Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released. (1 Viewer)

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In 1939 anyone who could have accurately predicted that NAA would be producing the plane most desired for L/R bomber escort, using a engine built in USA but designed in UK producing a reliable 1600BHP+ from a derivation of the Merlin, due to a more advanced supercharger and fuels coupled with advanced aerodynamics, would certainly be the richest man in the world, able break the bank in any casino or stock market he chose. In 2024 anyone who didnt foresee things with such clarity was a criminal, apparently.
 
As a side note about range:
I see many people these days look at a map showing direct distance between Berlin and London and tell me "it's not that far!".

Well yes, that's true, however, if the bombers flew in a direct line to and from their target, the Luftwaffe would have awarded the mission planners an Iron Cross second class for dropping the bombers in their lap.

As it was, the Germans established "flak alleys" near their industrial centers, based on terrain, tradition weather and logic. They also established airfields in projected bomber paths to expedite interception.

So mission planners had to think one step ahead of German defenses and missions were routed accordingly - this tactic resulted in added flight time and more fuel consumption.
 
I see many people these days look at a map showing direct distance between Berlin and London and tell me "it's not that far!".
Everybody ignores the distance the bombers had to fly from their bases to downtown London before they could turn towards Germany ;)

The 303rdbg website sometimes has route maps for some of the missions.
 
I only meant Berlin is not far from Hamburg in the sense that it isnt a huge distance over enemy territory from the sea, there are many places that German industry could have been relocated as the Russians did and in part the British did to take vital industries out of reach. When you look at the form up locations on the map posted previously they form a ring around East Anglia, the distance to those points and then to a RDV with the fighters somewhere above the North Sea it is no surprise that things went fubar occasionally or regularly
 
Everybody ignores the distance the bombers had to fly from their bases to downtown London before they could turn towards Germany ;)

The 303rdbg website sometimes has route maps for some of the missions.

Some time ago I went through some of those to determine the route distance versus the straight line distance. A few examples:

4 May 1943 to Antwerp: 706 miles route flown distance; 442 miles straight line out and back distance
17 May 1943 to Lorient: 789 miles route flown distance; 692 miles straight line out and back distance
13 June 1943 to Bremen: 1,034 miles route flown distance; 776 miles straight line out and back distance
9 Oct. 1943 to Anklam: 1,369 miles route flown distance; 1,184 miles straight line out and back distance


For Bomber Command, the ORBs for 77 Squadron list the route to be flown for that mission. For example, the route for the 25/26 Feb. 1943 operation to Nurnburg:

Base > Colne Point > Dungeness > Cayeux > 49º17' N 08º26' E > Target > 49º10' N 11º00' E > 49º17' N 08º26' E > Cayeux > Dungeness > Colne Point > Base

Using the latitude and longitude for the named places makes it possible to calculate the miles for each leg and thus the total route distance.
 
Mission Maps.....

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Correction, I think the P-38J-5 and J-10 were fitted with wing tanks at modification centres and it was the J-15 in December 1943 when the tanks became factory fitted.
I'm surprised that in 14 pages of posts, and since the central point of the thread seems to be G's criticism of the USAAF leadership in his video, no one has mentioned: The British told them it wouldn't work. "It" being precision daylight bombing (PDB) by lumbering bombers.
Ah G, the name whom one must not speak. Obviously and sensibly they do not want to be associated with the current attempts at video defence.

Actually the British told the US precision daylight bombing would work, it was what the British were trying to do within escort range, including in North Africa, what is day ground support by bombers other than precision, given the usual size of tactical targets? What the British correctly told the US was a campaign of *unescorted* day bomber raids would not work. They did not mention lumbering as a qualifier. The Bomber Command day Mosquito bomber raids, mostly a handful of sorties and at low level but going to places like Germany finished in May 1943. The British were quite sure trying medium to large formations of unescorted Mosquitoes even flying above 20,000 feet bombing Germany by day would not work.

