Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
I was secretary of the American Fighter Aces Assn for 14 years (PhD in Egotism) and early on I doubted the conventional wisdom of most (even 90%) of shootdowns by surprise. I think it began with Ray Toliver's 1970 bio of Hartmann, who guesstimated that figure. MAYBE it was semi-accurate for the E Front but in decades of interviewing aces and listening to hospitality suite/ready room sessions, it was notable how few of them mentioned surprising enemies or being surprised
So...in 1985 I wrote and circulated a questionnaire addressing training, combat environment, surprise, etc. Got over 200 replies from WW I to Vietnam. I don't know of a comparable study though the AF did some surveys about fighter-pilot selection & effectiveness. What I found: remarkable similarity from war to war, theater to theater. About 20% of shootdowns by surprise, including my interpretation of v. Richthofen's combat reports, and he was an ultimate stalker. Found that the same figure usually applied to incidents when Our Guys were hit air-air.
If you think about it, the numbers make sense. Maybe you tip-toe up behind a hostile formation and assassinate tail-end charlie, but at that moment everyone else is alerted.
As for tail-warning radars: when researching the 15AF book I found emphasis on the gear for recon aircraft, especially when 262s became common.
Adds upSome shoot-downs, maybe it's that 20%, took place in a bounce where it was a true surprise. Allied pilots in the ETO and the Med in particular were very worried about being bounced or blindsided, particularly by planes with a very high combat speed like the Fw 190. One Russian pilots put it this way "if we saw them, we could evade, if we didn't see them, we died. That simple."
You mean they were already under attack and as everything's in disarray they get blipped out by somebody?I think some others which would fall into Hartmans 'didn't even see me' type shoot downs are indeed within a combat where the combatants are aware there is a threat, i.e. after a bounce, but don't see the plane that gets them.
Ambush, get the drop, and get out...Hartmann and the German pilots in general followed a strategy of avoiding the dogfight and sticking with the bounce.
The key is with the Russian pilot who said "If we see them we can evade, of we don't see them we died". It is a big sky and seems plausible to me that if you saw your opponent you could evade before he could line you up. If you didn't see him, you died. Irregardless of the situation I think those two statements carry the most weight and indicate to me that the victim didn't see his attacker or was surprised 60-80% of the time.This is fascinating, sounds very plausible, and (not that this matters much to anybody except me) matches what I've read in a lot of books and written accounts of air to air combat (mostly WW2 stuff). And (I'm a little embarrassed to admit) flight sim game "experience" for example playing Il2. A few thoughts:
So the bottom line is, I think the lower ratio of "blideside bounces" does seem more probable to me.
- Some shoot-downs, maybe it's that 20%, took place in a bounce where it was a true surprise. Allied pilots in the ETO and the Med in particular were very worried about being bounced or blindsided, particularly by planes with a very high combat speed like the Fw 190. One Russian pilots put it this way "if we saw them, we could evade, if we didn't see them, we died. That simple." Australian Ace Bobby Gibbes refused to fly with USAAF pilots until the latter agreed to fly the Commonwealth type of formation, which had in large part to do with which pilots were keeping an eye out in which direction. Early to mid-war WW2 planes with 'razorback' canopies had a serious blind spot behind them and it took a while for Allied pilots to adopt the Finger 4 / Wingman strategy used by the LW since the Spanish Civil War. Also took a while to get good use out of their radios.
- I think some others which would fall into Hartmans 'didn't even see me' type shoot downs are indeed within a combat where the combatants are aware there is a threat, i.e. after a bounce, but don't see the plane that gets them. For example when one pilot is chasing an intended target and not watching his six. Certainly there are a lot of descriptions of shoot downs in these circumstances, and also by pilots describing themselves being shot down that way. And yep, it's also when you are most likely to get wacked in Il2.
- Hartmann and the German pilots in general followed a strategy of avoiding the dogfight and sticking with the bounce. That is one reason why he might have actually bounced most of his victims. That is what Luftwaffe fighter pilots were basically supposed to do according to doctrine - it plays to the strengths of the German fighters and away from their weaknesses. But not every pilot fought that way. I think it's correct that more modern fighters tend toward maneuverability since the 70's though perhaps we are seeing another divergence there.
- I also think another way that airplanes got shot down before even recognizing the immediate threat was just being 'blindsided' in the middle of a combat area, concentrating on one threat and missing another for example but also just trying to extend or climb and not noticing an enemy that sees them. This is indeed what a fast climbing, fast accelerating aircraft like a Bf 109 was particularly good at. Engage, check for vulnerability (if the target is capable of evading), move on to another target and so on.
- But from accounts of combat, daily squadron reports, pilot diaries, it does sound like a lot of victories, many loses and many combats involved fairly extended periods of combat where they at least knew the enemy was around even if they couldn't see them all the time. Accounts of air battles lasting 10, 20, even 45 minutes or an hour are not at all rare in the Med or the CBI. Now I know it's possible the pilots could be making it up, but some of these accounts are corroborated by reports on both sides and other records
S
The key is with the Russian pilot who said "If we see them we can evade, of we don't see them we died". It is a big sky and seems plausible to me that if you saw your opponent you could evade before he could line you up. If you didn't see him, you died. Irregardless of the situation I think those two statements carry the most weight and indicate to me that the victim didn't see his attacker or was surprised 60-80% of the time.
