Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

[Navalwarrior]

That is a little too simplistic.

The Army Directorate of Ground Support (Schlatter) was perhaps the earliest single most important driver to remove the Mustang from the clutches of Material Command. The Director- Military Requirements (Fairchild) also joined to move the AAF to the Mustang for Dive Bomber/attack fighter role leading to the A-36 and securing the P-51-1 from the RAF Mustang I order to fulfill both training and Observation/Recon 'hole' in Tactical Army Aviation. The impetus not only pulled the Allison Mustang into AAF but also escalated priority of Merlin based P-51B before the XP-51B was completed.

9th AF was the designated repository for all initial P-51Bs. Eaker didn't 'assign them' because they were not deployed to 8th AF. His sin was to not appeal to Arnold to get them. The first arrived in UK a month before Black Thursday - and Eaker was still convinced that the 8th could survive the impending attrition if he could just get the 600 heavy bomber inventory that he had fought for.

Pulling 354FG, then allowing trade for 357FG for P-47D equipped 358th FG, then pulling the 363rd FG was a decision by Spaatz and Doolittle in concert with Arnold approval. The 354th and 363rd went back under 9th/TAC in late May 1944

Resp:
Thanks for the correction on Merlin Mustang arrival in the ETO. I was under the impression that Gen Eaker placed his faith in the YB-40, a super-gunned B-17 in mid 1943 . . . rather than fighter escort. The commander of Bombers made a formal request in 'writing' to Fighter Command for more escorts.

 

[drgondog]

Resp:
Thanks for the correction on Merlin Mustang arrival in the ETO. I was under the impression that Gen Eaker placed his faith in the YB-40, a super-gunned B-17 in mid 1943 . . . rather than fighter escort. The commander of Bombers made a formal request in 'writing' to Fighter Command for more escorts.

The YB-40 was introduced and died in Blitz Week due to the myriad issues. The emergency re-deployment of the 55th FG occurred after August 17, 1943 Schweinfurt mission.. He drove th

The failure to have Long Range Escort in mid 1943 had many, many mothers - least of all Eaker. His attitude was "I need them - but don't see them'. If you want the single most important driver in 1943, look to Barney Giles Asst Chief of Staff AAF when Arnold told him - solve the problem by December (1943).

Immediately after being tasked by Arnold in early July 1943, he tasked Material Command and NAA, Lockheed and Republic to increase internal fuel. The result was the 85 gallon fuse tank for P-51B, the 55 gal LE fuel tank and intercooler re-design for P-38J, and the increase from 305 to 370 gal for P-47 plus wing pylons and fuel feed which arrived in P-47D-25 and P-47D-15 respectively.

 

[Navalwarrior]

The YB-40 was introduced and died in Blitz Week due to the myriad issues. The emergency re-deployment of the 55th FG occurred after August 17, 1943 Schweinfurt mission.. He drove th

The failure to have Long Range Escort in mid 1943 had many, many mothers - least of all Eaker. His attitude was "I need them - but don't see them'. If you want the single most important driver in 1943, look to Barney Giles Asst Chief of Staff AAF when Arnold told him - solve the problem by December (1943).

Immediately after being tasked by Arnold in early July 1943, he tasked Material Command and NAA, Lockheed and Republic to increase internal fuel. The result was the 85 gallon fuse tank for P-51B, the 55 gal LE fuel tank and intercooler re-design for P-38J, and the increase from 305 to 370 gal for P-47 plus wing pylons and fuel feed which arrived in P-47D-25 and P-47D-15 respectively.

Resp:
I am aware of Armold's letter to Giles, and his contribution to fighter production. He made things move! I also have read Arnold's ltr to Giles in mid 1943. But I must digress to Eaker; he met with English leaders for drop tank (forget the date, but it was fairly early 1943) production, but failed to confirm the order. In the mean time he cancelled a request for drop tanks from the US, as he thought a local source would take care of it. Before Eaker realized his error, much time had expired. Result? Fighters without drop tanks. I could go on.

 

[fubar57]

Resp: Oh please do..........

