Nice CGI from IJN perspective

[Admiral Beez]

I meant to say the IJN carrier force did not perform badly after Midway. They improved their scouting and also changed their doctrine to dedicate some carriers to CAP servicing.

At Midway the CAP could have been serviced from one carrier while preparing a strike on the other three. Per this video below, it was the inability to prepare a strike due to the need for all four carriers to service the CAP that prevented the IJN from hitting back, start at 24:06.



Instead, dedicate one carrier to refuel and especially rearm the Zeros (why does your fleet air defence fighter have only a short burst of ammunition?!), then you can get your strike aloft.

 

[SaparotRob]

At the time of Midway, carrier tactics were still evolving. At least for the USN. As XBe02Drvr pointed out, the IJN lived in a world of permanent air superiority. The Zero was the undisputed master of sky. Any minor setback could be fixed by "a touch of the armored gauntlet". ( I love that line. Got it from the book Shattered Sword.). I can't see the IJN having the wherewithal to have a dedicated cap carrier. It would have been far better (IMO) to have kept the smaller carriers with the Kido Butai as cap carriers. But they were off taking Attu and Kiska or covering the main body.
The loss at Midway offered almost no education at all for the IJN. The whole battle was hushed up. The survivors (ships and crews) were isolated from rest of their forces, especially the IJA! They were denigrated as losers. What could be learned from failure? Yeah I know.
The dedicated cap carrier did appear by 1944. As the war progressed, the USN steadily increased the fighter component of their air groups eventually leading to Admiral McCain's " big blue blanket ". I'm not up on much past the Battle of Midway until the the actions off Leyte. Heck, I never even heard of the "big blue blanket" until it was posted here. But it has the ring of truth. Japan's dwindling naval forces limited just what the IJN could do. Lesson not learned.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

At Midway the CAP could have been serviced from one carrier while preparing a strike on the other three.

Instead, dedicate one carrier to refuel and especially rearm the Zeros (why does your fleet air defence fighter have only a short burst of ammunition?!), then you can get your strike aloft.

The tradition bound Japanese generally suffered from a deficit of "forward think" and an affinity for the status quo, except for occasional stellar performers like Horikoshi and Yamamoto. They also lacked infinite resources and detailed information on what was going on technically in the wide world beyond.
Case in point, the Zero. Designed for, and based on the war in China, it was a world-beater at the time, but was born pretty well maxed out, with limited growth potential. The limitations of its cannon ammo supply hadn't been an issue until it met large numbers of heavier built planes that wouldn't quickly succumb to a burst of 7.7. No one (able to do anything about it) saw this coming. Their offensive-centered mindset wouldn't perceive the value of building such an aircraft. Likewise, the scenario of extended defensive air combat, unprecedented before Midway, wasn't in their thought processes. Attacks against the fleet, rare as they were, were generally over and done with in short order. The hornet's nest of Midway was beyond their ken.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Makes me wonder if Nagumo had IJNS Shōkaku and Zuikaku for a half dozen fleet carriers would it have made a difference.

 

[SaparotRob]

And that's what's most curious about the IJN to me. If an American carrier was out of action, the aircrews would be assigned to another, IIRC. I believe U.S.S. Saratoga's airgroups were assigned to other carriers while in dry dock.
The Shokaku was damaged and inoperable as a carrier but its air groups largely intact. The Zuikaku was undamaged but it's planes and aircrews decimated. It's unbelievable to me how they would leave their most modern carrier (close enough) and Shokaku's planes and veteran crews behind because the they never trained together. Say What? Imagine that happening in the RN or USN? They'd be flying off essentially the same ship. The island superstructures were on the same side. Some of Shokaku's pilots got home after LANDING on the Zuikaku (I think). So experience enough. It may have been "victory disease" or a monumental case of chutzpah in thinking THEY DIDN'T EVEN NEED Carrier Division 5.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It was the loss of the aircraft maintenance crews which really hurt. As XBe02Drvr pointed out, Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics.

I've also read that unlike the resourceful and often desperate Allies, IJ ground personnel neglected to scavenge parts from broken aircraft to keep others in the air. Three grounded Japanese aircraft wouldn't be stripped to make one flyable.

Clearly the props were pulled from these grounded Japanese aircraft, but there's no indication that engines or undercarriages were pulled. Was shipbourne aircraft maintenance any different?

Here's how the RAF linies (ground personnel) left their Buffalos. Stripped of everything to keep others in the air.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And that's what's most curious about the IJN to me. If an American carrier was out of action, the aircrews would be assigned to another, IIRC.

