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Even against inferior equipment?Not exactly. What mostly favored the outcome of the Battle of Philippine Sea was the radar, the skilled pilots in their brand new Hellcats and complete lack of the experience of their opponents, who were sent with small fighter cover and in groups.
Turkey Shoot was a consequence of well directed VFs, knowing where and when the prey will be, able to drop on them with altitude advantage. It was like a wolf feast over unaware lamb.
Could the same be said of the combat from the link ? Rabaul certainly had a radar installations, but its ability to guide Zeros was far inferior. Zero pilots were not complete newcomers with no experience, and could engage their opponents - of which they were aware and which did not possess complete advantage.
Agree to a point but some of those numbers need to be broken out by Squadrons and Groups and I'm pretty certain you'll find some of them were at least (I believe the 80th FG was one) 1: 1.5 until equipped with the P-38.Based on the linked book which contains both Japanese and Allied records (for RAAF wings, for USAF squadrons and Japanese air groups) Tainan Ku managed to bring down in a period of April 1 to November 15 1942 81 allied aircraft with 148 aircrews on boards.
Those were :
17 - P-40E Kittyhawks
5 - B-17 E/F Flying Fortress
38 - P-39 D/P-400 Aircobras
5 - A-24 Banshee
10 - B-25 Mitchell
1 - Lockheed Hudson
5 - B-26 Marauder
At the same time Tainan lost 18 machines to the allied fighters, 6 to bomber defensive fire, 2 were shot down by ground fire and 5 were written off. 8 were lost/became not operational by other, non combat reasons. So overall to direct combat actions Tainan lost 31 machines. 18 of those could be attributed to P-40 / P-39 pilots. That gives Tainan about 3 to 1 kill ratio for given period of time in fighter vs fighter combat in New Guinea.
If something was holding the line then I'd say it was P-40.
Mute point thenThey couldnt take it back becuase the Navy split the efforts between 3 areas (Port Moresby/New Guinea, Milne Bay and Guadalcanal) and air support could not be provided from Rabaul in any sufficient form except for attacks on Henderson Field. Otherwise Japanese had to travel over 1000 km to have a chance to bomb it. It wasnt until November 1942 that Kahili Airfield was constructed.
So of course they could not gain air superiority.
Because the Japanese did not design or pursue growth into the design, it couldn't keep up with newer opponents (you even covered that in your earlier post). There were also interchangeability, maintenance and operational issues with the aircraft as well.Because a fighter thats design is 6 years old cannot keep running forever against a newer and newer opponents makes it over rated ?
Actually the F6F was in use well after the war in reserve and training squadrons.Well, I'm sorry but what does it make of F6F ?
Fighter that entered service in late 1943 and by mid 1945 was already obsolete and being replaced by F8F ?
AgreeIn 1930s-1940s technology was quickly becoming old, with the amount of development and new discoveries the progress was tremendous.
Maybe its my lack of English understanding, as it is not my native language, but could you please what exactly you mean by this question ?Even against inferior equipment?
As you wish. I can break down the losses of the 17 P-40s and 38 P-39s/P-400s, though this is pretty tough work. Hope it will be appreciated.Agree to a point but some of those numbers need to be broken out by Squadrons and Groups and I'm pretty certain you'll find some of them were at least (I believe the 80th FG was one) 1: 1.5 until equipped with the P-38.
Well, considering the amount of requirements to satisfy Horikoshi did as much as he could, to envision the need of a Zero to tackle with P-38 and F4U is a bit too much to ask. Still, Horikoshi admitted that he did not design A6M specifically to fight in the Pacific War, if he knew of the Navy plans and possible changes then he would approach the topic differently.Because the Japanese did not design or pursue growth into the design, it couldn't keep up with newer opponents (you even covered that in your earlier post). There were also interchangeability, maintenance and operational issues with the aircraft as well.
Reserve and training squadrons ...Actually the F6F was in use well after the war in reserve and training squadrons.
Even though they were flying distances and were not newcomers (as you say) they were still flying against aircraft that they technically outclassed and many times came away inflicting higher losses then they received but still did not achieve victory - my point.Maybe its my lack of English understanding, as it is not my native language, but could you please what exactly you mean by this question ?
No apologies necessary and do appreciate the work - we could all learn from this.As you wish. I can break down the losses of the 17 P-40s and 38 P-39s/P-400s, though this is pretty tough work. Hope it will be appreciated.
In some cases I could not find details, so you have to forgive me.
