Nice CGI from IJN perspective

[XBe02Drvr]

Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics. How long to train mechanics? How long until they're good at it?

A long time, if your trainees are reporting to school without an experience-based conceptual framework of tools, processes, and mechanical principles. I showed up at A&P school with a pilot's license and a background of casual tinkering on lawn mowers, gokarts, and my SAAB ice race/autocross/hillclimb car, and found myself awash in a sea of lifelong motorheads with 10W30 in their veins, axle grease under their fingernails, and their heads full of tolerances and displacements. I could hold my own on the academic side of things, but in the shop, they all blew my doors off.
I taught a couple Iranian naval cadets to fly, (Pre-Khomeni) whose driving experience before they came to the US was limited to ox carts. They both learned eventually, but it was a long slow process, and one of them never really got good at it. He got shipped back home after the revolution and died in the Iran-Iraq war, while the other jumped ship, stayed here, got naturalized, and eventually got his commercial license. Where there's a will there's a way.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I was always so amazed that US torpedoes worked at the Coral Sea battle that I never remembered how many.

Five in the first attack, two in the second.

 

[Admiral Beez]

December 7, 1941 was day one of the Fast Carrier Task Force Era. The first day of a new game nobody had ever played before. It's hard to imagine now, but they were learning the ropes on the field of battle. Before you can set out to acquire that newfangled German technology, you've got to perceive the need for it. Obvious to us today, not so then. In their world of permanent air superiority, CAP and scouting had always done the job. The hornet's nest they encountered at Midway was outside their experience and heretofore inconceivable. A culture that worships the glories of its past often fails to envision its needs for the future.

I agree that these were all new experiences from Japan's perspective. But radar directed fleet air defence and fighter direction has been going in the Mediterranean since late 1940. Throughout 1941, operating from multiple carrier groups, Fulmars were directed by shipborne radar and centralized fighter direction offices to intercept incoming Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica strikes, allowing the Fulmar, inspite of its slow speed and climb rate to rank as the FAA's all time top scoring fighter. Not bad considering that it was being withdrawn throughout 1942.

Throughout the peace with Britain the IJN and embassy staff should have been reviewing the Royal Navy's carrier fleet. By autumn 1940's close of the Battle of Britain the benefit of radar should be obvious. The RN's fleet carriers and battleships had radar by then. The allies are often criticized for ignoring the advances of the Axis, but in carrier ops the IJN definitely had its blinders on.

If USA interwar anti-British feeling and isolationism can be overcome there's a huge opportunity for the RN and USN to run war game against their respective carrier fleets. 1935, Lexington, Saratoga, Glorious, Courageous and Furious meet at Bermuda.

 

[SaparotRob]

I agree that these were all new experiences from Japan's perspective. But radar directed fleet air defence and fighter direction has been going in the Mediterranean since late 1940. Throughout 1941, operating from multiple carrier groups, Fulmars were directed by shipborne radar and centralized fighter direction offices to intercept incoming Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica strikes, allowing the Fulmar, inspite of its slow speed and climb rate to rank as the FAA's all time top scoring fighter. Not bad considering that it was being withdrawn throughout 1942.

Throughout the peace with Britain the IJN and embassy staff should have been reviewing the Royal Navy's carrier fleet. By autumn 1940's close of the Battle of Britain the benefit of radar should be obvious. The RN's fleet carriers and battleships had radar by then. The allies are often criticized for ignoring the advances of the Axis, but in carrier ops the IJN definitely had its blinders on.

If USA interwar anti-British feeling and isolationism can be overcome there's a huge opportunity for the RN and USN to run war game against their respective carrier fleets. 1935, Lexington, Saratoga, Glorious, Courageous and Furious meet at Bermuda.

Now that's a fleet photo I'd love to see!
No argument that the RN had real world experience with radar direction as opposed to the Pacific opponents. The USN would have been better served without the ridiculous family squabbles between "cousins".

 

[SaparotRob]

.. and the other services as well. Kind of had blinders on there for a minute.

 

[SaparotRob]

December 7, 1941 was day one of the Fast Carrier Task Force Era. The first day of a new game nobody had ever played before. It's hard to imagine now, but they were learning the ropes on the field of battle. Before you can set out to acquire that newfangled German technology, you've got to perceive the need for it. Obvious to us today, not so then. In their world of permanent air superiority, CAP and scouting had always done the job. The hornet's nest they encountered at Midway was outside their experience and heretofore inconceivable. A culture that worships the glories of its past often fails to envision its needs for the future.

We need an icon for "Insightful".

