Nice CGI from IJN perspective

[nuuumannn]

culture sometimes trumps logic

Or put another way, logic sometimes cultures trump...

 

[SaparotRob]

Nah, that photo was taken when the Buffaloes arrived in Malaya...

I just knew you guys got the good ones.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Nah, that photo was taken when the Buffaloes arrived in Malaya...

It's another nod to the RAF linies that they could take an aircraft out of a box like an IKEA shelf and quickly knock it together.

IMO, the only thing wrong with the Buffalo was there weren't enough of them. Five squadrons of sixty active aircaft to patrol and defend a territory larger than the entire UK is untenable. Give Malaya Command sixty Spitfires or Meteor F3s and they're still doomed. But give them 400 Buffalos...

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Now, see, this is the problem. Americans don't get the rest of the world, because in the rest of the world uncertainty is the only certainty and most of us have learned to live with it.

Because of our dominant position on the world stage we feel so ENTITLED to a sense of security and certainty that we don't even recognize that it is an ENTITLEMENT enforced by our political, economical, and military power, rather than a global norm. Hence "the Ugly American". We have our own "perestroika" coming.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Or put another way, logic sometimes cultures trump...

Nah, it would take more than logic to do that...if it's even doable.

 

[SaparotRob]

Because of our dominant position on the world stage we feel so ENTITLED to a sense of security and certainty that we don't even recognize that it is an ENTITLEMENT enforced by our political, economical, and military power, rather than a global norm. Hence "the Ugly American". We have our own "perestroika" coming.

Sadly again, I agree.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Give Malaya Command sixty Spitfires or Meteor F3s and they're still doomed. But give them 400 Buffalos...

...and five Chenaults. Then maybe they'd have a chance.

 

[jetcal1]

Can you elaborate on what the "American" side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?

Edited: Oops, so many other replies. Much better than mine.

 

[jetcal1]

Now, see, this is the problem. Americans don't get the rest of the world, because in the rest of the world uncertainty is the only certainty and most of us have learned to live with it. The rest of the world tolerates the USA because it has no choice, just like it does other superpowers, but it is ironic that the superpowers (not just the USA) display disproportionate degrees of inflexibility when dealing with outher countries because of their absolute attitudes. Sigh.

I know, right? You'd think we were like pre-1914 England or something.

 

[jetcal1]

Well, at Coral Sea and Midway our DC performed better than the Japanese.

IMO? Yes and no. We were a little further along the "get rid of the flammables" curve and we had literally just started inerting POL systems. (Consider that someone listened to a Chief. I don't think that would have happened in the IJN.) The Japanese just basically got hit in better places than we did at Midway. 6-9 months later? After Guadalcanal? They weren't even in the same league, let alone ballpark.
Aside from the Bureau of Ordnance and our torpedoes the rest of the Navy reacted quickly and efficiently to keep ship's companies outfitted with increasing varieties and quantities of DC gear.

 

[SaparotRob]

Edited: Oops, so other replies. Much better than mine.

Edited: Oops, so other replies. Much better than mine.

Talk about read the writing on the wall!
This is what is so ironic. Senior IJN officers, in the same room, pointed out how flawed "The Plan" was.

 

[SaparotRob]

Hey, what just happened to the post I'm answering?
"The Americans kept surprising them. " is perfect. It's what happened.

 

[SaparotRob]

Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!

I haven't read what the IJN changed after Midway apart from having more scouting planes.

I've been thinking about this.
From Midway on, which side was on the offensive? The USN did suffer greatly at the hands of the IJN at Guadalcanal. I can explain it away all day but a few times, they whupped us good. The loss of two carriers, cruisers and destroyers. The loss of sea control that cost the lives of so many Marines from night time bombardment and re-supply of Japanese troops. Both sides were losing men and equipment. Both sides were slugging it out. The veteran air groups of the IJN at sea and on Rabaul were thinning out. Both sides were running out of the equipment they had from December 7 forward (Germany first). But not for long.
I don't think the IJN was doing so well. The IJN does however, hold Attu.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

From Midway on, which side was on the offensive? The USN did suffer greatly at the hands of the IJN at Guadalcanal. I can explain it away all day but a few times, they whupped us good.

Both sides...or neither side. Take your pick. The Solomons were a meat grinder, grinding down both sides. We had more meat to cram into the grinder. We could absorb more losses than the Japanese could and still maintain fighting effectiveness. Logistics pays.
Fortunately Guadalcanal was at the extreme effective range of Japanese ships and planes, thus allowing the Cactus Airforce to maintain local air superiority most of the time. Any Japanese surface units that showed their face in daylight within range of Henderson did so at their peril.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!

To be fair, beyond the two Shōkaku-class and the two converted, small and slow Hiyō-class, the IJN didn't have other fleet carriers to lose. And the two Hiyō class were used mostly as aircraft ferries. Their next true fleet carrier, Taihō doesn't enter service until spring 1944, which matches Britain's first new CV (since 1941!) HMS Indefatigable's entry into service in May 1944, but by which time the USN has completed ten Essex class CVs and nine Independence class CVLs.