 

[Navalwarrior]

Resp:
I am aware of Armold's letter to Giles, and his contribution to fighter production. He made things move! I also have read Arnold's ltr to Giles in mid 1943. But I must digress to Eaker; he met with English leaders for drop tank (forget the date, but it was fairly early 1943) production, but failed to confirm the order. In the mean time he cancelled a request for drop tanks from the US, as he thought a local source would take care of it. Before Eaker realized his error, much time had expired. Result? Fighters without drop tanks. I could go on.

Resp: Oh please do..........

Resp:
Eaker rarely met with RAF leadership. As a result, there was little coordination between the two Allied Air Forces. He and Hunter (fighter commander) were like two peas in a pod. Both were not very creative or entergetic. Arnold kept prodding Eaker for information on operations and specifics in mission results. Eaker gave vague and routine language that was difficult to understand. Replies were never timely (per Arnold). So Arnold made up forms that required listed spaces for specifies, what we today would call 'metrics.' It is unclear if Eaker understood what was being asked of him, as the forms rarely arrived with worthwhile information. (Just thinking aloud, did Eaker think if he was honest, the info would come back to haunt him?). Arnold left Eaker in command, but replaced Hunter and the Bomber Commander within 30 days of each other (was Arnold thinking Eaker was letting his subordinates slide? Not sure). If there was a lack of communication w Arnold, was there a lack of communication within Eaker's command? Oversight? It may have looked to Arnold that there was no oversight!

 

[GrauGeist]

Interestingly enough, Arnold was aware that the P-38E/F, starting with the late "E" (and the unarmed F-4-1-LO), had plumbing for droptanks in 1941.

 

[Navalwarrior]

Interestingly enough, Arnold was aware that the P-38E/F, starting with the late "E" (and the unarmed F-4-1-LO), had plumbing for droptanks in 1941.

Resp:
Actually, the F model, which was on the production line at the time of Pearl Harbor, was the only P-38 to be drop tank capable. The P-38Es were retro fitted. I have no knowledge of the F-4-1-LO either way. However, even though the P-38Fs were the first USAAF fighter to reach England, these same P-38s were sent to North Africa. Why, because with drop tanks they could quickly get there by flying them there. No need to put them on a ship.

 

[GrauGeist]

The E and F both were retro-fitted OR installed while being manufactured, as the plumbing design was in the works while they were being manufactured.
The F-4-1-LO is an unarmed E variant.
The G was the first to have the plumbing as production standard.

 

[Juha2]

Germans used drop tanks on their fighter biplanes in 1930s, US used external taks (both 'slipper' and drop-shaped) on their fighter biplanes in 1930s. Plus the Japanese on A5M Claude, at least....

Yes, and the VVS (Soviet AF) began use droptanks during the Winter War against Finland (30 Nov 1939 - 13 Mar 1940) to extend the combat radius of its fighters after sometimes heavy losses of its unescorted bombers.

 

[Navalwarrior]

The E and F both were retro-fitted OR installed while being manufactured, as the plumbing design was in the works while they were being manufactured.
The F-4-1-LO is an unarmed E variant.
The G was the first to have the plumbing as production standard.

Resp:
Inre to E & F; yes and yes. What is important is that it was ahead of other US fighters at the time, in having the capability of flying extremely long distances due to being drop tank capable. If it hadn't, there likely would have been no Yamamoto shoot down. History would have been very different.

 

[fubar57]

The P-38s on the Yamamoto raid carried a one off fuel load. Instead of the usual two 165 US gallon drop tanks, they used one 330 US gallon fuel tank and one 165 US gallon tanl

 

[Navalwarrior]

The P-38s on the Yamamoto raid carried a one off fuel load. Instead of the usual two 165 US gallon drop tanks, they used one 330 US gallon fuel tank and one 165 US gallon tanl

I have been trying to find out who and where these large tanks were made. They had to have been immediately available (read that they were flown in 'quick time'). So what was the logistics trail?

 

[Peter Gunn]

I have been trying to find out who and where these large tanks were made. They had to have been immediately available (read that they were flown in 'quick time'). So what was the logistics trail?