The 80% of those on the loosing end thing never saw it coming( which I have read also many times) fits with a theory I have that as long as your aircraft have at least the minimum requirements of speed, ceiling, and to a lesser degree climb(minimum requirements of these atributes meaning at least close to parity with the opponents) that outside of luck and disparities in pilot skill about 80% of the outcome will be dictated by tactics and not maneuverability, roll rates, or so many of the things often thought of as important atributes in fighter plane. Hence the success of for example the p40 in china or the f4f on Guadal Canal even though on paper it would seem as if the Japanese should have cleened there clock.
Agree. I kinda thought about that later that my equation so to speak was just a baseline of outcome predication. That any extra explotable advantage beyond that is of course only going to give you an edge but i think it does point something that I think doesn't get enough attention when it comes to airial combat and that is how important tactics are. I think many of us are prone to cosider equipment first, pilot proficiency second in importance, and tactics last of the three. I know that was my defalt way pf looking at it since I was a kid but the more I learn the more I think that order should be reversed. You need all 3 but i think tactics don't always get the attention they deserve.This is all legit if it was just plane vs plane randomly. But.
I think the roll rate and turn rate, dive and climb and stuff comes in when squadron leaders and individual pilots develop tactics which exploit those little advantages and help you win the fight. Chennault figured out a good tactic against the Japanese fighters - and it worked because of the strengths of the fighters he had. It wouldn't have worked with Hurricanes, for example.
Similarly, tactics were developed by the Germans, by the Japanese, and by their opponents among the Allies, to best exploit the little edges they had in performance or maneuverability. Adhering to the tactics - like the Thach weave, are what made Wildcats viable, figuring out that optimal tactic and sticking to it with discipline. Not so much just random luck.
And no, I don't think the 80% thing is anywhere near universal.
I also don't think the flaws of the Zero was so easy to exploit either. Most pilots couldn't in the first couple of years of the war.
S
By mid 42' the Zero mystique was being cracked. By 43' the writing was on the wall. If you look at areas where the IJN were given the mission to maintain aerial superiority, the Zero failed miserably, also attributed to declining pillot skill. The flaws of the Zero really didn't have to be exploited, in many cases the IJN defeated themselves. If you look at how their pilots were trained prior to the war, factor in actricition (losses at Midway were devastating), as well as improving US fighters there was no way the IJN would ever be able to maintain an effective aerial superiority anywhere in the Pacific, especially when numerical advantages were lost.I also don't think the flaws of the Zero was so easy to exploit either. Most pilots couldn't in the first couple of years of the war.
When you said the ijn defeated themselves and referenced pilot training that really sparked my curiosity. Could you elaborate.And what couple of years are you talking about? By mid 42' the Zero mystique was being cracked. By 43' the writing was on the wall. If you look at areas where the IJN were given the mission to maintain aerial superiority, the Zero failed miserably, also attributed to declining pillot skill. The flaws of the Zero really didn't have to be exploited, in many cases the IJN defeated themselves. If you look at how their pilots were trained prior to the war, factor in actricition (losses at Midway were devastating), as well as improving US fighters there was no way the IJN would ever be able to maintain an effective aerial superiority anywhere in the Pacific, especially when numerical advantages were lost.
Training and tactics. IJN pilots were probably the best in the world at the start of WW2. IIRC their training program was more than 2x longer than what US pilots were put though. The Japanese entered the war thinking that this small number of "super pilots" would would bring them a quick victory. Instead they lost many of them during Midway and would never recover.When you said the ijn defeated themselves and referenced pilot training that really sparked my curiosity. Could you elaborate.
Oh so putting to much time onto to few pilots of i understand that corectly.And that makes perfect sense and explains alot about the progression of things especially after Midway. I look forward to more info on the tactics.Training and tactics. IJN pilots were probably the best in the world at the start of WW2. IIRC their training program was more than 2x longer than what US pilots were put though. The Japanese entered the war thinking that this small number of "super pilots" would would bring them a quick victory. Instead they lost many of them during Midway and would never recover.
I'll talk tactics later
The 80% number came from my post upthread. I think it's clear that I was mis-remembering something, and was mistaken. I am assuming Barrett who responded up there is Barrett Tillman. I think his response to my post was good enough.
I am sorry for having bumped this ancient thread, it was a mistake, and it should probably be locked rather than degenerating into shitfight #900 on these forums about who is and who is not a pilot/WWII flightsims.
The 80% number came from my post upthread. I think it's clear that I was mis-remembering something, and was mistaken. I am assuming Barrett who responded up there is Barrett Tillman. I think his response to my post was good enough.
I am sorry for having bumped this ancient thread, it was a mistake, and it should probably be locked rather than degenerating into shitfight #900 on these forums about who is and who is not a pilot/WWII flightsims.