Meanwhile, between Midway and June 1944, in addition to the two Hiyō class being torpedoed and forced home for repairs, the IJN lost the smaller carriers Chūyō and Ryūjō. My point is that the period between Midway in June 1942 to June 1944 was not a period of respite for the IJN's carrier forces.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The IJN does however, hold Attu.

To what advantage? They couldn't do anything useful with it. It would never sustain an offensive along the Aleutian chain. If the Japanese had done their homework ahead of time they would have realized it would be a waste of effort, and require skills and equipment they didn't have. Like long range bombers equipped to fly IFR in continuous severe icing conditions and navigate and bomb "blind" by radar only. Like Ground Controlled Approach radars to get said bombers back on the ground in the ever present arctic fogs. The slender Japanese task force managed to sneak up on Dutch Harbor and poke them in the eye once, but that couldn't have been reliably repeated on the scale of a campaign, due to weather.

 

[SaparotRob]

To what advantage? They couldn't do anything useful with it. It would never sustain an offensive along the Aleutian chain. If the Japanese had done their homework ahead of time they would have realized it would be a waste of effort, and require skills and equipment they didn't have. Like long range bombers equipped to fly IFR in continuous severe icing conditions and navigate and bomb "blind" by radar only. Like Ground Controlled Approach radars to get said bombers back on the ground in the ever present arctic fogs. The slender Japanese task force managed to sneak up on Dutch Harbor and poke them in the eye once, but that couldn't have been reliably repeated on the scale of a campaign, due to weather.

Attempting to be sarcastic.

 

[jetcal1]

Both sides...or neither side. Take your pick. The Solomons were a meat grinder, grinding down both sides. We had more meat to cram into the grinder. We could absorb more losses than the Japanese could and still maintain fighting effectiveness. Logistics pays.
Fortunately Guadalcanal was at the extreme effective range of Japanese ships and planes, thus allowing the Cactus Airforce to maintain local air superiority most of the time. Any Japanese surface units that showed their face in daylight within range of Henderson did so at their peril.

(Rant on)
From the Navy side? The first few months there was no material advantage. The Japanese excelled at night fighting and had a torpedo that was so advanced the USN though they were taking mine hits. We had our asses handed to us on a routine basis.
The USN was forced to learn how to use radar, Talk Between Ships (TBS) and the Combat Information Center (CIC). IMO, The genesis of modern naval Command, Control and Communication (C3) started with the US Navy at Guadalcanal.

By the time we had the material advantage? We'd pulled our experienced folks out to teach the newbie's and the raisins. By the end of the campaign we were sending a mix of veterans and new ship's company against tired the worn out ships and sailors of the IJN. From a USN perspective? I would say after the Gilberts it was pretty much a done deal.

And? As you mentioned the US Navy by the time the battle was over in early '43? The USN was starting to become the master of Damage Control and was at the beginning of becoming awash in an embarrassment of DC equipment.
(Rant off)

As an side, We had an AFCM who was forced into retirement in '84. He was on the USS San Diego as part of their VOC Det and afloat at the Solomon's. He had some stories! 42 years of active duty.

 

[SaparotRob]

(Rant on)
From the Navy side? The first few months there was no material advantage. The Japanese excelled at night fighting and had a torpedo that was so advanced the USN though they were taking mine hits. We had our asses handed to us on a routine basis.
The USN was forced to learn how to use radar, Talk Between Ships (TBS) and the Combat Information Center (CIC). IMO, The genesis of modern naval Command, Control and Communication (C3) started with the US Navy at Guadalcanal.

By the time we had the material advantage? We'd pulled our experienced folks out to teach the newbie's and the raisins. By the end of the campaign we were sending a mix of veterans and new ship's company against tired the worn out ships and sailors of the IJN. From a USN perspective? I would say after the Gilberts it was pretty much a done deal.

And? As you mentioned the US Navy by the time the battle was over in early '43? The USN was starting to become the master of Damage Control and was at the beginning of becoming awash in an embarrassment of DC equipment.
(Rant off)

As an side, We had an AFCM who was forced into retirement in '84. He was on the USS San Diego as part of their VOC Det and afloat at the Solomon's. He had some stories! 42 years of active duty.

Please excuse my ignorance.
AFCM?
VOC DET?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

We had an AFCM who was forced into retirement in '84. He was on the USS San Diego as part of their VOC Det and afloat at the Solomon's. He had some stories! 42 years of active duty.

I met an APCM in 1974 who had been in for 40 years, and was flying left seat in a C9 with his son in law and CO, a newly frocked Rear Admiral as FO. He enlisted in 1934 and became an ordie, then a tail gunner, then sent to flight school under the cadet program, where he was denied commissioning due to what he described as a "couth deficit". Flew Helldivers (the biplane version), F4Fs and F6Fs in the RAG squadrons, then the early jets. He said he spent WWII stuck as an instructor in various RAG squadrons despite frantic efforts to get assigned to a deploying squadron. His SIL, the Admiral, said: "He shot himself in the foot by getting too good at what he did. They wouldn't let him go. Trained five Hellcat aces!"
This was their last trip together, as the new Admiral was being relieved as CO of the composite squadron and "kicked upstairs" to a Pentagon staff billet.