Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.

[GrauGeist]

That won't happen, Greg will block all historical documents because the docs don't agree with him...

 

[Engineman]

I do. That said it has a lot of factual errors.

I think it is usual that many Military study historical documents require extensive cross-referencing of detail facts. Of course, many such studies are very good but the accurate parts can be matched by inaccuracies. I think that Military studies made shortly after events can have good content from close involvement with the event but detail from "the other side" of the story can be thin. For example, I think that past Allied studies of Luftwaffe or German industry detail can fall short of the understanding available from some modern research.
Another factor in Military history recording is that it was often written with bias and contemporary Military history recording can have huge holes in the recording events at the time. Modern Military studies are a tool of Staff training and so the author may not be particularly involved with the subject. Bear in mind that just because a study has a military source, it does not necessarily draw from accurate or privileged source material.
So, overall it is great to see these linked studies.

Eng

 

[drgondog]

I think it is usual that many Military study historical documents require extensive cross-referencing of detail facts. Of course, many such studies are very good but the accurate parts can be matched by inaccuracies. I think that Military studies made shortly after events can have good content from close involvement with the event but detail from "the other side" of the story can be thin. For example, I think that past Allied studies of Luftwaffe or German industry detail can fall short of the understanding available from some modern research.

I'm not sure that 'modern research' provides added understanding. Which works of recent times shed more light on circa 1945-1948 studies and reports, such as Strategic Bombing Survey or The Army Air Forces in World War II? My view on this subject is that it is hard to re-read and investigate plowed ground by starting from scratch and research the written words and records to build a story - one that didn't begin with pre-conceived opinions.

Another factor in Military history recording is that it was often written with bias and contemporary Military history recording can have huge holes in the recording events at the time. Modern Military studies are a tool of Staff training and so the author may not be particularly involved with the subject. Bear in mind that just because a study has a military source, it does not necessarily draw from accurate or privileged source material.
So, overall it is great to see these linked studies.

Eng

I agree. Personally I have a habit of using several contemporary sources to cross reference specifics. That said, despite a few factual errors I have found in Boylon's Study 136, it is rich with specific citations/correspondence/orders that I personally tracked down and read - and used in my latest book.

Suppose it is natural to assume that each of the leaders post war bios may have selective recollections regarding unlattering circumstances, but recall that the Global Missions and late Arnold Papers were sourced from his daily diary and he flat out accepts responsibiliy for failures and less than successful decisions. Ditto Eaker and Spaatz.

The LW interview insights in the high numbred studies were also enlightening when comparing vewpoints.

My fav is the modern day narrative (Plus contemporary Chennault) of the so-called Bomber Mafia. From my hindsight and deep research, it existed in 1931 through 1940 in the purest form - The heavy long range bomber and destruction of enemy industry was the grand vision i order to achieve a separate Air Force. I can cite many references to show howver, that the mantra of the 'bomber will always get through' began to change as insight to fighter/bomber conflict displayed the ultimate supremacy of Pursuit over unescorted bombers - as evidenced in Spanish War and Battle of Britain and early attempts by both Germany and Britain to perform daylight bombing.

The opimism of Eaker was obviously misplaced due to a.) early 'success/low loss rates for escorted later unescorted shallow penetrations into W.GY; b.) Terrible claims processing of claims by bomber gunners - leading Eaker to believe 8th AF was inflicting unsustainable attrition by LW and could win the attrition war; c.) belief that the P-47C/D was adequate if only combat tanks could be installed for 'enough range' to punch through the perceived west wall of defense.

Pause for a moment for the concepts that the bomber mafia didn't care - that the losses were acceptable and could be replaced.

No - after Blitz Week, Tidal Wave at Ploesti, Regensburg-Schweinfurt, Munster and Schweinfurt - it was clear to the dimmest of the so called bomber mafia that the Dream would Die with defeat of Strategic Airpower. We were between a rock and a hard place because we still had to fight a war with the assets in hand. That is why Arnold responded quickly to June 1943 Lovett/Eaker plea for long range escort - when the P-47 was already in full blown ops - but not capable of stopping the bleeding. He re-routed P-38s BACK to Eaker one year afterEisenhower pulled them away from him for Torch. That is why the soon to be P-51B equipped 354, 357 and 363FG were dispatched to ETO and why Arnold requested, and Portal agreed, that all Mustang III be returned to AAF in the ETO.

IMO, based upon maybe 40 years of serious resarch into AAC/AAF growth and ETO airpower, the common threads of obstruction and incompetency all lead to the CG of Materiel Command, Oliver Echols.

Aside from the glaring vendetta against North American for the P-51, he was resposible for the XP-46, the slow (perceived) technical development of the self sealing combat drop tanks, for prodding dead end answers to the Kilner-Emons Board priority list (XP-75, YB-40, etc), for failure to rigorously test for operational suitability and combat range - which led to that responsibility shifted to Orlando and Eglin Field.

That said, even a miraculous development and production of the 110gal and 150gal flat tank STILL wasn't enough to bestow Long Range Escort title until the wing pylons ad then 370gal internal fuel version was delivered to ETO.

Other historians may disagree, but my own judgement is that Echols was both unimaginative and territorial - more interested in maintainng rigid control of deveopment and procurement through his feifdom, than he was in serving his customer - Plans and Operational Requirements at AAF-Hq.
It seems clear to me that Arnold figured out that many of his directs were less than optimal by mid 1943 when he started making major changes - not the least Swapping Doolittle for Eaker, lending his power and influence more liberally to achieve POINTBLANK objectives, putting a fence around Echols and pointing him to focus more on War Production and Logistics and less on aircraft development.

 

[33k in the air]

Roger Freeman thinks for P-47, external fuel radius, 84 gallons 280 miles, 108 gallons 325 miles, 165 gallons 375 miles, 215 gallons 480 miles, 300 gallons 550 miles, the final combination a pair of tanks. Going from 84 to 180 gallons gets you 3.75 mpg from the extra fuel, from 108 to 165 gallons 1.75 mpg, 165 to 215 gallons 4.2 mpg, 215 to 300 gallons 1.65 mpg. Fascinating if true about the drag different tanks had but more likely to reflect some are using the early 305 gallon internal fuel and others the later 370 gallons, the extra fuel adding around 215 miles to economic cruise range. The many times used range graphic has Spitfire 175 miles in May 1943, P-47 230 miles in June, 375 miles in August (Frankfurt, Kassel, Hannover just in range, Hamburg just out), P-38 520 miles in August and P-51 600 miles in early 1944. It would be very useful to find the 8th Air Force documents specifying how combat radius was calculated. Do not forget the extra pilot training and navigation aids required to enable an isolated fighter or small formation to find their way back from hundreds of miles out in less than perfect weather.

Combat radius for the P-47 from some other sources. The figure in parentheses is the internal fuel capacity in gallons.