Seems to me I read they flew them in (330g tanks) from Australia but now I cannot find the reference for it and am now not sure who made them and why. If they were fabricated for this mission or not.

I agree though, without them there's probably no Yamamoto mission, although if he had lived I doubt there's much he could have done different, it wasn't like he was going to turn the tide by any stretch.

 

[Navalwarrior]

Seems to me I read they flew them in (330g tanks) from Australia but now I cannot find the reference for it and am now not sure who made them and why. If they were fabricated for this mission or not.

I agree though, without them there's probably no Yamamoto mission, although if he had lived I doubt there's much he could have done different, it wasn't like he was going to turn the tide by any stretch.

Resp:
If I recall correctly, the plan/execution had a short turnaround time frame, so I want to say the 330 gal tanks already existed/physically available. Likely built for another aircraft.

 

[drgondog]

Interestingly enough, Arnold was aware that the P-38E/F, starting with the late "E" (and the unarmed F-4-1-LO), had plumbing for droptanks in 1941.

Dave - Several sources including Bodie and DeWitt Coop point to the Lockheed-Kelsey collaboration to provide pylon, plumbing and pylons was not known to Arnold until deployment of 1st and 14th FG was being planned for 8th AF in March/April 1942.

General Bob Olds was the father of the initiative to hang drop tanks on fighters despite entrenched AAC attitudes. Kelsey first proposed to the Fighter Board that drop tanks be designed and provided for the P-36. Arnold rejected the notion for combat tanks but Olds didn't hear a NO for Ferry capability.

Olds provided the command authority for Kelsey to approach Lockheed in mid 1941. The result was a pylon, sway brace capability for first, the 165 gal, then 330 gallon tanks. Kits were produced and released in Feb 1942. About that time during a Fighter Conference hosted by Arnold - the highest priority was the development of combat tanks for high altitude operations - self sealing etc.

Arnold directed Kelsey when he (kesley) returned from UK tour with Spaatz to proceed with a program for development and test - to support Ferry ops to UK for 8th AF.

That is when Kelsey sprung the 'news' that he had already begun at Lockheed. That said, the 165 gallon tank was the last to pass Combat tests ~ August 1943. But the Ferry tanks were used in June-July 1942 Atlantic crossing for P-38.

 

[Navalwarrior]

Dave - Several sources including Bodie and DeWitt Coop point to the Lockheed-Kelsey collaboration to provide pylon, plumbing and pylons was not known to Arnold until deployment of 1st and 14th FG was being planned for 8th AF in March/April 1942.

General Bob Olds was the father of the initiative to hang drop tanks on fighters despite entrenched AAC attitudes. Kelsey first proposed to the Fighter Board that drop tanks be designed and provided for the P-36. Arnold rejected the notion for combat tanks but Olds didn't hear a NO for Ferry capability.

Olds provided the command authority for Kelsey to approach Lockheed in mid 1941. The result was a pylon, sway brace capability for first, the 165 gal, then 330 gallon tanks. Kits were produced and released in Feb 1942. About that time during a Fighter Conference hosted by Arnold - the highest priority was the development of combat tanks for high altitude operations - self sealing etc.

Arnold directed Kelsey when he (kesley) returned from UK tour with Spaatz to proceed with a program for development and test - to support Ferry ops to UK for 8th AF.

That is when Kelsey sprung the 'news' that he had already begun at Lockheed. That said, the 165 gallon tank was the last to pass Combat tests ~ August 1943. But the Ferry tanks were used in June-July 1942 Atlantic crossing for P-38.

Resp:
Thanks drgondog. Sometimes it is better if the boss isn't presented with a decision. It often works against you. "Sir, I was just thinking we might need to 'ferry' some aircraft quickly to a destination." Well son, you did the right thing by add extra tanks for fuel!"

 

[Navalwarrior]

Resp:
Thanks drgondog. Sometimes it is better if the boss isn't presented with a decision. It often works against you. "Sir, I was just thinking we might need to 'ferry' some aircraft quickly to a destination." Well son, you did the right thing by add extra tanks for fuel!"