That's what I was looking at with regards to some of the more successful P-39 operations, again thanks you for this list, I'll go though it when I have more time, I'm at break at work.April 6th, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-9 - Flt Lt Les Jackson - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
- Kittyhawk A29-32 - P/O Edmund Johnson - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
April 9th, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-24 - Sqd-Ldr John Jackson - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
April 11th, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-38 - Sgt Don Brown - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
- A6M2 V-109 - Flyer1c Tanji Jufuku - Tainan Ku (shot down by RAAF pilot)
April 17th, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-7 - Sqd-Ldr Barney Cesswell - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
- A6M2 V-122 - FPO2c Sakai Yoshimi - Tainan Ku (shot down by RAAF Kittyhawks)
April 18th, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-47 - Flt A.H Boyd - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
April 24th, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-43 - Oswald Channon - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
- Kittyhawk A29-29 - F/Sgt Michael Butler - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
- Kittyhawk A29-76 - Bob Crawford - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
April 28th, 1942:
- Kittyhawk A29-8 - Sqd-Ldr John Jackson -RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
- A6M2 V-110 - FPO3c Maeda Yoshimitsu - Tainan Ku
April 30th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7128 - 1/Lt Edward Durand - 8th FG
- A6M2 - FPO2c Izumi Hideo - Tainan Ku (shot down by 8th FG)
May 2nd, 1942 :
- Kittyhawk A29-48 - Sgt D.W Munro - RAAF No. 75 Sqadron
May 1st, 1942 :
- A6M2 V-112 - FPO2c Arita Yashisuke - Tainan Ku (shot down by 8th FG)
May 2nd, 1942 :
- A6M2 V-104 - Flyer 1c Kawanishi Haruo - Tainan Ku (shot down by 8th FG)
May 3rd, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6909 - 2/Lt Joseph Lovett - 8th FG
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6956 - 2/Lt Charles Schwimmer - 8th FG
May 4th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6971 - 2/Lt Patrick Armstrong / 2/Lt Jefford Hooker / 2/Lt Victor Talbot - 35th FS (3 Aircobras went missing and there was a single claim that day made by WO Handa Watari, which would indicate that at least one of those 3 pilots was his victim)
May 8th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7188 - 2/Lt Guy Alva Hawkins - 36th FS of 8th FG
May 12th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6802 - 2/Lt Robert Wilde - 36th FS of 8th FG
May 13th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6945 - 1/Lt Hervey Carpenter -
- A6M2 V-104 - FPO3c Honda Toshiaki - Tainan Ku (shot down by 8th FG)
May 17th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7122 - Lt Jessie Bland - (8th FG ?)
May 18th, 1942 :
- Airacobra (Serial no. unknown) - 2/Lt William Plain (40th FS)
May 26th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7221 - 2/Lt Arthur Schulz (35th FS of 8th FG)
May 27th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7153 - 2/Lt Alva Hawkins (36th FS of 8th FG)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7162 - Capt. T.W Hornsby (36th FS of 8th FG)
May 28th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6970 - Lt Ward (36th FS of 8th FG)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7190 - Capt. Wyatt Exum (36th FS of 8th FG)
- Airacobra (Serial no. unknown) - 2/Lt Art Andres (36th FS of 8th FG)
May 29th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7116 - 2/Lt Grover Gholson (36th FS of 8th FG)
- A6M2 - FPO2c Komori Hisao - Tainan Ku (damaged by 8th FG and force landed)
June 1st, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39D #41-6942 - 2/Lt Thomas Rooney (36th FS of 8th FG)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7200 - 2/Lt William Hosford (35th FS of 8th FG)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7194 - 2/Lt Gerry Plunkett (35th FS of 8th FG)
- A6M2 V-114 - WO Miyazaki Gitaro - Tainan Ku (shot down by 8th FG)
June 9th, 1942 :
- A6M2 V-117 - WO Yoshino Satoshi - Tainan Ku (shot down by 39th FS)
June 16th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7204 - 2/Lt Harvey Rehrer (39th FS)
- Airacobra P-400 British no. AP 348 - 1/Lt Thomas Lynch (?)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-6941 - 2/Lt Paul Magre (40th FS)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7136 - 2/Lt Stanley Rice (40th FS)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7222 - 1/Lt William Hutcheson (40th FS)
- A6M2 - Flyer 1c Hidaka Takeichiro - Tainan Ku (shot down by 39th FS pilot)
June 18th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-400 British no. BX 169 - 1/Lt Carl Rauch (39th FS)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7140 - 1/Lt George Bartlett (39th FS)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7222 - 1/Lt Donald Greene (39th FS)
June 26th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7137 - 1/Lt William Stauter (?)
July 4th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-39F #41-7148 - 2/Lt James Foster (39th FS)
- Airacobra P-400 British no. AP 378 - 2/Lt Frank Angier (39th FS)
- Airacobra P-39F #41-714x - 2/Lt Wilmott Marlott (39th FS)
July 6th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-400 British no. unknown - 2/Lt Howard Welker (40th FS)
July 11th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-400 British no. unknown - 2/Lt Orvile Kirtland (40th FS)
July 25th, 1942 :
- Airacobra Serial no. unknown - 2/Lt Frank Beeson (?)