America's Hundred Thousand

P-47 (305) = 125 miles
P-47 (305) = 425 miles with 2 x 150 gallon
P-47 (370) = 225 miles
P-47 (370) = 600 miles with 2 x 150 gallon


P-51B Mustang — North American's Bastard Stepchild that Saved the Eighth Air Force

P-47 (305) = 125 miles
P-47 (305) = 230 miles with 1 x 75 gallon
P-47 (305) = 275 miles with 1 x 108 gallon
P-47 (305) = 375 miles with 1 x 150 gallon
P-47 (305) = 425 miles with 2 x 150 gallon


Plate from a historical document entitled Extension of Combat Radius

P-47 (305) = 150 miles
P-47 (305) = 250 miles with 1 x 75 gallon
P-47 (305) = 300 miles with 1 x 108 gallon
P-47 (305) = 500 miles with 2 x 150 gallon
P-47 (370) = 250 miles
P-47 (370) = 700 miles with 2 x 150 gallon


Historical document Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945

P-47 (305) = 175 miles (May 1943)
P-47 (305) = 230 miles (June 1943)
P-47 (305) = 340 miles with 1 x 75 gallon
P-47 (305) = 375 miles with 1 x 108 gallon
P-47 (305) = 425 miles with 1 x 150 gallon
P-47 (305) = 475 miles with 2 x 108 gallon


Historical document Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical Air Commands in the ETO.
(Combat radius is at 10,000 feet and includes distance covered in climb)

P-47 (370) = 280 miles
P-47 (370) = 400 miles with 1 x 108 gallon
P-47 (370) = 575 miles with 2 x 150 gallon
P-47 (370) = 260 miles with 2 x 500 lb bombs
P-47 (370) = 360 miles with 2 x 500 lb bombs and 1 x 108 gallon
P-47 (370) = 230 miles with 2 x 1,000 lb bombs


In terms of the performance penalty imposed by drop tanks, here are the Column IV cruise figures at 20,000 feet from the PFOI for the P-47 -25 to -35. Note that the Column IV figures were flight checked (the Column V numbers were preliminary).

2.67 air miles per gallon (302 mph TAS / 113 gph) — no external load
2.19 air miles per gallon (221 mph TAS / 101 gph) — 2 x 165 gallon drop tanks

 

[pbehn]

Suppose it is natural to assume that each of the leaders post war bios may have selective recollections regarding unflattering circumstances, but recall that the Global Power and late Arnold Papers were sourced from his daily diary and he flat out accepts responsibility for failures and less than successful decisions. Ditto Eaker and Spaatz.

In days gone by people did that, to explain what happened and guide those who followed. Now in an age where no one admits to any mistake at all, any past error of judgement for any reason is used to destroy reputations, more so if it is admitted because that shows weakness and incompetence to people who have never ben in that position.

 

[special ed]

West Point graduates lived by an honor code four years which most lived by as long, in their career, as possible.
"I will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate among us those who do."

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

In terms of the performance penalty imposed by drop tanks, here are the Column IV cruise figures at 20,000 feet from the PFOI for the P-47 -25 to -35. Note that the Column IV figures were flight checked (the Column V numbers were preliminary).

2.67 air miles per gallon (302 mph TAS / 113 gph) — no external load
2.19 air miles per gallon (221 mph TAS / 101 gph) — 2 x 165 gallon drop tanks

Thanks for all that interesting P-47 data. The other consumption figure is 20,000 feet, 3.03 mpg, 288 mph TAS, 95 g/hr. To me the figures say some of the loss in speed when carrying tanks is due to the engine not putting out as much power, as it is using around 10% less fuel. It also implies going from 288 to 302 mph, around a 2% increase in speed requires around a 20% increase in engine power, which is doubtful given the P-47D top speed.

Putting all the range data into a table. ID is just a number to use for sorting, Src = Source, Int = internal fuel gallons, ext = external fuel gallons, radius = reported combat radius in miles, mpg miles per gallon = twice the radius divided by the total fuel less 91 warm up, take off and climb, 91 combat and 48 reserve gallons. Table sorted by radius, internal, external fuel.

ID	Src	Int	ext	radius	"mpg"	note
1​	HunThou	305​	0​	125​	3.33​
5​	P-51B	305​	0​	125​	3.33​
10​	ExtCmbRad	305​	0​	150​	4.00​
16​	8thTAC	305​	0​	175​	4.67​	10,000 ft May 43
3​	HunThou	370​	0​	225​	3.21​
17​	8thTAC	305​	0​	230​	6.13​	10,000 ft Jun 43
6​	P-51B	305​	75​	230​	3.07​
27​	T&T	370​	0​	230​	3.29​	2x1000lb
11​	ExtCmbRad	305​	75​	250​	3.33​
14​	ExtCmbRad	370​	0​	250​	3.57​
25​	T&T	370​	0​	260​	3.71​	2x500lb
7​	P-51B	305​	108​	275​	3.01​
32​	Freeman	?	205​	275​	n/a	Ferry tank?
22​	T&T	370​	0​	280​	4.00​
28​	Freeman	?	84​	280​	n/a	Official 75 gal tank
12​	ExtCmbRad	305​	108​	300​	3.28​
29​	Freeman	?	108​	325​	n/a
18​	8thTAC	305​	75​	340​	4.53​	10,000 ft
26​	T&T	370​	108​	360​	2.90​	2x500lb
19​	8thTAC	305​	108​	375​	4.10​	10,000 ft
8​	P-51B	305​	150​	375​	3.33​
30​	Freeman	?	165​	375​	n/a	Official 150 gal tank
23​	T&T	370​	108​	400​	3.23​
20​	8thTAC	305​	150​	425​	3.78​	10,000 ft
2​	HunThou	305​	300​	425​	2.27​	2x150
9​	P-51B	305​	300​	425​	2.27​	2x150
21​	8thTAC	305​	216​	475​	3.26​	10,000 ft 2x108
33​	Freeman	?	215​	480​	n/a
13​	ExtCmbRad	305​	300​	500​	2.67​	2x150
31​	Freeman	?	330​	550​	n/a	2x165
24​	T&T	370​	300​	575​	2.61​	2x150
4​	HunThou	370​	300​	600​	2.73​	2x150
15​	ExtCmbRad	370​	300​	700​	3.18​	2x150

Roger Freeman appears to be mostly quoting figures for 305 gallon internal fuel models, he also points out the differences between official and actual capacity, 75 official = 84 actual, 150 official = 165 actual, 200 official = 215 actual. The other references are using official capacity. The importance of altitude is clear. You can say the table is reasonably consistent, but to be sure requires cruise speeds, altitude, time taken to climb, assumed formation size and probably other factors. One obvious point, the underwing fuel tanks had a lot of drag, carrying fuel under the fuselage looks like the better option. Extension of Combat Radius says 75 gallons external = 65 gallons internal. How radius went from 175 to 230 miles without more fuel in Eighth Air Force Tactical Development figures needs explaining, having 66/51 extra gallons in wing tanks only gets you 100 more miles versus a 150/165 gallon belly tank, though Freeman thinks it is an extra 140 miles. References supplied by 33k,

