a little late. One thing I noticed reading about the Western Desert was that some of the important Tactical and Operational changes actually bubbled up from below. Clive Caldwell seems to have been the first suggest (or more precisely insist) that it made more sense to put bombs on the Tomahawks and Hurricanes than to escort Blenheims at 100 mph. And I already mentioned his innovation for gunnery training.
But certainly leadership does play an important role, it's one of many relevant factors to the success of a given unit in a given Theater.
One thing that i have learned in doing research on my own period for about 20 years, is that it helps a lot if you can learn to view things from a variety of different perspectives. For example many people view history through the lens of "great men", there is even a whole body of theory based on this idea, dating back to the 19th Century.
For me, no historical model is iron clad, all theories and systems are provisional. History often fails to conform to theories and then it's always tempting to filter the data to better fit the model. I think it works better if you do it the other way around. Models, theories, and historical approaches are useful tools. But you shouldn't be too welded to any one. I don't necessarily disagree with 'great man' theory but I don't dismiss it outright either. The War in the Desert would have probably been different if Rommel hadn't been in charge of the Arfika Korps. Then again the availability of more or less fuel, inferior or superior tanks, and an extra division or two on one side or the other could also affect the outcome.
When it comes to WW2 aircraft, I think the technical specifications of the planes, the training of the pilots, their leadership as you pointed out, the maintenance, supply and ground conditions, and the nature of the fighting are all relevant. That is one of the reasons why I think it's better to consider a fighter or bomber in the context of the Theater rather than making broad generalizations. The Spitfire did better over England than it did in Burma or Darwin. The P-39 did better in Russia than in either of those places.
For sources, pilot interviews, commanders memoirs, day to day records of operations, corporate and government memos, archeological data, old photographs and film footage, and various forms of analysis (like comparing victory claims to loss ratios) are all valuable sources. General interpretations and theories sometimes have more to tell us about the time and place they were written than about the historical subject they cove. The histories which do rise above that are the ones which become widely read and renowned among scholars.
S
So it isn't all about numbers then? That is why no number "rubs me up the wrong way".
One pilots anecdote about an aircrafts handling doesn't change anything, neither does one anecdote in a aerial victory.
Thanks for producing an individual anecdote to prove your point, or were you proving mine?Any number, whether it's top speed, roll rate, production totals or total victory claims, is just another data point. It's the combination of different data that make the picture. And the picture does always change at least a little.
As for the idea that it rubbed you the wrong way, all I did was link to and mention the total number of victories by type when the subject came up. I was surprised by that list, and I thought it was pretty interesting. Then all the sudden several people including yourself started making snarky posts. That the number bothered you was my best guess.
No but the commentary of say, a dozen of the top aces for a given Theater might carry a bit more weight. The plural of anecdote is not a statistic, but when it comes to this kind of war where a small number of people can be so influential on the outcome of the battle, it isn't something you just dismiss outright, in my opinion. 15 experten in North Africa scored well over half of the victory claims in that Theater, for example. On the other hand, one Australian pilot seems to have shot down 4 of those experten* and killed two of them, another Canadian ace shot down two more and killed another. So I feel like these fellows were significant to the Air War in this Theater and value their analysis.
Nothing is decisive needless to say. But even small details can be relevant. Something like learning about the aileron problem with the P-51A / A-36 / Mustang I / Mustang II / F-6A / F-6B did help me understand some larger issues.
S
* These "experten" were:
Leutnant Heinz Schmidt of JG 27, 26 June 1941
Haptmann Wolfgangg Lippert (KIA), Gruppenkommandeur of II.JG27, 29 August 1941
Haputman Ergo Graf von Kageneck (KIA) (claimed as 'damaged'), III.JG27, 24 December 1941
Leutnant Arnold Stahlschmidt I./JG 27, Feruary 1942
Caldwell also fought off experten Leutnent Werner Schorer, severely damaging his Bf 109E7, and shot down his wingman in a heavily damaged P-40 after being bounced and wounded.