- Airacobra P-400 BW 117 - 2/Lt David Hoyer (?)
August 2nd, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-400 British no. AP 290 - 1/Lt Jess Dore (41st FS)
- Airacobra P-400 British no. AP 232 - 1/Lt Jesse Hague (41st FS)
August 11th, 1942 :
- RAAF Kittyhawk A29-123 - F/O Mark Sheldon (RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
- RAAF Kittyhawk A29-93 - F/O Albert McLeod (RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
- RAAF Kittyhawk A29-100 - W/O Francis Shelley (RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
- RAAF Kittyhawk A29-84 - F/Sgt George Inkster (RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
August 26th, 1942 :
- Airacobra P-400 British no. BW 112 - 2/Lt Gerald Rogers (80th FS)
- A6M2 - FPO3c Nakano Kiyoshi - Tainan Ku (shot down by 80th FS)
August 27th, 1942 :
- RAAF Kittyhawk A29-108 - P/O Stuart Munro (RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
- A6M2 - FPO1c Yamashita Sadao - Tainan Ku (shot down by RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
- A6M2 - Flyer1c Ninomiya Kihachi - Tainan Ku (shot down by RAAF No. 75 Sqadron)
- A6M2 - FPO3c Matsuda Takeo - Tainan Ku
November 1st, 1942 :
- P-40 E-1 #41-36173 - 2/Lt Glenn Wohlford
- A6M2 - FPO1c Kaneko Toshio - 251st Ku (shot down by 8th Fighter Squadron P-40)
80th Fighter Squadron (if thats what you mean) arrived on July 20th, and by the time it started serious flying it was August. Tainan Ku from August 7th was mostly occupied with Guadalcanal operations as well as many other Navy units in the area. Thus it is possible that 80th FS could achieve some success at that time (though I couldnt find any details), given only small detachment of Zeros was kept at Buna at that time. And not so long after, Navy would request Army support in New Guinea.
And that's all true - remember the p-38 was never intended to be placed in full scale production, let alone fight a war in Europe at altitude.Well, considering the amount of requirements to satisfy Horikoshi did as much as he could, to envision the need of a Zero to tackle with P-38 and F4U is a bit too much to ask. Still, Horikoshi admitted that he did not design A6M specifically to fight in the Pacific War, if he knew of the Navy plans and possible changes then he would approach the topic differently.
But Zero was based on experiences gathered in China.
Hard to say - but considering that both F6F and F4U were being designed before WW2 says a lot of the forward thinking of their designers. One thing American manufacturers would have never considered was the lack of pilot survivability (minimal armor protection).Afaik, I was always tempted to ask the question, how well would American constructors do given the specification issued by the Japanese Navy. How much "better" could Grumman or Vought do.
And in the US military they remained operationally prepared to be activated until the 1950s. It was determined that there was a viable use for these aircraft and they had the maintenance and logistic support. There were plenty combat US aircraft from WW2 that served an effective role well after WW2.Reserve and training squadrons ...
That true, there was a lot of vision put into those aircraft but one must remember that both went through horrendous amount of modifications before they reached the front service. In particular F6F got a new engine, since Wright R-2600 was deemed not enough and R-2800 was placed to power Hellcat.Hard to say - but considering that both F6F and F4U were being designed before WW2 says a lot of the forward thinking of their designers.
As Shortround6 said, its not exactly correct. Before the war no country except for Soviet Union provided any kind of protection to its warbirds. First to catch up were British and Germans, while Americans decided to focus in 1940-1941 period on designing and testing best possible protective features, which resulted in all rubber fuel cells.One thing American manufacturers would have never considered was the lack of pilot survivability (minimal armor protection).
Once the F6F received the R-2800, there was little modification from the original design, and if I remember correctly, it had the least amounts of design changes of all US fighters. I think the only noticeable design change was the installation of a window behind the pilot's head on later versions.That true, there was a lot of vision put into those aircraft but one must remember that both went through horrendous amount of modifications before they reached the front service. In particular F6F got a new engine, since Wright R-2600 was deemed not enough and R-2800 was placed to power Hellcat.
F4U was also largely modified from its original design, to adjust it for the needs.
And that's the case of those powerplants becoming available in a mass production basis.One must remember that both Vought and Grumman had more room to make changes and adjust aircraft to the needs, given their aircraft would be powered by 2000 HP engine.