AN 01-65BC-1APilot's Flight Operating Instructions for Army Models P-47D -25, -26, -27, -28, -30, and -35 Airplanes dated 25 Jan. 1945
America's Hundred Thousand Francis Dean
P-51B Mustang — North American Bastard Stepchild that Saved the Eighth Air Force James William "Bill" Marshall and Lowell F. Ford
Plate from a historical document entitled Extension of Combat Radius
Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945
Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical Air Commands in the ETO.
Mighty Eighth War Manual Roger Freeman page 221

Next to the Honourable Society of Bomber Operators. Pre WWII there was the usual to and fro between bombers and fighter performance, like a speed bomber that existing fighters could not easily catch, only to run into a better fighter design a short while later, if you have optimistic assumptions about the development cycle, say not much longer than WWI once peace time inertia is removed, it is easy to believe even if today's fighter can finally catch yesterday's bomber, tomorrow's bomber will restore the balance. The B-10, A-20, B-26, Blenheim, Ju88, Mosquito etc. versus the fighters in service when they arrived. Does not really work as well for heavy bombers because of the costs associated with being able to carry a large bomb load, works even less as defensive firepower goes up, but might work if acoustic is still the best detection and warning system. It takes a lot longer to change the mind of large organisation than an individual.

From early 1941 RAF fighter range would become an issue, just as the USAAF fighters lost a lot of range going to protected fuel tanks. The Bf109 over Britain was one thing, the British needed to fly Hurricanes off aircraft carriers to Malta, ferry across North Africa, fight over France and dream of being able to fly fighter aircraft from Britain to Gibraltar as the USAAF would do in late 1942. What radar could do for air defence in particular became widely known even if it was just at the detector stage, not at the full ground controlled interception stage.

The opimism of Eaker was obviously misplaced due to a.) early 'success/low loss rates for escorted later unescorted shallow penetrations into W.GY; b.) Terrible claims processing of claims by bomber gunners - leading Eaker to believe 8th AF was inflicting unsustainable attrition by LW and could win the attrition war; c.) belief that the P-47C/D was adequate if only combat tanks could be installed for 'enough range' to punch through the perceived west wall of defense.

Arthur Harris was only cleared for Ultra in February 1945, if at all, helping to explain his panacea oil targets ideas, any date for when Ira Eaker was cleared, again if at all? In 1943 the British were a lot more cautious over need to know. According to British intelligence in the Second World War : its influence on strategy and operations by F.H. Hinsley ; with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ranson, R.C. Knight, January to June 1943 the RAF fighter command allowed 249 kill claims against Luftwaffe fighters, the true number was 235. While Luftwaffe fighter units in Germany would normally use land lines to report, those in France would normally use radio. Ultra and the Y service were keeping an accurate eye on Luftwaffe strength, dispositions and losses. The 8th Air Force should have known how accurate its bomber gunner claims were for operations over France at least, which were just under half of all targets attacked, along with Luftwaffe fighter dispositions including in Germany. The Air Force would also be well aware of its own sorties and losses.

In money and manpower terms a B-17 cost about 3.5 P-51, to win the equipment exchange rate the bombers would need say a 4 to 1 kill ratio, to win the personnel exchange rate with a 10 person crew against single seat fighters it would take 20 to 1 kill ratio given half the fighter pilots escaping unhurt and the bombers mostly going down over enemy territory.

Once again using Richard Davis figures, sorties credited with attacking, need to add the other sorties that entered contested airspace while losses are missing only, need to add the Category E write offs.

8th Air Force Cumulative figures, all attacks
Aug-42 Attacking 87, Missing 0, %Missing 0.00
Sep-42 Attacking 170, Missing 2, %Missing 1.18
Oct-42 Attacking 308, Missing 9, %Missing 2.92
Nov-42 Attacking 583, Missing 18, %Missing 3.09
Dec-42 Attacking 754, Missing 31, %Missing 4.11
Jan-43 Attacking 995, Missing 47, %Missing 4.72
Feb-43 Attacking 1,244, Missing 69, %Missing 5.55
Mar-43 Attacking 1,855, Missing 88, %Missing 4.74
Apr-43 Attacking 2,206, Missing 116, %Missing 5.26
May-43 Attacking 3,423, Missing 182, %Missing 5.32
Jun-43 Attacking 4,545, Missing 267, %Missing 5.87
Jul-43 Attacking 6,158, Missing 375, %Missing 6.09

There is a clear trend, partly due to a steady increase in longer ranged attacks, partly due to increased and more experienced defences.

Cumulative figures, attacks on Germany
27-Jan-43 Attacking 55, Missing 1, %Missing 1.82
4-Feb-43 Attacking 94, Missing 6, %Missing 6.38
26-Feb-43 Attacking 158, Missing 13, %Missing 8.23
4-Mar-43 Attacking 174, Missing 18, %Missing 10.34
18-Mar-43 Attacking 271, Missing 20, %Missing 7.38
22-Mar-43 Attacking 355, Missing 23, %Missing 6.48
17-Apr-43 Attacking 461, Missing 39, %Missing 8.46
14-May-43 Attacking 587, Missing 47, %Missing 8.01
15-May-43 Attacking 722, Missing 53, %Missing 7.34
19-May-43 Attacking 880, Missing 59, %Missing 6.70
21-May-43 Attacking 1,003, Missing 71, %Missing 7.08
11-Jun-43 Attacking 1,221, Missing 79, %Missing 6.47
13-Jun-43 Attacking 1,403, Missing 105, %Missing 7.48
22-Jun-43 Attacking 1,586, Missing 121, %Missing 7.63
25-Jun-43 Attacking 1,753, Missing 139, %Missing 7.93
17-Jul-43 Attacking 1,787, Missing 141, %Missing 7.89
25-Jul-43 Attacking 2,004, Missing 159, %Missing 7.93
26-Jul-43 Attacking 2,203, Missing 183, %Missing 8.31
28-Jul-43 Attacking 2,297, Missing 205, %Missing 8.92
29-Jul-43 Attacking 2,490, Missing 215, %Missing 8.63
30-Jul-43 Attacking 2,624, Missing 227, %Missing 8.65

As of the second attack on Germany the overall loss rate went to an unacceptable level and stayed there. If all 21 attacks actually had the 300 aircraft the 8th Air Force calculated was the required strength to keep losses sustainable and that resulted in no more than historical casualties the loss rate would be 3.6%, if June onwards had seen 300 strong forces using the same ideas the loss rate would have been 5.2% of attacking sorties missing for those 10 raids.