Good to see adjectives keep being used, lumbering more accurately describes the latest failure to know the full advice.
Perhaps because G never mentioned that in his controversial video?
Perhaps because people knew the correct quote you have apparently just partially discovered? Controversial, now often a code word to describe a fairy story that someone wants to be considered true.
Our allies, in theatre, with extensive experience, apparently told the USAAF leadership PDB wouldn't work.
Now having successfully created the new imaginary advice, time to announce how that makes previous imaginary ideas real.
But, since I've been proven "wrong" on numerous other points,
So far you started with 10 times over inflated losses and now seem to want to go back to those figures. Still believe Mosquitoes and B-26 could substitute for B-17 and B-24? Flak suppression sorties? How ineffective the bomber gunners were? Still believe it was under 5% of bombs within 1 mile of target? Nothing you introduced was new, nil, zero. Including guilt by association and the "logic" a new fictional claim must be true so old fictional claims must be true as well. So who are the USAAF bomber mafia generals? How did they stop the 8th Air Force having a numerically viable escort force in 1943?
I'm sure that someone will chime in who knows the exact sequence of events WRT the British telling the American's that PDB would not work, ie., who told who, and when. Or if it is another myth that never happened. If it is true that they were told, then it would appear that the USAAF leadership was rather arrogant in assuming that they knew better. And that would constitute another black mark against them. Or perhaps they just wanted to follow Admiral King's lead in disagreeing with the British.....:lol:
Its paragraphs like the above that makes people I know tune in for the laughs. Having proved Americans living on average higher above sea level than the British therefore naturally having superior lung capacity we can see the great advantage that gave to aircraft performance as they did not need oxygen supplies until thousands of feet higher than British, or Germans. The USAAF Tibetan/Gurkha/Nepalese bomber groups, with their still classified history under operation Shangri La, were better still. The President deliberately used the code word to describe the Doolittle Raid base as part of an elaborate double bluff to hide the real program, along with the aircraft carrier of the same name, unfortunately to read more about this requires agreeing to an automatic and Swift death sentence, Taylor made for you.

Actually the USAAF knew they had bigger bomber aircraft, with heavier defensive power, flying 5 to 10,000 feet higher than previous attempts, all of which reduce the casualties taken, until it was tried no one knew if that was enough in 1943, but the warning signs were there practically from the start. In 1939 no one knew if the faster, higher flying than WWI bombers equipped with power operated turrets could do the same. The Wellingtons shot down in the 1939 day raids did not have self sealing fuel tanks. The Bf109 and FW190 upgrades in the 1942 to 1944 period mainly improved firepower and protection, things like top speeds and climb did not change very much, this helped kill big bombers and IL-2 but the extra weight tended to hurt when engaging enemy fighters. Then in 1943/44 the allies created a performance gap between their best and the best Luftwaffe fighters, similar to what the Luftwaffe had done in 1941/2 with similar results.

The strength and location of the defences, the enemy raid tracking systems meant the early B-17F in the 8th Air Force had a combat radius of 320 miles, so 640 miles range, despite test performance figures of 1,730 miles with 6,000 pounds of bombs. Similar effects on fighters. As has been noted a combat radius of 600 miles from Britain takes in most of Germany plus parts of Czech war industry. If the fighters match the bomber 240mph TAS they travel the same distance but have far fewer chances to intercept the interceptors. Fighter fast cruise gives the escorts better chances but they need weaving to stay with their bombers and at 600 bomber miles the fighter covers 750 miles. It is not just add more fuel to the fighters, tactics like patrolling sections of airspace as the bomber formations passed through keep fighter ranges down, as does having enough escorts to use relay tactics but that in turn requires the various formations keeping to timetables and locations. The 600 mile "limit" made it possible for 1944 technology to provide fighters with viable combat performance enough range, Roger Freeman's radius table tops out at 750 miles for a P-51 with a pair of 108 or 110 gallon external tanks. Then add the overall numbers effect, in this case mostly trained pilots, the Luftwaffe ran out of properly trained and experienced fighter pilots before it ran out of fuel and way before (if ever) it ran out of aircraft, for much of 1944 its official operational day fighter strength kept increasing. Which in turn caused worries for the allies as the Bf109K, Fw190D and the occasional Me262 were encountered.

An 8th Air Force that had the escort staying with a bomber formation for the duration of the mission at bomber speeds was not going to do a lot to the Luftwaffe fighter force, and not much better if only the fighter speeds were increased. Leading to the situation similar to the Luftwaffe night fighters, to sometime in 1944 that force was taking losses but not enough to stop the average crew experience level increasing, making them more dangerous, interfering with its equipment was needed and/or night escorts.

In the second half of 1944 the 8th Air force began flying direct or at least more straight courses as interceptions became rare, that saved on fuel and the risks of course changes etc. The downside was making it easier for the Germans to work out the probable target but then again once you start attacking a specific sector of the enemy economy you become more predictable anyway.

Some of the longer distance B-24 raid claims, round trip ranges 380th Bomb Group from North Australia, June 1943 Makassar 2,200 miles, July Soerabaja 2,400 miles, August Balikpapan 2,700 miles (3,000 pounds of bombs, 2,500 (imperial? gallons of fuel), lots of individual night flying and attacks, 10,000 foot runway used. September 1944 USAAF Noemfoor Island to Balikpapan 2,500 miles, 72 bombers, flying through the night, rendezvous at dawn 220 miles from target, form up and stay that way until a similar distance after the attack, 3,000 pounds of bombs and full ammunition, 16 hour flight, 68,500 pound take off weight, 700 gallons above normal fuel load carried. India from second half of 1944, most of the improvement considered due to Wing Commander J Blackburn. Bangkok 2,200 miles carrying 8,000 pounds of bombs, Malaya 2,800 miles, Penang 3,000+ miles dropping sea mines. The Mariana Islands are around 1,500 miles from Tokyo for B-29 raid distances.

