Most 'Underrated' Aircraft of WW2?

[michael rauls]

That sould have been" I didn't know all the particulars" in the 2nd sentence of that last post. Oops.

 

[michael rauls]

Michael,

Not sure if it was a missed opportunities or not. First the Merlin's Mustang was coming online, and second the P40Q didn't have the legs. What would you envision using a higher altitude Q for that the Mustang could not do better? I'm a big fan of the P40 line, and would liked to have seen the Q go into production, but looking at things from a wartime perspective I think I can see why it didn't happen. The P38K sort of falls into this category as well except it was still operating on the front lines in the Pacific.

Cheers,
Biff

Good point that there was no role for the q that couldn't be filled by other aircraft but just that it would have been an additional useful asset not so much a nescesary one. In addition if they were going to continue to manufacture the p40s anyway( until dec44 i think?) And I'm thinking that meant delivery into early 45 well i think all those guys would have been better off with the q than the m or n. As for a specific role maybe similar to the p47 sort of multipurpose ie escort when longer range wasn't needed and ground support .

 

[Venturi]

The major issue is that Curtiss was too busy building existing variants for a decent price, than in investing in r&d, and sacrificing production line space for changeover. They were above all a business and were more than a bit hidebound. Unfortunately the P40 never received the updates which would have kept it competitive, however it should not be overlooked that it could easily have been so, given the same foresight and effort which kept other airframes of similar vintage in the front running throughout the war - like the 109 or Spitfire.

 

[GrauGeist]

There's alot of factors to consider when looking back on a certain type and wonder "well, why didn't they do (insert suggestion here)?"
During peacetime, development falls into place at a certain rate, during wartime, it's a mad dash - however, this mad dash is being spread out all across the board WHILE at the same time, providing assets to the front. Development needs to be a priority, but the higher priority is to ensure production does not get interrupted.

There armloads of instances where an upgrade or improvement on a test airframe gets adopted on the next variant, but the current batch of aircraft needs to be completed and shipped to the front(s) ASAP- sometimes being retrofitted with the new improvement, sometimes not - depending how it will impact the production line.

It's a common pitfall for folks 75 years later, making observations like "why not put a bigger engine in the P-36" or "why didn't they work harder on the HeS8 and produce the He280" and so on...but before making these observations, one needs to step back and look at the much bigger picture as to why development took the course it did.

 

[GrauGeist]

The major issue is that Curtiss was too busy building existing variants for a decent price, than in investing in r&d, and sacrificing production line space for changeover. They were above all a business and were more than a bit hidebound. Unfortunately the P40 never received the updates which would have kept it competitive, however it should not be overlooked that it could easily have been so, given the same foresight and effort which kept other airframes of similar vintage in the front running throughout the war - like the 109 or Spitfire.

Actually, Curtiss spent a great deal of money on R&D to improve the P-40 (which itself, was an improvement on the P-36) which can be seen with the XP-46, XP-53, P-60(A/B/C/D/E).
Meanwhile, they were developing the XP-62, XBTC/XBT2C, XF14C and XF15C.

This was all going on while they were not only manufacturing the P-40, but also the Helldiver, Commando, Seahawk, Owl, Seamew and so on.

 

[michael rauls]

There's alot of factors to consider when looking back on a certain type and wonder "well, why didn't they do (insert suggestion here)?"
During peacetime, development falls into place at a certain rate, during wartime, it's a mad dash - however, this mad dash is being spread out all across the board WHILE at the same time, providing assets to the front. Development needs to be a priority, but the higher priority is to ensure production does not get interrupted.

There armloads of instances where an upgrade or improvement on a test airframe gets adopted on the next variant, but the current batch of aircraft needs to be completed and shipped to the front(s) ASAP- sometimes being retrofitted with the new improvement, sometimes not - depending how it will impact the production line.

It's a common pitfall for folks 75 years later, making observations like "why not put a bigger engine in the P-36" or "why didn't they work harder on the HeS8 and produce the He280" and so on...but before making these observations, one needs to step back and look at the much bigger picture as to why development took the course it did.

Good point about the conflict between upgrading the existing design and keeping production going. I imagine this was the case with the to Q or not to Q decision. Just seems like if Curtis could have had it ready to ship by fall 43(as venturi said) with the same foresight and effort that kept aircraft of similar vintage competitive like the 109 and the spitfire and Curtis chose not to put in the effort earlier until they saw there big meal ticket being threatened by more modern types because of profit motive then at least to me this was a shame and short sighted. More importantly seems like it short changed alot of guys that flew the p40 from spring 44 on.

 

[michael rauls]

Actually, Curtiss spent a great deal of money on R&D to improve the P-40 (which itself, was an improvement on the P-36) which can be seen with the XP-46, XP-53, P-60(A/B/C/D/E).
Meanwhile, they were developing the XP-62, XBTC/XBT2C, XF14C and XF15C.