Totals by country
Belgium Attacking 272, Missing 11, %missing 4.04
France Attacking 2,956, Missing 135, %missing 4.57
Germany Attacking 2,624, Missing 227, %missing 8.65
Netherlands Attacking 98, Missing 1, %missing 1.02
Norway Attacking 208, Missing 1, %missing 0.48

Even west of the German border the loss rates were nearly unacceptable. Somehow the 8th Air Force was thinking it could still make partly or unescorted raids work.

In contract dated 1939/40 the USAAF ordered 512 B-17, 388 B-24, 863 B-25, 798 B-26, 60 P-35, 552 P-38, 703 P-39, 1,063 P-40, 134 P-43, 772 P-47, not quite the all out heavy bomber force.

 

[Mustangtmg]

Greg apparently had his feelings hurt by me regarding 'contrarian' views on his P-47 series regarding range, and now his recent 'breathless' breaking news about Fokker being the real engineering and production cadre that built P-51.

I am banned

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWr50TP0CWc&t=4169s

For those that can wade into 58 minute region I am referred to as 'butt hurt' author trying to prop up sales.

The posts that lurched me into the evildooer image was a point by point fact citation for reasons the P-47 was Not held back from true place of glory on the first Schweinfurt mission.

But the posts that apparently put me into the evildooer/must be banned penalty box was a point by point rebuttal of his conclusions that NAA could ONLY have built the Mustang with heritage Fokker team acquired by General Motors team, then named General Aviation Manufacturing Corp.

His conclusion; Edgar Schmued was Fokker Design, someone I don't know (and not on NAA org chart) was the production genius and Van Breese was responsible for NAA test group - all Fokker in his words - and were the catalysts for North American ascension as a builder of airplanes. He did note that a couple of executives came from Douglas in a passing swipe.

Those (unmentioned) execs were Kindelberger (former VP of Engineering at Douglas - and daddy of DC-1 and DC-2), Atwood (Asst Chief of Engineering at Douglas and Chief of Structures), Smithson (Chief of Production) along with Ray Rice.
Atwood became Chief, Engineering at NAA, Rice joined later as Asst Chief of Engineering and Smithson became VP Production. This is mid 1934 Mangement team first at GAMC, then NAA on Jan 1 1935.

Sadly Greg has no clue regarding actual operations at Fokker when GAMC was formed, nor understanding what was important when the F.10 crash killed Knute Rockne in early 1931.

Apparently he believes that Fokker was leading Fokker Atlantic engineering that designed the F.10 to compete with Ford Tri-motor - not so. Robert Noorduyn who came to US with Fokker in 1921, left Fokker in 1929. Apparently Greg believes that Edgard Schmued developed his talent as an engineer under the tutelage of Fokker Engineers. Not so, Schmued was hired just as Fokker resigned after Rockne crash. The new Chief's of engineering replacements were first Thaden from Pittsburgh Aircaft, renamed Metalaire in 1931 and acquired by GAMC in 1931.

The Department of Commerce - Aeronautical Division as a result of Rockne crash investigation issued edict concerning comercial passenger aircraft. No more wooded structural members for flight safety (F-10 deemed to have failed due to rotted wood wing spar).

At this moment in time there were several F.10 and F-8 Universal still on the line that were sold offshore. The Fokker XO-27 was flying with several orders for YO-27 nad one request for bomber version XB-7 - which Schmued worked on as first assignment. ALL Fokker designs and production airframes were of wood spar with plywood covered wings, steel tube and linen fuselages.

The Thaden T-2 and T-4 were welded tube metal covered fuselage with steel truss spar/linen covered wing now being built by Pittsburgh Aircraft when acquired by GAMC. The Pilgrim 150 was a low cantilever, steel tube, alclad covered wing plus steel tube structure, Alclad fuselage.

The second new boss was Virginius Clark (Clark Y airfoil) and former Chief, Engineering that designed the Fairchild-American Pilgrim 150. The boss and the Pilgrim 150 came in December 1931 - to replace Thaden. The 150 was assigned GA-43. It first flew May 1932. There wil be more on this later if you can stay awake.

By end of 1931, all metal single and twin engine aircraft are flying or on the Drawing Board. Included are B-9, Boeing Model 200, Douglas DC-1 and Boeing 247. GAMC ses the handwriting on the wall - which is why Fokker is not only effectively DOA for future design in commercial aircraft due to lack of inhouse expertise in either sheet metal fabrication or aerodynamics, or airframe structure analytic for these new technologies.

Compare Fokker F.10 to the soon to be introduced Douglas DC-1. The DC-1 could take off an fly on one engine. ALL Alclad stressed skin construction, twin engines, 10 passenger, flaps, and retractable landing gear.

But a little bit about NAA. It was a Holding company specializing in commercial air transport companies and airframe manufacturers. It acquired Eastern Airlines, Curtis Aircraft, SperyGyroscope. 40% Douglas Aircraft, then Berliner Joyce Aircraft, then GAMC. When NAA acquired GAMC, it consolidated three plants to one at Dundalk MD with approximately 150-200 employees remaining - then in turn was acquired by GM and divested of all commercial airlines save Eastern Airlines.

Summary, end of 1934.
All Teteboro Fokker/GAMC/Pittsburgh Aircraft aircraft had been completed, delivered, shut down.
American Pilgram 150/GAMC GA-43 completed at Dundalk as first actual NAA aircraft produced.
Berliner Joyce new development complete, only new orders for SOC-1 & -2 steel, welded floats are in production.

Senior management team execs Kindelberger (CEO), Atwood (Chief Engineering), Smithson (VP Production), Bowen (Production Engineer and future X73 project manager, then Asst Plant Manager at new Dallas Plant), Hansen (Chief Project Enginering) - ALL from Douglas Aircraft

Key Managers and future key employees Rice (Asst Chief, Engineering) - Douglas Aircraft, Schlecher (Chief, Airframe structures) and Baldwin (Project Engineer) and Rudd (tool & die maker who rose to VP&Gen Mgr NAA Columbus Div) came from Berliner Joyce. Schmued (Preliminary Design engineer at acquisition by NAA (GAMC)

Summary-
Every design produced by NAA from XO-47 (GA-15) and BT-9 (NA-16) through XB-21, BC-1, Export Fighter NA-44, AT-6, NA-40, B-25, P-51 were led by Atwood through 1939, Rice thereafter. Douglas origins.

Schmued became Chief, Preliminary Design in 1939 wth first effort the P-509/X73. The project team was matrixed but still in Rice's Engineering department.

The Production quality was driven by Kindelberger with focus on speed, quality and ever decreasing Cost. Smithson and imbedded project engineers worked closely with Design with an eye towards actual process, and process flow.

Schmued's genius were two fold. A superb intuitive feel for aerodynamic shape and ability to pick/lead and manage a preliminary design team to a schedule the preliminary designs.
Schmued also the driver for the development and implementation of Projective Geometry of applied conical sections. He pushed, Roy Liming constructed the application to the Lofting developments.