 

[nuuumannn]

Obvious to us today, not so then.

The key to this forum. Get that into your head and everything becomes clearer, or... more blurred... or clearer...

 

[nuuumannn]

We need an icon for "Insightful".

Which emoji to use for "avoiding a marriage proposal..."

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The key to this forum. Get that into your head and everything becomes clearer, or... more blurred... or clearer...

Let's not get too clear! If truth becomes so clear it's incontrovertible, absolute, and uncontestable this forum has no raison d'etre. Now what fun is that?

 

[nuuumannn]

If truth becomes so clear it's incontrovertible, absolute, and uncontestable this forum has no raison d'etre. Now what fun is that?

You Americans, you always talk in absolutes...

 

[XBe02Drvr]

1935, Lexington, Saratoga, Glorious, Courageous and Furious meet at Bermuda.

In 1935, carriers were just scouting tagalongs to the battleships, and didn't have the offensive power to be thought of as capital ships by the decision makers. They were still flying F4B4s and VE7s. The idea (and the weaponry) of a "carrier fleet" as opposed to a "fleet carrier" were still 2/3 of a decade away. The quantum leap in striking power that turned the carrier into a true offensive weapon didn't occur until 1940-42. The Swordfish led the pack, but was handicapped in forming a formidable triad by shortcomings in the fighter and dive bomber arenas, hence making it an effective weapon only under certain conditions. We all know how the TBD turned out. Not until the Hellcat/Avenger/Dauntless did we have a sure fire counter to Zeke/Kate/Val.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

You Americans, you always talk in absolutes...

We abhor uncertainties, haven't the patience for halfway measures, and are addicted to extremes, it seems. AND PROUD OF IT!
No wonder the "Ugly American" is a worldwide icon. It's in our DNA.

 

[SaparotRob]

Which emoji to use for "avoiding a marriage proposal..."

Where was that emoji 6 years ago?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Where was that emoji 6 years ago?

Or 32 years ago?

 

[SaparotRob]

We abhor uncertainties, haven't the patience for halfway measures, and are addicted to extremes, it seems. AND PROUD OF IT!
No wonder the "Ugly American" is a worldwide icon. It's in our DNA.

We DEMAND rigidly defined boundaries of uncertainty.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I agree that these were all new experiences from Japan's perspective. But radar directed fleet air defence and fighter direction has been going in the Mediterranean since late 1940.

From the bridge of IJNS Akagi, spring 1942: "Neat stuff, but what we're doing is working just fine, and we're too busy right now to take the yard time to install it!"

Throughout the peace with Britain the IJN and embassy staff should have been reviewing the Royal Navy's carrier fleet.

By the late '30s Britain was viewed as an adversary, and despite the traditional homage of the IJN, the brotherly closeness of the Admiral Togo days was long gone.
And there was no "British carrier fleet" to review, at least in the Kido Butai sense. Carrier ops were either attached to larger fleet actions or as single carrier task groups. Multi deck fast carrier task forces with combined air group operations, a la Kido Butai, were few to non- existent, and certainly not a staple.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

We DEMAND rigidly defined boundaries of uncertainty.

As a people, I fear we are suffering from the neurological equivalent of "hardening of the arteries", hardening of the neurons.
Intellectual and philosophical agility TRUMPed by tribal rigidity.

 

[taly01]

Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!

I haven't read what the IJN changed after Midway apart from having more scouting planes.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!

I haven't read what the IJN changed after Midway apart from having more scouting planes.

It is a good point, what were the Japanese doing for those next two years? We know what the Americans were doing up to June 1944, rushing to complete ten Essex class carriers and introduce and perfect the Hellcat, Corsair, Helldiver and Avenger.

Over those two years Japan seemed to have learned and implemented nothing. They only completed three additional carriers up to June 1944 (2 x Hiyō-class, and Taiho). When war commenced in Dec. 1941 Japan had only one carrier under construction, Taiho. Japan's carriers of June 1944 had essentially the same planes, still lacked radar, radios and centralized fighter control. Did they learn nothing at Midway?

 

[taly01]

It is a good point, what were the Japanese doing for those next two years?

I meant to say the IJN carrier force did not perform badly after Midway. They improved their scouting and also changed their doctrine to dedicate some carriers to CAP servicing.

The IJN did come out slightly ahead after the battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. They did miss out the chance on a killer blow in Eastern Solomons as the flight leader of a large strike missed the radio call with the updated location of US fleet (according to my read of the First Team: Guadalcanal). Santa Cruz they won, and had a well coordinated strike, but had very high plane losses, due to the improved US defences radar/AAA.