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At Midway the CAP could have been serviced from one carrier while preparing a strike on the other three. Per this video below, it was the inability to prepare a strike due to the need for all four carriers to service the CAP that prevented the IJN from hitting back, start at 24:06.I meant to say the IJN carrier force did not perform badly after Midway. They improved their scouting and also changed their doctrine to dedicate some carriers to CAP servicing.
At Midway the CAP could have been serviced from one carrier while preparing a strike on the other three.
The tradition bound Japanese generally suffered from a deficit of "forward think" and an affinity for the status quo, except for occasional stellar performers like Horikoshi and Yamamoto. They also lacked infinite resources and detailed information on what was going on technically in the wide world beyond.Instead, dedicate one carrier to refuel and especially rearm the Zeros (why does your fleet air defence fighter have only a short burst of ammunition?!), then you can get your strike aloft.
I've also read that unlike the resourceful and often desperate Allies, IJ ground personnel neglected to scavenge parts from broken aircraft to keep others in the air. Three grounded Japanese aircraft wouldn't be stripped to make one flyable.It was the loss of the aircraft maintenance crews which really hurt. As XBe02Drvr pointed out, Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics.
Same with the British. HMS Eagle was disabled before the Nov 1940, Taranto raid. Eagle's Swordfish simply flew over to HMS Illustrious and carried on their part in the strike.And that's what's most curious about the IJN to me. If an American carrier was out of action, the aircrews would be assigned to another, IIRC.
Bingo. That's what I find bewildering about the IJN at that time.Same with the British. HMS Eagle was disabled before the Nov 1940, Taranto raid. Eagle's Swordfish simply flew over to HMS Illustrious and carried on their part in the strike.
But maximizing resources should have been. Japan chose the date for Midway, they should have waited the necessary month or so until the two carriers from Coral Sea were returned to frontline duties.Conserving his resources wasn't part of the plan.
Could she have been patched up and sent back out, like USS Yorktown? Here's Shōkaku's damage... Two significant hits, one through the flight deck, one in the bows.Shokaku was out of action for about 6 months.
I believe there's the wreck of a Hawker Hurricane in the rear left.Bingo. That's what I find bewildering about the IJN at that time.
They could have patched it up if Captain Eliot Buckmaster was her skipper and Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge of the IJN. (IMHO)Could she have been patched up and sent back out, like USS Yorktown? Here's Shōkaku's damage... Two significant hits, one through the flight deck, one in the bows.
View attachment 594033
View attachment 594034
I believe there's the wreck of a Hawker Hurricane in the rear left.
True. Looking at the damage, I'd say strip off the wood, lay down new wood, seal up the aft lift (there's two more), close the upper aft hangar if necessary, and plank over the bows.They could have patched it up if Captain Eliot Buckmaster was her skipper and Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge of the IJN. (IMHO)
Good question! I think it might have. Insert two more carriers into the historical sequence of the actual battle, and the likely retaliatory strike against TF17 would likely have been devastating. There wasn't much CAP available over the American carriers, and they would likely have been overwhelmed.Makes me wonder if Nagumo had IJNS Shōkaku and Zuikaku for a half dozen fleet carriers would it have made a difference.
True. Looking at the damage, I'd say strip off the wood, lay down new wood, seal up the aft lift (there's two more), close the upper aft hangar if necessary, and plank over the bows.