Additional Oddities
Nothing from Fokker related to manufacturing excellence, specifically not 'butt joint quality production that Greg cites as reason speed advantage over Spitfire. Curiously he didn't mention wing or Meredith effect as 'other reasons' for performance but all those lay at feet of Smithson, and Rudd including flush rivet passion and development of 7075 skin deelopment and techniques later. Nothing from Fokker instituted filling, sealing, priming and painting wing to achieve surface quality independent of butt joint construction.

Nothing from Fokker instructed Ed horkey, Ashkenas, Beerer (all Cal Tech grads) in the fine art of airfoil development, aerodynamics, performance analyss or Meredith effect cooling system design - the latter a far larger difference maker than butt joint construction.

Nothing from Fokker introduced alclad sheet stress panel analysis and design that was cornerstone of NAA quality and strength.

Greg cites Van Breese as one of the Fokker trained giants that vaulted the Mustang into glory?

Well, interesting that Van Breesehad his own aircraft company 1927-1934. Breese Aircraft Company. last operating at Mines Field. He co-designed the Vultee V-1. Was bought out during the Vultee consilidation. He DID consult with Fokker Netherlands as a Demonstrator test pilot for Various Fokker designs attempting to gain a foothold in 1937. From that approximate time he was basically a full time test pilot and consultant including a stint with NAA in 1939/40 for the NA-44 and then 73X

Now for the other side of the ledger.

The rapidity and excellence of the first big success of NAA Design - the NA-16 BT-9 - had a large contingent of Dutch speaking shop team that worked 18x7 to get the prototpe done in time to win against Seversky. While the GA-43 was largely GAMC (Pilgrim) workers, the BT-9 was welded steel tube fuselage and fabric covering for fuselage and wing - right in the strike zone for the surviving Fokker (and Berliner Joyce) cadre that made the trip to Dundalk.

If anyone feels like stirring up some stuff in Greg's new video, you have my permssion to cut and paste. Warning - you may get banned.

Sincerely,

Butthurt

Gee, Butthurt ... is there a way to join your "fan club."?

I'm sure that there's only a tiny chance that ANYONE out there (alive or dead) has "the handle" on the ACTUAL story that should be told to replace Greg's dime-store novel presentation on how we can thank Anton Fokker for the Mustang, Sliced Bread, Queso Dip and the Hula Hoop - to name only a few of the things that Western Civilization owes to "Fol-ker."

He didn't ban me - I was too "general" in my Comments on the video in question. He did attempt to "educate" me. I have almost NOT knowledge concerning the whole "back-story" of the development of the Mustang family of aircraft, but his sophomoric video is right up there with a certain unnamed US President who is "building back better."

Stay "salty," my friend!

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

but his sophomoric video is right up there with a certain unnamed US President who is "building back better."

You know what makes me salty? People bringing BS partisan politics into our forum.

Totally unnecessary, and not wanted, needed, or allowed on this forum.

 

[drgondog]

Thanks for all that interesting P-47 data. The other consumption figure is 20,000 feet, 3.03 mpg, 288 mph TAS, 95 g/hr. To me the figures say some of the loss in speed when carrying tanks is due to the engine not putting out as much power, as it is using around 10% less fuel. It also implies going from 288 to 302 mph, around a 2% increase in speed requires around a 20% increase in engine power, which is doubtful given the P-47D top speed.

All of the values are straight line course, drop tanks, engage, fly back with reserve. All, except as noted are for 10,000 feet. For changes in Mpg the primary causes were drag due to drop tanks. The 75s were cleaner than the 108/110 and the 108/110 was cleaner than the 150gal.

The C/L, B-7 rack, 75 gal tank combination was about the same as the actual drag of two, uncluttered wing pylons. An observation on no. 17 - there is no universe in which a P-47C/D achieved 6.13 with only a clean P-47. It uses far too much fuel from internal tanks at very low speeds before reaching cruise altitude. It was closer to 3mpg for a cruise radius of 125mi - That configuration is one of the very few configurations actually tested at Eglin in 1943.

No criticism on you or your effort, but if half the values reported by 8th TAC were anywhere close to reality, the second Schweinfurt mission would have been escorted to the target. They got as far as Aachen before turnng back. 75 gal combat tanks.

Putting all the range data into a table. ID is just a number to use for sorting, Src = Source, Int = internal fuel gallons, ext = external fuel gallons, radius = reported combat radius in miles, mpg miles per gallon = twice the radius divided by the total fuel less 91 warm up, take off and climb, 91 combat and 48 reserve gallons. Table sorted by radius, internal, external fuel.

ID	Src	Int	ext	radius	"mpg"	note
1​	HunThou	305​	0​	125​	3.33​
5​	P-51B	305​	0​	125​	3.33​
10​	ExtCmbRad	305​	0​	150​	4.00​
16​	8thTAC	305​	0​	175​	4.67​	10,000 ft May 43
3​	HunThou	370​	0​	225​	3.21​
17​	8thTAC	305​	0​	230​	6.13​	10,000 ft Jun 43
6​	P-51B	305​	75​	230​	3.07​
27​	T&T	370​	0​	230​	3.29​	2x1000lb
11​	ExtCmbRad	305​	75​	250​	3.33​
14​	ExtCmbRad	370​	0​	250​	3.57​
25​	T&T	370​	0​	260​	3.71​	2x500lb
7​	P-51B	305​	108​	275​	3.01​
32​	Freeman	?	205​	275​	n/a	Ferry tank?
22​	T&T	370​	0​	280​	4.00​
28​	Freeman	?	84​	280​	n/a	Official 75 gal tank
12​	ExtCmbRad	305​	108​	300​	3.28​
29​	Freeman	?	108​	325​	n/a
18​	8thTAC	305​	75​	340​	4.53​	10,000 ft
26​	T&T	370​	108​	360​	2.90​	2x500lb
19​	8thTAC	305​	108​	375​	4.10​	10,000 ft
8​	P-51B	305​	150​	375​	3.33​
30​	Freeman	?	165​	375​	n/a	Official 150 gal tank
23​	T&T	370​	108​	400​	3.23​
20​	8thTAC	305​	150​	425​	3.78​	10,000 ft
2​	HunThou	305​	300​	425​	2.27​	2x150
9​	P-51B	305​	300​	425​	2.27​	2x150
21​	8thTAC	305​	216​	475​	3.26​	10,000 ft 2x108
33​	Freeman	?	215​	480​	n/a
13​	ExtCmbRad	305​	300​	500​	2.67​	2x150
31​	Freeman	?	330​	550​	n/a	2x165
24​	T&T	370​	300​	575​	2.61​	2x150
4​	HunThou	370​	300​	600​	2.73​	2x150
15​	ExtCmbRad	370​	300​	700​	3.18​	2x150

Roger Freeman appears to be mostly quoting figures for 305 gallon internal fuel models, he also points out the differences between official and actual capacity, 75 official = 84 actual, 150 official = 165 actual, 200 official = 215 actual. The other references are using official capacity. The importance of altitude is clear. You can say the table is reasonably consistent, but to be sure requires cruise speeds, altitude, time taken to climb, assumed formation size and probably other factors. One obvious point, the underwing fuel tanks had a lot of drag, carrying fuel under the fuselage looks like the better option. Extension of Combat Radius says 75 gallons external = 65 gallons internal. How radius went from 175 to 230 miles without more fuel in Eighth Air Force Tactical Development figures needs explaining, having 66/51 extra gallons in wing tanks only gets you 100 more miles versus a 150/165 gallon belly tank, though Freeman thinks it is an extra 140 miles. References supplied by 33k,

Freeman's table values are not supported by any combat operation planning or results pre- 370gal internal tank, save straight line sweeps.

