"Most pilots shot down didn't see the enemy coming"

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All P-51D-25 and above series had tail warning radar.. first showed up in ETO in Jan 45. Having said that I am not aware of any instance in which it was cited as saving a Mustang.
 
You could paint the undersides like the Ta 152s, or Doras that were detailed to protect Me262s in the RTB and landing phase.
But i'm sure that'd be a little too wild for most of the gliders owners. And reds are the most expensive colors.

I wouldn't bet on that, but the vast majority do stick to white.
 
All P-51D-25 and above series had tail warning radar.. first showed up in ETO in Jan 45. Having said that I am not aware of any instance in which it was cited as saving a Mustang.

Hi Bill: Here's an instance where the tail warning system on a Mustang "gave good service" ;)

78-landers-19march45.jpg
 
All P-51D-25 and above series had tail warning radar.. first showed up in ETO in Jan 45. Having said that I am not aware of any instance in which it was cited as saving a Mustang.

Could that radar possibly interfere with FuG 16 radio?
 
Just to be clear, are you talking about an active radar with aerials on the tail of a P51 that radiated energy to the rear and could gave range and bearing information or a passive system that detected night fighters radar enery ?
 
I believe it was an active radar but it only beeped if someone was moving into the rear hemisphere and not give precise information. For this reason and many false alarms I understand they mostly just switched it off.
 
The P-47N was also featuring the tail warning radar.
 
First, I am sorry for bumping a five-year old thread. If this is not allowed please delete my post. But when I typed my search into Google, this was the first hit.

I have been scouring all my paper books and e-books and everything I have accumulated about WWII aerial combat, to try to figure out where I read this. I swear I remember reading about a postwar study that was done where they interviewed as many surviving allied and axis pilots as they could about air combat. And one of the things that came out of this was the quote that this thread is about. Something along the lines of "It was determined that approximately 80% of the time when a pilot was shot down, he either never saw his attacker, or did not see him until the attacker had reached a position of decisive advantage"

Does anyone know about the study I'm talking about? I do not think this was a part of the postwar "Fighter Conference", I seem to remember it being a totally different study.
 
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I wonder if it was just a wild ass guess, because let's face it, a fair number of those shot down pilots died before they had a chance to tell anyone what happened.
 
In the BoB everyone was looking to "bounce" the opposition. Usually coming out of the sun with height advantage. In this situation it was possible to make kills without losses or minimal losses. Once a mass fight or fur ball developed you cannot concentrate on looking around and shooting someone down. In such fights losses were pretty much equal on both sides but very low compared to the numbers involved. This before the massed raids on London.
 
Shenstone wanted a small fin, something he had learnt from Lippisch and during his time at Junkers.
Low drag...
It was designed to reflect the properties of slim fuselage boom and tuned wing wake spillage.
So the tail fin was fine tuned to the thin fuselage?

But the same (absolutely brilliant) work meant that a Spit would have good elevator authority even at very high speeds.
The thin fuselage, the wing and tail position on it?
 
I wonder if it was just a wild ass guess, because let's face it, a fair number of those shot down pilots died before they had a chance to tell anyone what happened.

I imagine you could come to a reasonable estimate by surveying the victors. My guess is the behavior of a pilot who knows you're lining up a shot is often distinct from one who is unaware.
 
I wonder if it was just a wild ass guess, because let's face it, a fair number of those shot down pilots died before they had a chance to tell anyone what happened.
With reference to the BoB very few planes flew alone, an individual pilot may have been shot down and unable to tell the tale but a squadron as a whole always knew it had been "bounced"
 
I was secretary of the American Fighter Aces Assn for 14 years (PhD in Egotism) and early on I doubted the conventional wisdom of most (even 90%) of shootdowns by surprise. I think it began with Ray Toliver's 1970 bio of Hartmann, who guesstimated that figure. MAYBE it was semi-accurate for the E Front but in decades of interviewing aces and listening to hospitality suite/ready room sessions, it was notable how few of them mentioned surprising enemies or being surprised

So...in 1985 I wrote and circulated a questionnaire addressing training, combat environment, surprise, etc. Got over 200 replies from WW I to Vietnam. I don't know of a comparable study though the AF did some surveys about fighter-pilot selection & effectiveness. What I found: remarkable similarity from war to war, theater to theater. About 20% of shootdowns by surprise, including my interpretation of v. Richthofen's combat reports, and he was an ultimate stalker. Found that the same figure usually applied to incidents when Our Guys were hit air-air.

If you think about it, the numbers make sense. Maybe you tip-toe up behind a hostile formation and assassinate tail-end charlie, but at that moment everyone else is alerted.

As for tail-warning radars: when researching the 15AF book I found emphasis on the gear for recon aircraft, especially when 262s became common.
 