1945 8th Air Force bomber raids on Germany, same criteria as before.
01-Jan-45 attacking: 727, missing: 9, percent of attacking missing: 1.24
02-Jan-45 attacking: 969, missing: 4, percent of attacking missing: 0.41
03-Jan-45 attacking: 1002, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
05-Jan-45 attacking: 902, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
06-Jan-45 attacking: 781, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.13
07-Jan-45 attacking: 1023, missing: 3, percent of attacking missing: 0.29
08-Jan-45 attacking: 604, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.33
10-Jan-45 attacking: 843, missing: 10, percent of attacking missing: 1.19
13-Jan-45 attacking: 887, missing: 7, percent of attacking missing: 0.79
14-Jan-45 attacking: 845, missing: 17, percent of attacking missing: 2.01
15-Jan-45 attacking: 619, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
16-Jan-45 attacking: 566, missing: 3, percent of attacking missing: 0.53
17-Jan-45 attacking: 664, missing: 9, percent of attacking missing: 1.36
18-Jan-45 attacking: 120, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
19-Jan-45 attacking: 11, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
20-Jan-45 attacking: 686, missing: 3, percent of attacking missing: 0.44
21-Jan-45 attacking: 751, missing: 8, percent of attacking missing: 1.07
22-Jan-45 attacking: 186, missing: 5, percent of attacking missing: 2.69
23-Jan-45 attacking: 180, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.56
28-Jan-45 attacking: 872, missing: 10, percent of attacking missing: 1.15
29-Jan-45 attacking: 1107, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.09
01-Feb-45 attacking: 617, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
02-Feb-45 attacking: 9, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
03-Feb-45 attacking: 1359, missing: 28, percent of attacking missing: 2.06
04-Feb-45 attacking: 1, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
06-Feb-45 attacking: 1292, missing: 5, percent of attacking missing: 0.39
07-Feb-45 attacking: 1, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
09-Feb-45 attacking: 1188, missing: 8, percent of attacking missing: 0.67
10-Feb-45 attacking: 155, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
11-Feb-45 attacking: 123, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
14-Feb-45 attacking: 1150, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 0.52
15-Feb-45 attacking: 1071, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.19
16-Feb-45 attacking: 953, missing: 8, percent of attacking missing: 0.84
17-Feb-45 attacking: 330, missing: 5, percent of attacking missing: 1.52
19-Feb-45 attacking: 1065, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.09
20-Feb-45 attacking: 873, missing: 5, percent of attacking missing: 0.57
21-Feb-45 attacking: 1228, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.08
22-Feb-45 attacking: 1356, missing: 7, percent of attacking missing: 0.52
23-Feb-45 attacking: 1216, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.16
24-Feb-45 attacking: 1062, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.19
25-Feb-45 attacking: 1141, missing: 5, percent of attacking missing: 0.44
26-Feb-45 attacking: 1132, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 0.53
27-Feb-45 attacking: 1092, missing: 3, percent of attacking missing: 0.27
28-Feb-45 attacking: 1087, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.09
01-Mar-45 attacking: 1182, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
02-Mar-45 attacking: 1162, missing: 13, percent of attacking missing: 1.12
03-Mar-45 attacking: 1061, missing: 9, percent of attacking missing: 0.85
04-Mar-45 attacking: 674, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.3
05-Mar-45 attacking: 431, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.23
06-Mar-45 attacking: 12, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
07-Mar-45 attacking: 922, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.11
08-Mar-45 attacking: 1237, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
09-Mar-45 attacking: 1036, missing: 8, percent of attacking missing: 0.77
10-Mar-45 attacking: 1353, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.07
11-Mar-45 attacking: 1227, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.08
12-Mar-45 attacking: 1327, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.08
13-Mar-45 attacking: 9, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
14-Mar-45 attacking: 1208, missing: 3, percent of attacking missing: 0.25
15-Mar-45 attacking: 1322, missing: 9, percent of attacking missing: 0.68
17-Mar-45 attacking: 1282, missing: 5, percent of attacking missing: 0.39
18-Mar-45 attacking: 1259, missing: 14, percent of attacking missing: 1.11
19-Mar-45 attacking: 1229, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 0.49
20-Mar-45 attacking: 428, missing: 4, percent of attacking missing: 0.93
21-Mar-45 attacking: 1351, missing: 7, percent of attacking missing: 0.52
22-Mar-45 attacking: 1308, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.15
23-Mar-45 attacking: 1258, missing: 7, percent of attacking missing: 0.56
24-Mar-45 attacking: 1463, missing: 19, percent of attacking missing: 1.3
25-Mar-45 attacking: 253, missing: 4, percent of attacking missing: 1.58
26-Mar-45 attacking: 329, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
28-Mar-45 attacking: 903, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.22
30-Mar-45 attacking: 1320, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 0.45
31-Mar-45 attacking: 1300, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 0.46
01-Apr-45 attacking: 12, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
03-Apr-45 attacking: 719, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.28
04-Apr-45 attacking: 968, missing: 11, percent of attacking missing: 1.14
05-Apr-45 attacking: 1034, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 0.58
06-Apr-45 attacking: 645, missing: 4, percent of attacking missing: 0.62
07-Apr-45 attacking: 1263, missing: 16, percent of attacking missing: 1.27
08-Apr-45 attacking: 1084, missing: 9, percent of attacking missing: 0.83
09-Apr-45 attacking: 1238, missing: 7, percent of attacking missing: 0.57
10-Apr-45 attacking: 1256, missing: 15, percent of attacking missing: 1.19
11-Apr-45 attacking: 1264, missing: 23, percent of attacking missing: 1.82
12-Apr-45 attacking: 9, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
13-Apr-45 attacking: 222, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
14-Apr-45 attacking: 19, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
15-Apr-45 attacking: 12, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
16-Apr-45 attacking: 721, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.14
17-Apr-45 attacking: 590, missing: 6, percent of attacking missing: 1.02
18-Apr-45 attacking: 644, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.31
19-Apr-45 attacking: 396, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.25
20-Apr-45 attacking: 755, missing: 1, percent of attacking missing: 0.13
21-Apr-45 attacking: 331, missing: 2, percent of attacking missing: 0.6
22-Apr-45 attacking: 10, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
25-Apr-45 attacking: 124, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
01-May-45 attacking: 4, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
03-May-45 attacking: 14, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
04-May-45 attacking: 7, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
06-May-45 attacking: 15, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
07-May-45 attacking: 15, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
08-May-45 attacking: 12, missing: 0, percent of attacking missing: 0
 