AN 01-65BC-1APilot's Flight Operating Instructions for Army Models P-47D -25, -26, -27, -28, -30, and -35 Airplanes dated 25 Jan. 1945
America's Hundred Thousand Francis Dean
P-51B Mustang — North American Bastard Stepchild that Saved the Eighth Air Force James William "Bill" Marshall and Lowell F. Ford
Plate from a historical document entitled Extension of Combat Radius
Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945
Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical Air Commands in the ETO.
Mighty Eighth War Manual Roger Freeman page 221


Arthur Harris was only cleared for Ultra in February 1945, if at all, helping to explain his panacea oil targets ideas, any date for when Ira Eaker was cleared, again if at all? In 1943 the British were a lot more cautious over need to know. According to British intelligence in the Second World War : its influence on strategy and operations by F.H. Hinsley ; with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ranson, R.C. Knight, January to June 1943 the RAF fighter command allowed 249 kill claims against Luftwaffe fighters, the true number was 235. While Luftwaffe fighter units in Germany would normally use land lines to report, those in France would normally use radio. Ultra and the Y service were keeping an accurate eye on Luftwaffe strength, dispositions and losses. The 8th Air Force should have known how accurate its bomber gunner claims were for operations over France at least, which were just under half of all targets attacked, along with Luftwaffe fighter dispositions including in Germany. The Air Force would also be well aware of its own sorties and losses.

To my knowledge Eaker was never cleared for Ultra. RAF Intelligence however, warned Eaker that the bomber gunner claims were far overstated.

Even west of the German border the loss rates were nearly unacceptable. Somehow the 8th Air Force was thinking it could still make partly or unescorted raids work.

In contract dated 1939/40 the USAAF ordered 512 B-17, 388 B-24, 863 B-25, 798 B-26, 60 P-35, 552 P-38, 703 P-39, 1,063 P-40, 134 P-43, 772 P-47, not quite the all out heavy bomber force.

That optimistic thinking departed ~ June 1943 when Eaker and Lovett beggd for P-38 and P-51. Arnold trumped the Air Defense Directorate in late July - which had allocation authority - and ordered that all Mustang and Lightning production for next three months be directed to ETO. Both the 20th and 55th FG P-38 equipped were first to arrive in August 1943 but the 55th deemed 'not ready' until after second Schweinfurt mission. The 20th began ops at end of December.

 

[33k in the air]

The C/L, B-7 rack, 75 gal tank combination was about the same as the actual drag of two, uncluttered wing pylons.

According to the PFOI for the P-51H, which has fully filled out cruise charts and a wide assortment of external load combinations, the drag from 2 x 75 gallon drop tanks was the same as for 2 x 500 lb bombs — the cruise chart figures for the two loads were identical.

An observation on no. 17 - there is no universe in which a P-47C/D achieved 6.13 with only a clean P-47. It uses far too much fuel from internal tanks at very low speeds before reaching cruise altitude. It was closer to 3mpg for a cruise radius of 125mi - That configuration is one of the very few configurations actually tested at Eglin in 1943.

It would help if there were a PFOI for the earlier P-47 models with a fully, or nearly so, filled out cruise charts. The two I have in digital form have incomplete data.

The PFOI for the RP-47B & C and P-47D & G (AN 01-65BC-1 dated 20 Nov. 1943) in Column IV has flight checked cruise figures for up to 30,000 feet; Column V (Maximum Air Range) has flight checked figures for up to only 10,000 feet.

The PFOI for the P-47D-25, -26, -27, -28, -30, and -35 (AN 01-65BC-1A dated 25 Jan. 1945) in Column IV has flight checked cruise figures for up to 20,000 feet; Column V (Maximum Air Range) has preliminary figures only and for up to 20,000 feet. It also has a cruise chart with 2 x 165 gallon drop tanks as the external load — Column IV figures are flight checked for up to 25,000 feet; Column V figures are flight checked up to 15,000 while the numbers for 20,000 and 25,000 feet are preliminary.

No criticism on you or your effort, but if half the values reported by 8th TAC were anywhere close to reality, the second Schweinfurt mission would have been escorted to the target. They got as far as Aachen before turnng back. 75 gal combat tanks.

The radius figures from Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945 are certainly at odds with the numbers from the other sources.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

lol, in reviewing Masters of the Air Ep 7, the guys at Unauthorized History of the Pacific War clearly are referring to Greg or one of his acolytes at about 37 minutes into this video, regarding range of fighter escort in ETO.

 

[WARSPITER]

lol, in reviewing Masters of the Air Ep 7, the guys at Unauthorized History of the Pacific War clearly are referring to Greg or one of his acolytes at about 37 minutes into this video, regarding range of fighter escort in ETO.

Nicely done vid.

 

[drgondog]

According to the PFOI for the P-51H, which has fully filled out cruise charts and a wide assortment of external load combinations, the drag from 2 x 75 gallon drop tanks was the same as for 2 x 500 lb bombs — the cruise chart figures for the two loads were identical.

Agreed - similar for XP-51F/G/J as well as D. All with P-51D bomb rack which is far cleaner than P-51B and P-38 and P-47 wing pylons. When I referred to the B-7 rack it was strictly pointed at the new Keel or early P47 as well as the bomb/fuel tank rack designed to release in flight.

It would help if there were a PFOI for the earlier P-47 models with a fully, or nearly so, filled out cruise charts. The two I have in digital form have incomplete data.

The PFOI for the RP-47B & C and P-47D & G (AN 01-65BC-1 dated 20 Nov. 1943) in Column IV has flight checked cruise figures for up to 30,000 feet; Column V (Maximum Air Range) has flight checked figures for up to only 10,000 feet.

The PFOI for all models of P-51B/C and early D refer to calculated values - ditto P-47B/C/D and the column V is for the 200gal tank which was not pressurized and would not feed above ~ 20,000 feet. IIRC the chart showed up to 15000 feet in Column V.

Flight tests at Eglin in 1945 were the most thorough and represent the charts from Wight Field Combat Radius reproduced in Dean's AOHT- which are non conservative. The reason for depicting them as simple start, warm up, climb and cruise in a straight line, drop tank, fight come home and arrive with approx 30 min reserve is to serve as a guide to planning - in which winds aloft, potential storm fronts, actual route deviations from straight line, escort nuances (straight line to area via sweep with no escort duties vs high cover close escort Essing, etc.).

