MOST OVERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII

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For the most overrated my vote goes to the A6M Zero.

I tend to agree - there was much hype about the Zero and its performance (Especially after Midway) but I believe much of that hype was based on propaganda (make your enemy look formidable and it serves well with the public when you win a major battle).

As we know "Bloody Shambles" does a great job in documenting the Zero's combat record early in the war, and although Zero equipped IJN units did well considering their logistic challenges, the end result did not coincide with the hype and as discussed many times before, there are many reasons for this.
 
The IJN (and IJA -with the more modestly performing Ki-43 at that) pilots deserve more credit than the Zero and did so in spite of some heavy limitations of their aircraft. (ironically, something closer to the qualities of the F2A-1 or F2A-2 might have been more formidable in their hands while retaining the extremely long range required to reach as far as the Zero managed: even without armor or self-sealing tanks, the F2A was still a more rugged aircraft built to take much higher G-loads and higher dive speeds all while having far lighter stick forces and -like most American fighters- having light ailerons with good roll rate at low speeds and retaining that quality at high speeds, while the Zero was more like the Hawker Hurricane in that respect)
 

I'm not sure I agree with you FLYBOYJ. After reading The First Team recently, I think the Zero was every bit as deadly as its reputation said. I believe the Japanese made a few errors in using it that really cost them. As was pointed out in The First Team, why would a Zero make a pass at an F4F and then pull up and away? If you are following a slower, slower climbing, less maneuverable airplane with no tail gunner, why wouldn't you just park on his tail and sit there and hose him until he went down or you ran out of ammunition? The Zero more than handled the vaunted Spitfire over Darwin and that was after flying a LONG way. I think there was a lot of luck for the Wildcat to hold its own against the Zero. The F4F happened to have the right weapon for the job, with a good rate of fire and enough ammo, it was tough enough to take a beating and keep flying, we just happened to teach our Navy pilots the art of deflection shooting and the Japanese using bad tactics, making firing passes at the F4F instead of parking on his tail and finishing him
 
I think the different training priorities should be taken into account. The IJN pilots were trained and encouraged to fight as individuals which is far less effective than fighting as a coherent unit. The Wildcat was able to do what it did because of its strength and good enough performance (but not great performance) but also because the pilots taught to support each other.
Had the IJN the same level of tactical training then I have little doubt the USN navy losses would have been a lot higher and the real capabilities of the Zero more apparent.
 
...making firing passes at the F4F instead of parking on his tail and finishing him
Several accounts by Japanese plots (Sakai's account comes to mind) where they did "park" on a Wildcat's six and literally emptied all their ammo into it with no "kill" for their effort.

Oblique passes allowed the Zero (or other IJN/IJA fighters) the opportunity to deliver engine strikes, hits on the cockpit/pilot and other vulnerable areas.

This can be compared to the frustration that Luftwaffe pilots had when attacking a P-47 from dead-astern and again, several accounts where they emptied their stores into the P-47 without bringing it down.
 

Sakai attempted to finish off "Pug" (can't remember his last name) with his 7.7 LMG, and couldn't do it (although from the description Sakai gave I'm not sure he could have gotten back to the airfield and landed) then he switched on his cannon and finished it off. But still, why make a pass and break off when there is little to no chance that an F4F could get away from you, especially if you are at low level?
 
"The Zero more than handled the vaunted Spitfire over Darwin"

Did it?
First is the tactical situation. If you conscientiously go after the bombers then you accept the chance of being 'bounced' by the accompanying escort and this is precisely what happened to 1 Fighter Wing on several occasions.
Then there is the woeful performance of the pilots of what were three very typical and ordinary mid war fighter squadrons. They couldn't hit anything. Peter Stanley has calculated that it took 9 gunnery passes to shoot down or write off a Japanese bomber. There were other systematic problems resulting from inadequate training and undeveloped tactical doctrine. Here we must be careful not to offend certain Australian Sacred Cows
None of this is the fault of the Spitfire, other problems were. Perhaps most notable was the unreliability of the Hispano cannons, meaning that often when a pilot had closed the range the cannon were no longer working and he was left with just four .303 machine guns. There were also well documented problems with the CSUs.
When all the combats over North West Australia are totted up we find that 1 Fighter Wing wrote off 28 Japanese aircraft (15 bombers, 7 reconnaissance aircraft and 6 fighters) for 28 Spitfires. This 1:1 ratio is about par for RAF fighter units in the early period of the war, similar to the Spitfire I in the BoB, and a lot better than the Spitfire Vs other major campaign in the 'lean forward' into France in 1941-42.
The Allies were victorious in numerous campaigns, even when the enemy fighters substantially and consistently outscored them. The air war in North Africa would be the best example. Both the Germans and Japanese seem to have espoused the notion that sheer will or mental strength in battle can overcome material shortages, but an air campaign is a numbers game, and the Allies had the numbers. In the end 1 Fighter Wing did enough.
Cheers
Steve
 