This was all going on while they were not only manufacturing the P-40, but also the Helldiver, Commando, Seahawk, Owl, Seamew and so on.

Of much of that I was unaware(obviously I am aware of the Helldiver but much of the rest I wasn't). So maybe this is more of a case of misalocation of effort and resources that is easy to see in hindsight but maybe not so much at the time instead of a profit over all motive or willful incompetence.

 

[michael rauls]

Still a shame though,at least in my mind especially for the guys that flew the p40 in 44/45.

 

[GrauGeist]

Good point about the conflict between upgrading the existing design and keeping production going. I imagine this was the case with the to Q or not to Q decision. Just seems like if Curtis could have had it ready to ship by fall 43(as venturi said) with the same foresight and effort that kept aircraft of similar vintage competitive like the 109 and the spitfire and Curtis chose not to put in the effort earlier until they saw there big meal ticket being threatened by more modern types because of profit motive then at least to me this was a shame and short sighted. More importantly seems like it short changed alot of guys that flew the p40 from spring 44 on.

Remember that the Army and foreign Air Forces kept buying them - as long as the contracts kept coming in, Curtiss was going to build them.

I know the "profit" angle sounds appealing, but like I said earlier, step back and look at the larger picture - the P-40 in it's different versions was proving to be useful, much like the aging F4F in it's different forms was produced nearly to war's end alongside much newer types, too. And I haven't heard a word about Grumman being driven by profit...

 

[michael rauls]

Remember that the Army and foreign Air Forces kept buying them - as long as the contracts kept coming in, Curtiss was going to build them.

I know the "profit" angle sounds appealing, but like I said earlier, step back and look at the larger picture - the P-40 in it's different versions was proving to be useful, much like the aging F4F in it's different forms was produced nearly to war's end alongside much newer types, too. And I haven't heard a word about Grumman being driven by profit...

As usual good points all.

 

[michael rauls]

As usual good points all.

Still seems, in hindsight at least, its a shame Curtis didn't put all that effort into the Q instead of alot of things that didn't work out like the xp46 and 53 but then again I guess hindsight is the key word here.

 

[Venturi]

The fact remains that after the P40E, Curtiss never built a front line, top tier fighter for the USAF again. Also after the war the congressional hearings into the substandard pace of development (older tech) of the P-40 program. And while they kept churning out older, while cheap and effective, variants of the P-40, and built a few one-off types, they were too busy as you say, providing front line fighters in 1941-1942 and didn't have what they needed by 1943 to stay in the top-tier game. It is highly likely that the Curtiss brass's interference in design, and Berlin's quitting has a lot to do with this. It certainly is indicative of the attitudes prevailing.

 

[P-39 Expert]

This whole two stage Allison was a real mystery to me. Would have provided high altitude performance for not only the P-40, but also the P-39 and P-51. In production for the P-63 since April '43 but the first P-63 airframes weren't ready to start dribbling out of the factory until October or so. Curtiss, Bell and NAA all knew the two-stage Allison was coming on line, so plenty of time to make the changes needed to fit it to their aircraft.

Also, this was not a "new" engine. Just a new second stage supercharger add-on to the existing Allison engine. All contemporary Allisons were exactly the same, differing only in internal supercharger gear ratio (8.1 for the two stage engines, 9.6 for the single stage engines) and reduction gear (remote for the P-39/63, conventional for the P-40 and P-51). Same power section for all of them, as an improvement was made it was applied to all contemporary models.

The first production Merlin P-51B rolled out in June '43 and would not see combat until December. With a little foresight the two stage Allison planes could have done the same or sooner.

The AAF sure spent a lot of money and time on the P-38. Could have had more capable planes sooner at a fraction of the cost.

 

[Venturi]

Ideology / Doctrine can sometimes be a real issue. And the pre war Army Air Force was just hell bent on the idea of having turbo-supercharged fighter aircraft to escort the only thing the army Air Force really cared about - and that was its bombers.

 

[Venturi]

Something to consider is that two stage super chargers really didn't arrive on the scene for liquid cooled engines until 1943 or so in any case. (But the USN demanded, and got, two stage setups even as early as the F4F3, a first at that time).

 

[Shortround6]

The major issue is that Curtiss was too busy building existing variants for a decent price, than in investing in r&d, and sacrificing production line space for changeover. They were above all a business and were more than a bit hidebound. Unfortunately the P40 never received the updates which would have kept it competitive, however it should not be overlooked that it could easily have been so, given the same foresight and effort which kept other airframes of similar vintage in the front running throughout the war - like the 109 or Spitfire.