Another reason the calculated values are non-conservative is that they are engineering calculations using Le Brequet equations assuming vigilent fuel management, constant altitude with throttle/speed change as weight is burned off and angle of attack reduces along with induced drag - which ain't happening in combat formations.

AFAIK, up through P-47D-23 all charts calculated for external tanks assumed switch to external tanks during the group formation process about the time the group began climb to cruise altitude and as far as the external tanks would permit, before dropping. AFAIK all paper tanks were dropped when empty, but the steel combat tanks were retained as much as possible if no combat ensued.

The PFOI for the P-47D-25, -26, -27, -28, -30, and -35 (AN 01-65BC-1A dated 25 Jan. 1945) in Column IV has flight checked cruise figures for up to 20,000 feet; Column V (Maximum Air Range) has preliminary figures only and for up to 20,000 feet. It also has a cruise chart with 2 x 165 gallon drop tanks as the external load — Column IV figures are flight checked for up to 25,000 feet; Column V figures are flight checked up to 15,000 while the numbers for 20,000 and 25,000 feet are preliminary.




The radius figures from Eighth Air Force Tactical Development — August 1942–May 1945 are certainly at odds with the numbers from the other sources.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

All of the values are straight line course, drop tanks, engage, fly back with reserve.

Thanks for that, a good way to compare their potential but they fly to their radius, get into a fight or not, if not they immediately turn back in case there is a fight on the way home, waving at the bombers as they turn. Loitering for say 20 minutes to provide target cover would cost a P-47 around 38 gallons or 50 miles from the radius.

All, except as noted are for 10,000 feet.

Would that be all at 20,000 feet except as noted for 10,000 feet?

The C/L, B-7 rack, 75 gal tank combination was about the same as the actual drag of two, uncluttered wing pylons.
An observation on no. 17 - there is no universe in which a P-47C/D achieved 6.13 with only a clean P-47.

Yes it is clear the wing racks and associated tanks hurt performance. Roger Freeman adds a pair of 150 gallon underwing tanks made handling difficult unlike the P-51. If you change the internal fuel on 17 from 305 to 370 gallons the mpg drops to 3.3 from 6.1

if half the values reported by 8th TAC were anywhere close to reality, the second Schweinfurt mission would have been escorted to the target.

I think part of the difference is the 8th TAC are at a very different altitude to the others. When it comes to the 200 gallon ferry tank usage the reports are half full, or 100 gallons, if it takes 91 gallons to get to altitude from take off then half full tanks were being dropped over Britain. Given how few operations were done using the tanks that probably reflects where those operations went. Setting a rule to stay below 20,000 feet and use the tank until starting to climb a given distance from the enemy coast would enable more fuel for a mission to Bremen or Hamburg for example than for one to Schweinfurt.

Freeman's table values are not supported by any combat operation planning or results pre- 370gal internal tank, save straight line sweeps.

Interesting as his values largely align with the other references.

To my knowledge Eaker was never cleared for Ultra. RAF Intelligence however, warned Eaker that the bomber gunner claims were far overstated.

If Eaker was not cleared for Ultra a question is if someone in the HQ was, but probably not in 1943. Which leaves Eaker, like Harris, unsure exactly how good the source was when making decisions on what to believe.

That optimistic thinking departed ~ June 1943 when Eaker and Lovett beggd for P-38 and P-51.

End June 1943 there were only 22 production P-51B, then again the Australians thought the Merlin Mustang was a good idea in 1942. The 8th was asking for external tanks from 1942 and were working on designs and British manufacture. The question becomes why did the Air Force, with the results to end June 1943 at least, carry out the July to October missions which were on average deeper into enemy airspace and against increasing resistance. The idea a 300 bomber force would reduce losses to acceptable level was not supported by the June operations or the operations against Germany in general, which raises the issue of where did the number come from and why it has made the histories.

Both the 20th and 55th FG P-38 equipped were first to arrive in August 1943 but the 55th deemed 'not ready' until after second Schweinfurt mission. The 20th began ops at end of December.

The 55th FG arrived on 26 August, first mission 15 October, the 20th FG arrived 16 September, first mission 28 December, similar time to first missions as the P-47 groups, 353rd 7 June to 12 August, 352nd 8 July to 9 September, 355th 8 July to 14 September, 356th 26 August to 15 October.

As of mid 1943 the only other mid to then long range allied fighter was the Spitfire VIII with a 50 to 90 gallon external tank. As far as I know none were offered, none asked for. There would be command issues of the sort that meant the abandonment of the idea the USAAF would do defensive sorties in Britain, otherwise it seems about the priorities given to the various fronts, along with RAF ideas on long range for single seat fighters.

Edit: Air Marshall Richard Williams, RAAF representative in Washington, in a letter dated 20 July 1942 notes "The improved Mustang with Merlin 61 engine will not be in production until 1943." The first Merlin Mustang flew in Britain on 13 October 1942. It was part of a section discussing the need for fighters with performance at altitude to counter the Zero. Apparently the local USAAF had asked for P-47 and were being sent P-38 "reported everywhere as being heavy in maintenance."

 

[33k in the air]

lol, in reviewing Masters of the Air Ep 7, the guys at Unauthorized History of the Pacific War clearly are referring to Greg or one of his acolytes at about 37 minutes into this video, regarding range of fighter escort in ETO.

Ooooh, the Greg acolytes are going to be mad.

 

[drgondog]

Thanks for that, a good way to compare their potential but they fly to their radius, get into a fight or not, if not they immediately turn back in case there is a fight on the way home, waving at the bombers as they turn. Loitering for say 20 minutes to provide target cover would cost a P-47 around 38 gallons or 50 miles from the radius.

Would that be all at 20,000 feet except as noted for 10,000 feet?

That is the problem. Not all charts present the altitudes for values, but USAAF typically plotted 10,000 and 25,000. The 10,000 foot values in my experience always exceed the 25K ranges displayed for same loadout. Technically, there is less Lift Co-efficient at lower altitude reducing Induced drag enough to overcome advantage in lower parasite drag at higher altitudes - as well as less fuel expended to get to cruise altitude,

Yes it is clear the wing racks and associated tanks hurt performance. Roger Freeman adds a pair of 150 gallon underwing tanks made handling difficult unlike the P-51. If you change the internal fuel on 17 from 305 to 370 gallons the mpg drops to 3.3 from 6.1

good catch.

I think part of the difference is the 8th TAC are at a very different altitude to the others. When it comes to the 200 gallon ferry tank usage the reports are half full, or 100 gallons, if it takes 91 gallons to get to altitude from take off then half full tanks were being dropped over Britain. Given how few operations were done using the tanks that probably reflects where those operations went. Setting a rule to stay below 20,000 feet and use the tank until starting to climb a given distance from the enemy coast would enable more fuel for a mission to Bremen or Hamburg for example than for one to Schweinfurt.