Same with the British. HMS Eagle was disabled before the Nov 1940, Taranto raid. Eagle's Swordfish simply flew over to HMS Illustrious and carried on their part in the strike.

 

[SaparotRob]

Same with the British. HMS Eagle was disabled before the Nov 1940, Taranto raid. Eagle's Swordfish simply flew over to HMS Illustrious and carried on their part in the strike.

Bingo. That's what I find bewildering about the IJN at that time.

 

[SaparotRob]

Also if one has the Samauri spirit and following the code of the Bushido (I never actually read it) why even stress it? Take the whole dang navy in one big fleet and sail up to Midway and level the place. They wanted a decisive battle, right? It's not like we could stop them. Even if they thought they would be attacked by land based aircraft, so what? Their naval aviation would sweep the Yankees away. I can't remember the name of the Admiral commanding the Center Force at the Battle of Samar but wasn't he supposed to attack the landing force at all costs? Conserving his resources wasn't part of the plan. He had battleships close enough to shoot at US fleet carriers (he thought they were fleet carriers). That's a decisive battle right there. Ain't saying the IJN would succeed but a touch of the armored gauntlet would take care of that.
Most confusing.

 

[SaparotRob]

Re: post #46
It's depressing to see those Buffalos like that.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Conserving his resources wasn't part of the plan.

But maximizing resources should have been. Japan chose the date for Midway, they should have waited the necessary month or so until the two carriers from Coral Sea were returned to frontline duties.

Come on Japan, put away your anti-Sino views and read your Sun Tzu.

 

[michaelmaltby]

culture sometimes trumps logic

 

[SaparotRob]

Shokaku was out of action for about 6 months. The Zuikaku was available. Still, 5 fleet carriers, a bunch of light carriers, battleships, including the biggest one on Earth, against the two carriers we had available (they thought) and no BB's.
Admiral Yamamoto's "6 month to 1 year" clock is running and time is running out. How many Essex class ships on the slipways?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Shokaku was out of action for about 6 months.

Could she have been patched up and sent back out, like USS Yorktown? Here's Shōkaku's damage... Two significant hits, one through the flight deck, one in the bows.

Bingo. That's what I find bewildering about the IJN at that time.

I believe there's the wreck of a Hawker Hurricane in the rear left.

 

[SaparotRob]

Could she have been patched up and sent back out, like USS Yorktown? Here's Shōkaku's damage... Two significant hits, one through the flight deck, one in the bows.

View attachment 594033

View attachment 594034

I believe there's the wreck of a Hawker Hurricane in the rear left.

They could have patched it up if Captain Eliot Buckmaster was her skipper and Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge of the IJN. (IMHO)

 

[SaparotRob]

Sorry about that. Couldn't resist. I was also going to say "and if Admiral Ernest J King was CINCJAP" but I don't want another "time out" from The Eagle.

 

[Admiral Beez]

They could have patched it up if Captain Eliot Buckmaster was her skipper and Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge of the IJN. (IMHO)

True. Looking at the damage, I'd say strip off the wood, lay down new wood, seal up the aft lift (there's two more), close the upper aft hangar if necessary, and plank over the bows.

 

[SaparotRob]

I agree with you and I can't understand why it wasn't done. Perhaps victory disease clouded judgement at the Imperial shipyards as well.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Makes me wonder if Nagumo had IJNS Shōkaku and Zuikaku for a half dozen fleet carriers would it have made a difference.

Good question! I think it might have. Insert two more carriers into the historical sequence of the actual battle, and the likely retaliatory strike against TF17 would likely have been devastating. There wasn't much CAP available over the American carriers, and they would likely have been overwhelmed.

 

[jetcal1]

True. Looking at the damage, I'd say strip off the wood, lay down new wood, seal up the aft lift (there's two more), close the upper aft hangar if necessary, and plank over the bows.

With a ship it's the damage that you don't see that could literally be seven or 8 frames away. Warped water tight doors, broken fire mains, water damaged wiring, and so forth. It depned on what kind of equipment you have, how well your crew has trained to both contain the initial conflagration and then contain, control, and repair the damage. Here are few nice picutres of the USS Houston from later in the war.
As someone who ran patching and shoring teams onboard a CV, I am in awe of the improvised repairs that were made to get her into Ulithi harbor.
(I'm not sure the '42 Yorktown crew had as much shoring material onboard or welding equipment capable of handling steel that was that thick.)

Here's a link to the Damage Report.
USS Houston CL81 War Damage Report No. 53