This point of view is repeated over and over and over. But does anybody really have any company memos or letters that say this?
Curtiss-Wright had more projects/prototypes than any other manufacturer and perhaps more than any other two combined. SOmething like 12-14 different aircraft made it to at least flying prototype stage.
Granted a lot of them were late and some of them weren't very good (in fact some were terrible) but it doesn't seem that Curtiss didn't at least try.
One of Curtiss's hidebound attempts.

or

as far as the 109 and Spitfire go. Both got much better engines than the 1939/40 versions. The 109 gained several hundred HP at altitude (not sea level WEP) by 1942/43 and some of the late 1944 and 45 aircraft got engines of 1500-1600hp at around 20,000ft. How well they worked or how long they lasted I don't know.
Spitfire got the 2 stage Merlin and then the Griffon.

Allison was not able to pull any rabbits out of the hat and get comparable engines until too late. The US had no other V-12 engine except the Packard Merlins.
(less said about the Army/Continental V-1430 the better)

I would also note that while fast and having good climb the Q might have had a few problems/deficiencies in service. As tested in March of 1944 it went 9000lbs which is only about 250-300lbs lighter than a P-51B/C (maybe even closer) however this is with 160 gallons of fuel instead of 180 gallons in the Mustang and 235 rounds per gun instead of the 250 rounds for the inner guns and 350 round for the outer in the Mustang ( 4 gun Mustang is carrying 27% more ammo).
The tests available make mention of production versions going to 6 .50 cal guns (another 280lbs or so depending on ammo) or four 20mm guns

 

[michael rauls]

As usual good points all.

This point of view is repeated over and over and over. But does anybody really have any company memos or letters that say this?
Curtiss-Wright had more projects/prototypes than any other manufacturer and perhaps more than any other two combined. SOmething like 12-14 different aircraft made it to at least flying prototype stage.
Granted a lot of them were late and some of them weren't very good (in fact some were terrible) but it doesn't seem that Curtiss didn't at least try.
One of Curtiss's hidebound attempts.
View attachment 502415
or
View attachment 502416


as far as the 109 and Spitfire go. Both got much better engines than the 1939/40 versions. The 109 gained several hundred HP at altitude (not sea level WEP) by 1942/43 and some of the late 1944 and 45 aircraft got engines of 1500-1600hp at around 20,000ft. How well they worked or how long they lasted I don't know.
Spitfire got the 2 stage Merlin and then the Griffon.

Allison was not able to pull any rabbits out of the hat and get comparable engines until too late. The US had no other V-12 engine except the Packard Merlins.
(less said about the Army/Continental V-1430 the better)

I would also note that while fast and having good climb the Q might have had a few problems/deficiencies in service. As tested in March of 1944 it went 9000lbs which is only about 250-300lbs lighter than a P-51B/C (maybe even closer) however this is with 160 gallons of fuel instead of 180 gallons in the Mustang and 235 rounds per gun instead of the 250 rounds for the inner guns and 350 round for the outer in the Mustang ( 4 gun Mustang is carrying 27% more ammo).
The tests available make mention of production versions going to 6 .50 cal guns (another 280lbs or so depending on ammo) or four 20mm guns

Alot of good information but don't you think as p39 expert said if they had the 2 stage Allison in production by April 43 and they new that it was commimg it doesn't seem like to much of a jump to think they could have had the q delivered by spring pf 44.

 

[michael rauls]

I should have added if they didn't spend alot of time and resources on other things that didn't work out.

 

[GrauGeist]

Alot of good information but don't you think as p39 expert said if they had the 2 stage Allison in production by April 43 and they new that it was commimg it doesn't seem like to much of a jump to think they could have had the q delivered by spring pf 44.

But the USAAC had specified that the V-1710 be a single-stage.

Once the design is put into production, one simply cannot wave a magic wand and make changes.

 

[Shortround6]

Alot of good information but don't you think as p39 expert said if they had the 2 stage Allison in production by April 43 and they new that it was commimg it doesn't seem like to much of a jump to think they could have had the q delivered by spring pf 44.

Please define "in production" and when.
The engine used in the March 1944 tests of the P-40Q was not built until early 1944. And even then only 4 were built.
There were several different 2 stage Allisons being test during 1943 but actual production doesn't seem to have started until the late summer or fall of 1943.
This is the V-1710-93 used in the P-63A. While a number of P-63s were built and were flying with this engine in the fall of 43 (Oct sees first deliveries) the engine doesn't finally pass it's model test until Nov 27th 1943 and doesn't pass it's WER test until Dec 1943. It took a long time to develop the water injection and improve the pistons and piston rings to withstand the WER.

The V-1710-121 engine used in the March 1944 tests developed hundreds more hp in the low 20,000ft area than the -93 engine did. Using water injection (and 3200rpm courtesy of a 12 counterweight crank) the -121 could pull 75in of MAP at over 20,000ft. The -93 engine was good for for 51.5in at 22,400ft.

So lets see how well our production P-40Q of the summer of 1943 does with about 500hp less at 22,000ft than the test airplane in March of 1944.