Availability?At the same Mitsubishi wanted a fighter powered by 870 HP Zuisei (later swapped for 950 HP Sakae 12, a comparison to R-2600 and R-2800 comes to the mind a bit ), able to reach more than 500 km/h top speed, reach 3000 meters in less than 3.5 minutes. Have a flight endurance of 6 to 8 hours on economic cruising speed, take off distance of less than 70 meters with a head wing of 12 m/s and importantly no worse dogfight performance than Type 96 fighter - A5M. The wingspan was specified to be as 12 m, armament was specified as well.
This basically called for an interceptor that can dogfight as well as escort and protect bombers. Machine that can fly fast and climb fast, but with a great wing and rather weak 870 HP engine.
That's the ongoing situation when designing combat aircraft - then and now.In my opinion it required a lot of mind stretching to satisfy all of this at once.
Aside from just bolting armor plating into fighter aircraft, self sealing tanks and 'wet wing' technology that was "mass production friendly" just being introduced when WW2 was beginning. No one in the 1930s (at least in the US) envisioned the way aerial combat would have taken place during WW2 and that's why you have US combat aircraft produced with little or no pilot protection. Once it was discovered the amount of combat damage a fighter could be exposed to, this was reversed and made a priority. Self sealing tanks were first introduced during WW1 and were sometimes not considered because a self sealing fuel tank carries less fuel than a conventional fuel cell or for that matter, an entire wet wing. I think I read somewhere that Martin was the only company that featured self sealing fuel tanks in their aircraft prior to WW2.As Shortround6 said, its not exactly correct. Before the war no country except for Soviet Union provided any kind of protection to its warbirds. First to catch up were British and Germans, while Americans decided to focus in 1940-1941 period on designing and testing best possible protective features, which resulted in all rubber fuel cells.
I think I've already addressed that in the other thread :
Top 3 mistakes per country, in field of military aviation
Ahh yes, I meant George Murdock...thanks for catching that!I thought the original patent was applied for by George Murdock. The Glenn Martin Company used this system but either bought the patent or payed a royalty to Murdock.
Cheers
Steve
Ahh yes, I meant George Murdock...thanks for catching that!
Funny how George Murdock and Glenn Martin have the same initials!!
On performance level indeed, P-40 and P-39 could outperform Wildcats but there is so much more than this. Wildcats were often flown by better trained pilots and could count on a better tactical situation (vide Guadalcanal where sufficient warning time would be given so machines could reach altitude allowing to take advantage of their high speed performance).The P-40 and P-39 were better off than the F4F given their lower drag and superior speed, dive acceleration and speed retention using dive and zoom tactics.
With proper energy tactics against early-war Japanese fighters, and proper exploitation of the superior roll rate and high-speed maneuverability, the P-40 and P-39 should have been all-around superior fighters.
Aside from the F2A, none of the US fighters of the time came close to the Zero's maximum range either (the P-40B at ideal manual lean cruising conditions and overload fuel still couldn't compete with the unprotected A6M ... the unprotected P-40 might have managed it though, especially if the wing guns were omitted).
Make no mistake, Mr. Hinoki refers directly to first Oscars. Ki-43-I indeed had issues with structural integrity during high G maneuvers. Especially the machines delivered before 1942, the first ones, could be even dangerous.The Ki 43 wasn't necessarily a very well-liked aircraft by the pilots who flew it either, and not just because of the armament.
But after initial discoveries, Army obliged Nakajima to strengthen the construction and add additional bolts in crucial places. And issue was not even mentioned in Ki-43-II which appeared by the end of 1942. But as Mr. Hinoki said in 5:22, when Oscar II became available it had greater firepower and improved integrity (shorter wingspan) as well as higher top speed. A fighter to fly with confidence. The only issue is that it came a bit too late and lacked performance for the new type of tasks.
- R. Dunn, Tuluvu's Air War, Chapter V, Untitled DocumentThis combat also illustrates that despite its exceptional high altitude performance the P-38 did have limitations fighting the nimble Type 1 fighter at low level. Five of the 9th's pilots encountered a single OSCAR with the following results:
"By this time, the enemy fighters were well thinned out, I saw one below me on the water being worked over by two P-38s. Three more of us joined the party. For 15 minutes the five of us made pass after pass at this fighter, although we didn't get it. When he got the opportunity the pilot would straighten momentarily up-coast, sucking us with him. He never seemed to have much throttle on and lazily turned toward us when we got in range, but never came head-on at anyone or fired a shot. Its canopy must have been open the whole time…15 minutes of this maneuvering and we returned to base."
Another of the P-38 pilots reported "This pilot was pretty good. He kept close to the water and would turn gradually until we were on him, then would slip down to the water in a tight turn." He also observed, "This Oscar had a green fuselage and brown spots in leopard fashion."
Spitfire, great plane for a 1930's design. A great intercepter but lacked the range to take the fight to the enemy.