I think you partially made my point - just look at the combat record of the Zero when the dust settled. It had it's days of glory but those days were quickly minimized. Even though it was faster than the Wildcat (for example), we well know that much of the Zero's maneuverability, especially around the longitudinal axis went to hell when it reached higher speeds. Aside from it's ability not to be able to withstand combat damage, maintenance and component interchangeability (like many Japanese aircraft) was poor. A change in tactics quickly diminished the Zero threat. Like any fighter of the period it could always be deadly given the right situation. but the numbers at the end of the war don't remotely match it's reputation. We also have to consider that some consideration had to be given with the confusion between the Zero and Oscar.
 

Oh, you bring up another good point from The First Team. The ability of the Zero to take damage. For 35 years everything I have ever read said that a dirty look would cause any Japanese aircraft to burst into flame. The First Team talks about Zero's, Betty's and other Japanese planes limping back to base (during Guadalcanal campaign) shot to shreds but never burning. Or in the case of the Torpedo Squadron commander at Midway, Tomonagua or something like that, his plane caught fire but it blew out and he flew back to the Hiryu and led his 1 way mission against the Yorktown.

As far as the turning of the Zero going to hell over 300 mph. The guy who led the defense at Darwin did a head to head test against a Spitfire MarkV and said the Spitfire had no advantage at all over the Zero below 19 or 20,000 feet and only a little advantage above that. Someone posted the test on here somewhere
 
And these are specific incidents and I'm sure there were many, but in how many of these situations were these shot up aircraft repaired and placed back into service? Aside from technical and tactical errors, attrition consumed much of the IJN ad JAAF because of supply and interchanbility issues.
And that is probably true but the fact remains that the Zero COULD NOT maintain superiority. You could look at all the campaigns it flew and point to either tactical blunders or operational limitations. For this aircraft that was supposed to be the scourge of the Pacific, it was basically neutralized within a year into the war.
 

I would like to point out that that record is no better than an F4F-4 Wildcat flying from Guadalcanal. A plane with a climb rate that isn't much better than a B17. F4F-4 from Guadalcanal were also intercepting bombers, defending ships etc. I would think that the vaunted Spitfire, which always ranks in the top 1, 2 or 3 in greatest interceptors when they have a poll, would have to do better than an over loaded, underpowered, F4F-4
 

As I said, it depends on the tactical situation, tactics employed (the Spitfire wing brought Big Wing thinking in its baggage) and the training and ability of the pilots. The raw figures from a fairly minor stop/start campaign tells us next to nothing about the capabilities of either aircraft.
The record of the tropicalised Spitfire Vs in NW Australia compares well with Spitfires just about anywhere else in the world during the mid war period, and is substantially better than 1941-42 flying against the Bf 109 F which was a significantly better aircraft then the 'Zero'.
Cheers
Steve
 
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Because while you're sitting there pecking away at him, his wingman may be closing in on you for the kill.

Tactics are most often developed through trial and error and with the sturdy American fighters, the Japanese discovered (the hard way) that it didn't pay to camp out on their six and use up most (or all) of their ammunition to bring the aircraft down.
 
Part of the problem is that the engagements are too small to get a valid statistical analysis. Several squadrons or a group/wingwing vs several squadrons or a group/wing operating over a few weeks or months time can produce wildly (and I do mean wildly vs widely) different statistical numbers from several thousand planes operating over several years. They can produce wildly different numbers from a few squadrons or a wing/group operating in a different theater.

One also has to be careful when comparing different aircraft that you are really comparing like models and take into account local conditions. Not just tropical filters but decreases in performance due to temperatures affecting both power and lift.
 

I agree with the small groups can skew numbers and there simply weren't the numbers of aircraft in the Pacific that there were over East and Western Europe.

On the other hand, blaming a planes lack of performance on tropical filters etc isn't really fair. If a Spitfire has to wear a tropical filter to survive dusty conditions and it degrades its performance to below that of the Zero, which is flying from the same conditions, then that just means the Spitfire isn't as good as the Zero in that area. Is is no different then adding carrier equipment to an airplane. A land based Spitfire, based in England, with no tropical filter, might well whip a Zero 99 times out of 100. But they weren't based in England, the conditions were dusty, the filter was needed and the Spitfire did not cope well with the Zero in that setting.
 
Actually I was referring to comparing the F4F and the Spitfire but it is quite possible to make unwarranted assumptions on too little data.

Perhaps the British did screw up but the Spitfire used an updraft carb and had it's air intake on the bottom of the nose, not an ideal location for dirty conditions. The P-40 with Allison used down draft carb and air intake on the top of the nose. P-40s in North Africa needed with Allisons needed significantly fewer engine replacements than P-40s with Merlins (Low air intake) flying from the same or nearby air fields.