Mission Maps.....

View attachment 766645
View attachment 766646

View attachment 766647
Great illustrations. On the subject of the October 18th mission, the target for Vinegrove 4-2 was Kassel - part of 2nd BD B-24 strike force.

additional 'tell' is 22,000 feet reference altitude. This mission is another example of P51B/D range.

The 355th TO time 0855, RV se Liege then continuous Penetration, Target and Withdrawal escort to Kassel and back to Malmedy for BE at 1309. Down at 1450. Total mission duration 5 hrs 55 minutes.
 
I'm surprised that in 14 pages of posts, and since the central point of the thread seems to be G's criticism of the USAAF leadership in his video, no one has mentioned: The British told them it wouldn't work. "It" being precision daylight bombing (PDB) by lumbering bombers. Perhaps because G never mentioned that in his controversial video?

Our allies, in theatre, with extensive experience, apparently told the USAAF leadership PDB wouldn't work. But, since I've been proven "wrong" on numerous other points, I'm sure that someone will chime in who knows the exact sequence of events WRT the British telling the American's that PDB would not work, ie., who told who, and when. Or if it is another myth that never happened. If it is true that they were told, then it would appear that the USAAF leadership was rather arrogant in assuming that they knew better. And that would constitute another black mark against them. Or perhaps they just wanted to follow Admiral King's lead in disagreeing with the British.....:lol:
There are so many misconceptions in your portfolio of beliefs that I wonder what your source pool looks like? Is it solely video or have you taken the time to read widely ranging books on the subject of US Airpower - doctrine, growth, milestones, changes in path, etc?

Would recommend:

The Amy Air Forces in World War II by Craven and Cate
Global Power by Arnold
Great Captains and Forged in Fire by Copp
Mighty Eighth War Manual by Freeman
Air Force Spoken Here by Parton and Gen Ira Eaker

But foremost

USAF Study 136 Development of the Long Range Fighter by Boylon - it touches on every single point/counterpoint in philosophical and practical development from the 1930s through EOW. Approximately 400 referenced docs and correspondence and orders and discussions of Emmons and Kilner Boards, etc., etc.

If you take a couple of days on Study 136, you will look back on your statements with some chagrin and dismay
 
I have that PDF as well. A good explanation of the development and reasons for the use of the P-51, plus
a good comparison with the P-38 and P-47.
 
....
If you take a couple of days on Study 136, you will look back on your statements with some chagrin and dismay

For PlanesandShips enlightenment that doc can be found at https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/101-150/AFD-090529-044.pdf

Many other enlightening documents can be found at Numbered USAF Historical Studies 101-150, including# 139 Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964, which comes in six parts

Maybe he should pass both links on to Greg as he also needs enlightenment.
 

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