Resp:
Even though Arnold was old school, he did pay attention to aircraft development, even aircraft that was used by the other services, such as when the prototype F4U clocked 400 mph with the P&W R-2800 radial engine level fight, circa 1940. Thinking about the coming conflict with Japan & Germany, it would be hard not to understand that this war would involve extreme distances. I am sure Arnold was aware of the 1939 restriction against incorporating 'drop tanks' on fighters. Gen Olds and Kelsey likely cemented Arnold thinking that he must ignore 'the ruling against drop tanks.' However, I think Arnold recognized the importance/significance that he must act, rule or no rule. Since Arnold may have been swayed by the phrase 'ferry tanks' when they were indeed 'drop tanks' (at some point), he probably thought that he could reply 'they are needed for ferrying aircraft to their destination' if ever challenged.
Strategic Bombing of Germany, whether it solely targeted military instillations, war production, communication centers or cities and agriculture areas . . . brought the war into Germany. However, during WWI Germany was largely untouched as the ground war was almost entirely fought in France. Yes, there were battles fought elsewhere, but either east or further south of France. And yes, the Germans lost sons & fathers, but the citizens got a free ride outside of the war zone. So I believe it was important that the Allies to gave them something to remember. Strategic Bombing brought the war home to Germany. The air war in the ETO was considered the most hazardous, by most historians.
We owe a debt of gratitude to the hundreds of thousands that made it happen!!

 

[michael rauls]

The p51 wins this hands down. Not that it wasn't an excellent aircraft but the post war legend that sprang up around it is, well, a legend. A few frequently printed examples; " the p51 was the only fighter that go make it to Berlin and back". Truth is by the time p51s were there in any significant numbers(early 44) the range of the p47d had been expanded to almost 700 miles(boxted airfield to Berlin is 589 miles) and of course the p38 had an even longer range with drop tanks. Another one of my favorites" the p51 turned things around durring big week" the truth: p51s acounted for about 80 kills durring big week, p47s and p38s almost 300.

 

[drgondog]

The p51 wins this hands down. Not that it wasn't an excellent aircraft but the post war legend that sprang up around it is, well, a legend. A few frequently printed examples; " the p51 was the only fighter that go make it to Berlin and back". Truth is by the time p51s were there in any significant numbers(early 44) the range of the p47d had been expanded to almost 700 miles(boxted airfield to Berlin is 589 miles) and of course the p38 had an even longer range with drop tanks. Another one of my favorites" the p51 turned things around durring big week" the truth: p51s acounted for about 80 kills durring big week, p47s and p38s almost 300.

No, actually Two P-51 Fighter Groups (354/357) accounted for 64.5 VC's destroyed, 11 P-47D Fighter Groups accounted for 78.0 and two P-38 FG's accounted for 10. Source USAF 85. Period February 20-25. What the P-51B did was basically kill LW ability to deploy T/E fighters with extremely heavy firepower out of range of Escorts - and be able to out perform the 109/190 escorts at 25-30K. Faster cruise, longer range, superior high altitude performance over the P-38 AND very difficult to identify.

As another illustration, five P-51FG (318.5), 9 P-47 Groups (316.) and 3 P-38 FGs (35) accounted for the 8th AF VCs (with 354/363 assigned from 9th, along with 4/355 and 357 FG) between 2-20 and 3-18-1944 and by June 1944 the Mustang FGs accounted for more victory credits than all the P-47 VCs from start of 8th AF combat ops in April 1943.

Next - P-51B/C with 85 gallon internal fuse tank and 110 gallon externals had greater combat radius than P-38K with 55 gal LE tanks plus 165 gallon external tanks and cruise about 40mph faster TAS at 25K. The P-38J was relegated mostly to either sweeps or intermediate escort in April-July timeframe.

Last - the P47D-25 with not only wing pylons/fuel feed of the -15, but also 370 gallons internal fuel, arrived in squadron numbers in July-August 1944, too late and too few to step up to LR escort as the P-51B/D groups were firmly entrenched.

 

[pbehn]

Not my area of expertise but when P-51s started arriving, there was not only a requirement for bomber escort but also a requirement to attack France on the ground as a build up to D-Day. Replacing P-47s with P-51s made perfect sense.