That one is tricky. VIII FC doctrine built around 'beware the Hun in the sun' was keen on entering enemy airspace at a high (er) rate of speed than optimum per the charts... and refrain from cruising as a sitting duck o enemy fighters that were positioned to attack at 25K+. Nobody was going all the way to Hamburg/Bremen in (P-47) in 1943. Contrast Blakesee on short TDY ith 354th FG hot down an Me 110 over Bremen on December 20th 1943. No 85 gal fuse tank, just two 75gal cmbat tanks.
The first example of P-47s engaging in combat at Bremen or Hamburg (offhand cursory inspection of Victory credits/location are 56th FG November 29, 1943 with 108 gal C/L tanks. The first for Hannover/Steinhder & Dummer Lake was Big Week February 20th, 1944. The next further penetration/combat further east was Celle, (ne Hannover) on May 5th. Off hand I don't know whether the February missions were flown with 110 or 150 gal C/L. The two pylon P-47D-15 was not operational with Group level staffing until late April/May 1944.

My only point in coupling encounter reports is that I believe those represent a fair 'true combat radius' which ilustrates drop tanks, engage and return home. Of course it IS coservative because the pilot did return rather than run out of fuel.

On deep escort missions it was common practice for group leader to instruct "Hit enemy fighters and return - don't chase, conserve fuel'. Those that engaged early frequenty returned early with a wingman as escort.

Interesting as his values largely align with the other references.

If Eaker was not cleared for Ultra a question is if someone in the HQ was, but probably not in 1943. Which leaves Eaker, like Harris, unsure exactly how good the source was when making decisions on what to believe.

End June 1943 there were only 22 production P-51B, then again the Australians thought the Merlin Mustang was a good idea in 1942. The 8th was asking for external tanks from 1942 and were working on designs and British manufacture. The question becomes why did the Air Force, with the results to end June 1943 at least, carry out the July to October missions which were on average deeper into enemy airspace and against increasing resistance. The idea a 300 bomber force would reduce losses to acceptable level was not supported by the June operations or the operations against Germany in general, which raises the issue of where did the number come from and why it has made the histories.

IIRC the June 1943 ops did not have a 300 B-17 dispatched mission. The first was the Blitz Week July 28h split force strikes at Kassel (182) and Oschersleben (120) (Freeman:source) - of which only a total of 95 were effectives due to most of force (>150) returning due to weather. Only 37 of the Oschersleben force dropped bombs.. The total loss was high but could be rationalized by greatly reduced defensive firepower.

The 55th FG arrived on 26 August, first mission 15 October, the 20th FG arrived 16 September, first mission 28 December, similar time to first missions as the P-47 groups, 353rd 7 June to 12 August, 352nd 8 July to 9 September, 355th 8 July to 14 September, 356th 26 August to 15 October.

As of mid 1943 the only other mid to then long range allied fighter was the Spitfire VIII with a 50 to 90 gallon external tank. As far as I know none were offered, none asked for. There would be command issues of the sort that meant the abandonment of the idea the USAAF would do defensive sorties in Britain, otherwise it seems about the priorities given to the various fronts, along with RAF ideas on long range for single seat fighters.

Edit: Air Marshall Richard Williams, RAAF representative in Washington, in a letter dated 20 July 1942 notes "The improved Mustang with Merlin 61 engine will not be in production until 1943." The first Merlin Mustang flew in Britain on 13 October 1942. It was part of a section discussing the need for fighters with performance at altitude to counter the Zero. Apparently the local USAAF had asked for P-47 and were being sent P-38 "reported everywhere as being heavy in maintenance."

Geoffrey I agree with much of what you write. That said, my records and Freeman agree 'circa' Aug 20th for 20th FG arrival, preceding 55th.

You are correct that approximately 20+ Production P-51B, but there were many more airfames on the tarmac awaiting the strike delayed Packard 1650-3 engines. The Aussies were negotiating what became NA-110 in March/April 1943.

The 8th AF had no alternative save the few 200gal Ferry tanks in late 1943. As to why? IMO twoprimary reasons. First was belief that LW defenses were arrayed on the 'outer ring' - with zero intelligence regarding movement from Sud and Ost fronts of experienced units deployed for defense of the Reich - in central Germany. Surprise regading confrontation with heavily armed Me 110 past escort fighter range. Second, there were the directives of the Combined Air Offensive and the RAF was carrying the greater share. Eaker was under heavy pressure to fly more missions and 'get on with it' by Arnold. Couple those two with ove optimism on part of Eaker that a mission that a.) was strongly escorted in to German Border was adequate to brunt most of the (Known) expected resistance, and b.) sufficiently populated by enough bombers to provide interlocking defensive fire ona large scale would succeed.

Recall that the plan for a 300 bomber steam to go to Schweinfurt 'en masse' the break off the 3rd BD to go to Regensburg - then go south to Africa - was a fairly good plan - save for complete disruption due to weather. In retrospect, image if Regensburg strike plan was to return to Britain and face the gauntlet again. Most folks forget that losses at Regensburg were 50% higher than Schweinfurt.

 

[33k in the air]

That is the problem. Not all charts present the altitudes for values, but USAAF typically plotted 10,000 and 25,000. The 10,000 foot values in my experience always exceed the 25K ranges displayed for same loadout. Technically, there is less Lift Co-efficient at lower altitude reducing Induced drag enough to overcome advantage in lower parasite drag at higher altitudes - as well as less fuel expended to get to cruise altitude,

It seems it is mostly due to the fuel expended in the climb. The air miles per gallon vary only slightly between altitudes. According to the cruise charts in the PFOI for the P-47D-25 through -35, using Column IV and no external load, at 10,000 feet the aircraft achieved 2.687 air miles per gallon (266 mph TAS / 99 gph) while at 20,000 feet it was 2.673 air miles per gallon (302 mph TAS / 113 gph). That's only a 0.5% difference.

At a gross weight of 14,200 lbs, climbing to 10,000 feet consumed 59 gallons while climbing to 20,000 feet used 91 gallons. That's an additional 32 gallons available at 10,000 feet for cruising, which equals about 86 miles at 2.687 air miles per gallon.

Including the distance covered in the climb can also add some miles to the radius.

 

[Snautzer01]

Can G Geoffrey Sinclair and drgondog stick their heads together and make an article for a magazine about this subject?
You wont get rich...

 

[Engineman]

Can G Geoffrey Sinclair and drgondog stick their heads together and make an article for a magazine about this subject?
You wont get rich...

I suspect that there is a serious new book in this that hits on the detail of the subject, covering the Military / Politics, the realities of aircraft capabilities and the actual raid plans and execution, including results. For sure, there are whole already written histories but, it seems to me that these guys are really hitting this nail on the head!

Eng