Planes climbing through cloud are very vulnerable. Not only are they at a height disadvantage they can be seen long before they can see an adversary.
 
The Germans did, it was called the 109, which fortunately for them was just manoeuvrable enough to be competitive when often forced into that situation.
I'm not sure I would say that, it seemed more maneuverable than the P-51 at lower speeds, similar to the P-40 at some speeds.
The US did too later, with things like the F-105, F-104 and so on, all rather less than successful....
The F-105 had to do more with the fact that the US didn't have an attack category, or more accurately some kind of small light-bomber category that was suitably to meet the tactical needs. As a result fighters filled the roles up and, to make it worse, the nuclear delivery role mattered more than agility.

As for the F-104, that is a more valid complaint: If I recall it was an example of...
  • The United States and most European air arms valued speed, maybe speed and climb rate first, then roll rate and agility second: It had to do with the ability to have the initiative, the ability to disengage at will first, and then be able to mix it up second. This is not so say maneuverability isn't important, but a person tasked with relentless prioritization might end up arriving at this if forced to choose.
  • The F-104 was initially designed to fly faster, climb faster and higher than any enemy fighter, but maneuverability was likely assumed to be an important variable -- it's sad that sometimes you have to explicitly say things that should be implicit, but it was more complicated than that.
    • The USAF was initially pretty accommodating of this because there was a war on, and the pilots on the front lines clearly knew best
    • The USAF wanted the aircraft also to be able to sustain Mach 2 performance either out of the speed requirement and/or the desire to use it as some form of day-interceptor, which ensured speed would remain an issue
    • The Mach 2 requirements seemed to ensure that it would be prioritized above other things such as maneuverability, which would have resulted in things like enlarged wings.
    • It could fly very high... the problem is that it couldn't fly as high as desired while retaining any real maneuverability subsonic.
Interestingly the British requirements that led to the Spitfire and Hurricane also had little about manoeuvrability.
The Hurricane was originally intended to be a fighter and later converted into an interceptor design with 8 x 0.303's. I'm not sure if the Spitfire was totally designed for interception off the bat, but the eight 303's came later, and that in turn actually played a role in leading to the elliptical wing (a decent airfoil that could stuff all eight guns in), also the company had an interest in the idea before. As for little being said about agility, I'm not sure if I would say that even about the spitfire: There was a stipulation for 6g with an overload of 9g (1.5).
So the 109 was good enough in most flight regimes to be (and stay) competitive. For example, against a Mustang, below 250-275mph it would hold its own (at least), above that the Mustang had the advantage in terms of turning (and definitely rolling). If they had just fixed up those rubbish elevators and ailerons it would have been even more dangerous that it was.
I'm confused here... are we talking about the P-51 or Me-109?
But the same (absolutely brilliant) work meant that a Spit would have good elevator authority even at very high speeds.
So the configuration of the thin fuselage, the tail based on the size of the wings, and the wings based on the massive fillets, played a role in the Spitfire's high dive-mach?
Everyone says that the Mustang was a superior aerodynamic design, personally I disagree totally . . . . then it's mach limit, then it's stall issues then
When you're talking about stall characteristics you mean issues with the tendency to spin? As for the mach limit, from what I remember Mach 0.75 was considered decent for the time, and it could be pushed up to 0.80-0.84 without coming unglued. Compared to the Spitfire, sure it was inferior, but almost everybody was.
Superb radiator design and superb frontal design (thanks to an 'unqualified air racer', NA's genius was to use him properly) and far (far) better quality control.
Unqualified air-racer?

FLYBOYJ said:
The Rand article is headed by Pierre Spey, he was part of the old Fighter mafia that brought the F-15 into play, a jealous old man who doesn't like Lockheed or being retired.
What's with him and his desire to distort or fudge information?
That 5G limit may be expanded at a later date - I think comparing this to Shermans or F-4s lack of cannons is a bit far reaching however as we do know history has a way of repeating itself.
While I'm not an aerospace engineer, I do remember it being said by people who served in the US Navy, and some people who did seem to have some engineering expertise, that it was best to build strength into a design off the bat, rather than attempt to add it in later.
 
by this stage the Australians had no faith in the British leadership, and fought their battles as they saw fit...not officially, of course, but thats how it was back then.

The lesson here is that experiewnce tells you when to go for it and when to keep your mouth shut and your head down.
I expect the same applies in the air.....the experienced guys know to keep a constant lookout....the ones that dont, generally dont live to tell the story

The above kind of describes how Australian pilots responded to the Desert War. They tried the British methods, found them woefully (and tragically) wanting, and started coming up with a series of their own largely successful innovations.

S
 

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