The Zero used an air intake at the top leading edge of the cowl. Luck or good planning? Or shortest distance to the down draft carb?
A number of Japanese aircraft had overheating problems due to too small openings in the cowl, testing planes in Japan's home climate doesn't prepare them for use in the tropics.

Without knowing actual times between overhaul's or replacement for the planes under consideration and knowing both the "normal" expected life and the life in difficult conditions ( how much dirty conditions shortened life) we can read too much or too little into accounts of shortened engine life or the need for filters.
With replacement engines/parts having to come from England trying to ensure that the engines lasted as long as possible was probably the right decision.

Perhaps somebody does know if the Japanese suffered shorter life for their engines in dirty conditions or perhaps it is better said, just how much shorter was Japanese engine life than "normal" conditions and what they did about it. Internal filters? Dirt trap in the curve leading to the carb? accepting shorter engine life and providing (or trying to) extra engines?

Apparently the Spitfires that went to Australia were predominately fitted with Merlin 46 engines (?) and while this gave better high altitude performance than the Merlin 45 it gave less power at low and medium altitudes and and for a period of time in question was limited to 9lbs of boost?
With tropical equipment and the Merlin 46 engine the Spit V may have been 1 min and 20 seconds slower climbing to 20,000ft than a MK V with a Merlin 45 without tropical equipment.
Perhaps the Zero was better in certain locations ( pilots were more likely to be combat veterans) but saying the Zero was better than "the vaunted Spitfire, which always ranks in the top 1, 2 or 3 in greatest interceptors when they have a poll" when the Spitfire in question was about the worst performing model in 1942 and "polls" often only consider the best models (MK XII with Griffon engine was being tested by the Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford at about the same time the Australians were trying to remove the Vokes filters from the MK Vs). This also rather shows the disconnect between what the RAF was using at home and what the Squadrons in the far east were using. Mk IX Spitfires leaving the factory in June of 1942 while the Australians were using MK Vs well into 1943.
See this website for more information: http://www.darwinspitfires.com/index.php?page=articles
 

I understand all the technical reasons you just laid out, but the terribly sad fact is that the F4F was at least 40 mph slower and around 2,000 fpm slower climb rate (that is probably very optimistic) flying from even more primitive conditions achieved around the same kill ratio. (They should have used unloaded B17's as interceptors at Guadalcanal. Without bombs they would climb about as fast as an F4F-4, were about as fast without bombs, and had better loiter time to orbit over the field, not to mention better defensive capability) The Japanese weren't exactly masters of resupply themselves, I doubt that the Zero's facing Darwin were factory fresh museum quality equipment. It's really kind've funny, but everyone makes excuses for the Spitfire when it comes to Darwin. No one makes excuses for the P39 getting whipped by the Zero and yet below 15,000 feet the P39 was about a match for the Spitfire or the Me109. Maybe, just maybe, the Zero was everything it was cracked up to be until 1943. It climbed great, had good firepower, unmatched low speed turn and exceptional range. I mean they flew to Darwin and fought until some of the Spitfires ran out of fuel and then flew home. Good thing the Japanese didn't have better fighter tactics
 
So how does that 40mph slower speed equate to a turning fight?

Very rarely does an encounter between warplanes means top speed is maintained for the duration. The top speed is good for the bounce and can be a great tool for getting out of trouble, but when the fur flies, it comes down to pilot skill and firepower.

The F4F proved that while it wasn't a record-setting thoroughbred, it was sturdy, reliable and packed a punch.

I might add that at the start of the war, the Japanese had extremely well trained pilots, most with combat experience. The U.S. pilots had training, but little experience and were at a disadvantage in terms of engaging the enemy. - especially on the enemy's terms. It would be quite a while before the U.S. and Allies were able to pick and choose where the fight would be. So with this in mind, the fact that the F4F not only stood up to the KI-43 and A6m, but had an impressive kill record to it's credit, speaks volumes about the Wildcat and it's pilot's determination.

As far as the B-17 comment goes, you're joking, right?
 

Yes the B-17 comment was tongue in cheek, but, did you know that during the Guadalcanal campaign it was actually suggested that B-17's fly CAP missions over I think the Enterprise battle group due to the shortage of fighters? It was a serious suggestion , but was not done. It was covered in The First Team

I think the main reason the Wildcat was able to deal with the Zero was: 1. US pilots were taught deflection shooting. Any Japanese plan within range was a fair target, they didn't have to get behind them 2. The F4F was tough. US pilots could take quite a beating waiting for an opportunity to get in a quick snap shot that would bring down a Zero 3. Zero pilots used poor tactics. With equal numbers they should have dropped down on the Wildcats and stayed on their tail unit they shot them down instead of making diving passes and pulling away.
 

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